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AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 In my professional activities relating to Europe during the past 30 
years, including teaching, law practice and government service, I have often 
discussed with European friends what it means to be a European, and how 
that compares to being Dutch, Czech, Italian, etc. Invariably these 
conversations turn to deeper levels of identity, loyalty and political 
expectations. The EU and European integration are always swirling around 
these conversations, and it is clear that none of my acquaintances ever expects 
to lose his or her nationality, even in a highly integrated Europe. There are 
some lines, such as loss of one’s language or culture, that nobody – even 
today’s students who are possessed of a strong sense of European-ness – 
wants to cross. But what about significant loss of political power at the 
national level? Before the EU Constitution, such a prospect surfaced 
occasionally, especially at key moments of integration such as institution of 
the euro. However, most Europeans continued (and still continue) to view the 
Union as an undertaking of sovereign nations. 
 
The Constitution and its aftermath have renewed public interest in the 
overall course of European integration, and it is widely felt that the 
Convention on the Future of Europe proposed something more than just 
another treaty amendment. Many Europeans believed that the Constitution 
represented a major change in the landscape – change was ultimately 
unacceptable in the form proposed. The discussions raised by the Constitution 
have inspired the theme of this treatise: What are the existing dividing lines in 
the EU system, and how might the Constitution have caused them to shift? 
Doubts over the Constitution’s ratification never deterred the many scholars 
who analysed the document, and in the Introduction I address why the demise 
of the Constitution has not discouraged my own efforts.  
 
In the process of preparing this text, I have drawn upon three articles 
that I have written during the past several years. The first, titled “The 
Proposed European Union Constitution: Will it Eliminate the EU’s 
Democratic Deficit?” was published at 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 
173 (2004). Portions of this article are the basis for Chapters 1 and 9 of this 
treatise. The second is entitled “How the New European Union Constitution 
Will Allocate Power between the EU and its Member States – a Textual 
Analysis,” and it was published at 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 993 (2004). This work provided a conceptual framework and outline for 
parts Two and Three of the text. The third piece, “Worth Doing Well – The 
Improvable European Union Constitution,” appeared at 26 Michigan Journal 
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of International Law 587 (2005), and it is reflected in Chapters 2, 3 and 18. 
Each journal has kindly consented to my re-use of the relevant material.  
 
Work on this project has taken place at the University of Oregon 
School of Law, in Slovakia at the Comenius University Institute of 
International Relations and Approximation of Law, at the University of 
Tennessee College of Law and at my current professional home, the 
Creighton University School of Law. I would like to thank the administrators 
of those institutions for their support in this work, which came in the form of 
research grants, administrative assistance and unquestioning encouragement. 
Particular gratitude is extended to Dean Margaret L. Paris at Oregon, who 
urged me to start down this path, and Deans Patrick J. Borchers and Marianne 
Culhane at Creighton, who supported the final stages of the research and 
writing. I would also like to acknowledge and thank those law students who 
have provided research assistance at various times, with special recognition to 
Stefanie van der Laan for translating the Dutch language summary found at 
the end of the treatise.  
 
My deepest appreciation goes to Prof. Dr. Jaap W. de Zwaan of the 
Faculty of Law at Erasmus University of Rotterdam, also currently Director 
of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague. He has served as mentor, 
colleague, editor and friend during the past four years, and without his patient 
support and persistent attention to detail, this treatise would not have come 
into being. I have learned so much from Jaap and he has contributed so much 
to this effort, that merely saying thanks seems like very little consideration in 
return. But thanks nevertheless. 
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this treatise to the following people: 
 
To my parents, Steve and Lois, 
 for a lifetime of intellectual example and inspiration 
  
To my wife, Carmelicia, 
 for supporting me at every stage of this project  
and for sharing all of our other adventures 
 
 
Stephen C. Sieberson 
Creighton University School of Law 
    Omaha, Nebraska 
September 2007
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Introduction 
 
 
Shall We Continue to Study the Constitutional Treaty? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the outset it is appropriate to emphasise what is suggested in the 
secondary title of this treatise, namely, that this is primarily an analysis of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the document that from 2004 to 
2007 was proposed as the foundational instrument for the European Union.1  
 
It is important to begin with this acknowledgement, because at the 
time of this publication it has recently been decided that the Constitution will 
                                                 
1 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, officially published at Dec. 16, 2004, 
O.J. (C 310) 1 [hereinafter Constitution or Constitutional Treaty]. The Constitution 
was the product of an unprecedented convention that took place over an 18-month 
period in 2002 and 2003, loftily named the Convention on the Future of Europe. The 
document produced by the Convention was ultimately approved by the EU’s 
Intergovernmental Conference in June, 2004 and signed in Rome by the heads of state 
or government of the Member States on October 29, 2004. The document approved 
by the IGC was a revised version of the draft produced by the Convention on July 18, 
2003. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, O.J. (C 169) 
1 [hereinafter Draft Treaty 2003]. AUTHOR’S NOTE: For shorthand reference 
purposes, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is generally referred to in 
this treatise as the “Constitution,” although in the title to the treatise and in the chapter 
titles the longer description “Constitutional Treaty” is used. The primary use of 
“Constitution” is consistent with the scholarship that has been produced in the English 
language. In other languages – Dutch, for example – scholars have preferred general 
use of the equivalent of “Constitutional Treaty” (in Dutch, grondwettelijk verdrag).  
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be replaced by a text amending the two principal EU treaties.2  The rejections 
of the Constitution by French and Dutch voters in mid-2005 referenda have 
ultimately led – after two years’ efforts to salvage the Constitution – to the 
conclusion that a new approach was necessary. The “Reform Treaty” that will 
replace the Constitution will be described below. In light of this development 
an appropriate question is why, then, should we continue to study the 
Constitution? 
 
There are two significant justifications for continuing our inquiry into 
what the Constitution would have meant for the European Union. First, the 
Reform Treaty (which has not been drafted as of the time this treatise was 
completed, but whose substantive contents have been agreed upon by the 
European Council), will contain the majority of institutional and substantive 
reforms that are found in the text of the Constitution. Second, despite the 
inability of certain Member States to ratify the Constitution, the document has 
for several years been the focal point of all discussions relating to the course 
of further Union integration. The Constitution is likely to hold a well-
established place in the ongoing debate over the form of the Union and the 
complex relationship between the EU and its Member States. This debate has 
lain at the core of the Union at every stage of its existence, and it will 
continue. Even as a rejected text, the Constitution and the reasons for its 
demise will be of academic and political interest. Thus, the Constitution’s 
place in the historical and ongoing development of the Union will be 
addressed throughout this treatise, as it relates to our primary subject matter – 
the dividing lines between the EU and its Member States. 
 
What happened to the Constitution? 
 
With the Constitution’s fate determined, we may look back at the past 
three years and recall how the document “almost made it.” From the moment 
                                                 
2 The Constitution would have supplanted the two treaties currently serving as the 
EU’s primary constituent documents, the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EC Treaty or TEC) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), both of 
which have been most recently amended by the 2001 Treaty of Nice. Constitution art. 
IV-437. The official citations to the Treaties are: Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, O.J. (C 340) 173, and Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht), Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1. The Treaty of Nice is officially cited 
as the Treaty of Nice amending the treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. 
(C 80) 1. The third foundational treaty is the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 259, but this treaty 
would have remained in effect despite the Constitution, as it will if the Reform Treaty 
is adopted. 
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of its signing in October of 2004, the ratification process commenced and was 
well underway when the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands 
signaled trouble. The EU’s official response to the problem was reflected in 
the following statement by the European Council just a few weeks after the 
French and Dutch plebiscites:  
 
To date, 10 Member States have successfully concluded 
ratification procedures, thereby expressing their commitment to the 
Constitutional Treaty. We have noted the outcome of the referendums 
in France and the Netherlands. We consider that these results do not 
call into question citizens’ attachment to the construction of Europe. 
Citizens have nevertheless expressed concerns and worries which 
need to be taken into account. Hence the need for us to reflect 
together on this situation. . . . 
 
 The recent developments do not call into question the validity 
of continuing with the ratification process. We agree that the 
timetable for the ratification in different Member States will be 
altered if necessary in response to these developments and according 
to the circumstances in these Member States. 
 
We have agreed to come back to this matter in the first half of 
2006 to make an overall assessment of the national debates and agree 
on how to proceed.3 
 
During the “period of reflection” – and consistent with the apparent 
expectations of the European Council – six additional Member States ratified 
the Constitution. Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia and Finland gave their 
approval through parliamentary action, and Luxembourg produced a positive 
result in its own referendum. Prior to the June, 2007 meeting of the European 
Council, which abandoned the Constitution, 16 Member States gave their full 
approval, while ratifications by Germany and Slovakia were being challenged 
in the courts of those nations. On the other hand, Poland, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland had indefinitely postponed their own planned referenda, and other 
nations likewise decided to bide their time.4  
                                                 
3 European Council, Declaration by the heads of state or government of the Member 
States of the European Union on the ratification of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, June 18;, 2005, SN 117/05. 
4 Graham Bowley, Luxembourg approves EU charter, Int'l Herald Trib., July 11, 
2005. The current status of Member State ratification is recorded the EU’s official 
Europa website: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm. For a prescient 
discussion (prior to the French and Dutch referenda) on the possible responses to a 
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 When the European Council met in June of 2006 it looked back on 
the previous twelve months and noted in its Presidency Conclusions that a 
broad debate on the Constitution had taken place and was ongoing. It 
commented: “While worries and concerns have been voiced during all public 
debates, citizens remain committed to the European Project.”5 The body then 
offered a “two-track approach” to the situation. First, after referring to the five 
latest ratifications, it opted to give the reflection process more time: 
 
  It considers that, in parallel with the ongoing ratification 
 process, further work, building on what has been achieved since last 
 June, is needed before decisions on the future of the Constitutional 
 Treaty can be taken. . . . 
 
 [T]he Presidency will present a report to the European 
 Council during the first semester of 2007, based on extensive 
 consultations with the Member States. This report should contain an 
 assessment of the state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional 
 Treaty and explore possible future developments. 
 
 The report will subsequently be examined by the European 
 Council. The outcome of this examination will serve as the basis for 
 further decisions on how to continue the reform process, it being 
 understood that the necessary steps to that effect will have been taken 
 during the second semester of 2008 at the latest. Each Presidency in 
 office since the start of the reflection period has a particular 
 responsibility to ensure the continuity of this process. 
 
The European Council calls for the adoption, on 25 March 
2007 in Berlin, of a political declaration by EU leaders, setting out 
Europe’s values and ambitions and confirming their shared 
commitment to deliver them, commemorating 50 years of the Treaties 
of Rome.6 
 
The second statement in the Presidency Conclusions was more 
assertive. Declaring that “the Union’s commitment to becoming more 
                                                                                                                    
negative referendum result, see Bruno de Witte, The Process of Ratification and the 
Crisis Options: A Legal Perspective, in in The EU Constitution: The Best Way 
Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005).  
5 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 16, 2006, CONCL 2, 10633/06 1. 
6 Id. at 16-17. 
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democratic, transparent and effective goes beyond the reflection period,”7 the 
European Council expressed its intention to immediately begin the 
implementation of a number of the reforms suggested in the Constitution 
notwithstanding the current uncertainty about the document’s ultimate 
ratification. It declared that “best use should be made of the possibilities 
offered by the existing treaties in order to deliver the concrete results that 
citizens expect.”8 A detailed agenda for a “Europe at work” was presented, 
with areas of activity to include “promoting freedom, security and justice,” 
“promoting the European way of life in a globalised world,” “improving the 
efficiency, coherence and visibility of the Union’s external policies,” and 
“improving the functioning of the Union.”9 The program most obviously 
reflective of the Constitution is the adoption of an “overall policy on 
transparency,” the primary feature of which will be the opening of many 
Council of Ministers meetings to the public.10 
 
 On the heels of the June 2006 European Council summit, the 
incoming Finnish Presidency commented on how it would address the 
challenge of the Constitution, but its message was mixed. On one hand, Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen stated: “I am convinced that an enlarging Union 
needs the Constitutional Treaty that was negotiated by its Member States. . . 
Thus, Finland has come out in favor of the Treaty as negotiated.” Vanhanen 
also indicated that Finland would ratify the Constitution during the Finnish 
Presidency in the second half of 2006,11 and this did happen. On the other 
hand, Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja commented: “We now have almost 
100 percent certainty that the constitution in its present form will not be 
preserved.” He suggested that a future treaty revision should retain “as much 
as possible” of the Constitution’s text, but that the name Constitution should 
be avoided.12 
 
 Ultimately, pessimism prevailed. German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
pledged to use Germany’s first semester 2007 EU Presidency to revive the 
Constitution, putting pressure on countries that had not yet ratified at that 
point. However, a legal action in the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
                                                 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. at 16. 
9 Id. at 2-15. 
10 Id at 23 (Annex 1). 
11 Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, Speech at the plenary session of the European 
Parliament, (July 5, 2006), available at http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/ 
speeches/ko27/en_GB/1152081630727. 
12 Lucia Kubusova, Finland seeks better climate for revised EU constitution, 
Euobserver.com, June 30, 2006, http://euobserver.com/9/21995. 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
  
challenging Germany’s own ratification of the document, resulted in a court 
statement that it would not make a definitive ruling in the foreseeable future.13 
With Germany’s position in doubt, Chancellor Merkel was left in a most 
awkward position. Meanwhile, Commission President José Manuel Barroso 
was described as delivering “last rites” to the Constitution by soundly 
criticizing the decision to call it by that name,14 while at the same time he 
publicly pledged his support for the document’s institutional reforms.15 Not to 
be deterred by the delicate politics of the moment, others such as MEP 
Andrew Duff boldly called for a wholesale reconsideration of the Constitution 
at the IGC level, with the expectation that all of the proposed reforms – and 
others – would be fair game for negotiation.16 Finally, hopes that the 
Netherlands and France would reverse themselves were effectively dashed 
when recent national elections in those countries offered no realistic 
expectations of national reconsideration.17 
 
The Reform Treaty 
 
 By the time the European Council met on June 21 to 23, 2007, 
Chancellor Merkel and new French President Nicolas Sarkozy had joined 
together to vigorously press for an end to two years of stalemate between the 
pro- and anti-Constitution camps. After a protracted session described as 
rancourous and bitter,18 the body emerged with a compromise calling for a 
                                                 
13 Merkel’s Constitution hopes on ice, Euractiv.com, http://www.euractiv.com/en/ 
constitution/merkel-constitution-hopes-ice/article-159355. 
14 For an interesting discussion of the impact of the word “Constitution,” see Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography, in The 
EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & 
Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
15 Barroso calls for EU to move beyond constitution debacle, Guardian Online, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329602512-106710,00.html.  
16 Duff, Andrew, Plan B: How to Rescue the European Constitution, Notre Europe, 
available at http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/working%20papers/Duff% 
202006.pdf. 
17 The results of national elections in the Netherlands in November, 2006, offered no 
mandate whatsoever that the new government would endorse a second attempt at 
ratification of the Constitution. The same may be said for the French election in May, 
2007. New President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed a preference for a modest document 
(such as the Treaty of Nice) that would amend the existing Treaties, rather than a 
wholesale re-formulation of the Treaties as in the proposed Constitution. Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s European Plans, Economist, May 10, 2007 at  
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9149133. 
18 Charlemagne, Treaty Blues, Economist, June 30, 2007, at 61. 
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new IGC to be convened in July, 2007.19 The IGC’s mandate would be to 
draw up a treaty amendment that would supplant the Constitution. The 
European Council’s highly ambitious agenda called for the “Reform Treaty” 
to be drafted in a matter of months, with the expectation that the IGC would 
approve it before the end of 2007 and then refer it to the Member States for 
ratification before June, 2009.   
 
 In its Presidency Conclusions the European Council provided a great 
deal of detail as to the shape of the Reform Treaty.20 Its provisions would 
include the following: 
 
(1) Primary features: 
 
--The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (referred to in this treatise as the EC 
Treaty or TEC) will remain in effect, each as amended by the Reform 
Treaty. The TEC will be renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the Union (acronym to be determined – likely the TFU).  
 
--The Union will succeed the Community and have a single legal 
personality. 
 
--The Constitution’s bold statement on primacy of EU law will be 
replaced by a Declaration referring to the primacy principle as 
developed in the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
 
--Certain words emphasising a constitutional character for the EU will 
be abandoned. Principally, the name “constitution” will be avoided. 
In addition, the proposed Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will 
retain the title High Representative. New designations for EU laws, 
such as “law” and “framework law” will be scrapped in favor of the 
existing terms “regulation” and “directive.” 
 
--Along with avoidance of the name “Constitution,” the enshrinement 
of symbols such as the flag, anthem and motto will be omitted from 
the Reform Treaty. 
 
                                                 
19 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 23, 2007, CONCL 2, 11177/07. 
20 See Draft IGC Mandate, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions, id. 
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(2) Amendments to the TEU:  
 
--The Charter of Fundamental Rights will be cross-referenced, but its 
text will not be included in the Treaty. It will have “the same legal 
value” as the Treaties, but there will be an exception for the United 
Kingdom.  
 
--The Constitution’s provisions on democratic principles will be 
added to the TEU. These include the citizens’ right of initiative, as 
well as statements on democratic equality, representative democracy 
and participatory democracy. 
 
--National parliaments will be offered enhanced rights to object to 
proposed EU legislation on the ground of subsidiarity. 
 
--Virtually all of the institutional changes proposed in the 
Constitution, including the new “permanent” President of the 
European Council and the new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(who will be called the High Representative), will be included in the 
Treaty. 
 
--As in the Constitution and the Treaties, the ability of the EU to 
make “law” in the common foreign and security policy will be limited 
to non-legislative decisions. Thus, the CFSP will be preserved as a 
separate “Pillar.” Furthermore, it will be emphasised that national 
security is the “sole responsibility” of the Member States. 
 
--The Constitution’s innovative right of a Member State to withdraw 
from the Union will be carried over into the TEU. 
 
--The Constitution’s new, simplified procedures for amending the 
document will be applied to the Treaties.   
 
(3) Amendments to the EC Treaty (to be renamed): 
 
--The Constitution’s delineation of the competences of the EU and 
Member States will be preserved. 
 
--Provisions on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice will be 
consolidated in this treaty. 
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--New substantive areas proposed in the Constitution – including 
public services, space, energy, civil protection, humanitarian aid, 
public health, sport, tourism and administrative cooperation – will be 
added to the treaty. 
 
--New budgetary procedures in the Constitution will be included. 
 
--EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights will be 
expressly permitted. 
 
Overall, the foregoing changes offer a description of a Reform Treaty that 
would in fact preserve a significant percentage of the substantive innovations 
proposed in the Constitution. Whether Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern is 
correct that “90% of it is still there”21 remains to be seen. Scholars will soon 
be able to lay the Constitution and the Reform Treaty side-by-side and offer 
their own opinions. For now, it appears that most of the Constitution will live 
on, and thus its text is of great interest in evaluating the course of European 
integration.  
 
The path is never smooth 
 
Interestingly, the Constitution’s text itself anticipated that ratification 
might not go smoothly, or at least not on a fixed schedule. Article IV-447(2) 
states:  
 
This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 November 2006, provided that 
all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, 
on the first day of the second month following the deposit of the 
instrument of ratification of the last signatory State to take this step. 
 
This language suggests an open-ended approach to the ratification process. 
More significantly, a declaration annexed to the Constitution provided that if 
within two years of the signing of the document “four fifths of the Member 
States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered 
difficulties in proceeding with ratification,” the Constitution would be 
referred to the European Council for further consideration.22 This is more or 
less what happened, and the European Council indeed acted to end the 
ratification impasse.  
 
                                                 
21 Charlemagne, Treaty Blues, supra note 18. 
22 Declaration (30) on the ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 464. 
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Interrupted development is nothing new for the European Union. 
Integration during its first half century has occurred despite the tensions 
caused by ambitious proposals, harsh rhetoric, and occasional setbacks. One 
might well recall the French “empty chair” in the 1960’s and the British 
blocking of budgetary matters in the 1980’s. These were political crises of the 
first magnitude, threatening the very viability of the EU, but they were 
overcome. Denmark’s initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and Ireland’s 
negative referendum on the Treaty of Nice – which were indeed precedent for 
the French and Dutch actions in 2005 – were likewise seen as major setbacks. 
In both of those instances the necessary public support was eventually 
generated to reverse the rejections and permit final ratification of the treaties. 
The current situation has followed a different path. In short, notwithstanding 
one challenge after another, the vision and hard work of European leaders has 
indeed led to “ever closer union” and to the unprecedented melding of the 
economies and destinies of a diverse group of sovereign nation states.  
 
Scholarly analysis of the Constitution remains relevant 
 
The Constitution did not just appear suddenly. It was in fact the 
product of many years of effort and of the ongoing evolution of the EU 
itself.23 Even though it has been rejected as an instrument, the Constitution did 
indeed offer a set of highly sophisticated intentions for further development 
and improvement of the Union. If the Reform Treaty is adopted as the 
European Council has urged, most of the Constitution’s proposed innovations 
will materialise, albeit in somewhat different clothing. Because of this fact, 
the already rich scholarship on the Constitution will remain highly relevant to 
future analysis of the Reform Treaty will look back to the Constitution as 
readily as it looks back to the TEU, the EC Treaty and their antecedents.     
 
Much of the recent scholarship on the Constitution has focused on 
particular fields of EU activity within the Union’s existing Three Pillars. The 
first and most prominent of these is the internal market, but increasing 
                                                 
23 Michiel Brand has written of the importance to recognise “the current constitutional 
process not as intending to create a constitution for Europe, but as intending to bring 
about a new, modified, different and more explicit form of constitution for Europe. It 
will, moreover, be asserted that this process towards the elaboration of a future 
European constitution, is a useful and desirable exercise, signifying an affirmation 
and refinement of already existing European constitutionalism.” Michiel Brand, 
Affirming and Refining European Constitutionalism:  Towards the Establishment of 
the First Constitution for the European Union 6 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Florence, Working 
Paper No. 2004/2). Brand’s article contains an in-depth exploration of different 
theories of European constitutionalism. 
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attention is being paid to the Second Pillar, the EU’s common foreign and 
security policy, and the Third Pillar, police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Within these broad areas there has been a wealth of 
legislation, regulatory enforcement and jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice, and thus the Constitution’s proposed changes to the current text of 
the Treaties merit close scrutiny. However, much is also being written on the 
overall impact of the Constitution or its replacement. Does the new document 
signal new subjects for Union activity? Do its institutional changes indicate a 
power shift among the EU institutions? Will a constitution or treaty 
amendment enable the Union to assume a more prominent role on the world 
stage? 
 
Two examples of the high quality of analysis that is underway are the 
following: The Asser Institute in The Hague held a colloquium on the 
Constitution in October, 2004, and from that conference a collection of more 
than 30 essays by a distinguished group of scholars was published in 2005 
(prior to the French and Dutch referenda) by T.M.C. Asser Press under the 
title The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? Topics of these essays 
range from the making of the Constitution to particular legal developments, 
the democratic life of the Union, expansion of judicial and legislative powers 
and access to justice. Several of these essays are cited in this treatise, and the 
entire volume is recommended. A second and quite different book is The 
Constitution for Europe – A Legal Analysis, authored by Jean-Claude Piris, 
Director-General of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, 
and published in 2006 by Cambridge University Press. Mr. Piris was present 
at all stages of the Constitution’s development, and he chaired the Working 
Party of Legal Experts that refined the final version of the document. As a 
lawyer, he adds many astute insights to the prospective structural, 
institutional, procedural and substantive impacts of the Constitution, but it is 
the wealth of his personal experience in Brussels that enables him to provide 
invaluable context to all of the document’s major innovations. As an insider, 
he is able to embellish the legal analysis with the key points of the history and 
politics that led to the details contained in the text of the Constitution. 
 
One of the more intriguing questions raised by the Constitution is 
how it would impact the delicate relationship between the European Union 
and its Member States. This is a significant issue within the Union, because 
the EU has always had a dual focus. On the one hand, the development of the 
EU has necessitated a central orientation, with significant energy being 
invested in the creation and management of a group of centralised institutions 
whose mandate is to represent the collective good of the Union. On the other 
hand, there has always been a conscious effort to preserve a meaningful role 
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for the national governments of the Member States within the EU system. 
Stated in different terms, it has been understood that the benefits of Union 
action must always be measured against the threat such action poses to the 
essential sovereignty of the states.24 Collective success and separate identity 
are often contradictory, and they are frequently the subject of intense political 
and academic debate.  
 
Dividing lines 
 
One way to illustrate the tension that is always lurking in the EU is to 
speak of dividing lines between the Union and its Member States. At their 
deepest level, the EU’s dividing lines reflect political power and jurisdiction 
that touch upon the very existence of the Union and its members. It is 
arguable that every increase in EU competence bears with it a corresponding 
diminishment of the independence and power of the states. But the lines may 
be more subtle, with some of them describing matters only of rhetorical 
emphasis that can affect public perceptions of the system without truly 
relating to allocation of power.  
 
 The dividing lines between the Union and the states may be described 
in terms of the balance of power within the EU system, a system in which 
both EU institutions and the Member States are active. Relevant questions 
relating to allocation of legislative and administrative power include the 
following: 
 
--What institutions are necessary to ensure that the EU reaches its 
potential, and what authority should they be granted? What is the role 
of the Member States in those institutions? 
 
--What instruments and decision-making procedures should be 
employed, and which institutions (including those of the Member 
States) should participate in particular actions? 
 
--In an expanding Union, how should the internal market be managed, 
and should there be a role for the Member State governments in its 
management?  
 
                                                 
24 Note, for example, the inherent tension between the free movement of persons 
offered in connection with the First Pillar internal market (see EC Treaty art. 14(2)), 
and the protections guaranteed to the Member States with respect to Third Pillar 
issues of crime prevention (see TEU arts. 29-42). These conflicting regimes are 
analysed in detail in Chapter 16 of this treatise. 
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--At what level should social policy be determined? Should key 
concepts be uniform throughout the EU, or should the Member States 
maintain local control? 
 
 --How should foreign affairs and defence be conducted? 
 
 But it is more than just political power that is of interest, more than 
which institution at which level has the authority to handle a particular task. 
Beyond allocation of power is the very character of the EU and of the Europe 
it encompasses. Questions in this regard might include the following: 
 
--Should the Member States continue to enjoy their status as 
sovereign nations within the world community? 
 
--Where is the loyalty and attachment of the individual European 
citizen to be focused? 
 
--Where are the manifestations of democracy to be found – at the 
national level only, at the EU level, or at both levels? 
 
 --How much integration is necessary, and where should it stop? 
 
 The Member States in many ways define the EU as much as do the 
EU institutions themselves. The Member States represent the origins of the 
EU, its historical roots, its diversity of cultures and its multi-faceted political 
outlook. The continuing vitality and integrity of the Member States are at the 
essence of the EU, and this treatise will examine the substance of the 
Constitution in this broader aspect as well as to how decisions are made on 
specific subjects. 
 
The methodology of this treatise 
 
The approach of this treatise is to analyse the Constitution in 
historical and contemporary context. The process begins with the 
identification of a primary theme, namely, the “dividing lines” between the 
European Union and its Member States. This is a particular point of view 
relating to the structure of the Union, its unique blend of 
intergovernmentalism and federalism, and the identity of its constituent 
Member States. This is but one of many approaches that could be taken in 
dissecting the Constitution, but it is the author’s opinion that this theme goes 
to the heart of the EU, both in its history and its ongoing development.  
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The Constitution is a lengthy and sweeping instrument, and the 
appropriate first step in the analysis is a careful reading of the document to 
develop a feel for its structure and substantive content. This straightforward 
phase of the analysis focuses on the organisation and wording selected by the 
drafters, with the aim of discerning the meaning of the document on its face. 
At the same time it is necessary to put the content and organisation of the text 
into proper perspective by comparing each constitutional chapter and 
provision with its counterpart, if any, in the Treaties. Whether one ultimately 
views the Constitution as an attempted tidying-up exercise or a proposed 
dramatic leap forward, the document is appropriately viewed in light of its 
direct antecedents. A side-by-side comparison of constitutional text and the 
Treaties is necessarily mechanical at times, but this detailed comparison 
ultimately provides valuable insights into the meaning of the Constitution. 
 
Because of the political significance of the Constitution (and of its 
eventual replacement) there is a myriad of other sources available to provide 
perspective. The bibliography to this treatise identifies a significant number of 
“primary” sources, such as other treaties and international agreements, treaty 
protocols, EU legislation and decisions of the Court of Justice. Most of these 
sources relate directly to the Constitution and Treaties, and all provide 
information relevant to the analysis of the constitutional text. Beyond these, 
there are more than 200 “secondary” sources identified, primarily the 
comments of EU scholars, but also the opinions of public officials and 
journalists. These materials provide extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of 
the Constitution. They address the antecedents of the Constitution, the process 
of its drafting, the politics behind it all, and many possible interpretations of 
its text. Taken together, these official, scholarly and popular materials 
demonstrate how the Constitution represented both a continuation of the EU 
treaty scheme and a new step along the historical path of European 
integration.  
 
In pursuit of the dividing lines as a central theme, the text of this 
treatise does not begin with the Preamble and follow the constitutional text 
straight on. Rather, the approach is organised around identifiable aspects of 
the Union’s character, including its values and objectives, its state-like 
attributes, its institutions, its procedures and its substantive competences. The 
analysis steps back from the Constitution and from the EU itself and asks 
questions such as: “What is the Union? Is it intergovernmental or federal? Is it 
a sovereign entity or a club of states? How does it resemble a state and how 
does it differ? How does it relate to its inhabitants? Is it set in concrete or is it 
flexible? What institutions and competences does it possess?” By applying 
this approach and by attempting to answer these questions, the Union’s 
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dividing lines come into clear focus. Following this method we are able to 
offer useful observations about the Constitution and its potential impact on the 
unique relationship between the European Union and the Member States. We 
may reach meaningful conclusions as to whether the Constitution would 
encroach on the states’ identities and competences or whether they would 
retain their essential sovereignty as nations within a complex 
intergovernmental organisation. 
 
Outline of this treatise 
 
This treatise is organised into categories that are intended to illustrate 
critical aspects of the dividing lines between the Union and the Member 
States. The text is organised as follows: 
 
--Part One first describes the background of the Constitution 
and then offers an overview of the findings that are detailed in Parts 
Two, Three and Four. Chapter 1 explores the historical debate over 
the basic character and structure of the EU, the debate that addresses 
whether the current Treaties can or should be replaced by something 
called a constitution. Chapter 2 reviews the creation of the 
Constitution, followed by a description in Chapter 3 of how the 
constitututional text is organised. Chapter 4 describes the major 
changes proposed in the document.25 The analysis then continues with 
two chapters that offer a preview of the balance of this treatise. 
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of the EU’s dividing lines. Chapter 
6 describes how the Constitution would shift certain of the dividing 
lines. The material offered in Chapters 5 and 6 is developed in depth 
in Chapters 7 through 17. 
 
--Part Two, consisting of Chapters 7 through 12, examines 
how the Constitution defines the essential characteristics of the 
Union, including its values and objectives, its state-like attributes, its 
manifestations of democracy, its structural flexibility, the unanimity 
requirement for amending the Constitution itself, and a set of 
                                                 
25 It is useful to note that Chapters 1 through 4 serve as background to the analysis of 
dividing lines within the European Union. For the reader not familiar with the classic 
debate over the Union’s form or not well versed in the history of the Constitution or 
its textual organisation, these chapters provide a starting point for an appreciation of 
the Constitution. The reader who has previously studied these subjects may 
comfortably begin with Chapter 5.  
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principles underlying its actions. This analysis will also identify how 
emphasis is placed on the continuing integrity of the Member States.  
 
--Part Three is comprised of Chapters 13 through 15, and they 
analyse the Union’s institutions and how law is made in the EU. 
Chapter 13 analyses the most important EU institutions and how they 
may be independent of or subject to control by the Member States. 
Chapter 14 discusses the instruments and procedures available to the 
institutions.26 Chapter 15 then addresses the critical matter of how the 
unanimous voting requirement on the Council and European Council 
protects Member State sovereignty. In detail this analysis identifies 
where the Constitution would have changed the Treaties’ unanimity 
requirement to qualified majority voting (QMV), where it offered 
new subjects of legislation for which QMV is permitted, and where it 
would have retained unanimous voting.  
 
--Part Four addresses the Constitution’s potential impact on 
the subject matter of EU activity. Chapter 16 addresses the area of 
freedom, security and justice, where the Constitution offered some of 
its most significant departures from the Treaties. Chapter 17 analyses 
where the dividing lines would shift in regard to other EU activity, 
both relating to internal activities and to external action. 
 
--Part Five contains final commentary. Chapter 18 offers a 
critical view on the Constitution as a document, with suggestions for 
its improvement. Chapter 19 contains a review of key constitutional 
provisions that favor centralised EU power versus those that 
emphasise Member State competence. This serves as a summary of 
how the Constitution would affect the existing dividing lines between 
the EU and its Member States. 
 
 Overall, the analysis will be limited to those aspects of the 
Constitution and the Treaties that relate to the role of the Member States 
within the European Union as compared to the role of the EU’s own 
institutions.27 Other changes not related to these dividing lines are beyond the 
                                                 
26 Like Chapters 1 – 4, Chapter 14 is included as background material. The reader 
familiar with the Union’s instruments and procedures may forego a review of this 
chapter. 
27 For a scientific, rather than legal, study of “the optimal assignment of policy tasks 
to the different levels of government within the EU” and an analysis of how “the 
competencies between the Union and the Member States [can] be delimited optimally 
based on economic efficiency,” see Fritz Breuss & Markus Eller, The Optimal 
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scope of the present analysis. Likewise, the full legislative history of the 
constitutional text is a complex subject that is generally beyond the scope of 
this treatise. It is also important to recognise that the impact of the 
Constitution with respect to the substantive areas of EU activity will be the 
subject of much writing in the coming years. Legal scholars have already 
begun the long process of commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
document in various subject areas,28 and their analysis will eventually fill 
many volumes.29 Because of the vast subject matter included in and 
potentially affected by the Constitution, comments in this treatise on the 
particular aspects of EU and Member State lawmaking will be offered for 
illustrative purposes only and are not meant to be comprehensive. 
 
A preview of the conclusions 
 
 Two somewhat contradictory conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
The first is that the drafters of the Constitution were for the most part faithful 
to the Treaties in carefully preserving the existing dividing lines between the 
Union and the Member States. Overall, in matters of substance and procedure 
the Constitution did not offer significant movement of these lines. Under the 
Constitution the Member States would have continued to enjoy a substantial 
                                                                                                                    
Decentralisation of Government Activity:  Normative Recommendations for the 
European Constitution, 15 Const. Pol. Econ. 27 (2004). 
28 For recent critiques that question and criticise the very notion of a constitution and 
the process by which it is created, see Cindy Skach, We, the Peoples? 
Constitutionalizing the European Union, 43 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 149 (2005); 
Heinrich Schneider, The Constitution Debate (Eur. Integration Online Papers, 
Working Paper No. 4, 2003).  
29 Overviews on the developing constitutionalism in Europe have long populated the 
bookshelves of EU scholars. Even before the Convention, this was a popular topic. 
See, e.g., Constitution-Building in the European Union (Brigid Laffan, ed., 1996); 
Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes Have an 
Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration (1999). As the Convention 
proceeded and ultimately completed its work, additional commentary kept pace with 
the official activities. See, e.g., The Post-Nice Process: Towards a European 
Constitution (Peter A. Zervakis & Peter J. Cullen, eds., 2002); Brendan P.G. Smith, 
Constitution Building in the European Union (2002); Stefan Collignon, The European 
Republic:  Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future Constitution (2003); Jo 
Shaw, et al., The Convention on the Future of Europe: Working Towards an EU 
Constitution (2003); A Constitution for the European Union (Charles B. Blankart & 
Dennis C. Mueller, eds., 2004); Political Theory and the European Constitution (Lynn 
Dobson & Andreas Follesdal, eds., 2004); Developing a Constitution for Europe (Erik 
Oddvar Eriksen, et al. eds., 2004); The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging 
Union: Unity in Diversity? (Kirstyn Inglis & Andrea Ott, eds., 2005). 
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measure of sovereignty despite having previously delegated certain 
competences to the Union. To those who were concerned that the Constitution 
represented a great shift of power to Brussels, this treatise argues that their 
fears were not well-founded.  
 
 The second conclusion is that notwithstanding the preservation of 
most of the EU’s dividing lines the Constitution did signal a new legal order 
for the Union. It would have repealed and replaced the principal Treaties,30 
and it would have eliminated the Pillar structure found in those documents. It 
would have created a new European Union with legal personality, and this 
entity would have been the successor to the European Community and the 
Maastricht EU.31 It offered the first textual expression that EU law has 
primacy over Member State law.32 Furthermore, the proposed document was 
called a constitution. The importance of all of these developments is 
debatable, and one might argue that they represented more style than 
substance. The better position is that there was substance in these proposed 
changes, but even those who would call them stylistic must acknowledge that 
in politics and diplomacy new terminology may have signaled a change in 
attitude and a shift in direction. Style may yield substance in the long run. 
 
 Detailed analysis of a document as lengthy as the proposed 
Constitution requires discipline and patience . . . and time. To overcome some 
of the logistical challenges inherent in this endeavor, this treatise employs 
chapter and section arrangements that are clear enough to facilitate easy 
location of particular subjects. It is hoped that this treatise – either as a whole 
or in its parts – will prove to be of value to others who may be studying the 
constitutional development of the European Union. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Constitution art. IV-437(1). The treaties that are supplanted are the EC Treaty and 
TEU. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community remains in 
effect. See EURATOM, supra note 2. 
31 Constitution art. IV-438(1). 
32 Constitution art. I-6. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
The Debate over Form – What is the EU? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 From its inception the European Union has had its own structures and 
institutions, but both the Union and its institutions have always been subject 
to certain levels of control by the Member State governments. As integration 
has progressed from the Union’s modest beginnings as the European Coal and 
Steel Community, academic and political observers have struggled to define 
just what the organization is, and, moreover, what it should be. The following 
analysis will describe the two principal opposing camps in a debate that 
regularly resurfaces in Europe. This debate underlies the drafting of the 
Constitution,33 and the two schools of thought have radically different ideas as 
to the proper dividing lines between the EU and its members. 
 
1.  TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT  
 
 Some commentators and politicians favor an intergovernmental form 
for the EU, a structure in which all critical decisions must be agreed to by 
each Member State. Others urge a federal arrangement in which the Union 
serves as an independent and powerful central government that stands above 
the national governments. These two approaches will be described, and they 
will be followed by a description of the middle ground, the “blended entity” 
theory that better defines the realities of the EU today.  
 
1.1  The EU as an intergovernmental organisation 
 
 The European Union was created by means of treaties among its 
founding members, it exists today by virtue of successor treaties, and there are 
                                                 
33 For a description of the events leading to the drafting of the Constitution, see 
Chapter 2. 
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those who believe it should remain as a treaty-based intergovernmental 
structure.  
 
According to the intergovernmental theory, the EU has in fact 
continued to operate in large part like an IGO. Peter Lindseth comments that 
one strand of social science literature “points to the considerable evidence of 
the Community’s continuing intergovernmental nature, notably at the levels 
of Treaty amendment and of major harmonisation legislation.”34 Armin von 
Bogdandy likewise asserts that EU continues to retain a “supranational 
character” because of the EU’s traditional treaty-revision process, its 
requirement of consensus in a number of policy fields, and its lack of 
“coercive force” against the Member States.35 Andrew Moravcsik observes 
that the EU’s ability to act in areas such as “budget, defence, police, cultural, 
educational and social policies” is sufficiently limited that its actions in these 
fields, if any take place at all, “are hardly different from those of a classic 
international organisation.”36 G.F. Mancini describes the EU structure as one 
in which “not only its foreign and security policies, which are openly carried 
out on an intergovernmental basis, but the very management of its 
supranational core, the single market, are entrusted, with or without a 
circumscribed control by the European Parliament, to diplomatic round 
tables.”37 
 
 Despite the Union’s intergovernmental origins and its retention of 
IGO-like features, it is clear that the EU contains elements that are not strictly 
intergovernmental in nature.38 These elements are described below in the 
descriptions of the federalist and blended entity theories. Lindseth has 
acknowledged that the EU’s range of delegated powers and its “relative 
independence from unilateral Member State control” distinguish it from other 
                                                 
34 Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 628, 
655 (1999). 
35 Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Supranational Federation: A 
Conceptual Attempt in the Light of the Amsterdam Treaty, 6 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27, 33 
(2000).   
36 Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 291, 309 (2000) [hereinafter Moravcsik 2000]. 
37 G.F. Mancini, Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union: Collected 
Essays 65 (2000). 
38 Jan Muller has stated: “Clearly, the Union started as an intergovernmental 
enterprise, and only over time acquired supranational and infranational 
characteristics.” Jan Muller, Constitutionalism and the Founding of Constitutions: 
Carl Schmitt and the Constitution of Europe, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1777, 1790 (2000). 
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international organisations.39 However, he argues that its “legal character” 
remains similar to that of “other less ambitious experiments with 
supranational delegation, such as the dispute settlement panels of the WTO.”40 
All such IGOs, he asserts, are “essentially of an administrative character” and 
provide efficient problem-solving mechanisms in place of more cumbersome 
diplomatic procedures.41 
 
 The essence of the intergovernmentalist position is that the Member 
States of the EU must retain their essential sovereignty.42 The British are 
strongly identified with this position and are said to champion a “club of 
sovereign nation-states,”43 preferring, for example, a greater involvement of 
national parliaments in EU policy-making over an enhanced role for the 
European Parliament.44 Joseph Weiler has called this approach “Thatcherism” 
and sees its vision of the European Union as “an arrangement, elaborate and 
sophisticated, of achieving long-term maximisation of the national interest in 
an interdependent world.”45 This school of thought, according to Weiler, 
measures the EU’s value “ultimately and exclusively with the coin of national 
utility and not community solidarity.”46  
 
                                                 
39 Lindseth, supra note 34, at 656, 734. 
40 Id. at 656, 734. 
41 Id.  
42 Michael Newman identifies the insistence on Member State sovereignty with the 
“realist theory” of international relations.  Proponents of this theory, he writes, “have 
viewed states as the irreducible element in international politics….” The EU is 
“regarded as a means of managing potential conflict and competition so as to enhance 
security. But it could never transcend the Member States in the sense suggested by 
Federalists, for those states are basically using it to promote their own interests. Thus 
while federalists might condemn governments for opposing the construction of a full 
political union, realists will argue that this is to be expected: states remain the ‘real’ 
actors which operate the international institutions that they establish.” Michael 
Newman, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union 17 (1996). Newman 
groups the realist theory, which many theorists recognize to be “over-simplified,” 
with other schools of thought into a broader category he calls “international relations 
theories.”  Id. at 20-21. 
43 Christopher Dickey & Michael Meyer, Is Europe Broken?, Newsweek, Aug. 12, 
2002, at 14. 
44 Europe's Convention: The Tortoise is Thinking of Moving, Economist, July 20, 
2002, at 41, 42. 
45 Weiler, supra note 29, at 93-94. 
46 Id. 
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 The difficulty with the intergovernmental position is that the EU has 
evolved significantly from its IGO roots. George Bermann asserts that the 
Union has: 
 
traveled further along the road from ‘pure’ intergovernmentalism than 
virtually any other international governance regime, and than one 
might realistically ever have imagined at the outset. No other 
international governance regime can even plausibly present itself as 
governing a ‘polity’, especially a polity in the most day-to-day, 
operational, ‘business as usual’ sense of the term.47 
 
A vigorous counterpoint to the intergovernmentalist theory is offered by the 
federal camp.  
 
1.2 The EU as a federal state 
 
 There have always been federalists in Europe, politicians and others 
who see the European Union evolving into a centralised federal system that 
must eventually become a United States of Europe. According to Michael 
Newman, their school of thought traces back to Altiero Spinelli and his 1941 
Ventotene Manifesto, which sets forth the theory that divesting the European 
nation states of their individual sovereignty would prevent future wars on the 
continent and solve a host of other vexing problems that would withstand an 
intergovernmental approach.48  Joseph Weiler comments that this “unity 
vision of the promised land sees then as its ‘ideal type’ a European polity, 
finally and decisively replacing its hitherto warring Member States with a 
political union of federal governance.”49 These ideas were clearly reflected in 
the original Treaty of Rome,50 and Newman asserts that today’s federalist 
perspective “generally holds that the EU is in the process of becoming a 
Federation . . .  [and] that the old state-centered world has passed.”51  
                                                 
47 George Bermann, The European Union as a Constitutional Experiment, 10 Eur. L.J. 
363 (2004). 
48 Newman, supra note 42, at 16. 
49 Weiler, supra note 29, at 93. 
50 “Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and 
backwardness of the less favoured regions…” Preamble to the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community (consolidated text), Mar. 25, 1957, O.J. (C 325) 41 
(2002). 
51 Newman, supra note 42, at 16. Weiler has described the current state of the EU as a 
“confederation." He writes: “It is not an accident that some of the most successful 
federations which emerged from separate polities—the United States, Switzerland, 
Germany—enjoyed a period as a confederation prior to unification. This does not 
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 The European Commission, in its White Paper on European 
Governance that preceded the Constitutional Convention, agrees that the EU 
is evolving.52 While careful to avoid using the word “federal,” the document 
asserts: “It is time to recognise that the Union has moved from a diplomatic to 
a democratic process, with policies that reach deep into national societies and 
daily life.”53 Weiler concurs that “the Community’s ‘operating system’ is no 
longer governed by general principles of public international law.”54 He 
contends that “constitutionalisation” and a new system of remedies within the 
EU have eliminated “the most central legal artifact of international law: the 
notion (and doctrinal apparatus) of exclusive state responsibility and its 
concomitant principles of reciprocity and counter-measures.”55 Like the 
Commission, he stops short of saying that these changes have made the EU 
into a federal state, but he believes that “the Community truly becomes 
something ‘new.’”56 By way of example, Weiler notes that in establishing the 
doctrine of “direct effect” of Community law on citizens of the EU, the 
European Court of Justice set aside the traditional right of a state to determine 
to what extent the state’s treaty obligations will impact its individual 
citizens.57 The seminal decision on direct effect was van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen.58 In this case the Court ruled that 
that it had the competence to determine whether a Dutch company had 
standing under Community law to directly challenge a Dutch government 
tariff on certain imported products from Germany. The Dutch government had 
argued that its national courts should have the exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret the scope of the EC Treaty in this instance. The Court declared: 
 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common 
Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested 
parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an 
                                                                                                                    
mean that confederation is a prerequisite to federation. It simply suggests that in a 
federation created by integration, rather than by devolution, there must be an 
adjustment period in which the political boundaries of the new polity become socially 
accepted as appropriate for the larger democratic rules by which the minority will 
accept a new majority.” Weiler, supra note 29, at 83.  
52 European Governance: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM (2001) 428 final at 11 [hereinafter White Paper]. 
53 Id. at 30. 
54 Weiler, supra note 29, at 12. 
55 Id. at 29. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 19-20, 107-109.   
58 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, 1963 
ECR 1. 
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agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the 
Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also 
confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions 
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member 
States and their citizens. . . . 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subject of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals.59 
 
 Armin von Bogdandy is less reticent about labeling EU development 
as federalism. He contends that “the Union has become an organisation of 
comprehensive regulation and coordination.”60 To illustrate, he cites the EU’s 
economic policy, its “power over certain mechanisms of macroeconomic 
policy coordination, which can culminate in restrictions on national budgetary 
policy and the possible imposition of severe sanctions on Member States” and 
its increasing activities in “classical state functions” such as “justice, security 
and (indirect) regulation of citizenship.”61 He argues that in these spheres the 
Union “can hardly be distinguished from the central level of a federal state.”62 
Furthermore, Von Bogdandy notes that the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties “promulgate objectives and competencies for the creation and 
preservation of a unitary territory” and that the concept of EU citizenship is 
becoming more clearly defined and significant.63 He asserts that in analysing 
these developments “one finds clear federal dynamics in the sense that a 
government for a defined territory and a defined citizenship exists and the 
sovereign authority defines itself in these terms.”64 
 
 Although the European Union may already possess federal elements, 
its ardent federalists believe that more is needed. German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer, in his noteworthy speech of May 12, 2000, at Humboldt 
University in Berlin, expressed his concerns that a “tension has emerged 
between the communitarisation of economy and currency on the one hand and 
                                                 
59 Id.  
60 Von Bogdandy, supra note 35, at 33.   
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 34-36. 
64 Id. at 36. 
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the lack of political and democratic structures on the other.”65  He urged that 
“productive steps” be taken to avoid crises in the EU and to complete “the 
process of integration.”66 In even bolder terms he proposed “the transition 
from a union of states to full parliamentarisation as a European Federation.”67 
In similar tones G.F. Mancini has asserted that “the confederal set-up has 
given rise to contradictions which grow in direct proportion to the growth of 
the Union’s powers and which only a leap towards federalism can hope to 
overcome.”68 Luís Lobo-Fernandes argues that a “neo-federal modality” for 
the EU would “make possible a qualitative institutional leap,” and he asserts 
that “a federal type of arrangement has a decisive advantage over the 
traditional diplomatic mechanism: it does not allow the system to be taken 
over by any group or coalition, because it guarantees the expression of various 
interests in an environment of reinforced democratic legitimacy.”69 
 
 But Europe is Europe after all, and even the federalists stop short of 
calling for an EU resembling the American model. The deeply entrenched 
national identities of the European people and their rich cultural (and often 
national) histories suggest that even a federal system must look “European.”  
G.F. Mancini speaks of “a European political entity organised along the lines 
of a state—a state, of course, without a nation—respectful of the identity of 
the peoples of which it is composed.”70 Joschka Fisher likewise acknowledges 
that the idea of a new federal state that would replace the Member States as 
the new sovereign power “shows itself to be an artificial construct which 
ignores the established realities in Europe.”71 He adds that further integration 
of the EU will be workable only if it “takes the nation-states along with it into 
                                                 
65 Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of 
European Integration, Speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 4 (May 12, 
2000), transcript available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/ 
download/pdf/reden/redene/r000512b-r1008e.pdf. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 7. 
68 Mancini, supra note 37, at 66. Youri Devuyst similarly argues for a “reinvigoration 
of the European integration process through the creation of a Federation of Nation 
States based on a coherent Constitutional system among those European countries 
willing to leave behind ancient notions of sovereignty.” Youri Devuyst, The European 
Union's Constitutional Order? Between Community Method and Ad Hoc 
Compromise, 18 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 1, 7, 51-52 (2000).  Further federal development, 
according to Devuyst, would “pursue the institutional logic behind the Rome Treaty.”  
Id. at 51. 
69 Luís Lobo-Fernandes, Por um sistema bicamarário na UE, Expresso (Lisbon), June 
7, 2003, at 30 (Luís Lobo-Fernandes trans.). 
70 Mancini, supra note 37, at xxvi. 
71 Fischer, supra note 65, at 7. 
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such a Federation, only if their institutions are not devalued or even made to 
disappear.”72 In short, he admits that the successful completion of European 
integration must be based on “a division of sovereignty between Europe and 
the nation-state.”73  
 
 Critics of the federal approach would agree.  Joseph Weiler contends 
that it would be “more than ironic if a polity with its political process set up to 
counter the excesses of statism ended up coming round full circle and 
transforming itself into a (super)state.”74 He adds that it would be “equally 
ironic that an ethos that rejected the nationalism of the Member States gave 
birth to a new European nation and European nationalism.”75 He concludes 
that “we are not about to see the demise of the Member States, at least for a 
long time.”76 In view of all of the practical and political challenges to creation 
of a true federal state, Giandomenico Majone maintains that “[f]ully fledged 
federalism . . . does not enjoy widespread political support at present.”77 
Andrew Moravcsik expresses it even more strongly: “Save perhaps in the 
minds of a few remaining true federalist believers and their conservative 
idealist critics, the dream of a European state supplanting the nation-state is 
finished, if indeed it ever existed.”78 Michael Newman examines the federalist 
and intergovernmentalist schools of thought and comments: “Federalism and 
realism constitute the two extremes in academic analysis of the EU and most 
contemporary theorists fall somewhere between them.”79 It is now appropriate 
to survey that middle ground. 
 
2.  THE EU AS A BLENDED ENTITY 
 
 Despite their differences of opinion, intergovernmentalists and 
federalists must agree that the European Union is a system that contains 
features of both models. As such, it might be described as a blended entity, a 
political cocktail whose bartenders are constantly experimenting to get the 
mix of ingredients just right.  
 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Weiler, supra note 29, at 94. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Giandomenico Majone, Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards, 
4 Eur. L.J. 5, 27 (1998).  
78 Moravcsik 2000, supra note 36, at 308. 
79 Newman, supra note 42, at 18. 
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 Many similar labels have been applied to describe the EU. Murray 
Forsyth has compared the European Community of the early 1980’s to several 
confederal entities.80  Lothar Funk has called the Union a “hybrid.”81 Ian 
Ward has described it as a “post-modern polity,”82 to which Jerome Rabkin 
adds that it “twists and bends traditional attributes of statehood or national 
sovereignty.”83  Kalypso Nicolaidis describes the EU as “neither simply a 
Union of democracies [described in this treatise as the IGO model] nor a 
Union as democracy [described in this treatise as the federal model],” but a 
“third way,” manifested as a “demoi-cracy” comprised of many peoples and 
their various states.84 Pavlos Eleftheriadis has asserted that the EU is 
comprised of a “complex set of institutions that follow both statist and 
federalist paths,” and he adds that its institutions “are not defined by the rights 
of a single ‘European people’ but by a cosmopolitan project of republican 
states.”85  He also refers to the Union’s “sui generis” nature that “manages to 
go beyond the model of national democracy without creating a Federal 
Europe.”86 Armin von Bogdandy describes the EU as a “functionally-oriented 
form of political and legal organisation” rather than a “territorially-oriented 
one”87 and sees its organisational structure as “characterised by polycentrism 
and fragmentation.”88 Michael Newman cites a variety of “integration 
                                                 
80 Murray Forsyth, Unions of States, at 10-16, 160-87 (1981). 
81 Lothar Funk, A Legally Binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?, 37 
Intereconomics 253, 262 (2002).  Another commentator has called the EU a hybrid, 
an entity “exceeding the territory of international law, yet without the coherence of a 
federal state.” Jiri Priban, European Union Constitution-Making, Political Identity and 
Central European Reflections, 11 Eur. L.J. 135, 149 (2005). 
82 Ian Ward, Identity and Difference: The European Union and Postmodernism, in 
New Legal Dynamics of European Union, 15, 21-26 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 
1995).  
83 Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 
Chi. J. Int'l L. 273, 275 (2000). 
84 Kalypso Nicolaidis, The New Constitution as European Demoi-cracy? The Federal 
Trust Online Paper 38/03, at 5, available at  
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/ uploads/constitution/38_03.pdf. 
85 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals, 7 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 21, 39 (2001). 
86 Id. at 28. Giandomenico Majone also refers to the “sui generis institutional 
architecture of the Community.” Majone, supra note 77, at 8. 
87 Von Bogdandy, supra note 35, at 32. 
88 Id. at 28. Von Bogdandy also comments that “the Treaty of Amsterdam has a 
substantial unifying potential. However, even if this potential is fully realized, the 
Union will remain an organisation that does not represent a societal and political unity 
in the sense of a nation. Similarly, its political system is constitutively far more 
fragmented than political systems of a state.” Id. at 38. 
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theories” such as “neo-functionalism . . .  co-operative federalism, neo-
federalism and also a non-specific form of economic determinism.”89 Joseph 
Weiler refers to a “community vision” in which the Member States and the 
EU “continue their uneasy co-existence, although in an ever-increasing 
embrace.”90 
 
 The “uneasy co-existence” is due to the prominent role of the 
Member States within the EU. Pavlos Eleftheriadis asserts that “the debate 
concerning European integration and its institutions is not about degrees of 
democracy. That would be too simple. The debate is also about the role of 
states in a cosmopolitan framework.”91 Jan Muller views the Union as a “dual 
system,” one in which “the member states are both inside and outside the 
constitutional system. Sovereignty is then shared in ‘normal times’ of 
European governance…but it reverts to the plural constituent power [i.e. that 
of the Member States] in moments of constitutional remodeling.”92 Within the 
EU there is also a division of power that at times heavily favors the influence 
of the Member States. The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) established three 
“pillars” of government,93 and Giandomenico Majone has described the EU’s 
arrangement as containing “two distinct elements: an intergovernmental 
component, where international features dominate (European Council, 
Council of ministers, and the second and third ‘pillars’ of the TEU), and a 
communitarian component where supranational features are most evident 
(European Parliament and Courts, Commission, and the policies and activities 
included in the first ‘pillar’ of the TEU).”94 
 
 The unusual structure of the EU is not the only feature that 
distinguishes it from a typical nation-state. Andrew Moravcsik illustrates a 
number of substantive differences by describing the many competencies of a 
state that have not been granted to the Union, including “taxation and the 
setting of fiscal priorities, social welfare provision, defence and police 
                                                 
89 Newman, supra note 42, at 18-19. 
90 Weiler, supra note 29, at 93. 
91 Eleftheriadis, supra note 85, at 39. 
92 Muller, supra note 38, at 1792. 
93 Article 1 of the TEU states: “The Union shall be founded on the European 
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by 
this Treaty.” TEU art. 1. The First Pillar covers the entirety of the European 
Community’s traditional common market activity, while the Second and Third Pillars 
cover cooperation among the Member States in the areas of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Second Pillar) and Cooperation in the Spheres of Justice and Home 
Affairs (Third Pillar). See Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the 
European Union 69 (2003).   
94 Majone, supra note 77, at 12.  
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powers, education policy, cultural policy, non-economic civil litigation, direct 
cultural promotion and regulation, the funding of civilian infrastructure, and 
most other regulatory policies unrelated to cross-border economic activity.” 
He notes that “the EU has made modest inroads into many of these areas, but 
only in limited areas directly related to cross-border flows.”95 He has also 
asserted: “Institutionally, [the EU’s] actions in these areas, if there are any at 
all, are hardly different from those of a classic international organisation.”96  
Moravcsik contends that “the spectre of a European superstate is an 
illusion.”97 Eleftheriadis concurs: “The European Union is not a state and does 
not resemble one closely. It does not have the ‘monopoly of force’ or other 
features of statehood: an army, courts or a comprehensive central 
government.”98  Giandomenico Majone notes that the EU has no general 
taxing and spending powers and that “with a budget of less than 1.3 percent of 
Union GDP which, moreover, must always be balanced, it can only undertake 
a limited range of policies.”99  Armin von Bogdandy also emphasises that the 
EU lacks the ability to redistribute wealth to any appreciable extent and that it 
“lacks the power for coercing Member State compliance . . .  with the Union’s 
law.”100 He adds: “A close analysis of the developing lines of the European 
Union from a dynamic perspective reveals more differences than analogies to 
a state-building process. These differences underline the Union’s qualification 
as a new form of government.”101 
 
 The state-like elements that do exist within the European Union, such 
as delegation of certain competencies to the central government, separation of 
powers into legislative, executive and judicial functions, and a popularly 
elected parliament, are not necessarily a sign that the EU is becoming a 
federal state.  Larry Cata Backer reminds us that in the early United States the 
“nature and structure of the union” and “the relative powers of state and 
general government within the federal scheme” were “hotly debated,” and that 
                                                 
95 Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 603, 607 (2002) 
[hereinafter Moravcsik 2002].  Moravcsik further argues that “by limiting the EU’s 
fiscal, administrative or coercive resources, the member states have imposed 
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voters.” Andrew Moravcsik, The EU Ain't Broke, Prospect, Mar. 2003, at 40-41, 
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96 Moravcsik 2000, supra note 36, at 309. 
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the current form of American government was not an inevitable result.102  
Thus, he argues, even though a “form of federal union” may have appeared in 
Europe, it need not presage an American-style superstate.103 He asserts: 
“Federations ought not to frighten states’ rights advocates in Europe. The 
nature of federalism is not set in stone, nor has the world yet witnessed all of 
the multiple forms of governance which can be constructed within the spirit of 
this principle.”104  Armin von Bogdandy likewise observes that “federal 
thought is not restricted to state polities. The notion of federation has always 
been used for non-state organisations. It is not necessarily connected with a 
vision of nation-building.”105 Majone predicts that even if aspects of 
federalism increase within the EU, “there is no reason at all to think that the 
political and constitutional arrangements of the future will mirror the 
institutional architecture of the nation-state.”106  
 
 Predictions on the future of the EU as a blended entity range from 
cautious to enthusiastic. Muller, while lauding the Union’s “high degree of 
flexibility,”107 believes that there will be “further muddling through well-
intentioned proposals for amendments, which then fail at intergovernmental 
conferences, and, above all, constitutional clashes at the EU’s core. As a 
result of the latter, there will be actual gradual reform.”108 Majone warns that 
the Union’s “historically unique approach to integration can succeed only if 
the economic and the political tracks are carefully kept separate,”109 and he 
predicts a system with “[o]verlapping jurisdictions, legal pluralism, extensive 
delegation of powers to transnational organisation—in short, a new 
‘medievalism.’”110 Newman maintains that most integrationists “now accept 
that integration will proceed in ‘fits and starts’ rather than ‘ever upward’ . . . 
and that the features which have made [the EU] so distinct will become more 
pronounced as time goes on.”111  Udo Di Fabio sees hope in “an emerging 
new model of multi-level democracy, characterised by contemporaneous 
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103 Id. at 195. 
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hierarchies and cooperative relationships.”112 The doxology is provided by 
Andrew Moravcsik, who, on the eve of the EU’s Constitutional Convention, 
wrote:  
 
Let us appreciate how much Europe has achieved. We should not be 
trapped by rhetoric or fears about what it aspires to be. The EU is not 
a United States of Europe in the making. Instead, it should be seen for 
what it is—the most successful international organisation in history. 
The secret of that success lies not only in the Europeans’ willingness 
to centralise certain types of political power, but also in knowing how 
to mold and limit that power.113 
 
 It is clear that the blended entity theory is the realistic point of view, 
that it offers an attractive – and correct – alternative to the extremes of the 
intergovernmental and federal schools of thought.114 The European Court of 
Justice recognized the “in-between” status of the Community in the van Gend 
en Loos decision, when it declared that “the Community constitutes a new 
legal order of international law” in which the Member States “have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields.”115 An excellent description 
of the limits of the EU’s power and the retained sovereignty of the Member 
States is the following statement by Juliane Kokott, an Advocate General of 
the Court, and Alexandra Ruth:  
 
 [T]he Constitution is not the product of an autonomous pouvoir 
constituant europeén. Instead, it is established by an international 
treaty as the expression of a volonté constituante of the Member 
States, which is, however, itself based on the sovereignty of their 
people.116 
                                                 
112 Udo Di Fabio, A European Charter: Towards a Constitution for the Union, 7 
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116 Juliane Kokott & Alexandra Ruth, The European Convention and its Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken 
Questions?, 40 C.M.L.R. 1315, 1320 (2003).  For a useful recent analysis of 
sovereignty within the EU system, see Anneli Albi & Peter Van Elsuwege, The EU 
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The ensuing comparison of the Constitution to the Treaties will illustrate 
whether and how the EU’s blended nature will be preserved.  
                                                                                                                    
Constitution, National Constitutions and Sovereignty:  An Assessment of a “European 
Constitutional Order,” 29 Eur. L. Rev. 741 (2004). 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The Genesis of the Constitutional Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Constitution was intended to replace the EU’s primary 
constituent documents, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (EC Treaty) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU).117 The 
treaties have been a work in progress, the subject of regular amendment,118 
but in their evolution, they have grown to be increasingly complex. 
 
The EC Treaty establishes the European Community, and it contains 
most of the provisions defining the body’s institutions and regulating the 
internal market.119 The TEU creates the European Union, which essentially 
retains and shares the EC Treaty’s institutional provisions. It also leaves in 
place the EC Treaty’s economic provisions as the “First Pillar” of a broader 
system.120 However, the TEU expands the scope of activity by establishing a 
Second Pillar relating to a common foreign and security policy and a Third 
                                                 
117 Constitution art. IV-437. References to the EC Treaty and TEU are found in note 1 
supra. The EURATOM treaty, supra note 2, would remain in effect. 
118 The major amendments have included: Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a 
Single Commission of the European Communities (Merger Treaty), Apr. 8, 1965, O.J. 
(L 152) 2; Single European Act, Feb. 7, 1986, O.J. (L 169) 1; Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1; Treaty of Nice, 
supra note 2. 
119 EC Treaty pt. III. 
120 The Treaties do not actually refer to “pillars.” Article 1 of the TEU states: “The 
Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies 
and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.” TEU art. 1. The First Pillar 
covers the entirety of the European Community’s traditional common market activity. 
See Nugent, supra note 93.  See also Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of 
the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 C.M.L.R. 17, 22–30 (1993). 
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Pillar governing police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.121 
Awkwardly, the operative entity for the First Pillar is still the European 
Community, while the European Union acts under the Second and Third 
Pillars. At the same time the Union forms umbrella organisation over all three 
of the Pillars. And if that isn’t complicated enough, notwithstanding the 
continuing separate existence of the Union and Community it is common to 
refer to the EU when describing any activity relating to any Pillar.  
 
Criticisms of the EU treaty structure are not new, but one of the more 
apt comments has come from British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: 
While the practical achievements of the EU have been profound, 
the Union’s treaties fail almost every test of clarity and brevity 
. . . For a start, there is not one constitution, but two. One “on 
European union,” the other “establishing the European 
community” . . . both have overlapping preambles with 
“objectives,” “tasks,” and “principles.” As for the institutional 
arrangements, they are shared between the two treaties. These 
complex texts make the case for a single, coherent constitution 
for the EU . . .  real reform is urgently needed.122 
Other commentators have referred to the Treaties as a “hodgepodge”123 and an 
“ad hoc and often incoherent set of documents.”124 
 
The drive for a new constitution was born of such frustrations. 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in a seminal address on May 12, 
2000, at Humboldt University in Berlin,125 expressed his concerns that the 
Union was in danger of becoming “utterly intransparent.”126 He asserted that 
“productive steps” should be taken to complete the process of integration,127 
and he proposed “the transition from a union of states to full 
parliamentarization as a European Federation.”128 He added: “This Federation 
will have to be based on a constituent treaty,” and he urged moving beyond 
                                                 
121 TEU arts. 11–28 (Second Pillar), 29–42 (Third Pillar). 
122 Jack Straw, Special Report: A Constitution for Europe, The Economist, Oct. 12, 
2002, at 55. 
123 Simon Heffer & Edward Heathcoat Amory, Blueprint for Tyranny, Daily Mail 
(London), May 8, 2003, at 12. 
124 Unconventional Wisdom, Times London, May 14, 2003, at 23.  
125 Fischer, supra note 65. 
126 Id. at 6–7. 
127 Id. at 4. 
128 Id. at 7. 
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the “fears and formulae of the 19th and 20th centuries”129 to a Europe 
“established anew with a constitution . . . centred around basic, human and 
civil rights, an equal division of powers between the European institutions and 
a precise delineation between European and nation-state level.”130 
 
Fischer’s call received a response in early 2001 from the 
intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that approved the Treaty of Nice, which 
provided the latest amendments to the EC Treaty and TEU.131 The IGC 
appended to the Treaty a declaration that called for a “deeper and wider 
debate about the future of the European Union.”132 Among the basic issues to 
be addressed in this debate were the following:  
 
--how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers 
between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the 
principle of subsidiarity; 
 
--the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, proclaimed in Nice . . . ;  
 
--a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer 
and better understood without changing their meaning; 
 
--the role of national parliaments in the European architecture.133 
 
The Nice Declaration indicated that a further pronouncement from the 
European Council would be forthcoming at its December 2001 meeting in 
Laeken, Belgium.134 
 
In July of 2001, the European Commission entered the discussion by 
publishing its White Paper on European Governance,135 which asserted: 
“Many people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex 
system to deliver the policies that they want.”136 Among the “principles of 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 9. 
131 Treaty of Nice, supra note 2. 
132 European Council, Declaration on the future of the Union, Mar. 10, 2001, O.J. (C 
80) 85 (2001) [hereinafter Nice Declaration]. 
133 Id. at 85-86. 
134 Id. at 85. 
135 White Paper, supra note 52. 
136 Id. at 3.  
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good governance” to which the EU should aspire, openness and coherence 
were listed as critical to making EU policy “accessible” and “easily 
understood.”137 The Commission, however, observed that these principles 
were not being followed: “The European Union’s policies and legislation are 
getting increasingly complex.”138 The White Paper also noted that the EU 
“needs clear principles identifying how competence is shared between the 
Union and the Member States.”139 Therefore, a call was issued for “a 
comprehensive programme of simplification of existing rules . . . regrouping 
legal texts, removing redundant or obsolete provisions, and shifting non-
essential obligations to executive measures.”140 The Commission committed 
that it would “simplify further existing EU law”141 and propose appropriate 
“Treaty changes” or “constitutional reform” to the European Council at the 
upcoming IGC in Laeken.142  
 
  As anticipated, on December 14-15, 2001, the European Council 
issued its Declaration on the Future of the European Union (the Laeken 
Declaration).143 The document observed that EU citizens “are calling for a 
clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach,”144 and 
it described the need for clearer division of competence between the Union 
and the Member States, simplification of EU legislation and more democracy, 
transparency and efficiency in Union institutions.145 The crux of the problem, 
according to the Declaration, was a need for simplification of the Union’s 
Treaties. In a series of statements under the heading “Towards a Constitution 
for European Citizens” the European Council presented the following 
challenges: 
 
The European Union currently has four Treaties.146 The objectives, 
powers and policy instruments of the Union are currently spread 
                                                 
137 Id. at 10. 
138 Id. at 18. 
139 Id. At 34. 
140  Id. at 23.  
141 Id. at 5. 
142 Id. at 34–35. 
143 European Council, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, in 
Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken, Dec. 14-15, 2001, 
Annex I, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, at 19, 20, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/ 
documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm [hereinafter Laeken Declaration]. 
144 Id. at 21. 
145 Id. at 21-23. 
146 In addition to the EC Treaty and TEU, the other treaties in effect in 2001 were the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), supra 
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across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, 
simplification is essential. 
Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns 
simplifying the existing Treaties without changing their content. 
Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities 
be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars? 
Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation of the 
Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty and 
the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve 
separating the texts? Could this lead to a distinction between the 
amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for 
the other treaty provisions? 
Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and to 
whether the European Community should accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification 
and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption 
of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic 
features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union 
cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, 
the relationship between Member States in the Union?147 
The Laeken Declaration called for a Convention on the Future of Europe to be 
convened in 2002, to produce a document that would provide a “starting 
point” for discussions at the next IGC.148 
 
In the inaugural session of the Convention, on February 26, 20002, 
Chairman Valery Giscard d’Estaing warned that “[t]he process of European 
union is showing signs of flagging. . . . The decision-making machinery has 
become more complex, to the point of being unintelligible to the general 
                                                                                                                    
note 2, as amended, and the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 261 UNTS 140, as amended. The ECSC lapsed 
as a separate treaty in 2002, and its assets, liabilities and programs were transferred to 
the European Community. Under the Constitution, EURATOM would remain in 
effect, amended by the Constitution.  
147 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 23-24. 
148 Id. at 24-25. 
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public.”149 He referred to a “tangled skein of powers [and] the complexity of 
procedures,”150 and commented: “We shall have to respond to the request for 
simplification of the Treaties, with the aim of achieving a single Treaty, 
readable by all, understandable by all.”151 
 
On July 18, 2003, seventeen months after Giscard d’Estaing’s 
opening address, he and his fellow Convention representatives produced the 
Constitution under the title of “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe.”152 Although the assembly’s procedures were criticized,153 and 
although some commentators questioned whether there had been true accord 
                                                 
149 Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Introductory Speech to the Convention on the Future of 
Europe 5 (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/ 
speeches/1.pdf [hereinafter Giscard d’Estaing]. 
150 Id. at 7. During the Convention Giscard d’Estaing observed that his study of the 
Mandarin language was easier than mastering the EU Treaties and agreements. 
Dickey & Meyer, supra note 43, at 14. 
151 Giscard d’Estaing, supra note 149, at 11.  As the Convention proceeded, Jean-Luc 
Dehaene echoed Giscard d’Estaing’s sentiments as follows: “If, in the Convention, we 
succeed to make the EU, its Treaty and its texts, its procedures and its processes, more 
‘understandable,’ we will have helped to remove a major obstacle that stand[s] in the 
way of achieving informed interest and involvement of citizens with EU affairs.” 
Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice President of the European Convention, Understanding 
Europe: The EU Citizen’s Right to Know, Speech Before the Conference Organized 
by the Friends of Europe in Brussels 6 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/8285.pdf. 
152 Peter Norman has written an invaluable on-the-scene account of the Convention 
from inception to adjournment. His book supplies great detail about the activities of 
Giscard d’Estaing’s Praesidium, the various working groups, and the plenary 
sessions, including the mechanics of drafting the Constitution and the politics of 
negotiating its more controversial provisions. Norman also provides valuable 
information about the personalities who affected the Convention and thus the 
Constitution itself. See Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution – The Story of the 
European Convention (2003). 
153 The Convention’s plenary sessions were held only once or twice per month, and 
generally for no more than two days per session. See the official website for the 
European Convention, at http://european-convention.eu.int/sessplan.asp?lang=EN. 
Larry Siedentop has commented that the meetings were not “frequent enough for 
members to come up with new ideas. Intimacy is needed for such a group to develop 
a mind of its own.” Larry Siedentop, We the People Do Not Understand, Fin. Times, 
June 5, 2003, at 21. Another commentator has referred to a “serious truncation and 
imbalance in the Convention’s debates.” Kirsty Hughes, A Dynamic and Democratic 
EU or Muddling Through Again?, The Federal Trust Online Paper 3 (August 2003), 
available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/25_03.pdf. 
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among the delegates,154 the Convention’s Praesidium felt at liberty to claim 
that it had accomplished what the Laeken Declaration had mandated, and it 
referred the document to the European Council as the product of “broad 
consensus.”155 
 
A nearly-completed draft of the Constitution was submitted to the 
European Council at its meeting in June of 2003. Some final work was 
permitted after the session, and the final Draft was submitted by the 
Convention on July 18th. This Draft was the subject of discussion at the 
intergovernmental Conference that convened on October 4, 2003, and some 
amendment to the constitutional text ensued. The 2003 IGC met again in 
December of 2003 and in June of 2004, and on June 18, 2004, it approved 
what became the final version of the Constitution. It was this version that was 
signed in Rome on October 29th of that year.156 The next step was to be a two-
year period of ratification, but as discussed in the introductory chapter of this 
treatise, that process has been interrupted. 
 
The foregoing description of the Constitution’s birth should not be 
taken as the complete story. In the pre-Convention period many activities and 
many proposals contributed to a process that eventually led to the writing of 
the Constitution. Some might well argue that the entire history of the 
European Union served as the run-up to the Convention, and that the 
Constitution was the inevitable result of that history. However, such a post 
hoc ergo propter hoc approach would not do justice to what is the unique and 
remarkable heart of this story. There had never before been a convention for 
                                                 
154 No votes were taken at the Convention’s plenary meetings. Daniel Dombey & 
George Parker, Dual Ambitions, Fin. Times, May 24, 2002, at 13. Giscard d’Estaing 
was accused of inventing consensus where it hardly existed and brushing aside 
dissenting voices. Id. See also George Parker, Political Leaders Are Starting to Take 
Seriously Discussions on a New Constitution for an Enlarged Union, Fin. Times, Dec. 
31, 2002, at 13. Three Benelux delegates wrote that they “deplored the procedure 
followed.” Letter from the Benelux countries to Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Chairman 
of the European Convention (Apr. 25, 2003) (on file with the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), available at http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=64E 
844AE637C4B2E89B3957CE2028F89X88X67360X33. A Finnish government 
representative described the workings of the Convention as “extremely ugly to 
watch.” Teija Tiilikainen, Finnish Delegates Reject Draft EU Constitution, Helsingin 
Sanomat (Helsinki), July 10, 2003, available at http://www.helsinki-hs.net/.  
155 Draft Treaty 2003, supra note 1. 
156 For a description of the final negotiations on the text of the Constitution and the 
discussions at various meetings of the 2003 IGC, see “Work of the IGC 2003/2004,” 
available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/cig2004/index_en.htm.  
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the purpose of amending the Treaties, and past history of the Union would 
more logically have suggested that an IGC be convened to consider a post-
Nice treaty amendment. Looking back, the issuance of the Laeken Declaration 
stands out as the seminal event among all those that contributed to the drafting 
of the Constitution. At that moment in December of 2001 the European 
Council made a deliberate decision to advance into unknown territory and to 
propel EU development into a new direction. The success or failure of that 
bold stroke remains to be seen. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Structure of the Constitutional Treaty’s Text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2 we examined the context of the Constitution, its 
historical underpinnings and its creation, while the remainder of the treatise 
focuses on the text of the Constitution, frequently comparing it to the Treaties 
to determine its potential impact on the dividing lines between the EU and its 
Member States. This examination may be enhanced by a brief overview of the 
structure of the Constitution. It is a lengthy document, and it is always useful 
to be clear as to where a particular provision fits into the textual organisation.  
To the reader who is new to the Constitution or otherwise not intimately 
familiar with its text, this chapter can serve as a reference guide to the 
analysis in Chapters 4 and following.  
 
1.  OVERALL STRUCTURE 
 
The Constitution begins with a Preamble that describes the Union’s 
heritage and objectives. The body of the document is divided into four parts: 
Part I, which is untitled, broadly defines the Union, its competences and its 
institutions. Part II is captioned “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
Union.” Part III is entitled “The Policies and Functioning of the Union.” Part 
IV contains “General and Final Provisions.” Various protocols and 
declarations follow the Constitution’s text. The individual articles of the 
Constitution are numbered consecutively from 1 to 448, although it is 
standard practice to refer to each article by its Part number and its article 
number, i.e. I-60 or IV-448. References to Parts I, II, III and IV, as well as to 
the numbered articles, are found throughout this treatise. 
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2.  PART I: UNTITLED157 
 
Part I is apparently intended as an overview of the European Union. 
Such a feature was absent in the Treaties, and this introduction may reflect the 
desire for a “basic treaty” as referred to in the Laeken Declaration. Part I 
consists of 60 articles in nine titles: 
 
Title I—Definition and Objectives of the Union.158 These 
eight provisions create the Union, grant it legal personality, affirm the 
primacy of EU law over Member State law, and identify the Union’s 
values and objectives, while acknowledging respect for the integrity 
of the Member States. 
 
Title II—Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union.159 
This brief section of two articles describes the EU’s commitment to 
human rights and presages the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part 
II of the Constitution. It also creates and defines EU citizenship. 
 
Title III—Union Competences.160 Clearly responding to a 
demand in the Laeken Declaration, these eight articles define what the 
EU may do, both in terms of its exclusive competences and with 
regard to competences shared with the Member States. These are 
critical concepts, on the one hand confirming Union authority and on 
the other hand underscoring that powers not specifically conferred to 
the EU are reserved to the Member States. 
 
Title IV—The Union’s Institutions.161 In straightforward 
terms, these 14 provisions describe the institutions, their composition 
and their responsibilities. Correcting an omission in the Treaties, the 
European Council is for the first time formally identified as an EU 
institution.162 The new positions of a permanent European Council 
                                                 
157 Constitution arts. I-1 to I-60. 
158 Constitution arts. I-1 to I-8. 
159 Constitution arts. I-9 to I-10. 
160 Constitution arts. I-11 to I-18. 
161 Constitution arts. I-19 to I-32. In the Constitution the European Council is always 
referred to with its full name, while in all provisions after Article I-19, the Council of 
Ministers is referred to as the “Council” and the European Commission is referred to 
as the “Commission.” See Constitution art. I-19(1). This treatise generally follows 
those usage conventions. 
162 Constitution arts. I-19, I-21. 
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President and Union Minister for Foreign Affairs are established.163 
Groups of three Member States will share presidencies of the Council 
for eighteen months, rather than rotating to a single State every six 
months,164 and the Commission will be reduced in size to less than 
one commissioner per Member State.165 This title also includes the 
controversial new formula for qualified majority voting on the 
European Council and Council.166 
 
Title V—Exercise of Union Competence.167 Significantly 
simplifying the Treaties, these 12 articles reduce the number of EU 
legal instruments to six—European laws, European framework laws, 
European regulations, European decisions, recommendations and 
                                                 
163 Constitution arts. I-22, I-28. 
164 Constitution art. I-24(7). Note that each of the three countries would chair all 
configurations of the Council (except Foreign Affairs) for a period of six months 
within the 18-month term. Draft Decision of the European Council on the Exercise of 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Meeting of Heads of State or Government, 
Brussels, June 28, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 420, Annex 8, art. 1 [hereinafter Draft 
Decision]. Arguably, this is not significantly different from the current system, in 
which the immediate past-president and the upcoming president coordinate with the 
current president. The participation of the same three Member States for the full 18-
month term might well have offered a greater measure of consistency and 
coordination than is currently the case, but the complete replacement of the team 
every 18 months might also have proven disruptive. 
165 The first Commission appointed under the Constitution would consist of one 
commissioner per Member State. Constitution art. I-26(5). After that full five-year 
term, the size of the body would be a number corresponding to two-thirds of the 
Member States, selected on the basis of equal rotation among the States. Constitution 
art. I-26(6). 
166 The Constitution’s QMV formula represents a departure from the weighted voting 
formulas inserted into the EC Treaty through the Treaty of Nice. EC Treaty art. 205. 
The formula proposed by the Convention was a majority of Member States 
representing three-fifths of the EU population, but this had been blocked by Spain and 
Poland at the December 2003 meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference. Thomas 
Fuller, supra note 108, at 1. The IGC meetings of June 2004 revised the formula to 
give greater voice to the smaller states. The final version would require the votes of 
55% of Council Members, representing at least 15 Member States and comprising at 
least 65% of the EU population. Constitution art. I-25(1). In addition a “blocking 
minority” would be required to include representatives of at least four Member States. 
Id. In certain instances the voting requirement is 72% of Council members 
representing at least 65% of the Union population. Constitution art. I-25(2). 
167 Constitution arts. I-33 to I-44. 
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opinions.168 This title describes which institution may adopt these 
measures, and it describes the procedures for such activity. An 
important procedural development is that legislative co-decision by 
the European Parliament becomes the norm.169 Furthermore, several 
provisions provide specific guidelines for Union action in common 
foreign and security policy, common defense and cooperation in 
freedom, security and justice.170 A final article in this section contains 
procedures for enhanced cooperation among groups of Member States 
in circumstances in which the entire Union is unable to act.171 
 
Title VI—The Democratic Life of the Union.172 These eight 
provisions respond to demands for more trappings of democracy 
within the EU. They demand equality for all EU citizens and 
guarantee openness and transparency in the workings of the Union’s 
institutions. The varied articles include a right of citizen initiative, the 
work of a European Ombudsman, protection of personal data, and 
Union respect for the status of churches and other organizations under 
national law.  
 
                                                 
168 Constitution art. I-33. The Constitution’s forms of legislation are similar to the five 
types currently provided under Article 249 of the EC Treaty, with the addition of 
“European regulations” as a new form of action. EC Treaty art. 249. See discussion in 
Chapter 14. 
169 The Constitution would expand the areas of co-decision from 37 to approximately 
80 subjects. Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Oral Report Presented to the European Council 
in Thessaloniki, June 20, 2003, SN 173/03, at 11, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/9604.pdf. This increase would be created through 
Article I-34(1), which provides that “European laws and European framework laws 
shall be adopted, on the basis of proposals from the Commission, jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure as set 
out in Article III-396.” Constitution art. I-34(1). Thus the Constitution would expand 
co-decision by including it as part of the normal legislative process, as opposed to an 
article-by-article amendment of substantive treaty provisions.  
170 Constitution arts. I-40 to I-43. Activities relating to the common foreign and 
security policy (the TEU’s Second Pillar) and cooperation and justice in home affairs 
(Third Pillar) are currently subject to their own types of legislation, such as “common 
strategies,” “joint actions,” and “common positions” in the Second Pillar, and 
“common positions,” “framework decisions,” “decisions,” and “conventions” in the 
Third Pillar. TEU arts. 13–15, 34. Under the Constitution, these types of legislative 
activity in theory would be carried out within the same six categories as all other 
forms of EU legislation. However, see comments in Chapter 14. 
171 Constitution art. I-44. 
172 Constitution arts. I-45 to I-52. 
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Title VII—The Union’s Finances.173 A concise summary of 
the EU’s budgetary system and processes is presented in four articles. 
 
Title VIII—The Union and its Immediate Environment.174 
This is a single provision that calls for the EU to establish close 
relationships with neighboring states. 
 
Title IX—Union Membership.175 These three provisions deal 
with accession to the EU, suspension of the rights of a Member State 
that violates the Union’s core values and voluntary withdrawal of a 
State from the Union. The articles on accession and suspension have 
antecedents in the Treaties,176 while the provision on withdrawal is 
unprecedented. 
3. PART II: THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS177 
 
This part of the Constitution incorporates the Charter that had 
previously been adopted as a “solemn proclamation” of the EU, but was not 
included in the Treaties.178 Part II consists of its own Preamble and 54 concise 
articles that are divided into titles designated as Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, 
Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and Justice. With the inclusion of the Charter in 
the text of the Constitution, the European Union will finally have a bill of 
rights at the core of its legal system. 
4. PART III: THE UNION’S POLICIES AND FUNCTIONING179 
 
The longest part of the Constitution with 322 articles, Part III 
incorporates much of the text of the EC Treaty and TEU. It contains 
considerable detail on the internal market, social, economic and monetary 
                                                 
173 Constitution arts. I-53 to I-56. 
174 Constitution art. I-57. 
175 Constitution arts. I-58 to I-60. 
176 TEU art. 49 (regarding accession); TEU art. 7, EC Treaty art. 309 (regarding 
suspension of rights). 
177 Constitution arts. II-61 to II-114. 
178 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. (C 
364) 1, 5 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. For an analysis of the Charter 
and its background, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From a Nation-State Europe to a Citizens’ Europe, 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 37 
(2002). Also see discussion in part 3 of Chapter 7. 
179 Constitution arts. III-115 to III-436. 
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policy, external action and the competences of the EU institutions. The 
following is a summary of its seven titles: 
 
Title I—Clauses of General Application.180 These eight 
provisions express general operating principles and objectives for the 
Union. 
 
Title II—Non-Discrimination and Citizenship.181 This brief 
section of seven articles restates certain civil rights of EU citizens, 
such as the rights to move and reside freely within the Union. 
Concepts of equality and non-discrimination are also reiterated. 
 
Title III—Internal Policies and Action.182 One of the most 
substantial sections in the Constitution, this title consists of 156 
articles, divided as follows: Chapter I on the internal market, 
including competition law; Chapter II on economic and monetary 
policy; Chapter III on certain specific areas such as employment, 
social policy, agriculture, environment, consumer protection, 
transport and energy; Chapter IV on border policies, immigration, 
asylum and police and judicial cooperation; and Chapter V on areas in 
which the EU may take action complementary to that of the Member 
States, including public health, industry, culture, education and civil 
protection. 
 
Title IV—Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories.183 This brief section of six articles contains special 
provisions governing the relationship between the Union and the 
overseas countries and territories of several Member States. 
 
Title V—The Union’s External Action.184 Various external 
matters have been consolidated into this section, whose 38 articles are 
divided into eight chapters. Most notably, the chapters cover the 
TEU’s Second and Third Pillars, relating to a common foreign 
security policy (including defense) and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Other subjects include a common 
trade policy, restrictive trade measures, humanitarian aid, the EU’s 
                                                 
180 Constitution arts. III-115 to III-122. 
181 Constitution arts. III-123 to III-129. 
182 Constitution arts. III-130 to III-285. See discussion in Chapter 17. 
183 Constitution arts. III-286 to III-291. 
184 Constitution arts. III-292 to III-329. See discussion in Chapter 17. 
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conclusion of international agreements and joint responses to terrorist 
attacks or disasters. 
 
Title VI—The Functioning of the Union.185 Another lengthy 
section, the 94 articles of this title are divided into three chapters. 
Chapter I contains detail on the EU institutions and advisory bodies, 
most of which was imported from the EC Treaty. Chapter II governs 
the Union’s budget and multi-annual financial framework. Chapter III 
offers details about enhanced cooperation among groups of Member 
States. 
 
Title VII—Common Provisions.186 A final section of 13 
articles deals with certain capacities of the Union and rights of the 
Member States, as well as several miscellaneous provisions. 
5.  PART IV: GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS187 
 
The final part of the Constitution’s text consists of 12 varied articles 
that deal with subjects such as the repeal of the EC Treaty and TEU, the 
continuity of the EU and its succession to the rights and obligations of the 
European Community. Procedures are described for the Constitution’s 
ratification and entry into force, and there are provisions governing future 
amendments to the document.188 
                                                 
185 Constitution arts. III-330 to III-423. 
186 Constitution arts. III-424 to III-436. 
187 Constitution arts. IV-437 to IV-448.  
188 The standard amendment procedure would require a new convention or an 
intergovernmental conference, plus eventual ratification by all Member States. 
Constitution art. I-9. More streamlined procedures, not requiring a convention or IGC, 
were proposed for changing unanimous voting requirements or special legislative 
procedures in Part III and revising internal Union policies in Part III. Constitution 
arts. IV-444, IV-445. See discussion in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
An Overview of the Constitutional Treaty’s Significant Innovations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before we proceed with our detailed examination in Parts Two, Three 
and Four of this treatise, it is appropriate to offer an additional overview of 
the Constitution. This chapter will provide a brief summary of the major 
points on which the Constitution would have changed the Treaties, and it will 
attempt to answer the question: In a nutshell, what would the Constitution do? 
This capsule description will be followed in Chapter 5 by another summary, 
one that illustrates how the Constitution defines the role of the Member States 
within the Union. In the course of these descriptions we identify the principal 
dividing lines between the EU and the states. Chapter 6 continues our 
introduction to the dividing lines, offering a brief summary of how and where 
the Constitution would have caused those lines to shift from their positions 
under the Treaties. As we continue beyond Part One and into the heart of this 
treatise, these three chapters will contribute a “big picture” perspective to help 
us maintain our bearings in the sea of details that lies ahead. Also, since these 
chapters serve as introduction to the remainder of the treatise, the discussion 
will include references to the corresponding treatments in later chapters. 
 
 The significant changes relating to the essential character of the EU 
have already been described at the end of the Introduction to this treatise. The 
Constitution would have repealed the EC Treaty and TEU, it would have 
created a new European Union with legal personality, and it would have 
scraped the Pillar structure. It also would have declared the primacy of EU 
law over national law. It bears the name “constitution” rather than “treaty.” It 
is suggested that all of these factors might have resulted in the creation of a 
new legal order for Europe. 
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 In terms of the structure of the treaty text, the principal changes 
embodied in the Constitution are its Part I and Part II. Part I contains an 
unprecedented overview of the Union and its competences, while Part II 
incorporates for the first time the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. 
Part III may be seen as largely a carryover of the provisions of the EC Treaty 
and TEU, although it contains a number of new policies in matters of 
substantive activity. Part IV contains the requisite technical and general 
articles, some of which are innovative.  
 
1. PART I – AN APPROACHABLE OVERVIEW, AND MORE 
 
 Taken alone, Part I189 in its nine Titles offers a substantial 
contribution to making the European Union more understandable. Its 
provisions introduce the EU and its institutions in a straightforward and clear 
manner, and some of its articles give substance to concepts that were at best 
implied in the Treaties. It should also be noted that in Part I, as well as in the 
preambles to the Constitution and to Part II, there are lofty statements of 
aspiration and intent that are worded differently than in the Treaties. The 
differences are analysed in Chapter 7, but the substantive importance of such 
statements would likely be subtle. 
 
Title I190 defines the Union, its values and objectives and its essential 
relationship with the Member States. It affirms the court-developed principle 
of primacy of EU law over Member State law, and it cures an omission in the 
Treaties by endowing the Union with legal personality and legal capacity. It 
also places new emphasis on the Member States by recognising their equality 
as states and calling upon the EU to treat the states with “full mutual respect” 
and “sincere cooperation.” Title II191 affirms EU citizenship and the basic 
rights attendant to it. Title III192 offers the clearest statement yet attempted in 
any of the Treaties as to the source of EU competences (stating that they are 
conferred by the Member States), the categories of these competences and 
how they relate to the authority reserved to the Member States. Containing a 
novel delineation of subjects as exclusive to the EU, shared between the EU 
and the Member States, or areas in which the EU may take only supporting, 
coordinating or complementary action, these provisions constitute an 
ambitious attempt to clarify the role of the Union institutions vis-à-vis the 
Member State governments. Also in this Title is the Constitution’s flexibility 
clause, Article I-18, which expands on its EC Treaty counterpart by 
                                                 
189 Constitution arts. I-1 to I-60. 
190 Constitution arts. I-1 to I-8. 
191 Constitution arts. I-9 to I-10. 
192 Constitution arts. I-11 to I-18. 
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broadening the subject areas in which the EU may act without specific 
constitutional authorization. The basic characteristics of the EU, 
corresponding somewhat to the subjects of Titles I to III, are analysed in 
Chapters 7 – 12 of this treatise. 
 
Title IV193 provides a useful snapshot of the EU institutions, although 
it must be noted that these introductory sections cannot be read without 
referring to much more extensive institutional provisions in Part III of the 
Constitution. Recognition of the European Council as an EU institution is 
unprecedented, as is the creation of a permanent (non-rotating) European 
Council Presidency. Other significant developments are the redefinition of a 
qualified majority for the Council and European Council, the creation of the 
post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a change in the system of rotating Council 
presidencies, the general grant of budgetary approval to the European 
Parliament and the planned reduction in size of the Commission. The EU 
institutions are examined in detail in Chapter 13. 
 
Title V194 provides for a simplification of the various legal 
instruments available to the EU and offers an explanation of how they are to 
be employed. These provisions manifest a boldness and level of innovation 
akin to Title III, and in so doing they would effectively eliminate the scheme 
of the Treaties that utilised different types of legal acts for EU activities 
falling within the different Pillars. Title V also solidifies the legislative role of 
the European Parliament by making co-decision the ordinary procedure.195 
Principles and procedures relating to EU law-making are analysed in Chapter 
14. 
 
Title VI196 enshrines for the first time a clear statement of how 
democracy is to be offered within the EU system to citizens of the Union. 
New developments include greater emphasis on transparency, including open 
meetings on the Council and greater access to EU documents. The Union 
institutions must maintain dialogue with citizens and representative 
associations, and the EU must respect the national status of churches and 
similar groups. The most innovative of these “democracy” provisions creates 
a citizen initiative process. Title VII,197 relating to the EU’s finances, 
reiterates principles found in the Treaties, but institutes for the first time a 
                                                 
193 Constitution arts. I-19 to I-32. 
194 Constitution arts. I-33 to I-44. 
195 Constitution art. I-34(1). 
196 Constitution arts. I-45 to I-52. 
197 Constitution arts. I-53 to I-56. 
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multiannual financial framework for the Union. Title VIII198 is a single 
section that offers a new emphasis on the EU’s relationships with its 
neighboring states. Title IX199 perpetuates basic principles relating to EU 
membership, but it also introduces the novel concept of a straightforward 
right for any Member State to withdraw from the Union. The subjects of 
Titles VI through VIII are analysed at various points in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Withdrawal from the Union is examined in Chapter 10. 
 
2. PART II – CONSTITUTIONALISING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
 The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union as 
Part II of the EU Constitution200 was a significant development, even though 
all of the Member States had previously adopted the Charter’s text as a 
political commitment through the European Council. The full impact of 
placing these rights in the constituent Union document was not clear, but 
under the Constitution the EU would have been subject to these sweeping 
rules respecting human rights. The Charter is further discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
 Related innovations are the requirements of Constitution Article I-9 
that the Union must (1) accede to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and (2) adhere to the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States” respecting 
fundamental rights.201 These concepts, coupled with the inclusion of the 
Charter’s text as Part II of the Constitution, display both a serious dedication 
and a complex approach to fundamental rights. This represents a dramatic 
shift in emphasis from the Treaties. 
 
3. PART III – A VARIETY OF NEW POLICIES 
 
 At the outset it should be noted that all areas of Part III202 are affected 
by the following innovations in Part I: (1) clarifications as to the Union’s 
competences, (2) simplification in the number of legislative instruments 
available, and (3) the re-defined ordinary legislative procedure. On the 
substantive side, Part III also offers a number of developments, described 
below, but it is noteworthy that the most visible areas of EU activity, the 
internal market and economic and monetary union, have been changed very 
little. The primary areas of substantive change are as follows:  
                                                 
198 Constitution art. I-57. 
199 Constitution arts. I-58 to I-60. 
200 Constitution arts. II-61 to II-114. 
201 Constitution art. I-9. 
202 Constitution arts. III-115 to III-436. 
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Space203 and energy policy204 would be added to the list of “policies 
in other areas” (i.e., beyond the internal market and economic and monetary 
policy) in which the EU is permitted to act.205 Areas in which the EU may 
take supporting, coordinating or complementary action206 would be expanded 
to include tourism,207 sport,208 civil protection,209 administrative cooperation210 
and certain aspects of public health.211 In addition, the Union would be 
permitted create an EU system of intellectual property rights.212 
 
The area of freedom, security and justice213 is consolidated from 
provisions taken from the TEU (Third Pillar)214 and the EC Treaty.215 Its 
scope is expanded somewhat, and it would be subject to the ordinary forms of 
legislative instrument. Furthermore, there is a pronounced move to more 
qualified majority voting on the Council in this field, and the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice would be significantly extended. 
 
 In the field of external action,216 the Union’s scope of activity is 
clarified to a considerable extent, beginning with a specific set of objectives 
for the EU’s external relations217 and an overall delineation of Union 
competences.218 The common foreign and security policy219 would be 
transformed from a distinct Second Pillar activity to an EU program that is 
subject to normal legislative procedures and instruments, including a certain 
measure of qualified majority voting on the Council of Ministers. The 
                                                 
203 Constitution art. III-254. 
204 Constitution art. III-256. Energy is mentioned as a Community activity in Article 
3(u) of the EC Treaty, but no separate provision is made for legislation in the field. 
205 Constitution arts. III-203 to III-256. 
206 Constitution arts. III-278 to III-285. 
207 Constitution art. III-281. Tourism is mentioned in EC Treaty Article 3(u) as a 
Community activity, but there is no separate section calling for legislation or action in 
the field. 
208 Constitution art. III-282. 
209 Constitution art. III-284. 
210 Constitution art. III-285. 
211 Constitution art. III-278. 
212 Constitution art. III-176. 
213 Constitution arts. III-257 to III-277. 
214 TEU arts. 29-42. 
215 EC Treaty arts. 61-69. 
216 Constitution arts. III-292 to III-329. 
217 Constitution art. I-3(4). 
218 Constitution arts. I-11 to I-18. 
219 Constitution arts. III-292 to III-313. 
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jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice would be extended into certain 
aspects of the CFSP. The common security and defence policy220 would 
likewise be removed from the Second Pillar, and it would be clarified in a 
number of ways. Its provisions for an EU operational capacity, a European 
Defence Agency and structured cooperation within the EU framework are 
novel.221 Other innovations include a provision relating to EU humanitarian 
aid,222 greater detail on how the Union may enter into international 
agreements,223 and a solidarity clause.224 
 
 The internal activities and external action of the EU are analysed in 
Chapter 17. 
 
4. PART IV – A NEW UNION; NEW AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 
 
 The most significant structural innovation in Part IV225 is the 
consolidation of the European Community and the European Union into a 
successor European Union. This would clean up an awkward and unnecessary 
dual personality that had been created with the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
 
Also worthy of note is the introduction of simplified procedures in 
Articles IV-444 and IV-445 by which the Constitution may be amended. 
However, these procedures would require unanimous Member State approval 
at some stage, in the form of a vote of the entire European Council, 
acquiescence by all national parliaments of the Member States, or ratification 
by all of the Member States. The new amendment procedures are 
supplemented by several other passerelle or “bridging” provisions in the 
Constitution that would permit the European Council to shift voting on the 
Council from unanimity to QMV. The European Council would be required to 
act unanimously to make these changes, but Member State ratification would 
not be required for what might be characterised as the equivalent of amending 
the Constitution. The bridging provisions, which have no precedent in the 
Treaties, are (1) Constitution Articles I-40(7) and III-300(3), which permit 
additional QMV to be instituted in the common foreign and security policy; 
(2) Constitution Article I-55(2), which permits additional QMV in relation to 
the EU’s multiannual financial framework; (3) Constitution Article III-269(3), 
                                                 
220 Constitution arts. III-309 to III-312. 
221 Constitution arts. I-41, III-311. 
222 Constitution art. III-321. 
223 Constitution arts. III-323 to III-326. 
224 Constitution art. III-329. 
225 Constitution arts. IV-437 to IV-448. 
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which permits additional QMV decision-making in certain matters of family 
law with cross-border implications; and (4) Constitution Article III-422, 
which permits additional QMV or a change in legislative procedure 
(participating Member States only) within a program of enhanced 
cooperation.226 A detailed examination of the amendment procedures may be 
found in Chapter 11. 
 
5. GENERAL COMMENT ON THE STRUCTURE 
 
 The Constitution may be fairly criticised for containing too much 
detail and for spreading the detail around, for example, in parallel sections in 
Part I and Part III. This critique and others are elaborated in Chapter 18. 
Nevertheless, the Constitution is easier to navigate than the EC Treaty and the 
TEU. Peter Norman has appropriately described the Constitution as “a huge 
advance on the existing jumble of treaties,” adding that it “is a text with a 
beginning, a middle and an end that an ordinary mortal can follow and that 
result far outshines anything produced by the two most recent 
intergovernmental conferences that culminated in the treaties of Amsterdam 
and Nice.”227 The improved layout of the Constitution must be seen as one of 
its significant overall changes. 
                                                 
226 Constitution art. III-422(1), (2). 
227 Norman, supra note 152, at 326-27. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
How the Constitutional Treaty Identifies the Dividing Lines  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will offer an overview of how the Constitution 
articulates the dividing lines between the EU and its Member States. This 
analysis serves as a preview of Parts Two, Three and Four (Chapters 7-17) of 
this treatise, first in a brief introduction and then in a more formal outline.  
 
It is important to note that the analysis in this chapter and in the 
remainder of this treatise does not follow the order of provisions in the 
Constitution. It would have been possible to do so, beginning with Article I-1 
of the constitutional text and proceeding in sequence to Article IV-448. But 
such an approach would not prove very useful in the pursuit of a particular 
theme such as the EU’s dividing lines. Rather, it has been more suitable to 
arrange the material as the subject itself suggests. In examining the division of 
competences between a central government and its constituent member states 
there will be, of course, many possible analytical frameworks, and no choice 
of approach is necessarily better than the alternatives. The organisation of this 
treatise was selected as a result of stepping back for a broad view of the 
European Union and posing a series of logical questions:  
 
What kind of entity is the EU? This question is so basic to the analysis 
that it was addressed in Chapter 1. The theme of that chapter is that the 
Union’s construct blends federal elements with structural components of an 
intergovernmental organisation. We also noted that the Union is not static; 
rather, it has evolved and continues to do so. From those conclusions and the 
other background material in Chapter 2 we proceed to our additional 
questions.  
 
Beyond its structural nature, what is the basic character of the EU? 
This question is examined in Part Two (Chapters 7-12). The initial focus, in 
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Chapter 7, is on the expressed values on which the Union is founded, and 
second on the concrete objectives for Union activity. With regard to values, 
we examine how and where they are stated. We examine whether they reflect 
a shared European point of view, whether there is pressure for full conformity 
among the Member States and whether there is room for any difference of 
opinion within the Union. We also inquire as to whether these stated values 
are aspirational only, or whether they carry the force of law. The second 
aspect of the EU’s character is how its stated values are translated into 
concrete objectives for Union activity. We observe that certain of the 
objectives are practical, such as creating and managing the internal market. 
Others are more elusive, such as elimination of discrimination and the 
promotion of human rights.  
 
What means are provided to the Union to enable it to pursue its 
objectives? Chapter 8 examines the attributes of the Union that permit it to 
function as a quasi-state. As an entity it is granted legal status, and the 
relationship between that characteristic and the separate legal status of the 
Member States is explored. The citizens of the Member States are granted a 
supplemental EU citizenship, which places them into a direct relationship 
with the Union. The Union possesses a measure of budgetary autonomy. It is 
empowered to act on matters internal to the geographic boundaries of its 
Member States, but also externally. Lastly, the EU is constituted with a 
sophisticated set of legislative, executive and judicial institutions that permit it 
to function much in the manner of a national government. 
 
In its activities will the EU be accountable to its citizens? Bearing in 
mind the debate in Chapter 1 as to whether the Union is “merely” an 
intergovernmental organisation or whether it is more federal in nature, in 
Chapter 9 we explore whether the EU is or should be democratic in its 
institutions and procedures. If the IGO characteristics are dominant, then it 
might be argued that the Union’s accountability is merely to the governments 
of the Member States. But it is quite clear that the scope of Union activity 
directly affects the individual citizen in profound ways. Thus, there is a deep-
seated expectation that something akin to national level democratic processes 
be offered at the EU level. The analysis explores how these democratic 
elements are infused into the EU’s institutions and activities.   
 
How can the EU adapt to new challenges and opportunities? The first 
50 years of the Union have seen rapid change in technology, lifestyle, 
attitudes and expectations. The EU has adapted to changing times, and it must 
not remain static. Chapter 10 examines how the Union will be able to 
facilitate “widening and deepening” – the accession of more Member States 
and the expansion of EU activity into new fields. Flexibility is the key, and 
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mechanisms for change are explored. At the same time, it is inevitable that the 
constituent documents of the Union will need periodic amending to permit 
new forms or levels of action to be taken. Chapter 11 explores the amendment 
requirements and the small steps proposed in the Constitution to simplify the 
process.    
 
On a more technical level, what principles govern how EU action is 
carried out? The final topic in Part Two is the examination in Chapter 12 of a 
series of legal concepts that govern EU lawmaking and other activity. These 
concepts include conferral, subsidiarity, primacy, exclusivity and others, and 
they represent a series of carefully crafted political decisions that have a 
profound impact on how the Union functions. Any analysis of the basic 
character of the EU would be incomplete without these technical, but highly 
significant details.  
 
After setting the stage in Parts One and Two, the analysis proceeds to 
the actual structure and operation of the EU – its institutions and how they 
create Union law. These subjects are addressed in Part Three. Chapter 13 
examines the primary EU institutions and how they reflect the Union’s 
carefully drawn dividing lines, while Chapter 14 describes the processes of 
EU lawmaking and administration. Chapter 15 explores the critically 
significant role of decisional requirements for the Council of Ministers, 
whether unanimity is mandated or whether a qualified majority is sufficient. 
Finally, we can turn to the actual subjects of EU activity, which we address in 
Part Four. Chapter 16 examines the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in 
which the Constitution’s most dramatic procedural changes are presented. 
Chapter 17 then reviews a variety of less significant developments relating to 
the EU’s internal activities and external action.  
 
Utilising the methodology just described, we are able to understand 
the attributes and competences of the European Union, as well as how it 
relates to the Member States that have created it. This approach is indeed 
consistent with the thrust (if not the outline) of the Constitution. The primary 
purpose of the document was to establish the Union and decree what it is 
empowered to do. However, as we proceed with our analysis we are struck by 
the fact that in many instances in which the Constitution describes the EU, it 
counterbalances those descriptions with explicit reminders of the powers 
reserved to the Member States. In other words, the Constitution’s text displays 
many of the EU’s the dividing lines and in many instances with considerable 
emphasis.  
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For the sake of brevity in the remainder of this chapter, attributes of 
the Union as expressed in the Constitution will be briefly noted, followed by 
examples of how the Member States are brought into the equation. When 
these same subjects are addressed in detail in Parts Two, Three and Four, the 
analysis will also compare the constitutional provisions with their predecessor 
articles, if any, in the Treaties. Citations are omitted in this chapter, but they 
are abundant in the ensuing analysis. 
 
1. THE CHARACTER OF THE EU (Treatise Part Two) 
 
1.1  EU values and objectives; Member State values and traditions 
(Chapter 7) 
 
 The Constitution identifies a number of values underlying the 
European Union and its activities, such as equality, democracy and the rule of 
law. The Union’s institutions are mandated to adhere to these values. At the 
same time, the Constitution notes that the EU’s values are common to and 
derive from the Member States. Recognition is also paid to the “peoples” of 
Europe and the diversity of cultures and traditions in the states. The EU is 
required to respect the status of churches and other such organisations under 
national law. The EU’s new motto is “united in diversity,” and the 
Constitution drops the goal of “ever closer union” that was expressed in the 
Treaties. 
 
 Springing from the Union’s values are an extensive and broad set of 
objectives for the EU. These include the fostering of prosperity, progress and 
peace, as well as promotion of human rights. In fact, nearly all EU activities, 
including those relating to the internal market and to external relations, are 
mentioned in sweeping terms as Union objectives. Both the EU institutions 
and the Member States are mandated to promote the Union’s values and 
pursue its objectives. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that the 
Union’s authority to pursue its objectives derives from the competences 
conferred on it by the Member States. 
 
 Perhaps because of the inclusion of the Charter as Part II of the 
Constitution, much emphasis is placed on human rights as a Union value, with 
the protection of such rights as a significant objective for the EU. Outside Part 
II there are numerous other textual references to individual rights. 
Nevertheless, this is not a field reserved for the EU. Rather, the Constitution 
contains many references to rights as recognized by Member State laws and 
traditions. For example, the provisions of Part II  mention respect for national 
laws in regard to education, conduct of business, workers’ rights, social 
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security and social assistance, health care, and access to services of general 
economic interest. In general terms, the EU must respect the Member States’ 
human rights traditions, the Charter must be interpreted in harmony with 
those traditions, and the Charter may not be interpreted as restricting rights 
recognised in Member State constitutions. The Constitution even notes, 
somewhat curiously, that the inclusion of the Charter is not intended to extend 
the scope of Union law. 
 
1.2  The EU’s state-like attributes; respect for the Member States 
(Chapter 8)  
 
a.  The legal character of the EU; the identity of the Member States 
 
 As a functioning organisation with powerful institutions and wide-
ranging activities, the European Union in many ways resembles a nation state. 
The Constitution reaffirms the Union’s state-like attributes, granting it legal 
personality, privileges and immunities and legal capacity. The EU possesses 
symbols such as a flag, an anthem and a currency. Under the Constitution the 
Union is a permanent entity, the successor to the EU and the European 
Community that were created by the Treaties. 
 
 Under the Constitution the European Union is required to respect the 
equality of the Member States, their national identities and their essential state 
functions. The EU must also treat the Member States with full mutual respect 
and deal with them in sincere cooperation. It must respect the cultural and 
linguistic diversity within Europe. The EU must promote solidarity among the 
Member States, and its institutions must serve the interests not only of the 
Union, but those of the Member States as well. In its capacity as a legal entity, 
the EU can acquire property under Member State law and be a party to legal 
proceedings under Member State law. Tort claims against the Union are to be 
made in accordance with principles common to the laws of the Member 
States. 
 
b. Citizenship of the Union; national citizenship 
 
 As under the Treaties, citizens of the Member States are granted EU 
citizenship, pursuant to which they possess certain rights to reside, work and 
even vote in other Member States. However, EU citizenship is specifically 
supplemental to Member State citizenship and does not replace it. National 
law retains the primary responsibility for citizens’ rights, and for example, 
when a citizen of one Member State votes in another Member State, he or she 
is bound by the conditions of local election laws.  
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c.  The Union budget; Member State input 
 
 The EU is granted budgetary independence, manifested in its own 
revenue stream and its authority over its expenditures. However, this is 
tempered considerably by the fact that many critical decisions relating to the 
budget require unanimous Council approval, and in some instances approval 
by the parliaments of the Member States, thus affording each state the 
opportunity to strongly assert itself in the budgeting process. A unanimous 
vote of the Council is also required to approve a law setting the multiannual 
financial framework of the Union. 
 
d.  The EU’s external action; limitations 
 
 The Union is empowered to carry out a wide array of activities in 
external affairs, but, as elaborated below and in Chapter 17, its authority is 
carefully contained. Each Member State retains a significant measure of 
competence to manage its own foreign affairs. 
 
e.  The institutions of the Union; respecting the Member States 
 
 The EU is manifested in a variety of institutions that carry out the 
Union’s work and pursue its objectives. These institutions to a great extent 
mirror the institutional framework of a nation. However, beyond the mandate 
for the institutions to manage the Union, the Constitution requires them to 
respect the Member States and serve their interests. The institutions are 
reminded to always adhere to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, thus protecting local interests where appropriate. The 
individual institutions are discussed in detail later in this chapter and in 
Chapter 13.  
 
1.3 The EU as a democracy; democracy in the Member States 
 (Chapter 9) 
 
 The Constitution requires the Union to adhere to democratic 
principles in its procedures and activities. EU citizens are to be treated 
equally, but they are also granted participatory rights through the European 
Parliament and through a new initiative process. EU decisions are to be taken 
openly, and the public right of access to Union documents is expanded. The 
Constitution’s provisions on democracy within the EU are emphasised more 
strongly than their counterparts in the Treaties, but despite this emphasis the 
democratic legitimacy of the Member States is in no way diminished. 
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Members of the European Council and Council of Ministers are 
democratically elected representatives of their separate national 
constituencies, and the Constitution assumes that each of the Member States 
will fully maintain its own democratic traditions.  
 
1.4 The EU as a flexible entity; Member State autonomy (Chapter 10) 
 
 One of the more pronounced characteristics of the European Union is 
the fact that it has steadily expanded and is likely to continue in its growth. 
But its flexibility has other manifestations. Under the Constitution a Member 
State may withdraw from the Union if it so chooses. In addition, there is the 
possibility for groups of Member States to engage in enhanced cooperation by 
themselves, and for individual states to opt out of Union activities such as the 
common currency. All of the foregoing may be seen as positive flexibility on 
the part of the EU, but they also underscore the fact that the Member States 
retain a substantial amount of autonomy despite their Union membership.  
 
1.5 Amending the Constitution; the impact of the unanimity 
requirement (Chapter 11) 
 
The Constitution, like its predecessor Treaties, could be amended 
only upon ratification by all of the EU’s Member States, each in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements. An innovation in the Constitution is 
that it provides for certain simplified amendment procedures, one of which 
avoids the ratification process. However, even if ratification is not necessary, 
there is the right of a national parliament to object and a veto right by any 
member of the European Council. Regardless of the procedure followed, full 
consensus must be reached among the Member States, and this fact 
emphasises the continuing sovereignty of the states as full treaty partners. 
 
1.6 Principles underlying EU action; emphasis on the Member States 
(Chapter 12) 
 
 The critical principles that guide all EU activity are tied in various 
ways to the separate identity and competence of the Member States. Union 
competences arise by conferral from the Member States, and competences not 
conferred in the Constitution remain with the states. The exclusivity of EU 
competence in certain areas is balanced by the fact that its competence in 
other areas may be shared with the Member States or limited to supporting, 
coordinating or complementing national activity. The principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality are specifically intended to limit the scope of 
Union activity, leaving for the Member States those activities that can be 
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effectively dealt with at the national level. The flexibility given to the EU to 
act in areas not specifically provided for in the Constitution is tempered by the 
fact that any such action must be unanimously approved by the Council and 
may not entail harmonisation of national law if the Constitution otherwise 
restricts harmonisation. The primacy of EU law over Member State law is 
tempered by the implied principle that such law must be authorised under the 
Constitution to be legally effective, and by the practical effect that 
implementation and administration of Union law is often left to the Member 
States.  
 
2.   INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU  
(Treatise Part Three) 
 
2.1 The EU institutions; the involvement of the Member States 
(Chapter 13) 
 
 European Union institutions do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they 
are in many ways representative of or reflective of the Member States, and 
decisions as to their make-up and authority may be subject to agreement by all 
of the states.  
 
 The seat of all institutions is subject to the common accord of the 
Member State governments. Their operating languages are subject to 
unanimous decisions by the Council. The composition of the European 
Parliament is to be decided by a unanimous vote of the European Council. 
The system for electing Parliament and rules governing the activities of 
parliamentarians are to receive unanimous approval by the Council. Members 
of the European Council represent their respective Member States, and this 
body must normally act by consensus, thus giving each state a veto on 
decisions. Members of the Council of Ministers also represent their respective 
Member States. A Council member is empowered to commit his or her 
government and cast its vote. The presidency of most Council formations is to 
be assigned on the basis of equal rotation among the Member States. 
 
 Under the Constitution, until the end of the first full five-year 
Commission term commencing after the Constitution takes effect, the body 
will continue to be composed of one commissioner per Member State. 
Thereafter, the size of the Commission will reflect two-thirds of the Member 
States, and unanimous votes of the European Council or Council will be 
necessary to change the body’s size and set its rotation. In any event, after 
appointment the commissioners will be required to act without instruction or 
influence from their national governments.  
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 The European Court of Justice and Court of Auditors are comprised 
of one judge per Member State, each being proposed by a Member State. The 
Court’s jurisdiction is exclusive only to the extent the Constitution so states; 
in other cases the courts of the Member States will have concurrent 
jurisdiction. The Governing Council of the European Central Bank includes 
the governors of the national central banks of the euro-zone Member States, 
although such governors and the Governing Council are to be independent of 
influence from the Member States. The members of the European Investment 
Bank are the Member States themselves. Members of the Union’s two 
advisory committees, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, are proposed by the Member States and unanimously agreed 
by the Council. 
 
2.2 Unanimous voting on the Council; the veto power (Chapter 15) 
 
As previously noted, the unanimity requirement for certain Council decisions 
affords each Member State the possibility to exercise a veto over the matter. 
Chapter 15 and the Addendum examine in detail the subjects for which 
unanimity, consensus or common accord may or may not be required. 
 
3.  SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF EU ACTIVITY (Treatise Part Four) 
 
 In specific matters of EU activity, numerous protections for the 
positions of the Member States may be found in the Constitution. First and 
foremost, such protections are set forth in Article I-12 of the document, which 
describes the EU’s competences in three primary categories: (i) exclusive, (ii) 
shared, and (iii) supporting, coordinating or complementary. In matters of 
exclusive competence, only the Union may act unless it specifically 
empowers the Member States to do so. In areas of shared competence, the 
Member States are free to act on their own if the EU decides not to. In areas 
of supporting, coordinating or complementary EU action the Union’s role is 
limited, and its activities may not supersede those of the Member States. 
Additional safeguards in specific areas are discussed below.  
 
 It is important to note that the following descriptions do not include 
the many instances in which a unanimous vote of the Council or European 
Council (or consensus or another form of unity) may be required to approve a 
particular law or adopt a particular decision. These are addressed in Chapter 
15 and the Addendum. Unanimity carries with it an obvious protection for 
each Member State, and the ramifications of unanimous voting are addressed 
at many points in this treatise. 
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3.1 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; expanded EU 
activities, but a role for the Member States (Chapter 16) 
 
 With the Constitution’s abandonment of the Pillar structure, all AFSJ 
activity would take place under the ordinary procedures of the Union and with 
the use of the new set of legislative instruments. The dramatic result is that 
virtually all decisions would be subject to qualified majority vote of the 
Council, rather than unanimity as under the TEU. 
 
Despite this significant development, certain EU action in the area 
AFSJ is marked for particular attention by the national parliaments of the 
Member States. Also, notwithstanding the need for EU policies on border 
controls, asylum and immigration, the Constitution emphasises that the 
Member States retain competence to define their own borders under 
international law, special consideration is to be given to a state that 
experiences a sudden influx of third country nationals, and each Member 
State retains control over the number of third country nationals permitted to 
enter and take up employment. In the field of police cooperation among the 
Member States a role is created for Europol, but any coercive measures are 
strictly reserved to national authorities. In broad terms the Constitution 
requires that legislation in the area of freedom, security and justice must also 
respect the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. 
 
3.2 The Union’s Internal Activities and External action  
(Chapter 17) 
 
a. Internal market; limits on EU competence 
 
 While the EU has a general mandate to manage the Union’s internal 
market, the Constitution contemplates derogations by Member States in time 
of economic need, wars or other disturbances. States may derogate from the 
free movement of persons and services by favoring nationals in public service 
positions and by restricting services related to a state’s exercise of official 
authority. Furthermore, restrictions may be imposed on foreign nationals on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The free movement 
of goods within the Union may be restricted on similar grounds, and the 
Member States may operate their own monopolies of a commercial character. 
The free flow of capital may be restricted in case of an external threat or on 
other grounds of public policy. The EU’s exclusive authority in competition 
law is limited to rules that are necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market, and Member States are permitted to grant aids to their business 
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sectors for social, cultural and development reasons. In general, Member State 
law relating to the internal market may vary from EU harmonisation 
requirements for reasons of public policy, morality, health, culture and even 
protection of a state’s working environment. 
 
b. Economic and monetary union; the non-participants 
 
 Despite the fact that the EU is to provide economic policy 
coordination and guidelines, the Constitution emphasises that the Member 
States will have their own economic policies. And although monetary union is 
a signature program of the Union, certain Member States have been permitted 
to opt out of the euro-zone and maintain substantial control over their own 
monetary policies. 
 
c. “Other areas;” retention of national competence 
 
 In a chapter dealing with EU policies in “other areas,” the 
Constitution addresses a wide range of subjects, many of which give 
particular consideration to the Member States. The Union’s coordination of 
employment policies recognises that these policies are essentially national in 
character, and harmonisation of Member State employment laws is prohibited. 
EU social policy harmonisation is to take account of diverse forms of national 
practice. In the field of environmental protection, the EU and the Member 
States are recognised as having their own spheres of competence, and 
Member States as well as the Union are permitted to enter into international 
agreements. Trans-European networks relating to transport, tele-
communications and energy supply are considered an area of shared 
competence, but any network that touches upon the territory of a Member 
State must be approved by the affected state. In the areas of research, 
technological development and space, the Union may complement Member 
State activity, but national competence is retained, and in some cases an EU 
program may involve certain states only.   
 
d. Areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action; a limited 
EU role 
 
 In the seven broad areas in which the EU is permitted to offer 
supporting, coordinating or complementary action, harmonisation of Member 
State laws is specifically prohibited with respect to industrial policy, cultural 
development, tourism support, education, sport, civil protection and 
administrative cooperation. The Constitution also recognises that each 
Member State is responsible for the content of its own education and 
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vocational training, as well as for the cultural and linguistic diversity in its 
education system. While the EU will offer administrative support to the 
Member States with regard to their implementation of Union law, any state 
may decline to accept this assistance. 
 
e. External action; national sovereignty 
 
 The EU is charged with a variety of responsibilities in external action, 
including development of a common foreign and security policy and the 
framing of a common security and defence policy. Nevertheless, these are 
fields in which the Member States retain substantial autonomy, and significant 
protections for the states are built into EU competences.  
 
 All policy decisions on external action are subject to a unanimous 
vote of the European Council. In the CFSP the Constitution emphasises 
containment of EU competences, mutual solidarity among the Member States 
and use of national as well as EU resources, while the Union is encouraged to 
strengthen systematic cooperation among the states. EU laws are not 
permitted in the CFSP; rather, action is to take the form of decisions. A 
Member State that objects to a decision may, as an alternative to exercising its 
veto power, opt out of the matter and permit the other states to proceed. 
Enhanced cooperation in foreign policy is permitted for groups of Member 
States. 
 
 In matters of defence, the EU is charged with the progressive framing 
of a common policy, but all decisions are to be unanimously made by the 
Council or European Council. Furthermore, the separate policies of the 
Member States and the obligations of certain states in NATO are to be 
respected. Member States are required to assist each other in case of attack, 
and the Constitution recognises the needs for a state’s own defence secrecy 
and trade in arms. Military resources are to stay in the hands of the Member 
States, and groups of states may be enlisted to carry out EU policy, while 
certain states may engage in permanent structured cooperation. 
 
 The common EU commercial policy includes Member State 
protections such as unanimous Council voting on certain matters, a 
declaration that such policy may not affect EU and Member State 
competences, and a prohibition of harmonisation of state laws if the 
Constitution provides such restrictions. In matters of development 
cooperation, EU policy must complement Member State policies, and the 
Constitution recognises the right of the states to conclude their own 
international agreements. Similar recognition of Member State competence is 
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expressed with regard to economic, financial and technical cooperation with 
third countries and with regard to humanitarian aid. The general authority of 
the EU to enter into international agreements is expressly qualified by a 
statement that the Member States’ competence to enter into such agreements 
is not to be prejudiced by Union action. Furthermore, in its activities in third 
countries and with international organisations, the EU is required to cooperate 
with Member State diplomatic and consular missions. 
 
4. SUMMARISING THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 As broadly described in the foregoing preview, the European Union’s 
dividing lines may be characterised in several ways. Many of them are 
obvious, and these would include specified limitations on EU competences 
and the right of a Member State to block a decision that requires unanimity. 
The procedures available to amend the Constitution represent the ultimate 
expression of intergovernmentalism, with each Member State separately 
permitted to determine whether to approve or reject a proposed amendment.  
 
Other dividing lines prove to be more subtle. For example, where 
values and objectives are stated for the Union, this does not imply that 
national values and objectives are thus diminished. Objectives relating to 
centralised activities may well be shared by the Member States. Another such 
subtlety is found in the highly detailed descriptions of the EU institutions, 
their competences and their operating procedures. Beneath the surface of 
these descriptions one may find many instances in which the Member States 
exert their individual influences on the EU institutions or on the activities 
being carried out by those institutions.  
 
Lastly, we must recognize that the dividing lines may be complex, 
and richly so. The principles underlying EU action – for example, primacy 
and subsidiarity – may be rather simply defined, but history has proven them 
to be full of nuance and the subject of vigorous academic and political debate. 
A great deal of the intensity of such discourse stems from the push and pull of 
national interests within the Union. Similarly, a review of the wide range of 
the subjects of EU activity reveals many points of debate as to how Union 
activity should or should not impact Member State competence in the same 
field.  
 
 In broad terms, the dividing lines serve as metaphor for the entire 
course of European integration. Individual sovereign nations have decided to 
band together for the greater good, but they do not wish to lose their 
nationhood in the process. No matter how successful and exciting the EU has 
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proven to be, one may never lose sight that it is not yet a United States of 
Europe. Many Europeans have viewed each stage of Union development with 
a critical eye and an earnest intention that the EU will never become 
integrated to that extent.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Notable Changes that May Affect the EU’s Dividing Lines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We conclude this introductory section by previewing and 
summarising the innovations in the Constitution that could have affected the 
existing dividing lines within the EU. Certain of the changes may have 
offered a shift toward the Union and toward central authority, at the same 
time diminishing the sovereignty or autonomy of the individual Member 
States. Other changes may have flowed in the opposite direction. It is worth 
emphasising that, unlike previous treaty amendments, it was not a primary 
purpose of the Constitution to expand EU competences or increase the pace of 
integration. Nor was it intended to “give back” any significant power to the 
Member States. Rather, the thrust of the constitutional project was to simplify, 
clarify and improve the existing EU institutions and procedures. That being 
said, some subtle shifting of the lines are the inevitable result of any treaty 
amendment. 
 
1. SHIFTING AWAY FROM THE MEMBER STATES 
 
Let us begin with a reminder that the new “legal order” previously 
described may well reflect meaningful movement toward a more cohesive and 
more supranational Union, and thus a corresponding diminishment of 
Member State sovereignty. The elements of this order are identified in part 
1.1 below, along with other provisions in the Constitution that arguably would 
have shifted the EU’s dividing lines toward more Union competence.  
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1.1 Structural and procedural matters 
 
(1) The new document is called a “treaty establishing a constitution,” 
suggesting that the EU is a more significant, constitutional entity. It repeals 
the EC Treaty and TEU, both of which are called treaties and nothing more.228 
 
(2) The Constitution creates a new European Union that is the 
successor to the European Community and to the existing Union.229 The new 
EU is a single, more cohesive entity than its predecessors. 
 
(3) Along with the new Union is a single set of legal instruments for 
all Union law-making.230 This effectively eliminates the Three Pillars and 
creates greater cohesion for the overall program of the EU. 
 
(4) The grant of legal personality to the Union231 and the 
acknowledgement of its legal capacity232 may be seen as affirming and 
strengthening its existence apart from the Member States. 
 
(5) The Constitution states that EU law has primacy over Member 
State law.233 This principle had developed in the case law of the European 
Court of Justice, but the constitutional provision arguably strengthens the 
concept. 
 
(6) The new delineation of the Union’s competences as “exclusive,” 
“shared” or “supporting, coordinating or supplementary”234 arguably cements 
the authority of the EU, but it could also be posited that the clarification 
equally protects the competences of the Member States. 
 
(7) The Constitution’s flexibility clause is broader than its EC Treaty 
counterpart,235 potentially opening the door to expanded EU activity. 
However, unanimous Council approval is required for any action taken under 
the flexibility clause, and the Constitution provides a new requirement of 
advance notification to the Member State parliaments. 
 
                                                 
228 Constitution art. IV-437(1). 
229 Constitution art. IV-438(1). 
230 Constitution art. I-33. 
231 Constitution art. I-7. 
232 Constitution art. III-426. 
233 Constitution art. I-6. 
234 Constitution arts. I-12 to I-17. 
235 Constitution art. I-18; EC Treaty art. 308. 
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(8) The most notable procedural changes are those instances in which 
unanimous voting on the Council or European Council is abandoned in favor
of qualified majority voting. These provisions are described in detail in 
Chapter 15. As the analysis indicates, although these provisions do remove 
the veto power of each Member State, most of the changes are in areas that 
are not matters of vital national concern. In instances where sensitivities were 
strong, proposals for change (such as a suggested QMV for company tax 
harmonisation) were rebuffed at the Convention or the ensuing sessions of the 
IGC.236 Proposals to permit amendment of the Constitution by a super-
majority were also rejected,237 with the result that the ordinary amendment 
procedure requires Member State ratification, and even the simplified 
amendment procedures in Part IV of the Constitution or its passerelle 
provisions permitting a streamlined approach to more qualified majority 
voting require some form of consent by each of the Member States or their 
representatives.238  
 
1.2 Institutional changes 
 
(1) The permanent President for the European Council239 has the 
potential to give greater attention to the EU, both within Europe and without. 
A more prominent face to the Union could draw attention away from Member 
State officials. 
 
(2) The new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs240 could create 
greater EU visibility in a manner similar to that of the new European Council 
President. In addition, the Minister would chair the Foreign Affairs formation 
of the Council of Ministers,241 in place of the current system in which the 
presidency rotates among the Member States. This removes a measure of 
political prominence, if not actual power, from the national governments. 
 
(3) The reduction in composition of the Commission to less than one 
commissioner from each Member State242 was anticipated in the Treaties, and 
the Constitution proposed to fix the body’s eventual size and the date of its 
restructuring. The eventual end to permanent participation of each state in this 
                                                 
236 See text accompanying note 977, infra. 
237 See Norman, supra note 152, at 81, 293, 332.   
238 See discussion in part 2 of Chapter 11. 
239 Constitution art. I-22. 
240 Constitution art. I-28. 
241 Constitution art. I-24(7). 
242 Constitution art. I-26(6). 
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institution243 will to some extent diminish the individual voices of the 
Member States in Brussels. 
 
1.3 Substantive developments  
 
 (1) Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the Constitution’s 
disclaimers,244 might have extended the Union’s reach into individual rights, 
and it would have expanded the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
 
 (2) The Constitution authorises the Union to create EU intellectual 
property rights,245 a field previously left to the Member States. In addition, 
EU action will for the first time be permitted in the areas of space, energy 
policy, tourism, sport, civil protection, administrative cooperation and certain 
aspects of public health.246 To the extent the Union actually enters these 
fields, the previous autonomy of the Member States on such matters will be 
lost. Additionally, the EC Treaty’s requirement of unanimous Council 
decisions in matters of culture is changed to qualified majority voting – a 
minor but potentially interesting loss of the national veto power.247 
 
 (3) The Constitution identifies as areas of “shared competence” the 
following: the internal market, social policy, policies relating to economic, 
social and territorial cohesion, agricultural and fisheries policy, the 
environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, 
energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, and common safety concerns 
in public health.248 The concept of shared competence had not been articulated 
in the Treaties, and it is possible that in some instances the Union’s newly 
articulated right to pre-empt action in these fields might diminish Member 
State activity. 
 
(4) The Constitution extends the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice into several aspects of the common foreign and security policy and 
into the area of freedom, security of justice.249 These extensions have the 
potential of undercutting the authority of the Member State courts.  
 
                                                 
243 Constitution art. I-26. 
244 Constitution art. II-111(2). 
245 Constitution art. III-176. 
246 See discussion in part 1.3 and 1.4 of Chapter 17. 
247 See discussion in part 1.4 of Chapter 17. 
248 Constitution art. I-14(2). See discussion in Chapters 16 and 17. 
249 See discussion in part 5 of Chapter 13. 
6:  CHANGES AFFECTING THE DIVIDING LINES 77 
 
(5) In the area of freedom, security and justice, there are several 
additional constitutional developments that arguably diminish the authority of 
the Member States. First, there is a shift from unanimous Council voting in 
the Third Pillar to qualified majority voting in many instances. Second, the 
right of Member States to initiate legislation in the field has changed from the 
right of a single state to do so to the requirement that one-fourth of the states 
must participate.250 Third, new EU action is permitted with respect to 
developing uniform standards for cross-border crime, support for crime 
prevention programs, and the establishment of an EU Public Prosecutor.251 
 
(6) In the field of the common foreign and security policy, the 
Constitution creates new areas in which qualified majority decisions are 
permitted on the Council. It also allows the European Council to unanimously 
decide to extend qualified majority voting into new areas, without amending 
the Constitution.252 
 
(7) With respect to the Union’s common security and defence policy, 
the Constitution speaks for the first time of the EU developing its own 
operational capacity, and it provides for establishment of a European Defence 
Agency.253 Although this strongly suggests expansion of EU activity at the 
expense of the Member States, it is important to note that decisions in these 
matters must be taken by consensus on the Council or European Council.254 
 
(6) Where the TEU anticipates bilateral cooperation between Member 
States within the framework of the Western European Union and NATO,255 
the Constitution provides that such activities may take the form of structured 
cooperation “within the Union framework.”256 A greater role for the EU may 
entail an eventual loss of Member State autonomy in matters of defence.  
  
2. NEW EMPHASIS ON THE MEMBER STATES 
 
 More remarkable perhaps than the new focus on the Union are the 
numerous examples of how the Constitution underscores the importance of 
                                                 
250 See discussion in Chapter 16. The increased difficulty of implementing the 
Member State initiative arguably strengthens the residual right of initiative held by 
the Commission. 
251 Constitution arts. III-271, III-272, III-274. 
252 See discussion in Chapter 17. 
253 See discussion in Chapter 17. 
254 Constitution arts. I-41(2), (4). 
255 TEU art. 17. 
256 Constitution art. I-41(6). 
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the Member States within the EU system. All of the items included in the 
following descriptions are novel, that is, they are not found in the Treaties at 
all or are given significant new emphasis in the Constitution. 
 
2.1 Reminders and mandates regarding the Member States 
 
 In its statements about the Union’s objectives, the Constitution makes 
more frequent reference to the role of the Member States in pursuing those 
objectives.257 More substantively, the Constitution requires the EU to respect 
the equality of the Member States, their national identities and their essential 
state functions,258 all in terms more forceful than those found in the Treaties. 
The Union is to treat the states with “full mutual respect” and deal with them 
in “sincere cooperation,”259 phrases not found in the Treaties. It must respect 
the cultural and linguistic diversity within Europe,260 and it must respect the 
status of churches and other such organisations under national law.261 The 
Union must offer more open meetings of its institutions,262 greater access to 
its documents263 and more availability for consultation with citizens and civil 
society.264 It must also respect the Member States’ human rights traditions.265 
The EU is recognized as a legal entity, and in that capacity it may have 
responsibilities under Member State law.266 EU citizenship is specifically 
supplemental to Member State citizenship and does not replace it.267 One 
interesting linguistic innovation is the fact that the Constitution’s preamble 
does not speak of “ever closer union” among the states, as the Treaties do.268 
 
2.2 EU structural, institutional and procedural concepts 
 
 The Constitution goes well beyond the Treaties by carefully defining 
the exclusive, shared and other competences of the EU.269 Arguably this new 
clarity may benefit the Member States as well as the EU, as it may curb Union 
encroachment into areas reserved to or shared with the states. The 
                                                 
257 See discussion in Chapter 7. 
258 Constitution art. I-5(1). 
259 Constitution art. I-5(2). 
260 Constitution art. I-3. 
261 Constitution art. I-52. 
262 Constitution art. I-50(2). 
263 Constitution art. I-50(3). 
264 Constitution art. I-47. 
265 Constitution art. I-9(3). 
266 Constitution arts. I-7, III-426. 
267 Constitution art. I-10. 
268 EC Treaty Preamble; TEU Preamble.  
269 Constitution arts. I-11 to I-18. 
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Constitution also expands on a vaguely-worded concept in the EC Treaty, 
emphasising that the Union’s powers are conferred by the Member States, and 
that all competences not conferred are reserved to the states.270 If the Union 
acts under its flexibility clause, it is required to give advance notification to 
the Member State parliaments.271 In areas of EU supporting, coordinating or 
complementary action, the Constitution clearly states that EU action may not 
supersede Member State competence in the same fields and may not require 
harmonisation of Member State law.272 Of equal significance is the fact that 
the Constitution’s protocols on national parliaments and subsidiarity provide 
new clarity and an expanded involvement on the part of the Member States.273 
 
 The Constitution clarifies that the European Council must normally 
act by consensus,274 and it emphasises that the members of the European 
Council and Council of Ministers are to actively represent the interests of 
their respective Member States.275 
 
 The Council must act unanimously to set the newly created 
multiannual financial framework.276 Likewise, laws passed under the 
Constitution’s flexibility clause must receive unanimous Council approval.277 
The new citizen initiative process offers greater participation directly to 
European citizens, rather than to their national governments, but a significant 
number of Member States must be represented in the signature lists for an 
initiative proposal to be legitimate.278 Groups of states with higher military 
capabilities may establish their own permanent structured cooperation within 
the EU framework.279 The ultimate procedural development in favor of the 
Member States is the new withdrawal provision, which permits any state to 
declare its intention to exit the Union and then do so without being 
punished.280 
 
                                                 
270 Constitution arts. I-1, I-11. 
271 Constitution art. I-18. 
272 Constitution art. I-12(5). 
273 Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, Dec. 16, 2004, 
O.J. (C 310) 204 [hereinafter Protocol on National Parliaments]; Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. 
(C 310) 207 [hereinafter Protocol on Subsidiarity]. 
274 Constitution art. I-21(4). 
275 Constitution arts. I-23(2), I-46. 
276 Constitution art. I-55(2). 
277 Constitution art. I-18(1). 
278 Constitution art. I-47(4). 
279 Constitution art. I-41(6). 
280 Constitution art. I-60. 
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2.3 EU internal policies 
 
 Various matters of new EU activity provide emphasis on the Member 
States. The selection of language arrangements for new EU intellectual 
property rights requires a unanimous Council vote.281 EU activities in space 
may not interfere with Member State competence in such endeavors.282 In the 
new fields of tourism,283 sport,284 civil protection285 and administrative 
cooperation,286 EU activity may not entail harmonisation of Member State 
laws. 
 
 In the area of freedom, security and justice a new provision requires 
the European Council, acting unanimously, to set strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational planning within the field.287 In addition, the EU is 
called upon to respect the different legal systems and traditions of the 
Member States.288 National parliaments are to ensure that certain activities in 
the AFSJ field must comply with the principle of subsidiarity.289 In the matter 
of border checks, asylum and immigration, new emphasis is placed on the 
right of each Member State to determine geographical demarcation of its 
borders under international law290 and to determine the volumes of third-
country nationals to be granted work permits,291 and the principles of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility are highlighted.292 In the area of 
police cooperation, any coercive measures are to be carried out by national 
authorities, rather than by Europol.293 
 
2.4  EU external action 
 
 The European Council must act unanimously to set the strategic 
interests and objectives of the EU in all of its external action, not just in the 
area of common foreign and security policy, and use of Member State 
                                                 
281 Constitution art. III-176. 
282 Constitution art. I-14(3). 
283 Constitution art. III-281. 
284 Constitution art. III-282. 
285 Constitution art. III-284. 
286 Constitution art. III-285. 
287 Constitution art. III-258. 
288 Constitution art. III-257. 
289 Constitution art. III-259. 
290 Constitution art. III-265. 
291 Constitution art. III-267. 
292 Constitution art. III-268. 
293 Constitution art. III-276(3). 
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resources is contemplated.294 Special note is made of the fact that Union 
activity in the CFSP may not affect the competences specifically granted to 
the EU in the Constitution, and by implication CFSP activity may not affect 
Member State competences either.295 In the common security and defence 
policy, Member States are called upon to assist each other,296 the obligations 
of certain EU members under NATO are respected,297 and structured 
cooperation among groups of states is contemplated.298 In matters of 
humanitarian aid, EU action is to complement Member State action,299 and the 
states must assist each other under a new solidarity clause.300  
 
3.  SUMMARISING THE CHANGES 
 
 There is a risk of over-simplification in offering a capsule summary 
of the changes that are already summarised in this chapter. Nevertheless a few 
broad comments are possible. First, the structural and procedural changes 
proposed in the Constitution might indeed suggest a new legal order for the 
European Union, but this would not be accompanied by an overt shift of 
competences to the EU institutions. Second, the major institutional changes 
might well serve to increase the Union’s efficiency and visibility, but again 
there is no proposal for an obvious increase in institutional competences. 
Finally, selected areas of substantive change, such as inclusion or the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the increase of QMV decision-making in the 
AFSJ, do in fact increase the EU’s competences while eliminating some 
opportunities for individual Member States to block EU action. Item for item, 
however, it is difficult to see these developments as anything other than 
incremental. In short, although certain dividing lines would shift under the 
Constitution, the potential movement is not nearly as dramatic as many critics 
have claimed. 
 
                                                 
294 Constitution arts. I-40(4), I-41(3), III-293(1), III-310. 
295 Constitution art. III-308. 
296 Constitution arts. I-41(7), I-43. 
297 Constitution art. I-41(2). 
298 Constitution arts. I-41(6), III-312. 
299 Constitution art. III-321(1). 
300 Constitution art. III-329. 
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Part Two:  The Character of the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We now move into the detailed analysis of the Constitution and how 
it compares with the existing Treaties. This part will examine the essential 
character of the European Union as endowed by the Constitution, because the 
very nature of the EU and its institutions reflects the dividing lines between 
the Union and its Member States.  
 
The outline of this part was previewed in Chapter 5, and the analysis 
begins with Chapter 7 addressing the values on which the EU is founded and 
the objectives it must pursue. Chapter 8 then explores the various ways in 
which the Union resembles a nation state – it offers a type of citizenship, it 
manages its own budget and it is manifested in a set of institutions. As an 
organisation with citizens, the EU is perceived as having responsibilities to 
deal openly and transparently with them, and Chapter 9 analyses the extent to 
which the Union offers democratic rights. Certain of the complexities in 
managing the EU are dealt with in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. Because of the 
tension between the need for effective central action and the insistence that 
the Member States retain their own national sovereignty, a built-in fluidity has 
evolved to permit the Union to move forward even where full consensus may 
be lacking. Chapter 10 analyses that flexibility. In contrast, Chapter 11 deals 
with the historical fact that the EU has its roots as a treaty organisation, and 
thus the Constitution retains the requirement that it cannot be amended 
without the complete agreement of all Member States. Finally, Chapter 12 
discusses a series of legal principles that guide and limit EU action. 
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These six chapters are intended to provide a meaningful portrait of the 
European Union, as well as an explanation of how its character is reflected in 
part by an identifiable set of dividing lines. With this portrait in mind, Part 
Three will address more fully the EU’s institutions and the processes by 
which they make and carry out its laws. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Values and Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The underpinnings of any organisation are the guiding principles on 
which it is based and the goals it will pursue. Both the EC Treaty and the 
Treaty on European Union contain broad statements of values and 
objectives,301 and the drafters of the Constitution seized the opportunity to 
include such expressions in the new document.  However, as an integral part 
of the expressed intentions for the Union, the authors of the Treaties and 
Constitution have also chosen to include affirmations of the Member States 
and their separate traditions. 
 
1.  VALUES UNDERLYING THE EU 
 
1.1  Shared values 
 
 The Constitution’s Preamble emphasises the “cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe” and the “universal values of the inviolable 
and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and 
the rule of law.” The preamble to Part II of the Constitution, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union, reiterates these ideas. References to the 
EU’s values may also be found within the body of the Constitution. 
According to Article I-1(2), the Union is to be open “to all European States 
which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together.” 
Article I-2 is entitled “The Union’s Values,” and it states them to be “respect 
for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” 
Article I-2 adds: “These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and 
equality between women and men prevail.” The values expressed in Article I-
                                                 
301 See EC Treaty Preamble; EC Treaty arts. 2–6; TEU Preamble; TEU arts. 1–3, 6. 
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2 are amplified in Part III, Article III-292(1), relating to the EU’s external 
action.  
  
 The Union and its institutions are called upon in Articles I-3 and I-19 
to promote its values,302 and, Article I-57(1) states that these values are to be 
the foundation for the EU’s relationships with its neighbouring states. Under 
Article I-41(5), Member States may be requested to take action to “protect the 
Union’s values and serve its interests.” To demonstrate the seriousness of the 
Union’s commitment to its stated values, Article I-59 permits the EU to 
suspend the constitutional rights of a Member State if it commits a “serious 
and persistent breach” of the values articulated in Article I-2.303 
 
 In contrast to the Constitution, the EC Treaty tends to speak of goals 
and objectives rather than underlying values. However, values are implicit in 
the EC Treaty Preamble’s reference to “solidarity,” “prosperity” and “peace 
and liberty,” and also in Article 2, which refers to “social protection,” 
“equality between men and women,” and “economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States.” However, the primary thrust of the first 6 
articles of the treaty is values relating to the economic sphere. For example, 
EC Treaty Article 2 mentions “a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities,” while Article 4(1) emphasises “the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.” Article 6 ties in 
the concept of environmental protection. 
 
 The Constitution’s statements of values have their true antecedents in 
the Treaty on European Union, which expresses values in a broader and 
deeper fashion than does the EC Treaty. The TEU’s Preamble confirms the 
principles of “liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.” It also affirms the importance 
of “fundamental social rights” and “solidarity” between the “peoples” of the 
Member States. TEU Article 6(1) contains the broadest and most significant 
statement: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” 
 
 According to Article 49 of the TEU, any European state that respects 
the principles of Article 6(1) may apply for Union membership, and indeed, 
the accession process should include careful scrutiny of a candidate country’s 
human rights record. Once membership is achieved, a Member State must 
adhere to these values, and TEU Article 7 provides that any Member State 
which is in “serious and persistent breach” of these values may have its treaty 
rights suspended, including its voting rights on the Council. 
                                                 
302 Constitution arts. I-3(1), I-3(4), I-19(1). 
303 A further discussion of suspension of rights is found in part 3 of Chapter 10. 
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 Certain of the values and concepts mentioned in the Constitution are 
unprecedented. These include its Preamble’s reference to the “cultural, 
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe” and the Article I-2 statement 
regarding “the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” Overall, the 
Constitution does expand somewhat the tone and content of the description of 
EU values. In general, the additional emphasis in the Constitution may be 
seen as stylistic. However, in an age in which substantial immigrant 
populations have developed throughout the Union, the reference to the rights 
of minorities is particularly appropriate. 
 
 Among the more interesting European values are two references that 
were not included in the Constitution. The document contains no reference to 
God and no mention of the Christian heritage of Europe. These were proposed 
and vigorously debated at the Convention,304 but to no avail. The final version 
of the Constitution’s Preamble contains a bland but more inclusive opening 
line acknowledging that the Member States are “drawing inspiration from the 
cultural, religious and humanist heritage of Europe.” These references may 
constitute an acknowledgment that Christianity is no longer the force that it 
has been in the past, or they may be tailored to make the millions of Muslim 
immigrants or a nation such as Turkey feel more at home in the Union. In any 
event, the agreed statements reflect a secular approach at the EU level, akin to 
the official stance and status of the French government.305 
 
1.2 National traditions 
 
In preface to a statement about closer union and common destiny, the 
Constitution’s Preamble speaks of the “peoples” of Europe (not “people”) 
who remain “proud of their own national identities and history.” The 
paradoxical phrase “united in diversity” is used in the Preamble and is 
designated in Article I-8 as the Union’s official motto. The Preamble also 
                                                 
304 Jean-Claude Piris, The Constitution for Europe – A Legal Analysis, 131 (2006). 
305 The editorial committee of the Common Market Law Review has commented on 
the sought-after reference to the Christian heritage of Europe: “At a strictly legal 
level, the debate is of little interest and the question of the origins of Europe is a 
matter for historians. At a political level, it is extremely sensitive. A reference to 
religious origins can entail reservations from States which are strictly secular as well 
as the opposition of those who consider that the traditions inherited from the 
enlightenment are at least equally valuable. A reference to the Christian origin rightly 
causes indignation among non-Christian religions, whose contribution to the 
development of Europe has been important.” Editorial Comments, A Constitution for 
Europe, 41 C.M.L.R. 899, 903 (2004). 
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gives credit to the European Convention for having written the Constitution 
on behalf of the “States of Europe” as well as for the citizens of Europe. The 
preamble to Part II declares that the Union respects “the diversity of cultures 
and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the 
Member States.” Article I-2 of the Constitution refers to values are “common 
to the Member States.” The preamble to Part II also proclaims regard for “the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member 
States.” In Article I-52(1) the Constitution affirms the EU’s respect for the 
status of churches and other religious associations under the national laws of 
the Member States.306 
 
 The Preamble to the EC Treaty refers to the “peoples” of Europe 
three times, and states the goal of economic and social progress “of their 
countries.” Article 2 looks for “solidarity among Member States” and “the 
flowering of the cultures of the Member States.”  The TEU Preamble also 
mentions the “peoples” of Europe in three separate statements: first, the 
Member States have a goal of “economic and social progress for their 
peoples;” second, the states share a desire “to deepen the solidarity between 
their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions;” 
and third, the states have a mutual goal of “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe.” TEU Article 1 mentions again the ever closer union of 
the “peoples,” as well as consistency and solidarity in relations “between the 
Member States and their peoples.” The Member States and their values are 
particularly emphasised in TEU Article 6(1), which recites the Union’s core 
values and notes that they are “common to the Member States.” Article 6(2) 
also speaks of human rights “as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States.”  
 
 While the Constitution and the Treaties have generally used similar 
terms to require respect for the peoples and traditions of the Member States, 
the Constitution’s reference to the status of churches and other religious 
associations under Member State law is novel. 
 
 The treaty and constitutional provisions mentioned in this section are 
fitting illustrations as to just how the drafters of these instruments have sought 
to establish the Union while at the same time offering reminders of the 
importance of the Member States and their values and traditions. The Treaties 
are, and the Constitution was intended to be, first and foremost the constituent 
                                                 
306 For a scathing criticism of Article I-52(1) and Article I-52(3) (which requires the 
Union to “maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and 
organisations”), see Nicola Giovannini, The Draft European Constitution and its 
antisecular article 51, 42 Am. Atheist Mag. 39 (Mar. 22, 2004). 
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documents of the Community and the Union, and yet there is an apparent 
need for well-placed reminders that the EU should not be spoken of as an 
entity on its own – its identity is still tied up with the separate identities and 
integrity of the Member States. Commenting on use of the word “peoples” 
rather than the singular form “people,” Kalypso Nicolaidis argues that the 
word choice is appropriate to emphasise that a homogeneous European 
community is not necessary. “Our European demoi-cracy is predicated on the 
mutual recognition, confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our 
respective and separate identities – not on their merger.”307 
 
2.  UNION OBJECTIVES 
 
2.1 A wide-ranging set of internal and external objectives for the EU 
 
a.  General statements in preambles 
 
 The Constitution’s Preamble speaks of a “reunited” Europe, one that 
is “united ever more closely,” and that “intends to continue along the path of 
civilisation, progress and prosperity.” This Europe also “wishes to remain a 
continent open to culture, learning and social progress . . . to deepen the 
democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, 
justice and solidarity throughout the world.” In correspondingly broad terms 
the Preamble to Part II speaks of the peoples of Europe who are “creating an 
ever closer union among them,” and it emphasises the objective of 
strengthening the protection of fundamental human rights. Such rights are the 
subject of a separate analysis below. Despite these shared goals, the motto for 
the EU will be “United in diversity.”308 
     
 The Preamble to the Treaty on European Union speaks of “a new 
stage in the process of European integration” and a deepening of solidarity 
between the peoples of the Member States. There is a desire to “enhance 
further the democratic and efficient functioning of the [EU] institutions,” to 
“achieve the strengthening and convergence of their economies” and to 
accomplish monetary union, economic and social progress, EU citizenship, a 
common foreign policy and a common defence. The objectives are 
summarised as a desire to “continue the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe.” TEU Article 1 repeats the goal of “an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” 
 
                                                 
307 Nicolaidis, supra note 84, at 5. 
308 Constitution art. I-8. 
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 The Preamble to the EC Treaty also speaks of an “ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe,” while affirming as the “essential objective” of 
the efforts of the Member States “the constant improvements of the living and 
working conditions of their peoples.” Many of the broad statements in this 
Preamble focus on the goals of the internal market, but there is also 
recognition of the need for the states to “strengthen peace and liberty” and to 
“promote the development of the highest possible level of knowledge for their 
peoples through a wide access to education.” 
 
 The Treaties both express a goal of achieving “ever closer union” 
among the Member States. In an interesting variation on this theme, the 
Constitution’s Preamble refers to a “reunited” Europe, and it describes 
peoples who are already “united ever more closely” and will “forge a 
common destiny.” The Preamble to Part II of the Constitution describes 
peoples who “in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to 
share a peaceful future based on common values.” However, the Constitution 
does not state an affirmative ongoing Union objective of “ever closer union” 
as expressed in the Treaties. Instead, the drafters of the Constitution seem to 
have accepted the measure of closer union that has already been achieved, and 
they have offered a new motto for the EU: “United in diversity.” The subtle 
shift in language in the Constitution is not a forceful political statement, but it 
is a shift nonetheless. There are sufficient numbers of Europeans and 
European leaders who believe that the EU has pushed its integration far 
enough, and thus “ever closer union” should not be pursued any longer. 
Perhaps, therefore, the motto should be clarified to say “United as far as we 
have come, but holding on to the diversity that we have retained.”  
 
b. Specific objectives within the EU 
 
 Like its Preambles, the substantive text of Constitution contains 
references to the EU’s objectives, but in greater detail. The principal section is 
Article I-3, appropriately entitled “The Union’s Objectives.” The first three 
subsections focus on internal EU matters, and the Union is called upon to 
promote, offer, work for or ensure all of the following: 
 
 --peace, the EU’s values and the well-being of its peoples, 
 --an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers,  
 --an internal market where competition is free and undistorted, 
 --the sustainable development of Europe based on:  
 
  --balanced economic growth and price stability, 
  --a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
  employment and social progress, and 
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--a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment, 
 
 --scientific and technological advance, 
 --an end to social exclusion and discrimination, 
 --social justice and protection, 
 --equality between women and men, 
 --solidarity between generations, 
 --protection of the rights of the child, 
--economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among the 
Member States, 
 --respect for the EU’s cultural and linguistic diversity, and 
 --the safeguarding and enhancement of Europe’s cultural heritage. 
 
Similar principles are stated in the initial provisions of Part III of the 
Constitution.309 These articles largely overlap with Article I-3, but add the 
following goals for the internal affairs of the EU: 
 
 --a high level of education, training and protection of human health,310 
--combating of discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation,311 
 --consumer protection,312 and 
 --animal welfare, but subject to Member State customs relating to 
 religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.313Article I-4 
 adds the following objectives for Union internal affairs: 
--guaranteeing the “four freedoms” on which the internal market is 
based,314 and 
 --prohibition of any discrimination on the grounds of  nationality.315   
 
Article I-3 of the Constitution has its antecedent in Article 2 of the 
TEU. The treaty provision lists a number of objectives for the EU, which the 
Union must promote, achieve, create, strengthen, establish, maintain and 
develop: 
 
 --economic and social progress, 
                                                 
309 Constitution arts. III-115 to III-122. 
310 Constitution art. III-117. 
311 Constitution art. III-118. 
312 Constitution art. III-120. 
313 Constitution art. III-121. 
314 Constitution art. I-4(1). 
315 Constitution art. I-4(2).  The four freedoms are described in part 1 of Chapter 17. 
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 --a high level of employment, 
 --balanced and sustainable development, 
 --an area without internal frontiers, 
 --strengthening of economic and social cohesion, 
--establishment of economic and monetary union, including a single 
currency, 
 --implementation of a common foreign and security policy, 
 --framing of a common defence policy,  
--protection of the rights and interests of Member State nationals 
through offering EU citizenship, and 
 --an area of freedom, security and justice. 
 
TEU Article 2 also stresses the need to maintain the full acquis 
communautaire of the Community. Article 2 is then supplemented by a 
number of provisions in the TEU and in the EC Treaty. TEU Article 6 calls 
upon the Union to respect: 
 
 --human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
 --the rule of law, and 
 --the national identities of the Member States.316 
 
TEU Article 3 notes that the Union, in seeking to meet its objectives, must act 
“while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.” 
 
Article 2 of the EC Treaty calls on the EU to promote all of the 
following within the Community: 
 
--a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities, 
 --a high level of employment and of social protection, 
 --equality between men and women, 
 --sustainable and non-inflationary growth, 
--a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic 
performance, 
--a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment, 
 --the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
--economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
 
EC Treaty Article 3 lists the activities of the Community, and this list includes 
further emphasis on principles such as strengthening of economic and social 
                                                 
316 TEU art. 6(1), (2), (3). 
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cohesion and elimination of inequalities between men and women. It also 
offers a wide-ranging set of specific objectives: 
 
 --elimination of restrictions in trade among the Member States, 
 --a common commercial policy, 
 --free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, 
--common policies or “measures” in agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
environment, industry competitiveness, consumer protection, energy, 
civil protection and tourism, 
 --regulation of competition, 
 --approximation of Member State laws to support the internal market, 
 --coordination of employment policies, 
 --a European Social Fund, 
 --economic and social cohesion, 
 --promotion of research, technological development and trans-
 European networks, 
 --a high level of health protection, 
 --contributing to education, training and culture, 
 --development cooperation, and 
 --cooperation with overseas countries and territories. 
 
Article 6 of the EC Treaty emphasises environmental protection as a 
Community goal, as well as promotion of sustainable development. Many 
other sections of the EC Treaty state or imply objectives in relation to 
particular substantive programmes of the Community. 
 
 Because Union objectives are scattered throughout the substantive 
provisions of the Treaties and the Constitution, the above lists are not 
exhaustive. Rather, they focus on the objectives as stated in the introductory 
articles of the documents. Comparing the lists, it is evident that the Treaties’ 
objectives have largely been mirrored in the Constitution, albeit with some 
rewording. However, several items in the Constitution are new. Where the 
Treaties emphasise equality between men and women, the Constitution calls 
for a general end to social exclusion and discrimination, solidarity between 
generations, protection of the rights of the child and combating discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation. A general objective of animal welfare within the text of the 
Constitution is also an innovation, although protection of animals is 
mentioned in the EC Treaty,317 and the terms of Constitution Article III-121 
                                                 
317 EC Treaty art. 30.   
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on animal rights are essentially taken from a protocol to the EC Treaty.318 
Additionally, the Constitution’s goal of respect for the Union’s cultural and 
linguistic diversity is a new and sharper statement compared to the EC 
Treaty’s goal of a flowering of cultures of the Member States. 
 
 The Constitution’s expanded list of prohibited bases for 
discrimination is a modernisation of EU principles, which are already 
reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted as a political 
commitment by each of the Member States, and the Constitution elevates 
these concepts to the level of constitutional principle.319  But overall, the 
objectives set in the Constitution are already in place in the Treaties. What is 
clear from both the Treaties and the Constitution is that the focus of the 
European Union goes well beyond the internal market. A much broader 
concern for the lives of EU citizens is reflected in the Union’s stated 
objectives. 
 
c. Goals for the EU’s external relations 
 
 Article I-3(4) of the Constitution focuses on external relationships of 
the EU, and in “its relations with the wider world” the Union is called upon to 
“uphold and promote its values and interests” and “contribute” to all of the 
following: 
  
--peace, 
 --security, 
 --the sustainable development of the Earth, 
 --solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
 --free and fair trade, 
 --eradication of poverty, 
 --protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, and 
--strict observance and development of international law, including 
respect for the United Nations Charter. 
 
 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union includes as an EU 
objective that the Union should “assert its identity on the international scene,” 
and TEU Article 3 calls for “consistency of its external activities as a whole,” 
but neither provision specifically connects the Union’s international activities 
to its stated goals and objectives. That connection may be found in TEU 
Article 11, which introduces the provisions on the Union’s common foreign 
                                                 
318 Protocol on protection and welfare of animals, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340/110) 
[hereinafter Protocol on Animals]. 
319 See the discussion in part 3 of this chapter. 
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and security policy (CFSP).320 Article 11 states the objectives of the CFSP to 
be the safeguarding, strengthening, preservation, promotion or development 
of the following: 
 
--common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, 
 --the security of the Union in all ways, 
 --peace, 
 --international security, 
 --international cooperation, 
 --democracy and the rule of law, and 
 --respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Comparing the foregoing lists, it may be seen that the Constitution restates 
several of the general international objectives set forth in TEU Article 11, 
while adding sustainable development, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade and eradication of poverty. This expanded list of 
external goals seems to be a sensible reflection of the scope of current EU 
interests and activities on the world scene. The Constitution may represent a 
better description of the EU’s external objectives, but its formulation cannot 
be seen as a dramatic shift in EU policy as expressed in the Treaties. 
 
d. Who is charged with achieving the objectives? 
 
 In broad terms, Article I-19(1) of the Constitution requires the EU 
institutions to “advance” the Union’s objectives, and Article I-3(4) makes it 
clear that this is not only within the Union, but in the wider world. At the 
same time, Article I-5(2) calls upon the Member States to “facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which would 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” Interestingly, where 
Constitution Article I-44(1) permits “enhanced cooperation” among groups of 
Member States – an activity that arguably undercuts the solidarity of the EU – 
even such programmes are mandated to “further the objectives of the 
Union.”321 
 
 Article 3 of the TEU requires the institutions of the EU to “ensure the 
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain 
[the Union’s] objectives.” Article 3 then mentions consistency in the Union’s 
                                                 
320 See TEU arts. 11-28 (describing the CFSP). 
321 The significance of enhanced cooperation is discussed in part 4 of Chapter 10. 
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external activities, suggesting without explicitly stating that such activities 
must also meet Union objectives. Like Article I-5 of the Constitution, Article 
10 of the EC Treaty requires the Member States to “facilitate the achievement 
of the Community’s tasks” and to “abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.” Also like the 
Constitution, where TEU Article 43 permits programmes of enhanced 
cooperation, the programmes must be “aimed at furthering the objectives of 
the Union and of the Community.” Overall, the Constitution offers a 
somewhat clearer mandate for the EU institutions to advance the Union 
objectives. However, the Constitution’s changes are stylistic, and the 
substance of the Treaties relating to which parties must pursue Union 
objectives is largely carried over into the Constitution. 
 
2.2 EU objectives and the Member States 
 
 Article I-1(1) of the Constitution declares that the Constitution 
establishes the European Union, but with the stated purpose of attaining the 
objectives that the Member States have “in common.” Furthermore, the Union 
is required to “coordinate the policies by which the Member States aim to 
achieve these objectives.” In the provisions of Constitution Article I-3(1) the 
EU is mandated to promote the well-being of its “peoples” rather than its 
“people.” Its goals are further articulated in Article I-3(3) to include 
“economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member 
States,” as well as respect for the Union’s “rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity.” 
 
Articles I-1(1) and I-11(1) of the Constitution emphasise that the 
authority of the EU to pursue its objectives arises directly and solely from the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States,322 while Article I-3(5) 
limits EU action to “appropriate means, depending on the extent to which the 
relevant competences are conferred upon it in the Constitution.” A role for the 
Member States themselves is described in Article I-5(2), which requires the 
states to “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any 
measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” 
 
The preambles of both Treaties mention the welfare of the “peoples” 
of Europe. TEU Article 6 emphasises respect for national identities as a Union 
objective, while EC Treaty Article 2 looks for solidarity among the Member 
States, and its Article 3 seeks the flowering of the cultures of the states. 
Article 10 of the EC Treaty, like Article I-5 of the Constitution, requires the 
Member States to “facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks” and 
                                                 
322 The principle of conferral is discussed in part 1 of Chapter 12. 
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to “abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty.” At the same time, TEU Article 11(2) speaks of the 
Member States supporting the Union’s CFSP and working together to 
“enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity” while refraining from 
any action that might impair the Union’s effectiveness internationally. 
 
 While there is overlap between the treaty provisions and those of the 
Constitution, the Constitution more frequently mentions the Member States as 
participants in the pursuit of Union objectives. In particular, the Treaties 
contain no counterpart to the Constitution’s statements in Article I-1(1) about 
the objectives shared by the Member States or their aim to achieve these 
objectives. A discussion in part 1 of Chapter 12 notes that EC treaty Article 5 
does mention the principle of conferral, but the concept is not expressed in 
relation to the EU’s objectives.  
 
 Despite the Constitution’s emphasis on the Member State role in 
promoting Union goals, the Constitution’s approach has been criticised. 
Andreas Føllesdal warns that the document pays “insufficient attention to the 
relationship between the objectives of the Union institutions and those of 
Member States, and their relative importance.”323 Føllesdal is correct in the 
sense that the Constitution’s references to EU objectives and the Member 
States are somewhat random. There is neither a definitive, well-crafted 
exposition of EU objectives nor a careful delineation as to how exactly the 
Member States are to promote such objectives. However, when compared 
with the many specific programs and procedures addressed in a detailed and 
organised fashion in the Constitution, concerns over broad statements of 
objectives cannot be seen as having great importance. 
 
In one of the more interesting turns of phrase in the Constitution, 
Article I-1(1) mandates the EU to exercise its conferred competences to 
achieve the Union objectives “on a Community basis.” These words were 
inserted to replace an early draft’s more ambitious phrase “on a federal 
basis.”324 No doubt due to the anti-federalist sensitivities of many European 
                                                 
323 Andreas Føllesdal, Achieving Stability? Forms and Areas of Institutional and 
National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, The Federal Trust Online Paper 
06/04, at 5, available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/06_04.pdf 
[hereinafter Føllesdal TFT]. 
324 The Preliminary Draft of the Constitution described “[a] Union of European States 
which, while retaining their national identities, closely coordinate their policies at the 
European level, and administer certain competences on a federal basis.” Praesidium 
of The European Convention, Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty, Oct. 28, 2002, 
CONV 369/02, Part One, art. 1. 
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leaders, who fear that federation means a stronger supranational (and 
correspondingly weaker intergovernmental) system, there was vigorous 
opposition at the Convention to the term “federal.”325 As a result the 
“infamous F-word”326 is never used in the Constitution to describe the 
Union’s pursuit of its objectives. Kalypso Nicolaidis argues that the word 
“federal” might appropriately be used for the EU in its current form, but in the 
sense of a “federal union, not as a federal state.” He concedes that the phrase 
“Community way” is “an acceptable second best.”327  
 
The Convention’s semantic tussle over “federal” versus 
“Community” is reminiscent of the delicate and somewhat confusing use of 
words in the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union. Article 1 
of the TEU creates the new Union, which is “founded” on the existing 
European Communities, but “supplemented by the policies and forms of 
cooperation established by this Treaty.” Thus, both a supranational 
“community” approach and an intergovernmental “union” approach are 
contemplated. Article 2 reiterates this duality by calling on the new Union to 
“maintain in full the [Communities’] acquis communautaire” (essentially 
perpetuating the supranational First Pillar regime) but also to “build on” the 
acquis (creating the new, more intergovernmental Second and Third 
Pillars).328 However, Article 2 notes that this dual task of “maintenance” and 
“building on” is to be done “with a view to considering to what extent the 
policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and 
institutions of the Community.” This suggests that the intergovernmental 
Union may gradually yield to Community approach, and to some extent it has 
done exactly that, especially in the Third Pillar.329 The tension between the 
                                                 
325 Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1321. Kokott and Ruth note that the term 
“constitution” was “especially for the British, as much a taboo as the term ‘federal’ 
itself. It seems, therefore, all the more remarkable that the Convention, backed by the 
political momentum of its convocation, quite quickly managed to raise the necessary 
support for picking up the Laeken reference to a ‘constitutional text’ and, in the end, 
by calling the text a ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution’ even went beyond what was 
terminologically expected until very recently.” Id. at 1320. The Reform Treaty 
abandons the name “constitution.” 
326 Markus G. Puder, Constitutionalizing the European Union – More Than a Sense of 
Direction From the Convention on the Future of Europe, 26 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1562, 
1583 (2003). 
327 Nicolaidis, supra note 84, at 6. 
328 Note that TEU Article 3 also refers to “respecting and building upon the acquis 
communautaire.” 
329 Under the Treaty of Amsterdam caused matters such as visas, asylum and 
immigration policies, as well as civil law cooperation, to be transferred from the 
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intergovernmental and supranational schemes is evident in these provisions of 
the TEU, and the Convention’s struggle over the word “federal” seems to 
reflect the ongoing debate. 
 
3.  PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
 
3.1 A multi-faceted EU approach to individual rights 
 
 Part II of the Constitution330 incorporates the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union (the Charter) into European Union law.331 The Charter 
begins with a Preamble that acknowledges the Union’s heritage and traditions, 
the diversity of its peoples and the identities of the Member States.332 Against 
that backdrop the Preamble concludes with the following commitment: “The 
Union therefore recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
hereafter.” The ensuing text is divided into titles such as “Dignity, Freedoms, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights and Justice.” In a final title relating to 
general application of the Charter, Article II-111(1) notes that the provisions 
of the Charter “are addressed to the Institutions, bodies and agencies of the 
Union . . . and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union 
law.” Thus, EU activity at all levels is subject to the Charter’s sweeping 
principles. 
 
 Apart from the Charter, the Preamble to the Constitution itself refers 
to “the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person” and “due regard 
for the rights of each individual.” Respect for human rights is identified in 
Article I-2 as a value on which the EU is founded. Article I-3 refers to human 
rights in general and “protection of the rights of the child.”333 Article I-9(1) 
refers to the Charter, but Article I-9(2) also requires the Union to accede to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                                                                                    
Third Pillar to the First Pillar.  See Jaap W. de Zwaan, The Legal Personality of the 
European Communities and the European Union, in Vol. XXX Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law 75, 94-95 (1999) [hereinafter De Zwaan 1999]. 
330 Constitution Part II, arts. II-61 to II-114. 
331 For a background perspective on the Charter, along with a review of the EU’s 
experience to date with the Charter and with human rights in general, see Jacqueline 
Dutheil de la Rochère, The EU and the Individual:  Fundamental Rights in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty, 41 C.M.L.R. 345 (2004). 
332 For an analysis of the Preamble to the Constitution in comparison to the Charter 
Preamble, see Ingolf Pernice, Integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the 
Constitution of the European Union: Practical and Theoretical Propositions, 10 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 5 (2004).  
333 Constitution art. I-3(3), (4). 
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Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).334 A 1996 ruling of the Court of Justice had 
concluded that the European Community lacked the competence to do so.335 
Constitution Article I-9(3) also incorporates as “general principles of the 
Union’s law” the fundamental rights resulting “from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States.” Lastly, a series of articles in Part 
III of the Constitution, entitled “Non-Discrimination and Citizenship,” 
provides for EU legislation relating to nationality-based discrimination and 
the rights guaranteed to EU citizens.336  
 
 The approach of the Treaties is less sweeping than that of the 
Constitution. The Preamble of the TEU affirms the EU’s “respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.” TEU Article 6(1) notes that these are 
founding principles of the Union. Article 6 also states that the EU must 
respect the rights granted by the ECHR,337 but, as noted above, the 
Community has not been able to become a signatory to the Convention. As an 
alternative course of action, under the Treaties the Union in 2000 adopted the 
Charter, not as a treaty provision but rather as a “solemn proclamation.”338 
Article 11(1) of the TEU states that respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is to be an objective of the Union’s common foreign and security 
policy. EC Treaty Article 177(2) states that respect for such rights is an 
objective of the Community’s activities in the field of development 
cooperation, and Article 181a(1) of the EC Treaty states a similar goal for 
Community action in the field of economic, financial and technical 
cooperation with third countries. 
 
                                                 
334 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
For commentary on the EU’s accession to the ECHR, see Dutheil de la Rochère, 
supra note 331, at 352-53. 
335 The Court ruled: “As Community law now stands, the Community has no 
competence to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on the 
Community institutions in a general way the power to enact rules concerning human 
rights or to conclude international agreements in this field . . . ” Case 2/94, Accession 
by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ECR I-1759.  
336 Constitution arts. III-123 to III-129. See the discussion on EU citizenship in part 2 
of Chapter 8. 
337 “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . as 
general principles of Community law.” TEU art. 6(2). 
338 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 178, at 5. 
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 Since the adoption of the Charter in 2000 as an EU proclamation and 
thus a political commitment by each of the Member States, there has been an 
uneasy co-existence between the ECHR, which is to be enforced by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (an independent, non-EU 
institution), and the Charter, which is to be respected by EU institutions under 
the watchful eye of the Court of Justice.339 To add to the complications of this 
situation, the Charter requires the Court to follow the interpretations issued by 
the European Court of Human Rights in cases which the Charter’s provisions 
correspond with provisions of the ECHR.340  
 
 Various commentators have criticised this state of affairs, noting that 
the EU should create more clarity and certainty by incorporating a declaration 
of human rights as part of its treaty framework.341 As the Charter was being 
adopted, Youri Devuyst warned that it would be a “mere political declaration” 
if it were not incorporated into the Treaties.342 Markus Puder has argued that 
either having the EU accede to the ECHR or incorporating the Charter into the 
EU Treaties would “enhance the protection of citizens’ rights . . . and 
forcefully assert ethical and moral values within the integration system.”343 
“Bolstering the fundamental rights at the European level has been described 
by Georgio Sacerdoti as a “crucial” factor in combating recent electoral 
successes of “racist and xenophobic” parties in countries such as Austria and 
Belgium.344 The Laeken Declaration challenged the Convention to consider 
                                                 
339 For an extensive analysis of the EU’s relationship to the ECHR and the Charter, 
and the complex jurisdictional issues involving the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Court of Justice, see Sacerdoti, supra note 178.  
340 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 178 art. 52(3). For an analysis of the 
Charter and the ECHR as “complementary instruments,” see Pernice, supra note 332, 
at 12-16. 
341 For an analysis of the Charter “in the context of the much broader, less easily 
captured, and often slippery notion of European constitutionalism,” see Gráinne de 
Búrca & Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, European Constitutionalism and the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Human Rights, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 355 (2003); see also Joseph H. H. 
Weiler, Human rights, constitutionalism and integration, in Eriksen, supra note 29, at 
59; Neil Walker, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Legal, Symbolic and 
Constitutional Implications, in Zervakis, supra note 29, at 119.   
342 Devuyst, supra note 68, at 49. 
343 Puder, supra note 326, at 1584. Puder notes that other alternatives would be to 
simply refer to the Charter in the EU Treaties or to adopt the Charter as sub-
constitutional EU legislation. Id. 
344 Sacerdoti, supra note 178, at 51. 
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whether the Charter should be included in the Treaties or whether the EU 
should accede to the ECHR.345  
 
 The Convention boldly responded to Laeken and the critics, and the 
Charter was placed at the heart of EU law as a part of the Constitution.346 
Ingolf Pernice has commented:  
 
 Inserting the Charter into [the Constitution] . . . is not only an 
important step in the process of constitutionalization of the European 
Union, but will affirm its very foundation. It will draw the citizens’ 
attention to their fundamental role in this process, and to their 
responsibilities in an integrated Europe.347  
 
The Treaties did recognise respect for human rights as a fundamental 
principle of the European Union, but the Constitution’s inclusion of the 
Charter in its text – accompanied by the prospect that the Court of Justice 
might take a more active role in interpreting human rights within the Union – 
is one of the most significant changes proposed by the Convention and the 
IGC. 
 
3.2 Member State law and practice in human rights 
 
 Despite the Constitution’s wide-ranging mandate for the EU to 
respect human rights, the document does not ignore Member State law and 
practice. Article I-9(3) of the Constitution incorporates as “general principles 
of the Union’s law” the fundamental rights resulting from “the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States.” In addition, in a matter analogous 
to human rights, Article III-121 of the Constitution requires that certain Union 
activities must “pay full regard to the requirements of animal welfare,” but 
Union policy must also respect “the legislative or administrative provisions 
and customs of Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural 
traditions and regional heritage.” 
 
                                                 
345 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 24. For an analysis of the suitability of the 
Charter as a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Document, 2004 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 37, 42-48 (2004). 
346 For a thoughtful analysis of how the Charter, as Part II of the Constitution, will 
deal with the status of individuals under the law, see Guido Alpa, The Meaning of 
‘Natural Person’ and the Impact of the Constitution for Europe on the Development 
of European Private Law, 10 Eur. L.J. 734, 747-749 (2004). 
347 Pernice, supra note 332, at 8. 
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 Part II of the Constitution, the Charter itself, also contains numerous 
references to national laws of the Member States. For example, Article II-
74(3) states that the right to education is to be respected “in accordance with 
the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.” Under 
Article II-76 the right to conduct business is recognised, but “in accordance 
with Union law and national laws and practices.” The same joint reference to 
EU law and national norms is found in three provisions relating to certain 
rights of workers348 and in Article II-94 regarding rights relating to social 
security and social assistance. Moreover, under Articles II-95 and II-96, 
health care rights and rights of “access to services of general economic 
interest” are tied to “the conditions established by national laws and 
practices.” 
 
In the general provisions at the end of the Charter, Article II-111 
places emphasis on the limits of Union competence and the principle of 
subsidiarity. In forceful terms Article II-111(2) states that the Charter “does 
not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the 
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers or 
tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution.”349 Article II-112, a 
provision on interpretation of the Charter, reiterates the need, in certain 
circumstances contemplated in the Charter, to recognise the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and to take “full account” of the 
national laws and practices of the States.350 Article II-113 also prohibits any 
interpretation of its provisions in a manner that would adversely affect human 
rights recognised elsewhere by Union law, by international agreements to 
which the EU or States may be party, or by Member State constitutions.  
 
In its incorporation of the Charter, the Constitution attempts to 
distinguish between “rights” and “principles.” The first four subsections of 
Article II-112 reference various “rights,” but subsection II-112(5) changes the 
focus to “principles” as follows: 
 
                                                 
348 Constitution arts. II-87, II-88, II-90. 
349 Two commentators have noted that “the General Provisions of the Charter [such as 
Article II-111(2)] are very clear in their intention not to confer additional 
competences on the EU . . . Whether respect for human rights becomes a more 
significant normative orientation of the EU legal order or whether these values remain 
(as some of those involved in drafting the Charter have expressly wished) more as a 
negative constraint on political action, remains to be seen.” De Búrca & 
Aschenbrenner, supra note 341, at 380-81. 
350 Constitution arts. II-112(4), II-112(6). 
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(5) The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be 
implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member 
States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their 
respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality. 
 
The differentiation between rights and principles has been described by David 
M. Trubek and Louise G. Trubek as an “awkwardly worded clause” which 
represents “an apparent effort to avoid judicial enforcement of social and 
economic rights.”351 They add that if the clause is so interpreted, “then direct 
judicial action in this sphere will be precluded.”352 However, they suggest that 
the Open Method of Co-ordination might be used as an alternative method of 
achieving what judicial enforcement might not accomplish.353   
 
 Lacking the Charter in their text, the Treaties have much less to say 
about human rights and thus fewer references to Member State practice. TEU 
Article 6(1) states that respect for human rights and fundamentals is a 
founding principle of the Union, but also a principle “common to the Member 
States.” Article 6(2) mandates the EU to respect “as general principles of 
Community law” the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, but also 
“as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.” It has previously been noted in this chapter that the terms of 
Constitution Article III-121 on animal rights, including the mandate for the 
Union to respect the laws and traditions of the Member States, are a direct 
carryover from a protocol to the EC Treaty.354 
 
The Charter, despite its sweeping statements, does offer substantive 
legal principles. And indeed, the Constitution’s treatment of human rights is 
more comprehensive than that of the Treaties, but its approach may be too 
                                                 
351 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of 
Social Europe:  The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 Eur. L.J. 343, 
362-63 (2005).   
352 Id. at 363. 
353 Citing earlier work by De Búrca, Trubek and Trubek have suggested that the OMC 
could be used in “mixing ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements, and to strengthen economic and 
social rights.” Id. For a general discussion of the OMC, see part III(F)(5) of this 
treatise. For further analysis of Article II-112(5), see Patrick Birkinshaw, A 
Constitution for the European Union? – A Letter from Home, 10 Eur. Pub. L. 57, 77-
79 (2004). 
354 Protocol on Animals, supra note 318. 
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complicated.355 For example, provisions in Parts I and II of the Constitution 
overlap with regard to certain substantive rights related to citizenship, 
personal data protection, access to documents and nondiscrimination.356 But a 
larger concern is that when the Charter, the ECHR and especially the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States” all become part of 
EU constitutional law, then private parties, Union institutions and even the 
states themselves will face the daunting task of studying the laws of all of the 
EU nations to discern these common traditions.357 In addition, Michael 
Dougan has argued that Constitution Article II-113, by deferring to these non-
EU sources of law, undermines the principle of primacy of EU law.358 There 
will likely be a need for a series of decisions by the Court of Justice to sort out 
the inconsistencies among these sources of law, and the Court may well be 
required to set rules of priority among them. Thus, in summary, the inclusion 
of the Charter in the Constitution was a significant development, and it may 
have represented an expansion of EU competences and thus a shift in the 
Union’s dividing lines. 
 
4. VALUES, OBJECTIVES AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 It is perhaps a bit easy to dismiss statements of values and objectives 
as mere “window dressing” intended to make the Constitution more attractive 
to the masses while offering nothing of legal substance. This is perhaps more 
true for values than objectives. Nevertheless, lawyers and politicians could be 
                                                 
355 One commentator has stated: “A first reading of the Draft Constitution gives an 
impression of an accumulation of references to rights and values, not contradictory 
but, in my view, excessively cumulative, and therefore unable to promote a clear idea 
of the ambition of the Union for the individual.” Dutheil de la Rochère, supra note 
331, at 350. For analysis of the various components of the EU’s human rights regime, 
see id., at 350-54. For further discussion of the complexities of the Charter in relation 
to other sources of human rights law, see Claudia Attucci, An institutional dialogue 
on common principles – Reflections on the significance of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in Dobson, supra note 29, at 151-63. 
356 Constitution arts. I-10, II-99, II-100, II-104, II-105 (certain rights of EU citizens), 
I-51, II-68 (personal data protection), I-50, II-102 (access to documents), I-4, II-81 
(non-discrimination). See also European Policy Center, The Draft Constitutional 
Treaty-An Assessment at 30, Issue No. 5 (July 3, 2003). 
357 For an analysis of the interplay between the various sources of human rights law, 
see Pernice, supra note 332, at 12-17. 
358 Michael Dougan, The Convention’s Constitutional Treaty: A “Tidying-Up 
Exercise” that Needs Some Tidying-up of Its Own, The Federal Trust Online Paper 
No. 27/03, at 3, available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/27_03. 
pdf.  Similar concerns have been expressed by Ingolf Pernice. See Pernice, supra note 
332, at 30-32. Also see the discussion of primacy in part 3 of Chapter 12. 
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expected at some point to find useful material in such statements, whether for 
use in courtroom arguments or in the conference rooms of Brussels. Where 
substantive legal text is not precise, persuasive arguments can be made on the 
basis of value expressions. Court decisions or new programs can be justified 
by constitutional or treaty provisions that reveal the objectives and intentions 
of those who drafted and ratified the document.  
 
Other than the significant inclusion of the Charter in the constitutional 
text, the Constitution in general merely restates the values and objectives 
already found in the Treaties. However, as noted the Constitution pays 
somewhat greater attention to the role of the Member States as participants in 
the pursuit of common objectives. A few turns of phrase in the Constitution – 
such as references to minorities and to the “cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe” – are obviously novel and even controversial. Beyond 
the Charter, any impact that the Constitution’s statements of objectives and 
values may have had on the EU’s dividing lines would likely have  been 
minor. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
The EU’s State-Like Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If the European Union is to be more than a mere aspiration, its stated 
values and objectives must be given substance. The entity must exist, it must 
have form and identity. In this chapter we will observe that the EU has been 
endowed with the characteristics of a governmental entity, including many 
attributes that resemble those of modern nation-states.  In addition, the EU is 
comprised of official bodies that are similar to those found in a typical 
national government.359 However, a closer look reveals a variety of carefully 
crafted limitations on the Union and its institutions.  
 
1.  THE EU’S LEGAL STATUS 
 
A number of core characteristics define the Union’s legal status. 
These include its existence and legal personality, its legal capacity, its 
privileges and immunities, its permanence as an entity, and even a number of 
nation-like symbols it possesses. Interestingly, as these are described in the 
Constitution, the constitutional text provides numerous reminders that the EU 
project does not diminish the residual sovereignty and integrity of the 
Member States.360 
                                                 
359 George Bermann has noted that the EU enjoys “a complex institutional apparatus 
enabling it to deliver a variety of state-like functions, among which we may discern 
functions broadly recognizable as law-making, law-applying, and law-enforcing. The 
very fact that the EU even has departments that we can liken, however approximately, 
to legislative, executive and judicial distinguishes it from most other such regimes. 
Not even NAFTA, the WTO, or the International Criminal Court – which are among 
the best-equipped international governance regimes – are nearly as well equipped.” 
Bermann, supra note 47, at 365. 
360 Bermann qualifies the statement in the immediately preceding footnote by 
stressing that “the Member States are far from displaced, not only as norm-givers, but 
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1.1 The legal character of the EU 
 
a. Existence; legal personality 
 
 The European Union is an entity created by, but existing apart from, 
the Member States. Article I-1(1) of the Constitution states: “Reflecting the 
will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this 
Constitution establishes the European Union.” Article I-7 declares simply: 
“The Union shall have legal personality.” Notably, this statement is not found 
in the Treaties. Article 1 of the TEU states that “the HIGH CONTRACTING 
PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN UNION,” but neither it 
nor any other sections of the treaty mention a grant of legal personality. The 
European Community, on the other hand, is granted such character. Article 
281 of the EC Treaty states clearly: “The Community shall have legal 
personality.” The Constitution thus elevates the EU to the same legal status 
that had previously been granted to the Community. 
 
 The lack of legal personality for the EU has been regarded as “one of 
the more pronounced oddities of the existing European treaty structure.”361 
Consider, for example, the question of whether the Union may enter into 
binding international agreements. Article 24(1) of the TEU empowers the 
Council to “conclude” international agreements in the Second Pillar, on the 
following terms:  
 
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more 
States or international organisations in implementation of this title 
[Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy], the Council 
may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as 
appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall 
be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the 
Presidency. 
  
Article 24(6) further provides: “Agreements concluded under the conditions 
set out by this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Union.” 
Historically, the Council has in fact entered into agreements under TEU 
                                                                                                                    
as the administrative apparatus upon which the effectiveness of EU policy still chiefly 
depends.” Id. 
361 Norman, supra note 152, at 84. For an extensive analysis of the legal personality of 
the European Communities and of the Union, see De Zwaan 1999, supra note 329. 
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Article 24,362 but the lack of full legal personality for the EU has raised 
questions as to just how far the EU as an entity could proceed to legally bind 
itself.363 The Convention, working under a mandate to simplify the Treaties,364 
authored a constitutional provision that was intended to clear up these 
doubts.365  
 
b. Legal capacity 
 
 The legal personality described above might be labeled as an 
“international law personality,” in that it most significantly relates to the 
Union’s ability to enter into agreements with third countries or international 
organisations. A second form of personality might be called “private law 
personality,” a status that permits the EU to be a party to private legal matters. 
The Constitution and Treaties refer to this as “legal capacity.”366  
 
                                                 
362 Two recent examples of Article 24 agreements include Agreement between the 
European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss 
Confederation in the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia), Dec. 
31, 2005, O.J. (L 349) 30 (2005); and Agreement between the European Union and 
Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European 
Union crisis management operations, Dec. 1, 2005 (L 315) 20 (2005).  
363 The European Community has authority under the EC Treaty to negotiate 
agreements in a variety of fields. See EC Treaty arts. 111, 133, 139, 170, 174, 181, 
181a, 186, 300 and 310. Because of the clearly expressed legal personality of the 
Community, the binding nature of these agreements has not been questioned. 
364 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 19, 23. 
365 Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Ruth have commented: “It might be briefly pointed 
out that the [Convention’s] Working Group charged with the question rightly took as 
its starting point the assumption that the Union does indeed already at present possess 
an implicit international legal personality. While this was not the case under the 
regime of the Maastricht Treaty, and while the situation after the reform of 
Amsterdam initially remained unclear due to the (deliberately) imprecise wording of 
the newly introduced article on treaty-making power [TEU Article 24], the actual 
practice confirmed the existence of an implicit legal personality of the Union. By 
deciding not to perpetuate this duality with the attribution of an explicit legal 
personality to the Union alongside those of the Communities, but instead to merge 
both into a single personality and to accompany this step by a merger of the Treaties, 
the Convention adequately put into practice what the Laeken Declaration had implied. 
This must be warmly welcomed for reasons of effectiveness, legal certainty, 
transparency and as it heightens the profile of the Union vis-à-vis third States and 
European citizens.” Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1323. 
366 Jaap W. de Zwaan provides a valuable description of the different forms of legal 
personality and how they manifest themselves in practice. See De Zwaan 1999, supra 
note 329, at 79-85. 
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Under Constitution Article III-426 the Union is also granted “the 
most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons” under the laws of the 
Member States, and in particular, the rights to own property and to be a party 
to legal proceedings. Furthermore, under Article III-431 the Union, as a legal 
person, is specifically made subject to the contract law of individual Member 
States and to tort law based on “the general principles common to the laws of 
the Member States.” The operative language of the Constitution is identical to 
Articles 282 and 288 of the EC Treaty. Again, neither the EC Treaty nor the 
TEU mentions any legal capacity for the EU, and the Constitution extends the 
concept to the Union. 
  
c. Privileges and immunities 
 
 Article III-434 of the Constitution provides that within the territory of 
the Member States the Union is allowed “such privileges and immunities as 
are necessary for the performance of its tasks.” The constitutional provision 
mirrors the language of Article 291 of the EC Treaty, and both the 
Constitution and EC Treaty refer to a protocol that further delineates these 
privileges and immunities.367 However, these characteristics relate to the 
Community only. Neither the TEU nor the EC Treaty mentions any privileges 
or immunities with respect to the Union. The Constitution addresses the EU to 
the same extent that the EC Treaty has addressed the Community, and the 
matter of privileges and immunities may be seen as both an outgrowth of the 
Union’s legal personality and a further strengthening of the personality 
concept. 
 
The concepts of legal personality for the Union, legal capacity and 
privileges and immunities in essence provide the Union with the status and 
capabilities that are afforded to any nation. In addition, with the merger of the 
Union and the European Community368 the EU is able to operate as a single 
entity to carry out all necessary and appropriate activities within its 
constitutional mandate. 
 
d. A permanent entity  
 
Article IV-446 of the Constitution states: “This Treaty is concluded 
for an unlimited period.” Article 312 of the EC Treaty and Article 51 of the 
TEU use precisely the same words. One might ask whether implementation of 
the Constitution would prove the treaty provisions to be wrong, that is, 
                                                 
367 Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities, Dec. 16, 
2004, O.J. (C 310) 261 [hereinafter Protocol on Privileges]. 
368 Constitution art. IV-438(1). 
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whether the replacement of the Treaties would terminate the entities created 
by them. In fact, Article IV-438 is carefully crafted to preserve the concept of 
permanence by declaring the continued existence of the EU. Article IV-438(1) 
states that the EU under the Constitution will be the “successor” to the TEU’s 
European Union and the EC Treaty’s European Community. Under Article 
IV-438(3) the acts of the EU and Community will remain in force until 
specifically “repealed, annulled or amended,” and the “other components of 
the acquis of the Community and of the Union” will similarly be “preserved 
until they have been deleted or amended.” Likewise, Article IV-438(4) 
mandates that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and Court of First 
Instance will continue as the “source of interpretation of Union law and in 
particular of the comparable provisions of the Constitution.” The same holds 
true for existing administrative and legal procedures, according to Article IV-
438(5). Thus, by its own terms the Constitution does not end the existence of 
the “permanent” treaty organisations, but instead preserves them in a new 
form and under a new constituent document. 
 
The effectiveness of the Constitution for an “unlimited period” and 
the continued existence of the Union are a continuation of these concepts as 
provided under the Treaties, and the principles provide essential stability. 
Both now and in the future the EU is not to be reinvented, replaced or 
reconfigured easily. As discussed in Chapter 11, this permanence is arguably 
reinforced by the unanimity requirement for amending the Constitution. 
However, permanence and stability do not necessarily mean that the EU will 
remain forever frozen in its current form. To the contrary, the Union is 
designed as a flexible entity with the capacity to expand and contract,369 and 
despite the unanimity requirement the Constitution could be amended.  
 
e. Nation-like symbols 
 
 The Constitution’s Article I-8 provides the EU with the typical 
symbols of nationhood such as a flag, an anthem, a motto and an annual 
holiday, as well as a Union currency, the euro.370 Except for references to the 
euro, which is a significant achievement of the Union and a cornerstone of EU 
market integration, the Treaties are silent as to these symbols. Article 4 of the 
EC Treaty refers to introduction of the single currency (called the “ecu”), and 
Chapters II, III and IV of Title VII of the EC Treaty371 describe the 
                                                 
369 For an analysis of the Union’s flexibility, see Chapter 10. 
370 Constitution art. I-8. The Constitution contains numerous other references to the 
euro. See Constitution arts. I-13, I-15, I-30, III-177, III-186, III-191, III-194 to III-
198, III-326, III-410. 
371 EC Treaty arts. 105-124. 
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programme for achieving the second and third stages of economic and 
monetary union, including numerous references to the common currency.372  
The TEU mentions the single currency in its Preamble and in the objectives 
stated in its Article 2. Although several of the EU symbols have been used 
under the Treaties, their formal adoption in Article I-8 of the Constitution 
represents a conscious effort by the Convention to institutionalise the outward 
manifestations that are associated primarily with nation states. The EU would 
have the “look and feel” of a state, and its use of the symbols was to be 
embedded in its Constitution.373  
 
1.2 The integrity of the Member States within the EU system 
 
a. Equality of the Member States 
 
 Article I-5(1) of the Constitution unequivocally requires that the EU 
“shall respect the equality of Member States before the Constitution.” Without 
addressing the stature of the states vis-à-vis the EU itself, this provision 
recognises the separate identity of each Member State. The smallest states are 
entitled to all of the respect that flows toward the largest states. Article I-5(1) 
came about after a request by Portuguese representatives at the Convention to 
have the Constitution recognize the principle of the “sovereign equality” of 
the States.374 A commentary has noted:  
 
 This request raised drafting difficulties, because, presented in those 
terms, it could clash with the desire to reduce the number of 
Commissioners and could have made the question of voting rights 
more difficult to resolve. It was for those reasons that it was decided 
to state in Article I-5 the fact that the Union respected the equality of 
the Member States before the Constitution. This wording is merely 
the expression of the fact that the law and the Constitution apply in 
the same way to all. It does not prohibit discrimination provided it is 
objectively justified and respects the principle of proportionality. 
There is no doubt that the Court will be required to fine-tune this 
interpretation.375 
 
Neither the EC Treaty nor the TEU mentions equality of the states in 
terms as broad as those of the Constitution.  However, the Protocol on the 
                                                 
372 See EC Treaty arts. 118, 119, 121, 122, 123. 
373 The Reform Treaty would not include references to the flag, anthem, motto or 
annual holiday. See Presidency Conclusions, supra note 19, Annex I, art. 3. 
374 Editorial Comments, supra note 305, at 903. 
375 Id. 
8:  STATE-LIKE ATTRIBUTES  113 
 
Enlargement of the European Union, attached to the Treaties through the 
Treaty of Nice, guarantees that Member States will be treated equally with 
regard to representation on the Commission when the Commission is 
comprised of less than one member per Member State.376 Furthermore, 
ratification of a treaty or the Constitution and amendment of any of them 
require the consent of each Member State on an equal basis. Michael Dougan 
has written that the ratification requirement “reflects one of the organising 
principles of the Union order – of ultimate equality between the Member 
States in their capacity as Treaty authors.”377 
 
One of the more sensitive political issues arising from the Convention 
was the formula for qualified majority voting on the Council. As discussed in 
Chapter 13,378 adjustments were necessary to the Convention’s proposed 
formula in order to achieve IGC approval of the Constitution. The inescapable 
fact is that there are substantial variations in the populations of the EU’s 
Member States, ranging from more than 80 million in Germany to less than 
half a million in Luxembourg and Malta. In an expanding Union it will be 
much more difficult to manage EU affairs on the basis of informal consensus 
among the Member States, and therefore the smaller nations may justifiably 
be concerned about their ability to avoid being completely dominated by the 
larger states. The equality clause in Constitution Article I-5(1) confirms the 
worth of the smaller states, although even they must recognise that in political 
terms their voices will not be as loud as those of the larger states.  
 
b. Respect for national identities 
 
 Constitution Article I-5(1) also requires that the EU must respect the 
Member States’ “national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional . . . [and] shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining 
law and order and safeguarding national security.” Article 6(3) of the TEU 
offers a simpler mandate for the Union to “respect the national identities of 
the Member States,” but neither of the Treaties mentions the essential state 
functions of the Member States or their fundamental structures. The 
enhancement offered in Article I-5(1) underscores the continuing importance 
and vitality of the Member States as sovereign nations whose national 
identities are manifested in the functions and structures of nationhood. As 
nations, they do not lose their essential character by participating in the 
                                                 
376 Protocol on the enlargement of the European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 
163 arts. 4(2), 4(3) (2002) [hereinafter Protocol on Enlargement]. 
377 Dougan, supra note 358, at 13. 
378 See part 3 of Chapter 13. 
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European Union. This concept complements the notion of equality of the 
Member States, but again it is appropriate to acknowledge that political 
identity is quite a different matter from political power, whether in the EU or 
in the world community. 
 
c. Cooperation and full mutual respect 
 
 Under Article I-5(2) of the Constitution, the Union on the one hand 
and the Member States on the other are required to adhere to “the principle of 
sincere cooperation.”  Pursuant to this principle, both the Union and the states 
must “in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Constitution.” The phrases “sincere cooperation” and “full mutual 
respect” are not found in the Treaties, but the Constitution’s words have 
certain antecedents. EC Treaty Article 10 requires the Member States to “take 
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community.” Article 10 also requires Member States to 
“facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks” and to “abstain from 
any measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.” Cooperation is often mentioned, but only with relation to specific 
policies. In the TEU, on the other hand, there is a general mandate for 
cooperation in Article 1, which refers to “the policies and forms of 
cooperation established by this Treaty.” The same provision calls upon the 
Union to “organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, 
relations between the Member States and their peoples.”  
 
 Despite some similarities with respect to cooperation, there are 
differences in emphasis between the Treaties and the Constitution. EC Treaty 
Article 10 requires the Member States to “facilitate the achievement of 
Community tasks,” but the obligation as expressed in the treaty’s text does not 
flow in the other direction.379 In TEU Article 1 the Union is mandated to 
“organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations 
between the Member States and between their peoples.” In neither treaty are 
the EU and Member States called upon to treat each other with “full mutual 
respect.” Thus, the Constitution arguably increases the stature of each 
Member State in its dealings with the European Union. The words of Article 
I-5(2) appear intended to prohibit a hegemonic relationship with the EU 
acting in supreme power over the Member States. Rather, the expressions 
prescribe a partnership in which the central authority will carry out a 
                                                 
379 Note, however, that the European Court of Justice has declared the obligation of 
support to be mutual. See ECJ, judgment of 6 Dec. 1990, Case C-2/88, J.J. Zwartveld 
and others, [1990], ECR I-3365, para. 17. 
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necessary coordinating function without asserting complete dominance. The 
concept of full mutual respect is entirely consistent with the principles of 
equality of the Member States and respect for their separate national 
identities.  
 
2.  CITIZENSHIP 
 
2.1 Citizenship of the Union 
 
 Under Constitution Article I-10(1) each national of a Member State is 
designated a “citizen of the Union.” Article I-10(2) identifies the rights 
attendant to this grant. Most importantly, EU citizens are guaranteed the right 
to “move and reside freely” in any Member State, a benefit that Jaap W. de 
Zwaan has described as the “core business” of EU citizenship.380 Furthermore, 
the Constitution ensures each citizen the right as a resident to vote and stand 
as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament elections, certain rights 
to diplomatic and consular assistance from any Member State, the right to 
petition the European Parliament, the right to seek assistance from the 
European Ombudsman, and the right to deal with EU institutions in any 
official EU language. Additional legislation relating these rights is 
contemplated in Part III of the Constitution,381 and rights relating to voting 
and standing for election are reiterated in Articles II-99 and II-100. In broad 
terms Article I-19(1) mandates the Union to serve the interests of its citizens, 
and Article I-3(2) offers them “an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers,” along with an effective single market.  
 
 The Constitution does not significantly alter the citizenship provisions 
already existing in the Treaties. The EC Treaty contains most of the 
Constitution’s principles relating to EU citizenship. Article 17 creates EU 
citizenship for Member State nationals.  Article 18 permits EU citizens to 
“move and reside freely” anywhere in the EU. Article 19 grants EU citizens 
the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections where a 
person resides. Article 20 offers EU citizens the right to limited diplomatic 
and consular protection from other Member State governments. Article 21 
ensures EU citizens the right to petition the European Parliament, the right to 
apply to the European Ombudsman, and the right to deal with Union 
institutions in any of the official EU languages, and Article 22 contemplates 
additional legislation on several of these matters. Article 154 offers EU 
                                                 
380 Jaap W. de Zwaan, European Citizenship: Origin, Contents and Perspectives, in 
The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? 245, 247 (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. 
Kellermann & Steven Blockmans eds., 2005) [hereinafter De Zwaan 2005]. 
381 Constitution arts. III-125 to III-129. 
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citizens the “full benefit from the setting-up of an area without internal 
frontiers.” EU citizens receive further mention in Articles 62, 191, 194, 195 
and 255. The Preamble to the TEU and its Article 2 mention establishment 
Union citizenship. The Preamble mentions the resolve “to establish a 
citizenship common to nationals of their countries,” while Article 2 speaks of 
“the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.” 
 
 Union citizenship under the Treaties has been interpreted in a number 
of decisions by the European Court of Justice, described by Jaap W. de Zwaan 
as follows: 
 
In fact it took the Court some time to give European Citizenship, 
notably the free movement dimension thereof, a proper dimension. 
This, however not so much with respect to economically active EU 
citizens. Indeed their situation is already governed in clear terms by 
the rules of the internal market, notably the provisions of the EC 
Treaty and secondary law concerning the free movement of workers 
and the right of establishment for independents. 
 
No, the developments initiated by the Court of Justice 
concern the scope of – what is called – non-economic EU citizens 
who claim a right of residence in another Member State . . .  such as 
 
--persons whose status under Community law is not clear; 
--job seekers;  
--students; or 
--family members.382 
 
There is no indication in the Constitution that the Court’s rulings were to be 
overturned, or that the scope of citizenship under the EC Treaty would be 
reduced. To the contrary, De Zwaan contends that under the Constitution EU 
citizenship would be “strengthened and promoted as a principle of EU law of 
major importance.”383 He bases this opinion not so much on the textual 
content of the Constitution’s citizenship provisions – which in substance 
mirror the EC Treaty – but on the expansion of citizen rights in other parts of 
the constitutional text. He sees this expansion in the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                 
382 De Zwaan 2005, supra note 380, at 247-48. For De Zwaan’s full description of the 
various Court decisions, see id., at 247-52. 
383 Id. at 257. 
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rights384 and in the “Citizen’s Europe” provisions in Part I under the heading 
“The Democratic Life of the Union.”385 
 
 By definition the members of a traditional intergovernmental 
organisation are nations, as represented by their governments. The IGO grants 
certain rights, privileges and services to its member states, and these benefits 
– such as free movement of goods and persons – may well flow through the 
states to their respective citizens. However, the organisation does not create a 
citizen class that is entitled to involvement at the IGO level. Citizens of the 
IGO’s members do not generally expect to enjoy a direct relationship with the 
organisation separate and apart from their relationship with their own national 
government. In stark contrast, the EU Treaties have created a Union 
citizenship, and its citizens possess a number of significant rights directly 
related to the Union and its institutions.386 In this respect the EU is clearly 
distinct from a classic IGO. The Constitution reaffirmed the EU’s citizenship 
provisions and enhanced them with greater emphasis on citizen rights. 
 
2.2 National citizenship retains its vitality 
 
 Unlike a federal nation, the EU does not offer a full, stand-alone 
version of citizenship. Article I-10(1) of the Constitution states: “Citizenship 
of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship; it shall not replace it.” 
Rights to vote and stand as a candidate are limited by Article I-10(2) to 
municipal and European Parliament elections.387  National and provincial 
elections are not mentioned, and “municipal” is not defined. The voting rules 
for such elections, according to Article II-100 are the “same conditions” that 
are applicable to nationals of the state. In other words, the national 
government will be fully competent to set its own election rules. In light of 
the slight amount of detail offered with respect to voting in another Member 
State, Article III-126 of the Constitution calls for EU legislation to 
supplement its provisions, but it notes that this legislation may provide for 
“derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.” The 
Constitution also contemplates EU legislation expanding the citizen rights 
                                                 
384 Constitution arts. II-61 to II-114. 
385 De Zwaan 2005, supra note 380, at 257. See Constitution arts. I-45 to I-52. 
386 In addition to the rights described in Article I-10 of the Constitution, EU citizens 
enjoy, for example, the benefits of the “four freedoms,” which include free movement 
of goods, persons, services (with the related right of establishment) and capital. See 
analysis in part 1 of Chapter 17. For a discussion of the connection between EU 
citizenship and the four freedoms, see Eleanor Spaventa, From Gebhard to Carpenter:  
Towards a (non-)economic European Constitution, 41 C.M.L.R. 743, 768-71 (2004). 
387 See also Constitution art. III-126. 
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described above, but according to Article III-129 such laws would require a 
unanimous vote on the Council and separate ratification by each of the 
Member States.  
 
 The citizenship provisions in the Constitution have essentially been 
carried over from the Treaties, both as to their emphasis on the Union and as 
to their emphasis on the Member States. Article 17(1) of the EC Treaty 
presages Article I-10 of the Constitution by noting that Union citizenship 
“shall complement and not replace national citizenship.” Article 19 limits the 
right to vote and stand for election in other Member States to their municipal 
elections and elections for the European Parliament. As in the Constitution, 
national and provincial elections are not mentioned, and “municipal” is not 
defined. Article 19 adds actual voting will be subject to “the same conditions” 
as are applicable for nationals of the host state, i.e., that the state may 
determine its own voting laws. Article 19 also declares that “detailed 
arrangements” to further define these rights are subject to a unanimous vote 
on the Council. Such arrangements are also subject to “derogations where 
warranted by problems specific to a Member State.” Article 22 anticipates EU 
legislation “to strengthen or add to” the citizen rights offered by the EC 
Treaty, but such legislation will require a unanimous vote on the Council and 
separate ratification by each of the Member States according to their 
respective constitutional requirements.  
 
 Two directives have expanded on the provisions of EC Treaty Article 
19. Council Directive 93/109388 sets forth the conditions for an EU citizen to 
vote or stand for election as a candidate for the European Parliament. Most of 
the conditions are technical in nature, but Article 14 of the Directive permits a 
Member State to impose restrictions (based on length of residency) if more 
than 20 percent of eligible voters in the state are non-nationals.389 The second 
directive is Council Directive 94/80,390 which elaborates on the rights of EU 
citizens to vote and stand for office in municipal elections in the Member 
State in which they reside. There are two interesting restrictions in this 
Directive. Article 12(1) permits residency-length requirements if more than 
20 percent of the voters in a Member State are non-nationals, and Article 5(3) 
permits a Member State to limit to its own nationals the right to serve as 
                                                 
388 Council Directive 93/109/EC, Dec. 30, 1993, O.J. (L 329) 34. 
389 Id. at art. 14(1). For example, if the 20 percent threshold has been exceeded, a 
minimum residency period of up to 5 years may be imposed on non-nationals who 
wish to vote, and up to 10 years on non-nationals who wish to stand for election to the 
European Parliament. 
390 Council Directive 94/80/EC, Dec. 31, 1994, O.J. (L 368) 38. 
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“elected head, deputy or member of the governing college of the executive of 
a basic local government.”391  
 
In the area of citizen rights, Constitution Article II-101(3) provides 
that tort claims may be brought against the EU not under Union law, but “in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member 
States.” This mirrors Article 288 of the EC Treaty, which states that a tort 
claim brought against the Community by an EU citizen or any other party will 
be subject not to Union law but to the “general principles common to the laws 
of the Member States.” Under Constitution Article II-106 the right to consular 
assistance from another Member State is based on that state’s legal practices 
in dealing with its own nationals. This is a carryover from EC Treaty Article 
20, which provides that the right to diplomatic or consular assistance from 
another Member State is subject to “the same conditions” as would apply to 
nationals of the assisting state. Under the Treaty and the Constitution the 
implication is that the assisting Member State will be entirely free to set its 
own rules and procedures for granting diplomatic or consular assistance both 
to its own nationals and to those of other EU Member States.  
 
 As defined in the Treaties and Constitution, EU citizenship is a 
carefully contained concept.392 It supplements, but does not replace the 
national citizenship that is offered by the Member States. An EU citizen 
residing in a Member State where he or she is not a national citizen may enjoy 
many, but not all of the political rights granted to nationals of that state. 
Furthermore, the EU’s ability to elaborate on the right to vote or stand for 
election in another Member State is subject to a unanimous vote on the 
Council, where any Member State can exercise a veto, and further subject to 
“derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.”393  
Likewise, the EU’s ability to “add to the rights laid down in [Constitution] 
Article I-10” is subject to both a unanimous Council vote and the additional 
safeguard of separate ratification by each of the Member States.394  The 
potential for derogations and the requirement of unanimity represent clear 
limits on the authority of the EU to define the rights of its citizens beyond the 
principles explicitly stated in the Constitution.395 
                                                 
391 Id. at arts. 10(1), 5(3). 
392 For an extended analysis of the rights attached to EU citizenship, see Dennis C. 
Mueller, Rights and Citizenship in the European Union, in Blankart, supra note 29, at 
61-84. 
393 Constitution art. III-126. 
394 Constitution art. III-129.  
395 Jaap W. de Zwaan has commented that the EC Treaty’s existing ratification 
requirement for expansion of citizen rights is “laborious” and comparable to the 
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3.  THE BUDGET 
 
3.1 The EU’s budgetary independence 
 
 The European Union is not dependent on yearly contributions from its 
members.  Rather, Article I-54 of the Constitution calls on the EU to provide 
itself “with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its 
policies.” Article I-54(2) states that the Union’s budget “shall be financed 
wholly from its own resources.” Pursuant to Constitution Article I-56, the EU 
is required to adopt an annual budget in accordance with elaborate procedures 
set forth in Article III-404 of the Constitution.396 As is appropriate for an 
organisation whose primary business is business, Article I-53(2) requires that 
the revenue and expenditure shown in the budget “shall be in balance.” 
Articles I-55 and III-402 require a five-year “multiannual financial 
framework” that sets annual ceilings for the various categories of 
expenditures. Once a budget has been set, Article I-53(5) mandates that the 
EU “shall not adopt any act which is likely to have appreciable implications 
for the budget without providing an assurance that the expenditure arising 
from such an act is capable of being financed within the limit of the Union’s 
own resources and in compliance with the multiannual financial framework.” 
In other words, the EU must live within its budget.  
 
 Many of the Constitution’s budgetary principles are carried over from 
the EC Treaty. Article 268 of the treaty calls for an annual budget, which 
must be in balance. Article 269 requires the budget to be “financed wholly 
from own resources.” Article 270 contains the elaborate expression found in 
Constitution Article I-53 requiring the EU to live within its budget. Articles 
271 to 280 contain details about the process of adopting the budget. Despite 
these similarities, two new elements are noteworthy. First, the Constitution 
creates a multiannual financial framework, which is intended to provide more 
predictability and consistency in the EU’s budgeting process. Second, under 
Article III-404 the European Parliament becomes a full participant in 
approving all aspects of the budget and in proposing amendments to it. Under 
Article 272 of the EC Treaty the Parliament’s right to amend was limited to 
                                                                                                                    
process of amending the treaty. Despite the sensitivity of these matters, De Zwaan 
states that “one could have hoped that a lighter procedure would have been included 
in the treaty.” De Zwaan 2005, supra note 380, at 246 n.5. 
396 Article III-404 is located in a section entitled “The Union’s Annual Budget” (arts. 
III-403 to III-406). This is followed by sections entitled “Implementation of the 
Budget and Discharge” (arts. III-407 to III-409), “Common Provisions” (arts. III-410 
to III-414) and “Combating Fraud” (art. III-415).  
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compulsory expenditures.397 The Constitution’s approach adds a significant 
boost to the role of the Parliament. 
 
 Beyond actual creation of the budget, Constitution Article I-53 
requires the Member States to cooperate in countering fraud relating to the 
EU’s financial interests398 and to work with the Union to ensure proper use of 
budgeted monies.399 Similarly, EC Treaty Article 280 calls for Member State 
cooperation in countering fraud relating to the Community’s financial 
interests, but the treaty lacks a broader mandate for the states to work with the 
Community to ensure proper use of budgeted monies. 
 
 The European Union’s budgetary independence, and in particular its 
ability to finance its activities through its own resources, are a critical 
distinction between the EU and a typical intergovernmental organisation. An 
IGO has no taxing power and is typically dependent upon subscriptions, 
assessments or contributions from its members. Payment of such 
contributions may be mandated by the IGO’s constituent treaty, but revenue 
comes only from the treasuries of the member states. The EU’s financial 
framework is a key indicator of its unique status and its state-like nature. 
 
3.2 Elements of Member State control over EU finances 
 
 Article I-54(3) of the Constitution requires that European laws 
“relating to the system of own resources of the Union” and those which create 
new categories of resources (as well as abolishing any existing category) are 
subject to both a unanimous vote on the Council and approval by the Member 
States in accordance with their national constitutional requirements. 
Furthermore, according to Constitution Article I-55(2), each multiannual 
financial framework must be unanimously approved by the Council.400 This 
consensus-based framework will establish the approved categories of 
expenditures and the annual appropriations ceilings for each category for 
                                                 
397 EC Treaty Article 272(4), second subparagraph, provides that Parliament has a 
right “to amend the draft budget, acting by a majority of its Members, and to propose 
to the Council, acting by an absolute majority of the votes cast, modifications to the 
draft budget relating to expenditure necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance therewith.” (emphasis supplied) 
398 Constitution arts. I-53(7), III-415. 
399 Constitution arts. I-53(6), III-407. The Member States are also required to take 
steps to “counter fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests.” Constitution art. III-
415. 
400 However, note that a unanimous vote of the European Council can change this to 
approval by QMV. Constitution art. I-55(4). 
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periods of at least five years.401 Finally, Constitution Article III-412(3) 
requires that until the end of 2006 the Council must vote unanimously to 
adopt certain financial rules relating to the EU budget. 
 
 The unanimity provisions in the Constitution are a reflection and 
amplification of the procedures contained in the EC Treaty. Article 269 of the 
treaty requires that provisions “relating to the system of own resources of the 
Community” are subject to both a unanimous vote on the Council and 
approval by the Member States in accordance with their national 
constitutional requirements. The multiannual framework is not found in the 
Treaties. 
 
 One commentator has criticised the unanimity requirement in 
budgeting as follows: “Unanimity is now required for all relevant decisions 
related to own resources. Majority voting only applies to implementing 
measures where specifically provided for in earlier unanimous decisions 
[Constitution art. I-54(4)]. In a Union of 25, with crucial decisions on 
financing on the horizon, this is far from satisfactory.”402 It might be that the 
requirement of Member State cooperation on own resources arises from the 
fact that substantial portions of the EU budget are passed along to the Member 
States in the form of financial support for agriculture and other programmes, 
and each state has great incentive to protect its share of the payment stream 
from Brussels.403 But regardless of the motives or history that may lie behind 
the unanimity requirements, each Member State in the Union has a voice that 
must be heard in the process of determining categories of own resources. 
Neither the EU nor a majority of the other states can force a decision on own 
resources upon a member that has serious reservations. As a result, the 
financial independence that distinguishes the EU from a typical IGO is 
counterbalanced with a substantial protection left in the hands of each 
Member State. 
  
                                                 
401 Constitution arts. I-55(1), III-402(1). 
402 Giovanni Grevi, Light and shade of a quasi-Constitution – An Assessment, EPC 
Issue Paper No. 14, at 8-9 (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.theepc.net.  For a 
socio-economic analysis of the challenges facing the EU in setting its future budgets, 
see Charles B. Blankart & Christian Kirchner, The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An 
Economic Analysis of the Ways In and Ways Out, in Blankart, supra note 29, at 109-
38. 
403 Agriculture subsidies consume nearly half the EU budget. Chronology – EU 
Common Agricultural Policy, Reuters, June 26, 2003,  
available at http:// www.forbes.com/business/newswire/2003/06/26/rtr1011815.html. 
For the authority to support agriculture, see Constitution art. III-228(2). 
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4.  EXTERNAL ACTION 
 
 The Constitution anticipates the fact that the EU will have “relations 
with the wider world.”404 This phrase is not found in the Treaties, but the 
Treaties do mandate the Union to take action in a variety of international 
settings and for various purposes. The external action of the EU is examined 
in greater detail in Chapter 17, as one of the substantive areas of the Union’s 
activity. It is briefly referenced here as one of the significant indicia of the 
EU’s character, namely, that its Treaties and the new Constitution endow it 
with the state-like authority to carry out relations with the nations of the world 
and with international organisations. 
 
 As the analysis in Chapter 17 action will demonstrate, the authority of 
the EU to act in external matters is carefully limited, both in the existing 
Treaties and in the Constitution.  
 
5. DESCRIPTION AND MANDATE OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS 
 
5.1 A state-like institutional framework 
 
a. Overview of the EU institutions 
 
 An overview of the EU’s institutions is presented in Title IV of Part I 
of the Constitution, “The Union’s Institutions and Bodies.”405 This title 
consists of two chapters, with Chapter I describing the principal EU 
institutions under the heading “The Institutional Framework.”406 Chapter II 
describes “The Other Union Institutions and Advisory Bodies.”407 It is 
important to note at the outset that Title IV provides important information 
about the institutions, but it is an overview only. Much more detail regarding 
the functioning of the institutions is relegated to Part III of the Constitution.408  
 
 According to Constitution Article I-19(1), the EU is to consist of “an 
institutional framework” comprised of the European Parliament, European 
Council, Council, Commission and Court of Justice.409 As further discussed 
                                                 
404 Constitution art. I-3(4). 
405 Constitution arts. I-19 to I-32. 
406 Constitution arts. I-19 to I-29. 
407 Constitution arts. I-30 to I-32 
408 Constitution arts. III-330 to III-401. 
409 In the Constitution the European Council is always referred to with its full name, 
while in all provisions after Article I-19 the Council of Ministers is referred to as the 
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below, it is noteworthy that the Constitution deviates from EC Treaty Article 
7(1) by including the European Council in the list of primary institutions, 
while at the same time shifting the Court of Auditors from this list to the 
category of “other institutions.” In all instances, the Constitution requires each 
institution to act “within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the 
Constitution.”410 Following the introduction in Article I-19 there are separate 
articles describing each of the identified institutions.  A single provision, 
Article I-20, describes the European Parliament. Articles I-21 and I-22 
respectively describe the European Council and its President. Articles I-23 to 
I-25 describe the Council, its configurations and its system for qualified 
majority voting. The Commission, its President and the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs are described in Articles I-26 to I-28. The final article in this 
chapter is Article I-29, which introduces the European Court of Justice.  
 
 The Chapter I institutions are further covered in Part III of the 
Constitution as follows: the European Parliament in Articles III-330 to III-
340; the European Council in Article III-341; the Council in Articles III-342 
to III-346; the Commission in Articles III-347 to III-352; and the Court of 
Justice in Articles III-353 to III-381. Each of these institutions is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 13 of this treatise. 
 
 Chapter II of Title IV, consisting of Articles I-30 to I-32, describes 
the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors and the EU’s two official 
“advisory bodies,” the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and 
Social Committee. Again, each of these bodies is further described in Part III 
of the Constitution, with the ECB being covered in Articles III-382 and III-
383, the Court of Auditors in Articles III-384 and III-385, and the Committee 
of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee respectively in 
Articles III-386 to III-388 and III-389 to III-392, In addition, the European 
Investment Bank is described in Articles III-393 and III-394.  
 
 The institutional provisions in the Constitution may be seen as an 
amplification of those found in the Treaties. EC Treaty Article 7(1) offers a 
formal list of the Community institutions, including the European Parliament, 
Council, Commission, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors. The Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions are mentioned in 
Article 7(2), but, as noted above, the European Council is not listed. As a later 
instrument that builds on the EC Treaty, the Treaty on European Union 
arguably does not require a specific elaboration of the institutional 
                                                                                                                    
“Council” and the European Commission is referred to as the “Commission.” 
Constitution art. I-19(2). This treatise will generally follow those usage conventions.   
410 Constitution art. I-19(2). 
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framework, and a formal list is not included. However, at the beginning of the 
TEU, in its “Common Provisions,” Article 3 states that “[t]he Union shall be 
served by a single institutional framework.” Article 3 also mentions the 
Council and Commission and their responsibilities with regard to the EU’s 
external activities. Article 4 then describes the European Council and how it 
operates, although it is not labeled as an EU “institution” or “body.”  TEU 
Article 5 mentions the European Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of 
Justice and Court of Auditors, not as part of a description of an institutional 
framework, but to make clear that these institutions must “exercise their 
powers” under both the EC Treaty and the TEU.  
 
 It is Part Five of the EC Treaty, Articles 189 to 280, that contains 
most of the Treaties’ detail on the EU institutions. The European Parliament is 
covered in Articles 189 to 201, the Council in Articles 202 to 210, the 
Commission in Articles 211 to 219, the Court of Justice in Articles 220 to 245 
and the Court of Auditors in Articles 246 to 248. Articles 249 to 256 contain 
provisions common to the institutions, including the co-decision procedure for 
legislation (Article 251) and the cooperation procedure (Article 252). The 
Economic and Social Committee is described in Articles 257 to 262, the 
Committee of the Regions in Articles 263 to 265, and the European 
Investment Bank in Articles 266 and 267. Financial provisions relating to the 
Community are included as the final section of Part Five, in Articles 268 to 
280. 
 
 The institutional details provided in Part III of the Constitution411 
generally follow the approach of the provisions in Part Five of the EC 
Treaty,412 and to some degree the institutional sections in Articles I-19 to I-32 
of the Constitution resemble Articles 3 to 5 of the TEU. However the 
Constitution’s overview of the institutions in its Part I is much more detailed 
than that in the TEU and is presented in a clearer, more straightforward and 
cohesive manner than either of the Treaties offers. It may be fair to criticise 
the constitutional text for dividing the institutional provisions between Part I 
and Part III – this separation requires the reader to move back and forth 
between the parts to get the complete picture – but the general presentation of 
the material in the Constitution is an improvement over the more random 
approach in the Treaties. 
 
                                                 
411 Constitution arts. III-330 to III-401. 
412 EC Treaty arts. 189-267. 
126 THE CHARACTER OF THE EU 
 
  
b. Institutional mandate and functions 
 
 According to Article I-19(1) of the Constitution, the purpose of the 
EU institutions is “to promote its [the EU’s] values, advance its objectives, 
serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, [and] 
ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and 
actions.” Each institution is further called upon in Article I-19(2) to act within 
“the limits of the powers conferred upon it in the Constitution, and in 
conformity with the procedures and conditions set out in it,” and all of them 
are required to practice “sincere mutual cooperation.” Specific responsibilities 
for each institution are discussed below. One of the Constitution’s chief 
mandates for the institutions is to create law for the Union. Article I-33(1) 
states that the institutions are to use a variety of legal instruments in the 
course of exercising their competences. These legal instruments are described 
in Article I-33 and further defined in Articles I-33 to I-36, and they will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 14. 
 
 Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union mandates the Union 
institutions to “ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities 
carried out in order to attain [the Union’s] objectives while respecting and 
building upon the acquis communautaire.” Article 3 also mentions the need 
for consistency in the EU’s external activities and the responsibilities of the 
Council and Commission toward that end. The EC Treaty also contains a 
number of general provisions that describe the responsibilities of the Union’s 
institutions. Note that these provisions refer to the Community rather than the 
Union, but the Union is brought in through Article 1 of the TEU.413 EC Treaty 
Article 5 mandates the Community to act within its conferred powers, and 
subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. These principles 
are discussed in Chapter 12.414 Article 7 notes that the Community’s tasks are 
entrusted to its institutions, each of which must act “within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.” The identified institutions are the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and 
the Court of Auditors. Articles 8 and 9 expand on the institutional mandate by 
mentioning the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank. 
Article 10 calls on the Member States to support the institutions in their work. 
Part Five of the EC Treaty415 contains most of the detail on the institutions 
and their responsibilities, and Part Six mentions various responsibilities of the 
                                                 
413 TEU Article 1 states: “The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, 
supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.”  
414 See part 2 of Chapter 12. 
415 EC Treaty arts. 189-267. 
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Community in general or the Council and Commission acting on behalf of the 
Community.416 
 
 Article I-50(2) of the Constitution requires that “the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as 
possible.” This makes concrete an aspirational statement in Article 1 of the 
the Treaty on European Union that decisions in the Union “are taken as 
openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.” The EU 
Parliament is required by Article I-50(2) to meet in public, as is the Council 
when it is “considering and voting on a draft legislative act.” A specific 
requirement of open meetings is not found in the Treaties.  
 
 Article I-50(3) grants the public a broad “right of access to documents 
of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their 
medium.” EC Treaty Article 255 offers public access to Community 
documents, although the only institutions mentioned are the Parliament, 
Council and Commission. Interestingly, the Constitution’s wide sweep would 
include for the first time the European Council, which has heretofore operated 
without being subject to any right of access. 
 
 Notwithstanding the differences in how the Constitution describes the 
EU institutions, it is fair to say that – with the notable exceptions of the roles 
of the permanent European Council President and the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs – the new document would change very little with respect to 
the institutions’ overall functions. The differences, if any, are discussed below 
with respect to each institution. The Constitution’s method of organising and 
describing the broad institutional mandates is different from that of the 
Treaties, but the substance is the generally the same. One exception is that, as 
noted above, the public right of access to EU documents is expanded to 
include all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Furthermore, as 
described in Chapter 14, the forms of legislation and regulation available for 
use by the EU’s institutions, as such are prescribed by the Constitution, 
represent a simplification from the varieties available under the Treaties.417 
 
c. Authorisations granted to the EU institutions 
 
 To support the Union’s activities, Constitution Article III-428 permits 
the Commission to “collect any information necessary and carry out any 
checks required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it,” pursuant to a 
                                                 
416 EC Treaty arts. 281-314. 
417 See analysis in part 1 of Chapter 14. 
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European regulation or decision adopted by the Council by simple majority. A 
simple majority means a majority of the Council’s component members.418 
Article III-429 allows the EU to compile statistics “necessary for the 
performance of the Union’s activities,” pursuant to a European law or 
framework law. However, the production of statistics is subject to certain 
guidelines and may not “entail excessive burdens on economic operators.” 
The general permission to collect information is found in Article 284 of the 
EC Treaty, in terms essentially the same as Constitution Article III-428, and 
since qualified majority voting on the Council is not mentioned in Article 284, 
by its default rule the Council decision will be taken by a majority vote of its 
members.419  The right to produce statistics is found in EC Treaty Article 286, 
whose terms are essentially the same as Constitution Article III-429. 
 
 Under Constitution Article III-427 the Union may, in a European law, 
set the employment regulations for its own officials and employees.420 The 
constitutional provision mirrors Article 283 of the EC Treaty.421 It is useful to 
note, however, that the EU employees are subject to EU regulations and are 
thus outside the employment laws of the Member States where the employees 
work. Under the Treaties and the Constitution the EU is given complete 
autonomy in this area. 
 
 The members of EU institutions and committees, along with all other 
Union officials and employees, are prohibited by Constitution Article III-430 
from disclosing information “of the kind covered by the obligation of 
professional secrecy,” and this obligation continues “even after their duties 
have ceased.” Of particular concern is information “about undertakings, their 
business relations or their cost components.” EC Treaty article 287 is identical 
in its operative terms. Interestingly, neither the Constitution nor the treaty 
specifies the source of these obligations or where they may be found. Unless 
further EU regulatory or legislative action is taken to identify the obligations, 
the source might be found in Member State law, EU law or some form of 
generally accepted principles. 
 
 The activities of the EU institutions are subject to review by a 
completely independent Ombudsman, who is first mentioned in Article I-
10(2) of the Constitution, which describes the various rights that attach to EU 
citizenship. The office is generally described in Article I-49. The Ombudsman 
represents both the power of the European Parliament, who appoints him or 
                                                 
418 Constitution art. III-343(2). 
419 EC Treaty art. 205(1). 
420 Constitution art. III-427. 
421 EC Treaty art 283. 
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her, and a sounding board for EU citizens. He or she is to “receive, examine 
and report on complaints about maladministration” of EU institutions and 
officials, and must be completely independent in carrying out this mandate.422 
Additional detail regarding the Ombudsman is found in Constitution Article 
III-335. The Ombudsman is elected by the European Parliament423 and must 
operate pursuant to a “European law of the European Parliament,” that has 
been approved by the Council.424 While the Commission must be consulted on 
this law, the legislative initiative and enactment comes from the Parliament 
alone.425 A brief reference to the Ombudsman is found in Article 21 of the EC 
Treaty, which identifies the rights of EU citizens. Article 195 of the treaty 
contains details similar to those in Article III-335 of the Constitution. A 
separate description like that of Constitution Article I-49 is not found in the 
treaty text. Under the Treaties and the Constitution the existence of the office 
reflects a measure of self-sufficiency in the EU institutions. The European 
Parliament has the ability to appoint the Ombudsman without consulting the 
Member States, and the Ombudsman can carry out his or her responsibilities 
without seeking the approval of the Member States. The Ombudsman’s 
oversight of the EU institutions takes place exclusively at the Union level. 
 
5.2 The EU’s institutions must respect the Member States 
 
 Article I-19(1) of the Constitution mandates that the EU institutions 
must serve the interests of the Member States. This is consistent with Article 
I-5(1), which requires the EU, acting through its institutions, to respect the 
national identities of the Member States and their functioning as states.426 
Article I-11(1) provides that EU institutions must govern their actions by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and Article I-11(3) elaborates 
that under the subsidiarity principle the institutions must limit themselves to 
actions whose objectives “cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States.” Procedurally, the Constitution’s Protocol on the Role of Member 
States’ National Parliaments in the European Union (Protocol on National 
Parliaments) provides that the national parliaments must be advised of all 
proposed EU legislation and may issue a “reasoned opinion” if they believe 
that the subsidiarity principle is being violated.427 Furthermore, pursuant to 
the Constitution’s Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
                                                 
422 Constitution art. I-49. 
423 Constitution art. III-335(1). 
424 Constitution art. III-335(4). 
425 Constitution art. III-335(4). 
426 Constitution art. I-5(1). 
427 Protocol on National Parliaments, supra note 273. 
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Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Protocol on Subsidiarity), 428 if their 
objections do not obtain the desired results, groups of Member States may 
force reconsideration,429 and any state may challenge the legislation in an 
action at the European Court of Justice.430 
 
The constitutional provisions have several antecedents in the Treaties. 
TEU Article 6 requires the Union, and thus its institutions, to “respect the 
national identities of the Member States.” Article 10 of the EC Treaty has 
been interpreted to impose on the Community a duty of “sincere cooperation” 
with the Member States.431 EC Treaty Article 5 sets forth the principles of 
conferral, exclusivity, subsidiarity and proportionality as a check on EU 
power, and here too the test of subsidiarity is whether EU action “cannot be 
sufficiently be achieved by the Member States.”  Both the Protocol on 
National Parliaments and the Protocol on Subsidiarity have been appended to 
the Treaties since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.432 However, as noted in 
Chapter 12, the constitutional versions of these protocols provide a greater 
role for the Member State parliaments.433 
 
Although the EU does have the power to run its own affairs, Articles 
III-432 and III-433 of the Constitution require that certain politically sensitive 
issues relating to Union institutions are subject to unanimous adoption. These 
include decisions on the seat of Union institutions, which must be approved 
by “common accord of the governments of the Member States,434 and 
regulations governing the official use of languages within the institutions, 
which must be unanimously adopted by the Council.435 The words of Article 
III-432 regarding a common accord decision to determine the seat of EU 
institutions are essentially identical to EC Treaty Article 289. The provisions 
of Article III-433 on a unanimous Council decision to govern the official use 
of languages in the EU institutions are also a direct carryover, in this case 
from EC Treaty Article 290.  
                                                 
428 Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273. Also see Constitution arts. I-18(2), I-
11(3), III-259. 
429 Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273, art. 6. For comments on the expanded 
review rights for the national parliaments, see Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 
1334-35. 
430 Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273, art. 7; Constitution art. III-365(2). 
431 See the Court of Justice ruling in Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, supra note 379. 
432 Protocol on National Parliaments, supra note 273. Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra 
note 273. 
433 See part 2 of Chapter 12. 
434 Constitution art. III-432. 
435 Constitution art. III-433. 
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 Compared to the Treaties, the Constitution provides more emphasis 
on the EU having respect for the Member States and serving their interests. In 
addition, Peter Norman reports that the Protocol on National Parliaments and 
the Protocol on Subsidiarity were “beefed up somewhat” at the Convention 
“to increase the member states’ safeguards against any centralising urges 
emanating from Brussels.”436 In the Constitution’s version, the Protocol on 
National Parliaments contains more detailed procedures regarding the 
forwarding of proposed EU legislation to the parliaments for review and 
creates a right for the parliaments to send a “reasoned opinion” to the EU 
concerning compliance with the subsidiarity principle. The Constitution’s 
Protocol on Subsidiarity adds the procedures by which national parliaments 
may object to legislative acts on subsidiarity grounds, force reconsideration, 
and ultimately challenge the legislation in an action at the Court of Justice. 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and these protocols are 
further discussed in Chapter 12.437 
 
 There are two additional means by which the residual power of the 
Member States vis-à-vis the EU institutions is affirmed in the Constitution. 
First, the Union’s activity is limited to what is conferred on it “by the Member 
States in the Constitution to attain the objectives set out in the 
Constitution.”438 Second, the Member States must unanimously agree to 
amend any part of the Constitution, including the institutional provisions.439 
The conferral principle and the amendment requirements are carryovers from 
the Treaties,440 and both are the subject of further analysis below.441 
 
6.  STATE-LIKE ATTRIBUTES AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 Of the subjects addressed this chapter, the matter most likely to 
impact the EU’s dividing lines, at least in theory, is the enhanced legal status 
that the Constitution offers to the Union. Lack of legal personality for the 
Union (as opposed to the Community) has not really caused the Union to 
refrain from acting as its membership has wished, but the Union’s new 
personality and its status as successor to the old Union and the Community 
suggest a new legal order and thus an invigorated entity that may be better 
                                                 
436 Norman, supra note 152, at 252. 
437 See part 2 of Chapter 12. 
438 Constitution art. I-11(2). 
439 Constitution art. IV-443, IV-444, IV-445. See the discussion in Chapter 11. 
440 EC Treaty art. 5 (conferral); TEU art. 48 (amendment). 
441 See part 1 of Chapter 12 (regarding conferral) and Chapter 11 (regarding 
unanimity to amend the Constitution). 
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able to assert itself to the world and to its members. But is this really a 
movement of dividing lines, or is it just an outward makeover that does not 
expand EU competences? It is difficult to see any shift in competences in this 
regard.  Likewise, will the ability of the new Union to more clearly and 
legally bind itself in international agreements mean that it will do so more 
frequently and to the detriment of Member State competences? Given the fact 
that other paths are currently open for the making of such agreements, there is 
little reason to conclude that the Constitution’s textual clarification would 
have resulted in a significant increase in this type of activity.  
 
 In contrast, does the Constitution’s new expression of the equality of 
the Member States somehow imply a limitation on EU competences? This 
must also be answered in the negative. In general, the same sorts of 
conclusions are appropriate with regard to the constitutional provisions 
addressing citizenship, budgetary affairs, external action and institutional 
matters. 
 
In short, the state-like attributes of the Union under the Constitution 
are clarified and improved-upon, but they do not represent a meaningful shift 
in the EU’s dividing lines.  
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Chapter 9 
 
 
The EU as a Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historically, the Union’s values and objectives and its state-like 
attributes have been recurring themes in the Great Debate on whether the 
Union is (or should be) essentially intergovernmental in nature or a federation 
in-the-making. This chapter will expand our consideration of one of the EU’s 
stated values – democracy, and we will examine the democratic features 
embedded in the Union’s processes and institutions. In an organisation itself 
comprised of democratic states, one might not expect that elements of 
democracy at the EU level would be controversial. Nevertheless, this subject 
has proven to be of significant interest, and it has in fact engendered 
philosophical disagreement. 
 
1.  IS DEMOCRACY REALLY NECESSARY AT THE EU LEVEL? 
 
 Article I-2 of the Constitution identifies democracy as a core value of 
the Union, as does Article 6(1) of the TEU. But democracy at what level? Is 
the intention to respect democracy within the Member States, or does it mean 
that democracy should be practiced within the institutions and activities of the 
EU itself?  
 
We can posit that proponents of a vigorous intergovernmental theory 
would contend the following: The EU is and should remain a project of the 
Member States, with centralisation only as absolutely necessary to coordinate 
national action. Since the Union should be little more than a limited pooling 
of certain national resources, citizens of the Member States should not be very 
concerned about influencing the EU processes except through their national 
governments. Thus, democracy within the Union should flow naturally – and 
exclusively – from and through the democratic features of the Member 
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States.442  In contrast, those who espouse the federal approach would see an 
increasing role for the Union in the lives of individual Europeans, and this 
would necessitate rights and procedures at the EU level to ensure citizen 
control. In other words, the new legal order developing in the EU demands a 
democratic approach, and the Union must be structured to enhance 
transparency, individual participation and a strong European Parliament.443 
Without these elements the system would suffer from a “democratic 
deficit.”444  
 
 For an historical perspective, G.F. Mancini outlines four reasons why 
the European Community was not founded as a democratic institution. First, 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) “do not normally provide for much 
direct democracy in their decision-making apparatus;” rather, a measure of 
democracy exists through national parliamentary control over the state’s 
representatives to the IGO.445 Second, the Community’s Member States were 
“anxious to circumscribe the surrender of national sovereignty within clearly 
defined limits.”446 Third, a full national-style parliamentary system was not 
deemed feasible, and therefore the early version of the European Parliament 
was limited to a consultative role.447 Finally, an empowered parliament was 
seen as a hindrance to the desired IGO-inspired consensus approach to 
decision-making.448 Nevertheless, the Community had its democratic 
                                                 
442 Lindseth urges that “we should not confuse formal democratisation of European 
institutions with democratic legitimacy.  The Community remains, in essence, a 
supranational administrative body, the legitimacy of which derives from its ability to 
solve practical problems reasonably efficiently, as a regulatory agency of the Member 
States representing their particular national communities.” Lindseth, supra note 34, at 
683. 
443 Albert Weale, in his 1999 treatise on democracy, asserts that any “non-utopian” 
normative theory of democracy “is committed to the position that ‘ought implies 
can.’” Christopher Lord, Assessing Democracy in a Contested Polity, 39 J. Common 
Mkt. Stud. 641, 644 (2001). 
444 The idea of a democratic deficit can be traced to David Marquand who in 1979 
championed a strong European Parliament. See David Marquand, Parliament for 
Europe (1979). See also Yves Mény, De la democratie en Europe: Old Concepts and 
New Challenges, 41 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 1 (2002); Majone, supra note 77, at 6.  
For an extended analysis of the European Union’s “democratic deficit” and how the 
Constitution will affect democratic rights and processes within the EU, see Stephen C. 
Sieberson, The Proposed European Union Constitution—Will it Eliminate the EU’s 
Democratic Deficit?, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 173 (2004). 
445 Mancini, supra note 37, at 31-33. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. 
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underpinnings. Jan Muller has observed that “the initial constituent power was 
a plural one: the member states, represented by their governments, engaged in 
elite bargaining, and made the political decision to constitute the Community. 
Consequently, there was a deficit of direct democracy from the very start, but 
there was no lack of a democratically constituted, plural constituent 
power.”449 Muller’s comments would be echoed by the intergovernmental 
camp, who would contend that the original democratic underpinnings of the 
Community are sufficient for the EU today and in the future. Mancini strongly 
articulates the contrary, federalist position:  
 
Indeed, the Union is doomed never to be truly democratic as long as 
not only its foreign and security policies, which are openly carried out 
on an intergovernmental basis, but the very management of its 
supranational core, the single market, are entrusted, with or without a 
circumscribed control by the European Parliament, to diplomatic 
round tables. In other words, democracy will elude Europe as long as 
its form of government includes rules and legitimises practices 
moulded on those of the international community.450 
 
Whether the European Union can or should manifest democratic 
elements depends both on the nature of the EU and the nature of democracy 
itself. The following section will examine first whether the Union possesses 
one of the building blocks of democracy, a demos – an identifiable people on 
which a democratic system can be based. Second, the analysis looks at 
whether there is an ideal form of democratic system to which the EU should 
aspire. Third, there is consideration of the practical issue of delegation as a 
necessary element of democracy in a complex society. After these inquiries, 
the Constitution and Treaties will be examined to identify elements of 
democracy that exist at the EU level, as well as areas in which the national 
democracies of the Member States are emphasised.  
 
2.  THE CHARACTER OF DEMOCRACY AT THE EU LEVEL 
 
2.1 Is there a demos on which a democracy can be based? 
 
 In classic terms the basis for any democracy is the existence of a 
demos, an identifiable group of people with sufficient cohesiveness to agree 
on the principles of their self-governance.451 Shared geography alone is not 
                                                 
449 Muller, supra note 38, at 1790-91. 
450 Mancini, supra note 37, at 65. 
451 See general discussion in Neil MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity, and 
Citizenship in the 'European Commonwealth', 16 Law & Phil. 331, 340-42 (1997).  
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enough to create the common culture or values that can give rise to a demos. 
Rather, the people within the territory must share a deeper common identity. 
With respect to the existence of a demos at the core of the European Union, 
commentators generally fall into three camps. The first contends that such a 
demos can never develop, and thus a true pan-European democracy cannot be 
created. The second argues that Europeans do possess sufficient shared values 
to constitute a demos that will support an EU democracy. A third camp 
suggests that this debate is unnecessary, and that the Union does not need a 
traditional demos as a prerequisite to supporting a democratic system. We will 
briefly examine each of these theories. 
 
 The case against the existence of a European demos begins with the 
empirical observation that Europeans are a diverse people with diverse values. 
Andreas Føllesdal  makes reference to the lack of “a shared history or gene 
pool among all Europeans, to create a common identity” and sees that “there 
is no ‘demos’, no shared sense of destiny or broad set of common values.”452 
He also sees “no sufficiently widespread and appropriate political culture” 
and “little in the way of sufficiently clear and shared normative conceptions 
of what justice requires regarding the institutional distribution of political 
rights and material resources.”453 Andrew Moravcsik notes that multilateral 
bodies such as the EU “lack the grounding in a common history, culture and 
symbolism upon which most individual polities can draw.”454 One of the 
greatest concerns to some commentators is the absence of a common 
European language.  Dieter Grimm, a justice of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, sees the language problem as “the biggest obstacle to 
Europeanisation of the political substructure, on which the functioning of a 
                                                                                                                    
Democracy has been described as “the power of the demos.” Yves Mény, supra note 
444, at 3. 
452 Andreas Føllesdal, Citizenship and Political Rights in the European Union: 
Consensus and Questions, Institute for Advanced Studies, 1, 4, available at 
http://www.ihs.ac.at/public_rel/kbericht/ak1/fo.html [hereinafter Føllesdal IAS]. For a 
general discussion of the “no demos” theory, see Brand, supra note 19, at 7-17.   
453 Føllesdal IAS, supra note 452, at 12-13. 
454 Moravcsik 2003, supra note 95, at 38. Maltese Convention delegates George Vella 
and Alfred Sant have argued that “the diversity of cultures, languages, traditions, 
beliefs and historical backgrounds, found in the present and future member states of 
the EU, is the strongest factor against the claim that the EU should assume the 
structures of a federal superstate.” Jesmond Bonello, Draft EU Constitution: MLP 
Sees Voluntary Withdrawal Clause as 'Interesting', Times Malta, May 28, 2003, at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/core/article.php?id=127081. Joschka Fischer, an ardent 
proponent of further EU integration, likewise acknowledges that the Member States 
remain as the repository for citizens’ identity and loyalty. Fischer, supra note 65, at 7. 
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democratic system and the performance of a parliament depends.”455 He 
asserts that effective democracy depends on effective communication, and 
that a shared language is critical.456 G.F. Mancini agrees. He acknowledges 
that multi-language nations do exist, but he asserts that the size of the EU and 
the number of its languages create unprecedented challenges for 
democratisation.457 
 
 Population movement throughout history demonstrates that people are 
capable of shedding languages and nationalities while embracing new 
cultures. As an example, the Europeans who emigrated to the United States 
during the 19th century were generally successful in leaving the “Old World” 
behind and blending into the evolving American demos. But their willingness 
and ability to take on a new identity were spurred by the desperate economic 
or political conditions that led to emigration and by the dramatic impact of a 
physical relocation.  It cannot be expected that today’s Europeans who remain 
in their homelands during relatively comfortable economic circumstances will 
have the same motivation to let go of their national identities and personally 
accede to a pan-European demos. Joschka Fischer agrees that in these 
circumstances the nation states of Europe are “realities that cannot simply be 
                                                 
455 Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 Eur. L.J. 282, 295 (1995).  
See also the analysis by G.F. Mancini, who observes that multi-lingual European 
states such as Belgium, Switzerland and Finland do exist, but are relatively small 
compared to the totality of the EU.  In light of the Union’s daunting language 
problem, Mancini concludes that the EU’s democratic deficit “is therefore inborn and 
cannot realistically be removed within a time-frame which is other than geological or, 
at the very least, epochal.” Mancini, supra note 37, at 56 (2000).  Mancini notes that 
these temporal adjectives were used “ironically, but quite correctly in my opinion” by 
Joseph H. H. Weiler. Id. at 56 n.29.  See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a 
Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 Eur. L.J. 219, 
229 (1995) [hereinafter Weiler 1995].   
456 “Communication is bound up with language and linguistically mediated 
experience and interpretation of the world. Information and participation as basic 
conditions of democratic existence are mediated through language.” Grimm, supra 
note 455, at 292. 
457 Mancini, supra note 37, at 56. Mancini observes that multi-lingual European states 
such as Belgium, Switzerland and Finland are relatively small and manageable 
compared to the EU.  In light of the Union’s daunting language problem, Mancini 
concludes that the EU’s democratic deficit “is therefore inborn and cannot 
realistically be removed within a time-frame which is other than geological or, at the 
very least, epochal.” Id. at 56. Mancini notes that these adjectives were used 
“ironically, but quite correctly in my opinion” by Joseph H.H. Weiler. Id. at 56 n.29.  
See Weiler 1995, supra note 455, at 229.  
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erased” by the process of European integration.458 Similarly, Alan 
Branthwaite sees “little evidence of European identity being able to offer a 
compensatory identity to replace national identities.”459 He describes the EU 
as “an artificial entity for which there are no natural feelings or sympathy.”460 
Likewise, it has been argued that “the average voter will always relate far 
more to his national political institutions” than to the EU.461 In this vein Peter 
Lindseth has asserted that “as long as political identity continues to cling to 
the nation state . . . the status of the EC/EU as a self-legitimating 
‘constitutional’ level of governance will remain tenuous.”462  
 
 A number of observers have dismissed the “no demos” argument by 
asserting that Europeans in fact share certain deeply-held principles. Former 
French Prime Minister and current MEP Michel Rocard has described “the 
extraordinary community constituted by the intellectual and cultural 
patrimony that unites Europeans around recognised and accepted values.”463  
Among these values are “respect for human life, the desire to protect the weak 
and the oppressed, equal treatment of women, the commitment to the rule of 
law” as well as liberty of thought, religious freedom and pluralism, and 
Rocard heralds these principles as the nearly unanimously-accepted “pillars of 
political and institutional stability in today’s Europe.”464 He might well have 
                                                 
458 In commenting on the “the transition from a union of states to full 
parliamentarisation as a European Federation” Fischer notes that such a level of 
integration is highly controversial: “Of course, this simple solution is immediately 
criticized as being utterly unworkable. Europe is not a new continent, so the criticism 
goes, but full of different peoples, languages and histories. The nation-states are 
realities that cannot simply be erased, and the more globalisation and Europeanisation 
create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the 
people will cling on to the nation-states that give them comfort and security.” Fischer, 
supra note 65, at 7. Fischer states that he shares these objections, and therefore he 
endorses the idea that Member States should have in an integrated Europe. Id. at 7.  
459 Alan Branthwaite, The Psychological Basis of Independent Statehood, in States in 
a Changing World 46, 60 (Robert H. Jackson & Alan James eds., 1993).  
460 Id. 
461 Charlemagne, Europe's Forgotten President: Why It Matters Who Runs the 
European Parliament, Economist, Jan. 12, 2002, at 49. 
462 Lindseth, supra note 34, at 644. Lindseth engages in an extensive analysis of 
democratic legitimacy and the “no demos” theory. Id. at 645-51, 672-83. 
463 Michel Rocard, Europe's Secular Mission, Taipei Times, May 28, 2003, at 9, 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2003/05/28/2003053028. 
464 Id.  Rocard notes the influence of Christianity on the development of these shared 
values, but he adds that “Europe also found a productive balance between church and 
state.  In Europe, sovereignty belongs to the people and does not flow from a 
transcendent power . . .” Id. 
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quoted Article 6(1) of the TEU, which states: “The Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States.” (emphasis supplied) Andreas Føllesdal refers to a “shared sense of 
justice,”465 and social philosopher Jurgen Habermas has spoken of “the idea of 
Europe” being based on a “specific notion of justice” as manifested in “the 
social welfare state and the social market economy.”466 These ideas suggest 
that a deeper bond already exists among EU citizens,467 and the European 
Community itself in 1973 attempted to recognize this bond in its “Declaration 
on the European Identity,” which stated that the Member States at that time 
shared “the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society 
which measures up to the needs of the individual.”468  
 
 A third approach is to suggest that the EU does not actually require a 
demos in the classic sense. Lothar Funk contends that the EU is a unique 
polity that “does not need citizens with a predominantly European identity” in 
order to be as legitimate as the Member States.469  Eric Stein agrees and 
argues that since the EU is not a state in the traditional sense, “it does not 
need the underpinning of a single ‘people.’”470 Likewise, Lindseth proposes 
that a redefinition of demos may be necessary for the concept of democracy to 
adequately apply to an institution such as the EU that exists outside the 
                                                 
465 Føllesdal IAS, supra note 452, at 4. 
466 Jurgen Kaube, Espresso and Croissants, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 
2001, available at http://www.faz.com/IN/INtemplates/ AZ/archive.asp?rub={B131 
1FFE-FBFB-11D2-B228-00105A9CAF88}&doc={7E646849-6AE3-11D5-A3B5-
009027BA22E4}.   
467 It has also been argued that greater public participation in the EU’s processes and 
institutions will engender a deeper European identity. EU trade commissioner Pascal 
Lamy and French official Jean Pisani-Ferry have suggested that formation of effective 
multi-national political parties within the Parliament may give rise to “a truly pan-
European civil society that can bring life to pan-European debates.” Pascal Lamy & 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Europe's Future and the Centre-left, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 8, 
2002, at 19. In contrast, Andrew Moravcsik describes as “questionable” the 
proposition that “greater participation in European political institutions will generate a 
deeper sense of political community in Europe….” Moravcsik 2002, supra note 95, at 
615.  
468 Commission of the European Communities, Declaration on the European Identity, 
(1973) EC Bulletin 12, Cl. 2501, 118-127. For thoughts on the European identity 
from the perspective of a scholar from one of the new Central European Member 
States, see Priban, supra note 81.   
469 Funk, supra note 81. 
470 Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 
Am. J. Int'l L. 489, 526 (2001). 
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traditional concept of the nation-state.471 Antonio Estella argues: “The 
important thing is not whether a demos exists; the important thing is that the 
pact is in equilibrium, that is, that a positive-sum game situation is created for 
all players.”472 
 
 Reflecting on the debate, Stein questions whether the search for a 
demos may be a red herring, but he does recognise that something uniquely 
European is developing.  In describing this “hopeful vision” he states: 
“Elements of what might emerge as a ‘European identity’ may be in place, but 
if this evolves, it will differ from, and will coexist with, the discrete identities 
of the peoples in the individual member states.”473 This idea of coexisting 
identities or attachments is explored by Joseph Weiler, who describes the 
concept as that of “multiple demoi.”474 He describes several versions of this 
theory, and they share the following characteristics: “[T]he invitation is to 
embrace the national in the in-reaching strong sense of organic-cultural 
identification and belongingness and to embrace the European in terms of 
European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-
national diversity.”475 
 
2.2 Can pure democracy exist in the EU? 
 
 Whether a demos exists in the EU or is even necessary, a second 
threshold question is whether there is an ideal form of democracy that can be 
identified for the European Union or for any society. Whether described with 
reference to the Greek polis, the New England town or the Westminster 
model,476 the pure majoritarian government “of the people, by the people, for 
                                                 
471 Lindseth, supra note 34, at 643.  See also Kenneth Armstrong, Civil Society and 
the White Paper: Bridging or Jumping the Gap? (Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No.6/01, 2001), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011601.html.    
472 Antonio Estella, Constitutional Legitimacy and Credible Commitments in the 
European Union, 11 Eur. L.J. 22, 26 (2005). 
473 Stein, supra note 470, at 528.  See also Di Fabio, supra note 112, at 168.  Note also 
Alan Branthwaite’s reference to an EU identity that might be “complementary” to 
national identities. Branthwaite, supra note 459, at 60.  
474 Weiler, supra note 29, at 344-448. 
475 Id. at 346. 
476 “The Westminster model (which originated in Great Britain about three hundred 
years ago) concentrates power in the hands of cabinet ministers, and particularly the 
prime minister. The central attribute of this model of government is the individual and 
collective responsibility of ministers to Parliament (and of Parliament to the people).” 
W.T. Stanbury, Accountability to Citizens in the Westminster Model of Government: 
More Myth Than Reality, Fraser Inst. Digital Publication (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/westminster.pdf. Also, for a useful 
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the people” is proffered as a hope, an intention and a goal. But in the world of 
reality this magnificent aspiration is exposed as no more than an elusive 
abstraction. Yves Mény has branded Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg phrase as a 
highly “misleading” motto that has unfortunately come to define “the ideal 
form of democracy conceived by citizens.”477 Joseph Weiler states that 
“democracy can not exist in a modern polity” as it might in the ideal 
community.478 Giandomenico Majone has characterised the “pure 
majoritarian” model of democracy as one standard that the Union will not be 
able to meet,479 but Mény insists that “all of today’s democracies are 
‘impure’.”480  He contends that the EU’s prospects for democracy should be 
viewed with no more scepticism than more recognized democratic systems.481 
In a further commentary, published after finalisation of the Constitution’s text 
in the fall of 2004, Mény observes: “The EU is not yet the traditional 
democratic polity that we have become used to (rather recently by the way!), 
but it is a democracy in the making. It is imperfect, to be sure. But then so is 
democracy itself.”482 
 
 The impossibility of attaining the democratic ideal arises from the 
practical fact that democracies are institutions created by finite human beings 
operating under the constraints of culture, geography, time and the politics of 
the moment.483 For Europe, one of its defining characteristics is its variety, 
from the rich diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups, to the dramatic 
differences in climate and topography and the ever-changing economic and 
geopolitical picture. Creating a widely accepted and stable system of 
government for such a continent is no small task. The fact that there are 
different governmental traditions within the EU only compounds the 
challenge for the Union. All of the Member States are democracies, but in 
                                                                                                                    
historical analysis of the relationship between democracy and sovereignty, see 
Newman, supra note 42, at 4-15. 
477 Mény, supra note 444, at 3. 
478 Weiler, supra note 29, at 81. 
479 Majone, supra note 77, at 6.  
Majone classifies current democratic deficit arguments into four groups, based on the 
underlying standards used: “Standards based on the analogy with national institutions; 
Majoritarian standards; Standards derived from the democratic legitimacy of the 
Member States; [and] Social standards.” Id. 
480 Mény, supra note 444, at 3. 
481 Id. at 12. 
482 Yves Mény, The Achievements of the Convention, 14 J. Democracy 57, 70 (2003). 
483 Even the meaning of “democracy” is variable by era and location. “The very same 
word applies to the Athenian government, to de Tocqueville’s America, to the British 
or continental parliamentary systems, to the new political systems emerging from the 
collapse of communism, etc.” Mény, supra note 444, at 10. 
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different forms. Jan Muller observes that “in Britain, the Crown in Parliament 
is sovereign, in France, it is the state, representing the sovereign people, and 
its common national will. Finally, in Germany, the constitution is interpreted 
through the Federal Constitutional Court as the final arbiter.”484 Eric Stein 
describes “the consensual (consociational) pattern in the Netherlands [where it 
is known as the “polder model”485], Belgium, Austria and Switzerland…the 
strong regionalism in Spain… [and] the federal variants in Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, and Switzerland.”486 In the face of these divergent approaches, and 
against the backdrop of Europe’s broad diversity, Yves Mény argues: “The 
legitimacy battle over who does what, at which level and according to which 
rules will be with us forever.”487 He sees an EU that will never be a “rational, 
well-ordered, uniform type of polity,” but rather a system in constant 
motion.488 He asserts that “we have to accept changes, disparities and 
differences over time and space, and not consider this a traumatic situation” 
and he adds that the Union can survive “only by accepting—and organising—
these variations, be they beliefs, rules or institutions.”489 
 
 Setting aside the ideal and embracing a flexible approach need not 
imply that there are no measurable standards for democracy in the European 
Union.  Joseph Weiler asserts that “democracy can be measured by the 
closeness, responsiveness, representativeness, and accountability of the 
governors to the governed.”490 In similar terms, Michael Newman writes that 
“non-governmental opinion needs to be able to influence outcomes, expose 
injustice and incompetence, and offer alternative policies based on 
information about current policy failures.”491  These are useful concepts, but 
still abstract. Newman acknowledges that “such notions are exceedingly 
difficult to implement in practice in most political systems, and that there are 
particular problems involved in applying them within the EU.”492 More 
concrete standards and measurements are called for, and Andrew Moravcsik 
                                                 
484 Muller, supra note 38, at 1779. 
485 Historically, all elements of Dutch society needed to cooperate just to protect the 
country from the sea, to build dikes and to reclaim land (polder). More recently, the 
economic policy-setting cooperation among employers’ organisations, labour unions 
and the government has been referred to as the polder model. Mark Kranenburg, The 
political branch of the polder model, NRC Handelsblad (July 1, 1999) available at 
http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Netherlands/politics.html. 
486 Stein, supra note 470, at 489-95.  
487 Mény, supra note 444, at 12. 
488 Id. at 12. 
489 Id. 
490 Weiler, supra note 29, at 81.    
491 Newman, supra note 42, at 173. 
492 Id. 
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argues that in order to be fair, “any useful and realistic assessment of the EU’s 
democratic performance must be based on a comparison with the actual 
functioning of national democracies.”493 In an elaborate analysis, Christopher 
Lord proposes two methods of creating appropriate standards.  First, he 
suggests that “benchmarks for democratic performance used elsewhere [i.e., 
in other systems] should be adapted to the specific case of the EU.”494 Second, 
he examines self-assessments and peer reviews gleaned from a wide array of 
reports and other documents issued by the various EU institutions.495 Lord 
theorises that further studies utilising these two approaches will yield “a series 
of grounded and discriminating assessments of where in the EU’s political 
system, and in relation to what democratic standards, problems are most acute 
or solutions most developed.”496 
 
2.3 Delegation and its impact on democracy 
 
 Regardless of the standards by which European Union democracy is 
to be measured, it is a certainty that delegation will be part of the system, as it 
is in any modern, functioning democracy. In a large and complex society it is 
simply a practical necessity to use elected and appointed representatives to 
carry out the task of governing, as an alternative to direct action by the 
citizenry.497 There are two basic types of delegation.  At the first level, 
individuals are elected by popular (democratic) vote to legislative bodies or 
executive positions, and these representatives carry out their responsibilities 
with the knowledge that they will in due course be required to stand again for 
election. At the second level, elected representatives appoint civil servants 
                                                 
493 Moravcsik 2003, supra note 95, at 38, 45. 
494 Lord, supra note 443, at 645. These benchmarks include (1) distinguishing among 
“competing models of Euro-democracy” offered by academics and practitioners, 
including majoritarian, consensus and participatory classifications, (2) identifying 
indices of democratic performance for each model, (3) specifying units of assessment, 
and (4) setting standards of evidence. Id. at 645-48.   
495 Id. at 648-56.  
496 Id. at 657. 
497 Yves Mény describes the “major intellectual shift” that occurred at the time of the 
American and French Revolutions: “Up until these major political changes, there was 
a general consensus about, on the one hand, the eminent quality of democracy (the 
best possible regime) and, on the other hand, its intrinsic limitation (democracy, it 
was argued, unfortunately can work only in tiny states and cities). The ‘miracle’ 
resulted from the combination of the representative principle with the democratic 
principle into something that was still called ‘democracy’, but had little to do with 
what the enlightenment had in mind.” Mény, supra note 444, at 11.  Joseph H. H. 
Weiler puts it succinctly: “Representative democracy replaces direct participation.” 
Weiler, supra note 29, at 81. 
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who carry out executive, administrative and judicial tasks and are subject, not 
to future elections, but to rules of administrative procedure and standards of 
good behavior.498 It is this second type of delegation that engenders most of 
the debate about the democratic legitimacy of any system of government, and 
of the European Union in particular.499  
 
 Delegation to administrative agencies is both widespread and 
functional. Peter Lindseth has commented that “[t]he practice of delegation is 
so common in modern administrative states that one could probably describe 
it as ‘universal.’”500  Likewise, Giandomenico Majone asserts that  “the pure 
majoritarian model of democracy is the exception rather than the rule” and 
that “most democratic polities . . . rely extensively on non-majoritarian 
principles and institutions.”501 Andrew Moravcsik explains that non-
majoritarian bodies, insulated from public pressure, offer much-needed 
efficiency and expertise, impartial dispensation of justice, protection of 
minorities, and unbiased representation of majority interests.502 Majone also 
sees delegation as a means of managing the “deep cleavages” in a system such 
as the European Union, where “a strict application of majoritarian standards 
                                                 
498 There are regional variations as to which governmental positions are elected and 
which are appointed.  In the United States, for example, in some jurisdictions the 
offices of sheriff, city attorney and even trial and appellate judges may appointed, 
while in others they may be elected.  
499 Note that Articles 202 and 211 of the EC Treaty specifically provide for the 
Council of Ministers (elected officials who represent the first level of delegation from 
the European citizens) to delegate to the Commission the right to adopt specific EU 
laws (the second level of delegation). 
500 Lindseth, supra note 34, at 645. 
501 Majone, supra note 77, at 11. Yves Mény writes: “An endless number of 
institutions which are at the heart of democratic systems are in fact not democratic 
(central banks, judiciaries, professional bodies with regulatory powers, etc.)….” 
Mény, supra note 444, at 9. 
502 Moravcsik 2002, supra note 95, at 613-14. Moravcsik also asserts that “non-
majoritarian decision-making is justified in democratic theory not simply because it 
may be efficient, but because, ironically, it may better represent the long-term 
interests of the median voter than does a more participatory system—in distributive 
conflicts as well as matters of efficiency. Moravcsik 2000, supra note 36, at 311.  
Majone comments that “one of the important tasks of EC institutions has always been 
to protect the individual rights created by the Treaties, even against the majoritarian 
decisions of a Member State or the unanimous preference of all the Member States.  
EC competences [i.e., delegated authority] that serve to protect such rights are 
legitimated, and limited, by this function.” Majone, supra note 77, at 23. Yves Mény 
concurs: “Power has to originate in the people.  But, in a representative system, the 
minority has to be protected from the excesses of the majority.”  Mény, supra note 
444, at 9.  
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would only produce deadlock and possibly even disintegration.”503 Beyond 
these practical benefits, Majone sees the delegation of authority as a 
manifestation of the delegating parties’ commitment to the system.504  In this 
view, the yielding of sovereignty from elected bodies to more independent 
administrative institutions ensures greater consistency and continuity of 
policy, and thus represents a greater endorsement by the electorate of their 
public officials.505 
 
 Common as it is, and useful as it may be, delegation is a two-edged 
sword. The very act of delegating to an administrative agency is a transfer of 
power away from individual citizens and a setting-aside of the principle of 
decision by majority vote. Inevitably there are times in any society when the 
electorate, the media and even other public officials will lash out at the 
“bureaucrats” who seem too removed from the people they are supposed to 
serve. Majone acknowledges the challenges posed by institutions “which by 
design are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected 
representatives.”506  Lindseth has noted that despite the widespread practice of 
delegation in modern administrative states, “the power of unelected 
administrators to make regulatory norms—notably the power to make general 
rules in a quasi-legislative sense—is inescapably problematic from the 
standpoint of democratic legitimacy.”507 Within the European Union, the 
presence of non-majoritarian institutions has been described as “the conflict 
between bureaucracy and democracy, which is really at the heart of the 
present political and economic malaise across Europe.”508 The extent of 
delegation is thus a key point of contention in the debate over the proper 
structure for the European Union. A proper balance between efficient 
operation of government and popular control over core policy decisions is 
                                                 
503 Majone, supra note 77, at 11. Majone describes the cleavages as “linguistic, 
geographical, economic, ideological and, especially, the division between large and 
small Member States.”  Id.    
504 Id. at 17. 
505 Majone states: “Because a legislature or a majority coalition cannot bind a 
subsequent legislature or another coalition, public policies are always vulnerable to 
reneging and hence lack credibility.  Delegation to politically independent institutions 
is one method of achieving credible policy commitments.” Id. at 17. 
506 Id. at 15. Majone also acknowledges the perception that independent regulatory 
agencies “do not fit well into the traditional framework of controls, checks and 
balances.”  Id.  
507 Lindseth, supra note 34, at 645. 
508 Anatole Kaletsky, EU Blueprint Spells the Demise of Democracy, Times London, 
Oct. 31, 2002, at 24. 
146 THE CHARACTER OF THE EU 
 
  
sought by all sides,509 but the precise form of that balance is where the 
divergence occurs. Those who would espouse a greater the role for the 
Commission must acknowledge that this will result in further removing 
decision-making from the European citizenry. On the other hand, those who 
would urge greater power for the European Parliament or Council must 
recognise that democratic procedures – and politics – are likely to yield a loss 
of efficiency. The picture is further complicated by the fact that in a complex 
system such as the EU, delegated administration and its oversight are spread 
among different levels of government,510 and thus, the possibilities for 
adjusting the structure are seemingly endless. 
 
3.  DEMOCRACY AT THE EU AND NATIONAL LEVELS  
 
3.1 Democratic elements in the Union 
 
 To emphasise the benefits of EU citizenship, Part I of the Constitution 
contains a boldly expressed section, Articles I-45 to I-52, entitled “The 
Democratic Life of the Union.” It begins with a mandate in Article I-45 for 
the EU to treat all of its citizens equally, but much more interesting from a 
structural point of view are provisions of Articles I-46 and I-47 that 
underscore the Union’s commitment to the principles of “representative 
democracy” and “participatory democracy.” These articles guarantee citizens 
the right of direct representation at the Union level in the European 
Parliament, the right to “participate in the democratic life of the Union,” the 
right to have EU decisions taken “as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen” and the right to act through EU-level political 
parties.511 Citizens are also promised a public forum for their views, access for 
their representative associations, broad consultation from Union officials and 
                                                 
509 Peter Lindseth writes of the need for a “broader scholarly discussion of the 
appropriate means of controlling delegated normative power in any supranational 
body….” Lindseth, supra note 34, at 643. Francesca Bignami describes the challenges 
of achieving balance as follows: “A legislature that exercises too much oversight 
might very well slow down administrative action, render it partial, or compromise the 
scientific character of decision-making. Similar consequences follow from an 
administrative process that is too swift, relies too heavily on expert opinion, or is 
overly concerned with fairness. The aim is to achieve a balance, one that is not simply 
a matter of technocratic virtuosity but also depends on collective perceptions as what 
that balance should be.” Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European 
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 Harv. 
Int'l L.J. 451, 460 (1999). 
510 Moravcsik 2003, supra note 95, at 42. 
511 Constitution art. I-46. 
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a right of initiative.512 In the remaining Articles of this section, the 
Constitution addresses issues such as EU dialogue with “social partners,”513 
the work of a Union ombudsman,514 a requirement of open meetings by most 
Union institutions, access to EU documents,515 a right of personal data 
protection516 and respect for the national status of churches and non-
confessional organisations.517  
 
 The Treaty on European Union mentions democracy, but only as an 
aspiration. The treaty’s preamble identifies democracy as a principle to which 
the people of Europe are attached, and it expresses their desire to “further the 
democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions.” Article 1 refers to a 
union in which “decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizens.” Article 6(1) declares that the Union is founded on the 
principle of democracy, along with “liberty” and “respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” Article 11(1) notes that 
development and consolidation of democracy is an objective of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy. The TEU does not contain any 
substantive provisions relating to the practice of democracy at the Union 
level. 
 
The EC Treaty notes that fostering democracy is an objective of the 
Community’s external relations,518 but this treaty also addresses in concrete 
terms certain aspects of EU-level democracy that are covered by Articles I-45 
to I-52 of the Constitution. For example, EC Treaty Articles 189 and 190 
include the right of direct representation in the European Parliament, and 
Article 191 includes recognition of the importance of EU-level political 
parties. The EC Treaty does not mention access for “representative 
associations” or “social partners,” or respect for the national status of 
churches and non-confessional organisations, and civil society is mentioned 
only in EC Treaty Article 257 as one of the groups represented on the EU’s 
Economic and Social Committee. The EC Treaty does not mandate open 
                                                 
512 Constitution art. I-47. 
513 Constitution art. I-48. 
514 Constitution art. I-49. 
515 Constitution art. I-50. 
516 Constitution art. I-51(1). Data protection is also required of Member States when 
carrying out EU-mandated activities. Constitution art. I-51(2). 
517 Constitution art. I-52. In fact, the EU is required to maintain regular, open and 
transparent dialogue with churches and similar organisations. Constitution art. I-
52(3). 
518 EC Treaty arts. 177(2) (regarding development cooperation), 181a(1) (regarding 
economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries).  
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meetings or taking decisions as openly as possible,519 but Article 255 
guarantees public access to documents of the Council, Commission and 
Parliament, and Article 207 requires the Council to set rules for access to its 
documents. Personal data protection is referenced in Article 286 of the EC 
Treaty, but the treaty does not articulate the right of protection in terms as 
strong as those found in Constitution Article I-51. Lastly, the EC Treaty 
contains no right of public initiative, as offered in Article I-47(4) of the 
Constitution. 
 
 The primary difference between the Constitution and the Treaties is 
one of emphasis. The Treaties do not contain a cohesive section on the 
democratic life of the Union, do not use the Constitution’s terms 
“representative democracy,” “participatory democracy” or “democratic life of 
the Union,” and do not refer to the Community or Union in any other term 
relating to democratic principles. The Constitution also recognises for the first 
time the rights and status in the EU of representative associations, social 
partners and civil society, as well as the national status of churches and other 
such groups. Open meetings of EU institutions are offered in some 
circumstances, and access to EU documents is increased. The right of public 
initiative is also introduced, although the editors of the European Law Review 
have expressed their “particular ire for the ridiculous citizen initiatives” in the 
following terms: 
 
 This gimmick reeks of crass populism, as it allows minority interests 
representing less than a third of one per cent of the Union population 
to hijack Commission legislative resources. It forgets that the point of 
political institutions is that we pay them and hold them to account for 
exercising their judgment on these matters, not for kowtowing to 
newspaper editorial initiatives.520 
 
 A classic intergovernmental organisation does not offer citizenship, 
and neither does it offer its own democratic rights and processes to the 
citizens of its member states. Certain of the benefits offered by an IGO to its 
member states may well flow through the states to their citizens, and the 
operating rules of the organisation may offer a measure of openness and 
access to the public, but the organisation does not offer traditional rights at the 
                                                 
519 Note, however, that the European Council has recently decided that certain 
meetings of the Council of Ministers shall be open to the public. This decision is 
taken under the Treaties, but without a specific textual mandate in the Treaties. See 
note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
520 Editorial, A Constitution Whose Bottle is Definitely Half-Full and Not Half-
Empty, 28 Eur. L. Rev. 449 (2003). 
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IGO level. The uniqueness of the European Union is emphasised by the fact 
that it has adopted a variety of democratic principles for the benefit of EU 
citizens and for improving their oversight of EU institutions. In this instance 
the Constitution absorbed the principles previously included in the Treaties 
and both extended the substance of the principles and dramatically increased 
the prominence with which they are presented. 
 
 The expansion of democratic principles in the Constitution is 
arguably one of the most significant innovations proposed by the Convention 
and the IGC, and the need for this expansion was a motivating factor behind 
the Convention.521 When the Commission published its White Paper on 
European Governance in 2001, it based its sweeping proposals for EU 
institutional reform on “principles of good governance,” including openness, 
participation and accountability.522 These principles were described as the 
underpinning of democracy, not only for the Member States, but also for the 
Union.523 The White Paper added: “Democracy depends on people being able 
to take part in public debate.  To do this, they must have access to reliable 
information on European issues and to be able to scrutinise the policy process 
in its various stages.”524 The Commission insisted that both the EU 
institutions and the Member States “need to communicate more actively with 
the general public on European issues” and that information “should be 
presented in a way adapted to local needs and concerns, and be available in all 
official languages.”525 Later in 2001 the European Council met in Laeken, 
Belgium, and issued its Declaration on the Future of the European Union.526 
The Laeken Declaration noted that the EU “derives its legitimacy from the 
democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and 
instruments it possesses” as well as from its “democratic, transparent and 
efficient institutions.”527 The Declaration described a need for the EU “to 
become more democratic, more transparent and efficient” and mandated the 
Convention to resolve the challenge of “how to bring citizens . . .  closer to 
the European design and the European institutions.”528 The Declaration also 
                                                 
521 The Laeken Declaration stated: “The first question is . . . how we can increase the 
democratic legitimacy and transparency of the present institutions.” Laeken 
Declaration, supra note 143, at 23.   
522 White Paper, supra note 52, at 10. 
523 Id. 
524 Id. at 11. The Laeken Declaration also called on EU institutions to be more open.  
Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 20. 
525 White Paper, supra note 52, at 11. 
526 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 19, 20.   
527 Id. at 22-23. 
528 Id. at 21. 
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set forth a lengthy list of questions illustrating the need to “increase the 
democratic legitimacy” of the EU’s institutions.529 These questions were 
intended to serve as themes for the Constitutional Convention that the 
Declaration instituted.530 
 
 Demands for more democracy and transparency were translated into 
the Constitution’s provisions for open proceedings and for greater public 
access to Union documents.531 The significance of the constitutional section 
on “The Democratic Life of the Union” lies in the actual rights created, but 
also in the ambitious language and tenor of the democracy articles as drafted. 
Because of the dramatic scope of these provisions, they will have an impact 
on any future debate over the EU’s form. Under the Constitution, democracy 
at the EU institutional level is guaranteed to all EU citizens. This is certainly a 
step away from classic intergovernmentalism, and it may have constituted a 
further step toward classic federalism. 
 
3.2 The importance of democracy at the national level 
 
 In Article I-46 of the Constitution, the same provision that references 
citizens’ direct representation at the Union level, provides a reminder that the 
Member States themselves are represented on the European Council and 
Council, whose respective members are “democratically accountable either to 
their national parliaments, or to their citizens.”532 In Article I-47(4), which 
provides for the new right of citizen initiative within the EU, the requirement 
for submission of an initiative is the signatures of at least one million citizens. 
Interestingly, however, the article also requires that the requisite number of 
citizens must represent “a significant number of Member States.” The EU’s 
mandate in Article I-51 to protect individuals’ personal data is also made 
                                                 
529 Id. at 23. 
530 Id. at 24-26. 
531 Kokott and Ruth have commented on “increasing democratic legitimacy and 
transparency of the Institutions” as follows: “The Constitution, in principle, maintains 
the present institutional design, which, in spite of its well-known deficiencies with 
regard to the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy, seems to be the most 
appropriate at the Union’s current state of integration. Attempting a major overhaul of 
the institutional set-up would have not only been premature and therefore unlikely to 
lead to satisfying results, but would have endangered the whole project of a 
Constitution. It thus appears, for the time being, preferable, to bring about the 
necessary changes not by a single ‘constitutional stroke’, but through the European 
integration process of progressive reforms and adjustments of the Union’s 
institutional architecture, all the while striving for the utmost transparency.” Kokott & 
Ruth, supra note 116, at 1331. See their expanded analysis, id. at 1331-33.  
532 Constitution art. I-46(2). 
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applicable to the Member States “when carrying out activities which fall 
within the scope of Union law.”533 There is no general requirement imposed 
on the Member States in all circumstances of their activities – only in their 
EU activities. Last, the statement in Constitution Article I-52(1) that the 
Union “respects and does not prejudice” the status of churches and non-
confessional organisations is specifically tied to their status under the national 
laws of the Member States. 
 
 In contrast to the Constitution, the Treaties primarily mention the EU 
and its institutions in those few treaty provisions that suggest democratic 
principles and processes. The Member States and their democracy are surely 
implied in the Treaties, but the only specific reference to them is TEU Article 
6, which notes that liberty, democracy and other principles are “common to 
the Member States.” 
 
4.  DEMOCRACY AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 Regarding the Constitution’s unprecedented series of articles on the 
“democratic life of the Union,”534 it is important to note that these provisions 
are mainly about the EU and not about the Member States. The few references 
to the Member States, identified above, must be seen as little more than 
reminders of Member State democracy in the context of the EU system. The 
Constitution’s principal thrust in Articles I-45 to I-52 is to illustrate how the 
Union is to be brought closer to its citizens.  
 
As noted in the preceding analysis, an increased association of the EU 
and its institutions with the familiar democratic principles and processes that 
EU citizens expect at the national level is a calculated move to create greater 
popular appreciation for the Union. Coincidentally, at a different level such 
developments may appeal to those who would desire the EU to evolve into an 
democratic federal system. In contrast, those who prefer to preserve the 
Union’s essential character as an intergovernmental organisation might well 
argue that the EU does not need to offer either its own citizenship or Union-
level democratic concepts; national citizenship and the national democracy 
should be sufficient. The reality is that the trappings of democracy do not 
necessarily create or portend a superstate. The EU can indeed offer more 
direct rights to its citizens – and thus foster greater popular support for the 
Union – without necessarily altering its essential character as a blended entity 
that is neither intergovernmental in the traditional sense, nor fully federal.  
                                                 
533 Constitution art. I-51(2). 
534 Constitution arts. I-45 to I-52. 
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With respect to the EU’s existing dividing lines, greater transparency 
and more opportunities for citizen involvement do not obviously change 
anything. In the long run, greater citizen appreciation for the Union may open 
the door to expanded Union involvement in any number of substantive areas, 
and with that the dividing lines may well shift. But more trappings of Euro-
democracy, by themselves, do not have that effect. 
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Chapter 10 
 
 
A Flexible Entity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The history of the European Union is one of steady enlargement. It 
has grown from the original six nations that formed the European Coal and 
Steel and Community to the group of 27 resulting after the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania on January 1st, 2007.535 This growth stands in stark 
contrast to the general geographical stability of the individual Member States 
during the same 50-year period.536 The EU’s expansion has necessitated treaty 
provisions to reflect and govern the process, and the Constitution deals with 
both the accession of further Member States and the prospect that one or more 
states may choose to leave the Union. In addition, the Constitution provides 
for an additional form of structural flexibility in its provisions regarding the 
suspension of rights of a Member State that fails to live up to the Union’s 
most basic principles. 
 
1.  FUTURE EXPANSION THROUGH ACCESSIONS 
 
 Article I-58(1) of the Constitution provides that the EU is to be open 
“to all European States” committed to promotion of the Union’s values.537 
                                                 
535 The original six members were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded in 1973, 
followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Sweden and 
Finland in 1995. The 2004 “Big Bang” expansion took in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. 
536 The principal geographical change among the Member States was the 1989 
reunification of German, when the former East Germany merged into West Germany. 
A related development of political, but not geographical, significance was the 
attainment of true independence by Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. 
537 For an analysis of the interplay between expansion of the EU through accessions 
and the development of the Union as a constitutional system, see Neil Walker, 
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The provision offers a procedure by which a state can apply for membership, 
and then the application must receive consent of the European Parliament and 
unanimous approval by the Council. After an accession agreement has been 
concluded, each of the existing EU Member States must ratify the agreement 
according to its national constitutional requirements.538 The enlargement of 
the EU by admitting states that accept its basic principles is a concept 
previously expressed in TEU Article 49. The accession process described in 
Article 49 is essentially the same as the Constitution’s formulation. In 
addition, the EC Treaty and TEU contain a Protocol on the Enlargement of 
the European Union.539 
 
 The Union’s further enlargement has recently proven to be a sensitive 
issue, as reflected in the “no” votes in the French and Dutch referenda in mid-
2005 on ratification of the Constitution.540 Whereas at one point it was 
generally assumed that the EU would eventually admit Turkey and others, the 
2004 and 2007 accessions have caused something of an identity crisis within 
the Union as well as an administrative challenge.541 Nevertheless, the 
provision for a formal accession process in the Constitution and in the 
Treaties is based on the reality of the European Union as an entity whose 
geographical potential has not yet been reached.   
 
2.  CONTRACTION – WITHDRAWAL OF A MEMBER STATE 
 
 Part I of the Constitution presents an overview of the European 
Union, a kind of promotional and user-friendly summary of its values and 
objectives, its competences and the commitment of the Member States to its 
                                                                                                                    
Constitutionalising Enlargement, Enlarging Constitutionalism¸ 9 Eur. L.J. 365 (2003).  
For a discussion of the linkage between accession to the EU and a candidate country’s 
respect for human rights, see Cesare Pinelli, Conditionality and Enlargement in Light 
of EU Constitutional Developments, 10 Eur. L.J. 354 (2004). 
538 Constitution art. I-58(2). 
539 Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 376. 
540 The French referendum took place on May 29, 2005, followed closely by the 
Dutch vote on June 1st. 
541 Turkey has been approved as a candidate without a fixed accession timetable, but 
its possible accession has proven highly controversial, owing to a great extent to its 
overwhelmingly Muslim population. All future accessions may be in jeopardy, 
because the French and Dutch referenda have been seen in part as a reaction to the 
impact of the EU’s expansion in 2004. Graham Bowley, EU teeters on edge of a 
broader crisis, Int’l Herald Trib., June 3, 2005; Katrin Bennhold, EU cuts expansion 
from its to-do list, Int’l Herald Trib., June 14, 2005. Other states considered as 
prospects for future accession include Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Albania, 
Moldova, Ukraine and the Balkan states that were formerly part of Yugoslavia. 
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success. Ironically, after all of that, the final provision of Part I creates the 
right of a Member State to voluntarily withdraw from the Union. Article I-60 
calls for notification by the withdrawing state, negotiation of a withdrawal 
agreement, and, unless the parties agree otherwise, an exit date two years after 
first notification is given to the EU. 542 A state that has withdrawn may later 
apply to rejoin the Union pursuant to the ordinary accession procedure.543 The 
inclusion of a withdrawal right in the Constitution, which has no precedent in 
the Treaties, was highly controversial at the Convention.544 A number of 
proposals were made to delete the provision, and, failing that, to create more 
severe consequences for the withdrawing state. In the end, the prevailing 
sentiment was expressed by Convention President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, 
who noted that the European Union “is after all not a prison.” 545 Thus, Article 
I-60’s provisions require procedures to be followed, but they impose no 
penalties. 
 
 George Bermann has described the EU’s constitution-making as 
“highly untidy,” and he notes that “the product at any given time will look 
highly unfinished.”546 He adds:  
 
This is all the more so when the only thing that has been 
predetermined is that these states will in principle continue to 
deliberate among themselves (and with other partner states they might 
pick up along the way), when each amendment will have to have been 
the product of the untidy political bargaining that strongly typifies 
intergovernmental decision-making, and when, by way of innovation 
under the new draft constitution, all States know that their partners 
have the express right to withdraw if they should ever become 
                                                 
542 Constitution arts. I-60(2), I-60(3). For a discussion of withdrawal from the Union,  
see Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, The Process and Impact of EU Constitution-
making: ‘Voice and Exit,’ in The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre 
Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
543 Constitution art. I-60(4). See also Constitution art. I-58 (regarding accession 
procedures). 
544 Despite the controversy over Article I-60, the European Union has experienced a 
type of withdrawal, not of a Member State, but of a constituent portion of a Member 
State. In 1985 Greenland, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, was permitted to 
withdraw from the European Community and change its status to that of an Overseas 
Country or Territory. For an analysis of this event and a comparative review of 
withdrawal rights and restrictions in several different governmental systems, see 
Raymond J. Friel, Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the 
EU: Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution, 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 407 (2004). 
545 Norman, supra note 152, at 215, 255. 
546 Bermann, supra note 47, at 369. 
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sufficiently disenchanted or come to look upon the EU as a 
sufficiently bad bargain.547 
 
 Secession of a constituent part from a federation, as the American 
Civil War demonstrated, is a threat to the very existence of the federal entity 
and is considered by some scholars to be illegal.548 Furthermore, treaties are 
governed by the rule of pacta sunt servanda – the expectation that a treaty is a 
solemn undertaking and that a state will fulfill its treaty obligations.549 
However, even that venerable precept has its exceptions. International law 
does recognise a variety of grounds for revoking and withdrawing from a 
treaty.550 Under the law of treaties the concept of state sovereignty would 
allow withdrawal either in accordance with the terms of the treaty itself or on 
the basis of an ultimate expression of self-interest. If the treaty itself does not 
provide for withdrawal, a party may withdraw on grounds such as 
supervening impossibility of performance or a fundamental change of 
circumstances.551 The Constitution’s inclusion of Article I-60 underscores the 
fact that in many ways it is still a treaty – its parties, the Member States, may 
assert their self-interest by withdrawing from the Union.552 It can be argued 
that Article I-60 pays homage to the deepest level of Member State 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
547 Id. 
548 The United States Supreme Court has decreed secession to be in violation of 
American federal law. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724-26 (1869). Joseph H.H. 
Weiler has noted the “juridical” conclusion that under the current Treaties unilateral 
withdrawal from European Union would be illegal. Weiler, supra note 29, at 18. Cass 
Sunstein argues that provisions permitting secession may well endanger “ordinary 
democratic processes” and that they have no place in a constitution. Cass Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633, 669-70 (1991). 
549 Preamble, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 336, art. 60 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna 
Convention of Treaties 84 (1984).  
550 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, arts. 54-64. See also, Sinclair, supra note 549, 
at 181.  
551 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, arts. 61, 62. 
552 Raymond Friel sees secession as a distinctly anti-federal concept, and he writes: 
“The degree to which secession is controlled tells us much about whether the Union is 
simply an association of States or a true federal Union.” Raymond J. Friel, The Draft 
Constitution: Issues and Analyses: Secession from the European Union: Checking out 
of the Proverbial “Cockroach Motel,” 27 U. Fordham Int’l L.J. 590, 641 (2004). 
Michael Dougan describes Article I-60 as “the ultimate constraint upon Union 
competence.” Dougan, supra note 358, at 8. 
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3.  SUSPENSION OF RIGHTS 
 
 Article I-59(2) of the Constitution provides that the European Council 
may, after complying with strict procedures, determine that a Member State 
has committed a “serious and persistent breach” of the EU’s core values. The 
values are those expressed in Constitution Article I-2, namely, “respect for 
human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” The 
Article I-59 procedures include a preliminary determination by the Council 
and the consent of the European Parliament.553 The decision by the European 
Council must be unanimous, with the accused Member State ineligible to vote 
on the matter.554 Upon such a determination, the Council may suspend certain 
of the violating State’s rights under the Constitution, including its voting 
rights within the Council.555 Despite such a suspension, Article I-59(3) 
requires that the State in question will “continue to be bound by its obligations 
under the Constitution.” 
 
 Similar provisions for the suspension of rights are contained in the 
Treaties. Article 7 of the TEU offers the greatest detail as to the procedures 
leading to a suspension, and the principles that the offending Member State 
must have violated are set forth in Article 6(1) of the TEU. These principles 
are “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law” – the Constitution’s references to human dignity, equality 
and the rights of minorities are not mentioned in the treaty. EC Treaty Article 
309(1) refers to and builds upon the TEU principles and the TEU suspension 
process, and it adds that a Member State whose voting rights have been 
suspended under the TEU will also lose its voting rights under the EC Treaty. 
Other rights under the EC Treaty may also be suspended, as the Council may 
determine.556 
 
 There is a slight difference between the Constitution and the TEU 
with respect to who will make the critical decision on suspension. Where the 
Constitution’s process involves action by the European Council,557 Article 
7(2) of the TEU refers to the “Council, meeting in the composition of the 
Heads of State or Government.”558 The distinction is that the European 
Council of the Constitution includes the European Council President (who 
                                                 
553 Constitution arts. I-59(1), I-59(2). 
554 Constitution arts. I-59(2), I-59(5). 
555 Constitution art. I-59(3).  
556 EC Treaty art. 309(2). 
557 Constitution art. I-59(2). 
558 TEU art. 7(2). 
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does not represent any Member State) and the President of the Commission, 
each sitting as a nonvoting member. The “Council” formation described in the 
TEU would not include the Commission President, but the “Council” 
President would obviously be present as one of the heads of state or 
government, and he or she would be a voting member of the formation.559 
One other difference is that the Constitution’s voting requirements for certain 
Council decisions under Article I-59 are expressed in percentages,560 while 
TEU Article 7(5) provides for the use of allocated votes as set forth in EC 
Treaty Article 205(2).561 Regardless of these technical differences, under the 
Treaties and the Constitution the suspension of rights is essentially a political 
process assigned to the highest political levels within the Union. 
 
Given the harshness of an actual suspension of rights, it would seem 
unlikely that the procedure will ever be utilised.562 However, if it ever is 
invoked, the citizens of the suspended state would be partially disenfrachised 
by having their national government incapable of fully representing them at 
the EU.563 Thus, both the Constitution and the Treaties direct the Council to 
“take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension for the 
rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.”564 The specific details on 
such “taking into account” are not provided. 
                                                 
559 Note that the European Council is described in the second paragraph of TEU 
Article 4, and this institution does include the President of the Commission. However, 
the suspension procedure of TEU Article 7 does not involve the European Council as 
defined in Article 4. As noted in the text, the suspension decision is to be made by the 
“Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government.” TEU art. 
7(2). 
560 Constitution Article I-59(5) defines a qualified majority vote of the Council in 
certain Article 59 decisions to be “72% of the members of the Council, representing 
the participating Member States, comprising at least 65% of the population of these 
States.” 
561 See also EC Treaty art. 309(4). 
562 In January of 2000 the EU Member States imposed an informal “diplomatic 
isolation” on Austria after a far right political leader, Jörg Haider, joined the country’s 
governing coalition. This situation, which did not constitute official EU action, lasted 
approximately 9 months before being withdrawn. However, the episode led directly to 
the later inclusion of TEU Article 7 in the Treaty of Nice. See EurActiv.com, 
Austria’s Haider affair gave the EU an “emergency brake,” 7 August, 2006,   
http://www.euractiv.com/en/agenda2004/austria-haider-affair-gave-eu-emergency-
brake/article-151443. 
563 Anticipating such fallout, the Constitution provides that “the Council shall take 
into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and 
obligations of natural and legal persons.” Constitution art. I-59(3). 
564 The quote is from Constitution art. I-59(3). The language of TEU art. 7(3) and EC 
Treaty art. 309(2) is nearly identical. 
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 In legal terms the employment of Article I-59 represents a form of 
counter-measure imposed by treaty partners on a state that has breached its 
treaty obligations. The aggrieved states reciprocate by denying the violating 
state the benefit of the treaty relationship.565 The underpinnings of 
countermeasures are twofold: the sovereignty of the violating state and the 
corresponding inability of the other states to enforce treaty compliance.  From 
this point of view, Article I-59 and its TEU antecedent tacitly recognise that 
the Member States are sovereign entities within the Union, and in their 
sovereignty they may be immune to centrally imposed enforcement of their 
core responsibilities. In contrast, in a strong federal system the ability of the 
central government to enforce the constitution should not be in doubt.   
 
4.  VARYING LEVELS OF COMMITMENT 
 
4.1 Enhanced cooperation 
 
 Article I-44 of the Constitution, supplemented by Constitution 
Articles III-416 to III-423, permits groups of Member States to engage in 
“enhanced cooperation” in areas where the Council has determined that the 
Union as a whole cannot be expected to participate. There are demanding 
criteria to be met before a plan of enhanced cooperation may be undertaken. 
This special form of cooperation may be undertaken only in areas outside the 
EU’s exclusive competence, and only if Union-wide action is not feasible. 
The cooperative activity may not undermine the internal market, cause any 
discrimination in trade within the EU, distort competition or interfere with the 
rights of non-participating Member States. Further restrictions include a 
requirement that one-third of the Member States must participate, that any 
other Member State may join the cooperation at any subsequent time and that 
the activity must “further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and 
reinforce its integration process.”566 Once the process has been approved the 
participating states may make use of the EU institutions to implement the 
programme.567 
 
                                                 
565 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, art. 60.  Notwithstanding the possibility of 
suspension of a Member State’s voting rights, Joseph H.H. Weiler has argued that 
legal remedies available within the EU have largely eliminated “the most central legal 
artifact of international law: the notion (and doctrinal apparatus) of exclusive state 
responsibility and its concomitant principles of reciprocity and counter-measures.” 
Weiler, supra note 29, at 29. 
566 Constitution art. I-44. See also Constitution arts. III-416, III-417. 
567 Constitution art. I-44(1).  
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 The Constitution follows the precedent of the Treaties with respect to 
enhanced cooperation. The procedure is provided for in Articles 11 and 11a of 
the EC Treaty with respect to the First Pillar, in TEU Articles 27a through 27e 
for the Second Pillar, and TEU Articles 40 through 40b for the Third Pillar. 
Procedural details for all types of enhanced cooperation are provided in 
Articles 43 to 45 of the TEU. Both the TEU and Constitution refer to the 
enhanced cooperation as a “last resort,”568 and in similar terms they prohibit 
the process from undermining the internal market or causing trade 
discrimination against non-participating Member States. Notable changes 
from the Treaties include the Constitution’s requirement that one-third of 
Member States must participate, rather than a fixed number of eight states,569 
and the ability of a Member State to block enhanced cooperation in the area of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy on grounds of national policy570 has 
been eliminated.571 It should be noted that under the Treaties enhanced 
cooperation as a formal process has not yet been utilised.572 
 
4.2 Other forms of special cooperation 
 
 It might well be noted that the EU is already a multi-track system 
with regard to monetary policy. Since Slovenia became a full participant in 
the common currency at the beginning of 2007, there are 13 Member States 
within the euro-zone, 11 new Member States which must enter the zone when 
economically qualified, two states (the U.K and Denmark) which are 
permitted to remain outside the common currency, and one state (Sweden) 
which would qualify but has chosen not to take the necessary steps do so.573 
The euro programme is a unique, treaty-based activity that contemplates non-
participation by certain Member States; it is not being carried out under the 
existing enhanced cooperation provisions in the Treaties.574 The Constitution 
would have carried forward the current program, including the opt-outs. 
                                                 
568 TEU art. 43a; Constitution art. I-44(2). 
569 Constitution art. I-44(2); TEU art. 43(g). 
570 TEU arts. 27(c), 23(2). 
571 For further analysis of the Constitution’s changes to the enhanced cooperation 
procedures, see Dougan, supra note 358, at 12-13. 
572 Id. at 12. 
573 The current euro-zone countries are Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Greece and Slovenia. 
The new Member States required to join are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta, Bugaria and Romania. Among this 
group Cyprus and Malta have been approved to join the euro-zone in 2008. Sweden 
has not yet created the necessary institutional independence for its central bank. 
574 For further discussion of economic and monetary policy, see part 1.2 of Chapter 
17. 
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 Another treaty-based example of “flexible integration” relates to the 
EU’s integration into the EU legal order of the Schengen acquis on 
elimination of internal border controls, coordinated external border controls, 
certain visas, asylum and other related matters. When the European 
Community was unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on these 
issues, a core group consisting of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands entered into a 1985 agreement outside the Community 
process. The accord eventually included 13 countries, and it was thereafter 
incorporated into EU law in 1999 through the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
also transferred certain Third Pillar matters to the First Pillar.575 However, 
through protocols the treaty recognised special treatment for Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom.576 Pieter Jan Kuijper has summarised these 
arrangements as follows: 
  
The sector of freedom of movement, asylum and immigration as well 
as of civil cooperation has become famous for its variable geometry. 
To recapitulate briefly: the UK and Ireland are in principle excluded 
from integration in those areas, but may opt into Community law, if 
they so desire, whilst Denmark is wholly excluded, except for visa 
policy and can only opt for the possibility to apply acts building on 
the Schengen acquis as a matter of normal international law (i.e. no 
supremacy and no direct effect).577 
 
The Constitution would have perpetuated these exceptional rights and the 
protocols.578 
 
 An additional concept similar to enhanced cooperation, but also 
technically outside the enhanced cooperation procedures, is the requirement in 
                                                 
575 Europa Website, The Schengen acquis and its integration into the Union, http:// 
europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33020.htm. See Protocol integrating the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the European Union, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 144. 
Also see Pieter Jan Kuijper, The Evolution of the Third Pillar from Maastricht to the 
European Constitution: Institutional Aspects, 41 C.M.L.R. 609 (2004). 
576 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. 
(C 340) 99; Protocol on the position of Denmark, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 101. 
577 Pieter Jan Kuijper, supra note 575, at 620 (2004). For further critical commentary 
by Kuijper on the confusing results of flexible application of the Schengen regime, 
see id. at 624-26. 
578 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland on policies in respect 
of border controls, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters and 
on police cooperation, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 353; Protocol on the position of 
Denmark, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 356. 
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Constitution Article I-41(6) that certain Member States with superior military 
capabilities must engage in “structured cooperation” in connection with the 
EU’s common security and defence policy.579 According to Article III-312 of 
the Constitution, provisions relating to enhanced cooperation are applicable to 
such structured cooperation, including the right of a Member State initially 
outside the programme to subscribe at a later date. Article 17 of the TEU 
anticipates cooperation between Member States in the field of armaments580 
and bilateral cooperation between states “in the framework of the Western 
European Union (WEU) and NATO,”581 but these programs and organisations 
exist outside the European Union. The WEU may serve as a model of 
structured cooperation, but the innovation in the Constitution is that this form 
of cooperation is to be carried out “within the Union framework.”582  
 
 One further example of the EU’s tolerance for special relationships 
among its Member States is the explicit permission in Constitution Article IV-
441 for continued “regional unions” among the Benelux countries. The 
Constitution’s provision is essentially identical to Article 306 of the EC 
Treaty. 
 
4.3 The implications of varying commitments 
 
 The multi-track characteristic of the European Union has been the 
subject of much analysis, undoubtedly because it creates confusion and it may 
be seen as an inherent weakness in the system. In 2004 the think-tank Friends 
of Europe expressed their own concerns on this subject, tempered with a sense 
of realism: 
 
Multi-speed solutions clearly generate anxiety. They raise 
difficulties of principle. Yet they are already part and parcel of EU 
reality. This is most notably the case with Schengen and the 
Eurozone. A defence group is beginning to form along similar lines. 
The Benelux customs union and the Belgo-Luxembourg currency 
union played the same role in the early days. Social opt-outs are also 
part of the practice. And the new member states will have only 
limited access to some important policies, including agricultural 
support, structural funds and the single market in labour. 
 
                                                 
579 For further requirements, see Constitution art III-312.  
580 TEU art. 17(1). 
581 TEU art. 17(4). 
582 Constitution art. I-41(6). 
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So the question is not whether or not to introduce multi-speed 
now. The real issue is whether the concept can be taken further in 
ways that are helpful to the Union as a whole.583 
 
The Friends of Europe then identified three classes of varying commitment 
that might be considered: 
 
--A full-scale Political Union, of perhaps the six founder states, 
binding themselves to act as one on all issues, taking the form of a 
federation or confederation, and effectively becoming a single state. 
Discussed some years ago, this hardly seems a real prospect today. 
 
--A clearly defined Vanguard, or hard core, of states agreeing to work 
together on a single list of specified issues. This has been frequently 
advocated in recent years. 
 
--A number of Pioneer Groups with different membership for 
different issues, but with a common core of France, Germany and 
some others.584 
 
The opportunities for varying levels of commitment by the EU’s 
Member States are uncharacteristic of a true federal system in which powers 
are divided vertically between the central government on the one hand and the 
states on the other.585 In a federation, critical matters of policy are determined 
centrally and are applicable throughout the system. If there is insufficient 
support for a policy at the federal level, either no action will be taken or, at 
best, separate action might be taken at the state level, but groups of states will 
not undertake to do as a bloc what the central government could not 
accomplish. Action by smaller groupings reveals a lack of collective will to 
maintain policy consistency within the EU.586 It is indisputable that if 
enhanced cooperation or other forms of group activity are utilised to a 
                                                 
583 Keith Richardson & Robert Cox, Salvaging the Wreckage of Europe’s 
Constitution, 2004 Friends of Eur. 3, 17. 
584 Id. at 18. 
585 Robert Senelle, Federal Belgium, in Federalism and Regionalism in Europe 27, 29 
(Antonio d’Atena ed., 1998).   
586 For a detailed review of “flexible integration” within the EU, both as to historical 
experiences and future possibilities, see Franklin Dehousse, Wouter Coussens & 
Giovanni Grevi, Integrating Europe: Multiple speeds – One direction? (EPC, Working 
Paper No. 9, 2004), available at http://www.theepc.net/en/default.asp?TYP=CE&LV= 
177&see=y&PG=TEWN/EN/detail&AI=353&l=. For an integrationist’s perspective 
on the value of enhanced cooperation, see Fischer, supra note 65, at 9-12. 
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significant extent, the result will be a loss of coordination and an overall 
weakening of the EU. A multi-track Union would emphasise the continuing 
autonomy of the states and the intergovernmental character of the Union. The 
Constitution’s enshrinement of enhanced cooperation and similar vehicles, 
while perhaps a political necessity, reflects the continuing vitality and 
integrity of the Member States as separate nations.  
 
5.  FLEXIBILITY AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 Most of the concepts discussed in this chapter – accessions, 
suspension of rights and enhanced cooperation – describe a Union that is 
either creatively adjustable or frustratingly unstable, depending on one’s 
enthusiasm for structural flexibility. But these concepts are not changed in the 
Constitution, and thus the relevant dividing lines are not affected. The 
remaining concept – the withdrawal of a Member State – is articulated for the 
first time in the Constitution, and one could argue that a state’s control over 
its EU membership (a particular dividing line) would shift dramatically 
toward the individual state. However, our analysis strongly suggests that the 
right of withdrawal in all likelihood already exists under the Treaties, either as 
a legal proposition or as a political reality. Thus, the Union as a flexible entity 
and its related dividing lines would not have changed under the Constitution. 
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Chapter 11 
 
 
Amending the Constitutional Treaty – the Unanimity Requirement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every national legal system has a procedure for amending its 
constitution or other foundational legal acts. Every democratic system 
provides for such amendment to be carried out on the basis of majoritarian 
principles. On the other hand, international law provides that amending a 
treaty requires the approval by each nation that is a party to the instrument.587 
One of the striking characteristics of the European Union is its foundational 
basis as a treaty organisation, clearly manifested in the Treaties’ provisions 
requiring unanimity for their amendment. The Constitution would have 
perpetuated this characteristic, while adding flexibility to the process of 
amendment.588  
 
                                                 
587 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, art. 40. Article 40 provides that unanimity is 
required unless the treaty itself provides otherwise. 
588 A frequently cited characteristic of the European Union is that, beginning with the 
Single European Act in 1985, the Treaties have been the subject of amendment every 
few years. In response to this phenomenon, various commentators have called for 
greater stability. One such critique was offered by Neil Walker, who suggested that 
the EU might benefit from a strict time limit of 10 years between amendments to the 
new Constitution, if it is ratified. To counter concerns about the rigidity of such a 
limitation, Walker asserts: “To design a constitution in the knowledge that it must 
remain untouched for 10 years would concentrate the minds of present IGC and future 
Convention members not only on the profound consequences of the results of their 
deliberations, but also on the question of what matters should be excluded from the 
10-year embargo.” Neil Walker, Europe’s Constitutional Passion Play, 28 Eur. L. 
Rev. 905, 908 (2003). 
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1.  THE STANDARD AMENDMENT PROCEDURE 
 
 The “ordinary revision procedure” for amending the Constitution is 
set forth in Article III-443. Any Member State government, the European 
Parliament or the Commission may submit an amendment proposal to 
theCouncil, which refers it to the European Council and notifies the national 
parliaments.589 After consulting with the European Parliament and the 
Commission, the European Council by simple majority vote must either 
convene a constitutional convention or an intergovernmental conference to 
consider the proposed amendment.590 Much like the Convention that wrote the 
Constitution, an amending convention would consist of representatives of the 
Member State parliaments, heads of state or government of the Member 
States, the European Parliament and the Commission.591  If an IGC is 
convened instead of a convention, the conference will simply consist of 
representatives of each of the Member States.592 A convention must approve 
the amendment by “consensus,” whereupon it is referred to an IGC.593 
Whether acting alone without a convention or acting upon reference from a 
convention, the IGC must approve a proposed amendment by “common 
accord.”594 After IGC approval and Member State representatives’ signing of 
the amendment document, the amendment will take effect only when it has 
been ratified by all of the Member States, acting in accordance with their own 
constitutional requirements.595 If four fifths of the Member States have ratified 
the amendment within two years of its signature, but full ratification has not 
been achieved, the Constitution provides that “the matter shall be referred to 
the European Council.”596  
 
                                                 
589 Constitution art. IV-443(1). 
590 Constitution art. IV-443(2). 
591 Constitution art. IV-443(2). 
592 Constitution art. IV-443(2), (3). 
593 Constitution art. IV-443(2). The editors of the Common Market Law Review have 
criticised the process of holding a convention and then an IGC. They are concerned 
that the 2002-2003 Convention was not sufficiently representative of the Member 
States and that it exceed its Laeken Declaration mandate. One particular criticism 
related to the Convention’s controversial (and ultimately unacceptable) new formula 
for QMV on the Council. The editors assert that “it is inconceivable that a Presidency 
would have put before an IGC, in which all the protagonists were represented and 
speaking with equal voices, a proposal so loaded with political dynamite.” Editorial, 
The Failure to Reach Agreement on the EU Constitution - Hard Questions, 41 
C.M.L.R. 1, 3 (2004). 
594 Constitution art. IV-443(3). 
595 Constitution art. IV-443(3). See comments on ratification in part 4 of this chapter. 
596 Constitution art. IV-443(4). 
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The Treaties’ only amendment provisions are found in Article 48 of 
the TEU, which refers to “the Treaties on which the Union is founded.” 
Article 1 of the TEU explains that the EU “shall be founded on the European 
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation 
established by this Treaty.” Thus, the EC Treaty is included in the TEU’s 
amendment provision. One provision of the EC Treaty, Article 300(5), 
confirms this by providing that if an international agreement to be entered into 
by the Community would require an amendment to the EC Treaty, such 
amendment must be adopted pursuant to TEU Article 48. Procedurally, under 
Article 48 any Member State government or the Commission may submit an 
amendment proposal to the Council. The Council must “consult” with the 
European Parliament, and may consult with the Commission, and thereafter 
the Council may deliver “an opinion in favour” of calling an 
intergovernmental conference into existence. The IGC is then convened by 
the Council President, and the conference’s decision to approve the proposed 
amendment must be by common accord. If approved, the amendment must be 
ratified by all Member States in accordance with their respective national 
constitutional requirements, and the amendment will take effect when all of 
the states have ratified. Article 48 does not provide for a constitutional 
convention as a preliminary step to the IGC process, but the 2002-2003 
Convention took place in any event. 
 
Herwig C.H. Hofmann has commented that the ratification 
requirement relating to constitutional amendments “can be regarded as the last 
direct link between EU law and public international law principles … A 
strong intergovernmental aspect accompanies it.”597 As noted in Chapter 1, 
the intergovernmental school of thought places emphasis on traditional treaty 
law, under which the dividing lines are clear and the ultimate power is 
reserved to the Member States. 
 
2.  THE NEW SIMPLIFIED AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 
 
 The Constitution also contains two “simplified” amendment 
procedures relating to Part III of the document. Under the first, Article IV-444 
provides a mechanism for changing unanimous voting requirements in Part III 
to QMV, and special legislative procedures in Part III can be replaced with 
                                                 
597 Herwig C. H. Hofmann, A Critical Analysis of the New Typology of Acts in the 
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Eur. Integration Online Papers, 
Working Paper No. 9, 2003), available at http://eiop.or.at/ eiop/pdf/2003-009.pdf. As 
noted earlier, the intergovernmental school of thought places emphasis on the ultimate 
power of the Member States.  
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the ordinary procedure.598 Each of these changes can be adopted by the 
European Council without the necessity of a convention or IGC. However, 
prior to voting the European Council must notify the Member State 
parliaments of its possible action. Opposition by any parliament within six 
months of notification from the European Council will block the amendment, 
and the European Council may not proceed. If no opposition is expressed, the 
European Council may adopt the amendment unanimously as a European 
decision.599  
 
The second procedure, presented in Article IV-445 of the 
Constitution, permits revisions to Title III of Part III (the internal policies of 
the Union) without a convention or IGC, but a unanimous decision of the 
European Council is required, and the amendment is subject to ratification by 
all of the Member States.  
 
 Interestingly, there are several additional procedures that effectively 
amend the Constitution while completely avoiding referral to national 
parliaments or ratification by the Member States:  
 
--Constitution Articles I-40(7) and III-300(3) permit additional QMV 
decision-making to be instituted in the common foreign and security 
policy. This change requires a unanimous decision of the European 
Council.  
 
--Constitution Article I-55(4) permits additional QMV in relation to 
the EU’s multiannual financial framework. This change requires a 
unanimous decision of the European Council. 
 
--Constitution Article III-269(3) permits additional QMV in certain 
matters of family law with cross-border implications. A unanimous 
decision of the Council is necessary to make this change. 
 
--Constitution Article III-422(1) permits additional QMV decision-
making (participating Member States only) within a program of 
enhanced cooperation. This change requires a unanimous decision of 
Council members representing the participating Member States only. 
 
--Constitution Article III-422(2) permits a special legislative 
procedure within a program of enhanced cooperation to be changed to 
                                                 
598 Constitution art. IV-444(1), (2). 
599 Constitution art. IV-444(3). European Council decisions are to be adopted by 
consensus unless the Constitution provides otherwise. Constitution art. I-21(4).  
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the ordinary legislative procedure. This change requires a unanimous 
decision of Council members representing the participating states 
only.600 
 
The national parliaments and Member State governments have no role in any 
of the foregoing processes, but Member States are protected by the 
requirement of a unanimous Council or European Council decision to institute 
these changes.  
 
Neither the TEU nor the EC Treaty contains the simplified 
amendment procedures of Articles IV-444 or IV-445 of the Constitution, and 
neither treaty provides any of the Constitution’s other abbreviated procedures 
that avoid referral to national governments. Article 42 of the TEU does 
include a procedure by which the Council (by unanimous vote) may move 
actions from the treaty’s Third Pillar to Title IV of the EC Treaty, but the 
Council’s decision must be approved by each of the Member State 
governments. This Article 42 procedure would have the same effect as a 
treaty amendment, and national approval is required, but an intergovernmental 
conference under TEU Article 48 may be avoided. It is a streamlined process, 
but not as easily carried out as the Part I and Part III abbreviated procedures 
under the Constitution.601 
 
Peter Norman has reported that the Convention referred to the 
Constitution’s simplified amendment articles as “bridge or passerelle” 
provisions “designed to eliminate the need for future treaty changes (with the 
attendant problems of ratification by all member states).”602 Various versions 
of the provisions were hotly debated at the Convention,603 but Norman sees 
                                                 
600 The provision that restricts voting under Articles III-422(1) and (2) to participating 
Member States is found in Part I of the Constitution. Constitution art. I-44(3). 
However, non-participating members may take part in the Council’s deliberations. Id. 
601 Note that the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006 stated its intention to 
actively pursue the “community method” and greater use of qualified majority voting 
in Third Pillar matters, which would likely be brought about through the TEU Article 
42 procedure. See the published speech of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen at the 
plenary session of the European Parliament on 5 July 2006, available at   
http://www.government.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/puhe/en.jsp?oid=163080. These ideas 
had been introduced on May 10, 2006 by Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso, “A Citizen’s Agenda – Delivering results for Europe, Speech/06/286, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/ 
286&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
602 Norman, supra note 152, at 113. 
603 Id. at 286-97. 
170 THE CHARACTER OF THE EU 
 
  
the end result as something that “may offer an interesting way forward.”604 In 
particular, he believes that Article IV-444, “marks a major relaxation” of the 
existing requirement of an IGC and Member State ratification. He is 
optimistic that the procedure may be workable, even though it has been 
“criticised by integrationists as likely to remain inoperable in a Union of 
25.”605 It is easy to agree with Norman that the Constitution would have added 
variety and flexibility to the amendment process. Nevertheless, his optimism 
must be tempered by the fact that unanimity is preserved in all of the 
proposed new procedures, regardless of how or where the consensus must be 
achieved. As discussed in part 4 of this chapter, the retention of unanimity is 
of vital importance in assessing the impact of the new processes on the EU’s 
dividing lines.  
 
3.  INITIAL RATIFICATION 
 
Although the focus in this chapter is on the amendment process, it 
should be noted that the initial adoption of the Constitution also requires 
Member State ratification, a process that ultimately failed. Article IV-447 
requires that its initial approval be accomplished through ratification by each 
of the states at the national level according to its own constitutional 
requirements,606 and the Constitution would become effective only when all 
Member States have ratified.607  
 
The Constitution’s ratification process mirrors that of the Treaties. 
Article 313 of the EC Treaty calls for the “High Contracting Parties” to ratify 
the treaty “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” 
The effective date of the instrument was to be the date the final signature was 
deposited into the archives of the Italian government.608 Article 52 of the TEU 
                                                 
604 Id. at 331. 
605 Id.  
606 Constitution art. IV-447(1). 
607 Constitution art. IV-447(2). However, note that Declaration 30 to the Constitution 
provides that if ratification is not completed within two years of the Constitution’s 
signature, but four fifths of the Member States have ratified, then the matter will be 
referred to the European Council for further consideration. Declaration (30) on the 
ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, supra note 22 at 464. 
In a general discussion of the character of the Constitution, including the question of 
whether it is actually a constitution or a treaty, Anneli Albi and Peter Van Elsuwege 
have commented that the Constitution’s ratification requirement, which corresponds 
to treaty practice, “does not diminish its constitutional character.” Albi & Van 
Elsuwege, supra note 116, at 750.   
608 EC Treaty art. 313, 314. 
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contains identical requirements for initial ratification of the treaty,609 with the 
effective date being January 1, 1993 or the first day of the month following 
the date of deposit of the last signature, whichever should occur later.610  
 
With regard to initial adoption, both the Constitution and the Treaties 
are consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 24 
of the Convention provides that unless a treaty specifically provides 
otherwise, “a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the 
treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.”611  
 
4.  UNANIMITY REQUIREMENTS AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
The Constitution’s unanimity requirements – both as to initial 
ratification and as to subsequent amendment – are a reflection that the 
Constitution would have retained the essential character of the existing 
Treaties as international compacts among sovereign nation states. The EC 
Treaty and TEU have been subject to unanimous approval at the time of 
original adoption and whenever an amendment is proposed. All contracting 
parties have been required to approve each word of the treaty text at each 
stage of the document’s development, and this indeed reflects standard treaty 
practice. The fact that the Constitution would have been subject to some 
version of unanimous approval for initial ratification and for later amendment 
is one strong indicator that the Constitution is itself a treaty. Its official name, 
“Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,” is not coincidental.  
 
The unanimity rules offer clear evidence of a dividing line between 
the Union and the Member States that would not have shifted under the 
Constitution. Of course, one could argue that because national ratification 
would be eliminated for some amendment procedures, the ultimate voice in 
the amendment process would be transferred from the national capitals to the 
Council chambers in Brussels. Wouldn’t this procedural change reflect 
something of a political shift and a modest centralising trend? While it is 
inarguable that the new amendment processes would have been more efficient 
and more “centrally” carried out, one should not overlook the fact that the 
Council by its very nature consists of a group of ministers, each of whom is 
directly representative of and answerable to a national government and its 
sovereign interests. Except for the unlikely situation of a renegade minister, 
the national veto would always be available under the Constitution, and no 
                                                 
609 TEU art. 52(1). 
610 TEU art. 52(2). 
611 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, art. 24(2). 
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Member State should view the new amendment processes as a transfer of 
power to Brussels. 
 
But unanimity has its detractors. Giovanni Grevi has written: 
“Considering the sometimes twisted dynamics of national politics in relation 
to Europe, this is absurd and seriously undermines the effectiveness of a very 
important procedure, allowing for a minimal degree of flexibility to overcome 
unanimity.”612 Grevi’s complaints are made in the context that at the 
Convention there were several attempts to permit constitutional amendments 
by less than a unanimous vote.  However, even proposals for an easier path to 
amendment of Part III provisions that “do not involve a shift of competences 
of the Union and member states” were rejected, despite the suggestion that 
such non-threatening amendments be approved by a five-sixths majority of 
the Member States.613 
 
 With the unanimity requirement well preserved regardless of which 
amendment procedure is followed, each Member State would have effectively 
possessed a veto on even minor changes to the highly detailed Constitution. 
The need for flexibility could have been provided much more efficiently if a 
majority vote were sufficient, but the framers of the Constitution conceded the 
point. The majoritarian ideal yielded to the absolute right of each Member 
State to preserve intact what it has previously agreed to, including the 
Constitution’s carefully drawn dividing lines. Any formal change in the 
competences of the Union and its institutions – even if minor – would have 
been subject to procedural safeguards and full consensus. In acceding to EU 
membership and in choosing to remain in the Union, each Member States 
could expect the maintenance of the status quo unless it specifically consented 
otherwise. The Member States need not have feared that their national powers 
would be eroded without their conscious and explicit approval. In the final 
analysis, the unanimity requirement protects each state from the unwanted 
imposition of an ultimate loss of sovereignty, which could occur if a majority 
or even super-majority of states were given the power to amend the 
Constitution or any of the Treaties. Such stability remains an integral part of 
the EU bargain. 
 
                                                 
612 Grevi, supra note 402, at 11. For an analysis of the historical development and 
future prospects for the treaty/constitutional amendment process, see Smith, supra 
note 29, at 207-53. 
613 See Norman, supra note 152, at 81, 293, 332.  
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Chapter 12 
 
 
Principles Underlying EU Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To complete this analysis of the basic character of the European 
Union, it is appropriate to examine several foundational principles that govern 
the EU’s activities. These principles both reinforce and restrict Union power, 
and thus they reflect both the independence of the Union and its dependence 
on the Member States that created it. In the Constitution, most of these 
precepts are expressed in Part I, Articles I-11 to I-18, gathered under the 
heading “Union Competences.” 
 
1. CONFERRAL 
 
 The Constitution grants a wide range of power and authority to the 
European Union, the scope of which is discussed throughout this treatise. The 
powers granted to the Union under the Constitution are largely the same 
powers that have been assigned to the Union and the Communities under the 
Treaties.614 Under the Constitution and the Treaties the EU’s powers arise by 
conferral, which is in essence a principle of limitation.  
 
 The first provision of the Constitution, Article I-1(1), states that “this 
Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States 
confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.” The same 
provision notes: “The Union shall coordinate the policies by which the 
Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and shall exercise on a 
Community basis the competences they confer on it.” Article I-11(1) declares:  
                                                 
614 Particular differences between the Treaties and Constitution are discussed 
throughout this treatise, with emphasis on how competences are allocated between the 
EU institutions on one hand and the governments of the Member States on the other. 
The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union is the most 
noteworthy change, but its actual impact on EU competences remains to be seen. 
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“The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral,” 
while Article I-11(2) adds that pursuant to this principle, “the Union shall act 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States 
in the Constitution to attain the objectives set out in the Constitution.” These 
are the key statements regarding conferral, but several other references should 
be noted: 
 
--Article I-3(5) mentions the competences conferred on the Union “in 
the Constitution.” 
 
--Article I-6 simply refers to the Union “exercising competences 
conferred on it.” 
 
--Subsections 1 and 2 of Article I-12 begin with the words: “When 
the Constitution confers on the Union….”  
 
--Article I-14(1) refers to the Union sharing competences with the 
Member States “where the Constitution confers on it [the EU] a 
competence….” 
 
--Article II-111(1) refers to “the limits of the powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution.” 
 
--Article III-115 states that the EU is to “ensure consistency” in its 
activities in light of its objectives and “in accordance with the 
principle of conferring of powers.”  
 
--Article III-315(6), dealing with the EU’s common commercial 
policy, references the “exercise of the competences conferred by this 
Article.” 
 
--In Article IV-445, which establishes a simplified procedure for 
amending certain provisions in Title III of Part III of the Constitution, 
subsection 3 states that the European decision approving such an 
amendment “shall not increase the competences conferred on the 
Union in this Treaty.” 
 
The ramifications of these different formulations are discussed below, but 
regardless of how conferral is expressed in the Constitution, its implications 
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are not left to speculation. Article I-11(2) states: “Competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States.”615  
 
The TEU does not mention the conferral principle. The EC Treaty 
contains a single, but significant reference to conferral of powers on the 
European Community. EC Treaty Article 5 states: “The Community shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein.”616  Thus, where the Treaties contain a single 
reference to powers being conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty, 
Articles I-1(1) and I-11(2) of the Constitution provide a new emphasis that 
conferral comes from the Member States. 
 
 As illustrated above, in two instances the Constitution describes 
conferral without mentioning its source (Articles I-6, III-115). It also 
mentions conferral “in” the Constitution (Articles I-3, I-11, II-111) or “in this 
Treaty” (Article IV-445). These references offer no difficulty in 
interpretation, because they are neutral as to the source of conferral. More 
problematic are statements that the Union’s powers are conferred by the 
Constitution itself (Article I-12, I-14) or by an article of the Constitution 
(Article III-315). These provisions reflect the EC Treaty, which speaks of the 
Community enjoying powers “conferred on it by this Treaty,” but they are 
different from expressions in Articles I-1 and I-11 that describe conferral as a 
grant directly from the Member States. Whether this difference constitutes an 
inconsistency is debatable. On one hand, one could contend that conferral by 
the Constitution itself suggests a communal origin, rooted in the peoples of 
Europe rather than in the Member States. The better argument would seem to 
be that the authors of a treaty are none other than the states that are party to it, 
that the treaty (or Constitution in this case) has no existence or character 
                                                 
615 This statement bears a striking resemblance to the Tenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.” The doctrine of limited federal authority in the American system is 
complex and highly developed. Interestingly, Erwin Chemerinsky writes that from 
1937 to 1995 not one federal law was declared unconstitutional as violating the limits 
of Congressional power. However, since 1995 a more conservative Supreme Court 
“has revived the Tenth Amendment” and is beginning to indicate its willingness to 
declare limitations on the federal power. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 
Principles and Policies 230-31 (2002). 
616 Within the EC Treaty there are some references to the treaty’s conferral of powers 
on Community institutions. For example, EC Treaty Article 7(1) notes that each of 
the institutions “shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty.” Article 5 is the only provision that mentions conferral of power on the 
Community as a whole. 
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whatsoever without its parties, and that such a document by itself cannot 
confer any powers or competences. 
 
 It might at least be said that the various descriptions of conferral 
reflect a lapse in good drafting that might have been avoided. Nevertheless, it 
must be agreed that the Constitution underscores the role of the Member 
States as the parties with inherent power who choose to confer limited powers 
on the European Union. Two commentators have observed that this 
expression of conferral “underlines that Union competences derive from the 
Member States who remain the ‘masters of the treaties’.”617 The ratification 
requirement relating to the Treaties and the Constitution augments this idea, 
because it is the Member States whose approval creates the Union and 
endows it with the powers it enjoys. 
 
2. SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are limitations on 
EU action and thus reservations of rights in the Member States. The terms 
themselves have the sound of Euro-jargon, but the Constitution offers quite 
concise definitions. Article I-11(3) states:  
 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as 
the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.  
 
Article I-11(4) defines proportionality as follows: “Under the principle of 
proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Constitution.” Proportionality is not 
expressly limited to Union action outside the areas of its exclusive 
competence, and thus it arguably applies even to matters of EU exclusivity. 
However, the very concept of exclusivity would seem to entail the widest 
possible discretion as to the scope of action taken (always bearing in mind the 
“objectives of the Constitution”). 
 
 Subsidiarity and proportionality are both carryovers from the EC 
Treaty. The second subparagraph of EC Treaty Article 5 states:  
                                                 
617 Lars Hoffmann & Jo Shaw, Constitutionalism and Federalism in the ‘Future of 
Europe’ debate: The German Dimension, The Federal Trust Online Paper 03/04, at 7, 
available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/03_04.pdf. 
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. 
 
Without using the term “proportionality,” the third subparagraph of Article 5 
adds: “Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.” TEU Article 1, which states that in the 
EU “decisions are taken . . .  as closely as possible to the citizen,” has been 
described as “a broader expression of subsidiarity.”618 In a similar vein, the 
preamble to the TEU notes the resolve of the Member States “to continue the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in 
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity.” Article 2 of the TEU states the Union’s 
objectives and notes that they are to be carried out “while respecting the 
principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the [EC Treaty].”  
 
In an article that compares the European Union concept of 
subsidiarity with its antecedent in Catholic doctrine,619 N. W. Barber notes 
three “operative elements” within EC Treaty Article 5: 
 
First, the Article contains a preference for power to be allocated to the 
smaller unit: Member States . . .  Second, this allocation of power is 
qualified by an efficiency test. Power should be shifted downwards 
unless the centralization of power will result in efficiency gains . . . 
Lastly, it is implicit in Article 5 that the power should be exercised by 
the Member State that will be affected by the power.620   
 
The primary change in the Constitution’s formulation of the 
subsidiarity rule is that Union action must be weighed against what could be 
achieved by the Member States “either at central level or at regional and local 
                                                 
618 P. W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 Eur. L.J. 308, 312 (2005). 
619 The Catholic catechism defines subsidiarity as a concept by which “a community 
of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower 
order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need 
and help co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a 
view to the common good.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, art. 1, ¶ 1883, available at http://www.usccb. 
org/catechism/text/pt3sect1chpt2.htm.  
620 Barber, supra note 618, at 311-12. 
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level.” The EC Treaty merely mentions action “by the Member States.” In the 
matter of proportionality, the EC Treaty states that “any action” by the 
Community must not “go beyond what is necessary” to achieve the treaty’s 
objectives. The Constitution requires that “the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary” to achieve the Constitution’s 
objectives. (emphasis supplied) 
 
 Expanding on the Constitution’s definitions, Constitution Article I-
11(4) adds that the EU institutions must apply the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles in accordance with “Protocol on the application of 
subsidiarity and proportionality” (Protocol on Subsidiarity).621 This protocol 
requires each EU institution to “ensure constant respect” for the principles,622 
it requires the Commission to “consult widely” before proposing legislation, 
623and it requires the institutions to forward both drafts and final legislation to 
the national parliaments of the Member States for review.624 Proposed 
legislation must be accompanied by statements and substantiating data to 
demonstrate that it complies with the two principles.625 The national 
parliaments may object to legislation on the grounds that it fails to meet the 
subsidiarity standard,626 and in most instances if one-third of all votes 
allocated to the parliaments (two votes per nation, one per each legislative 
chamber in bicameral legislatures) concur in the objection, the legislation 
“must be reviewed” by the Commission or other institution that has proposed 
the act.627 The parliaments that force such a review cannot actually block the 
legislation, but the initiating institution must give reasons for maintaining, 
amending or withdrawing the legislation.628 The European Court of Justice is 
granted jurisdiction to hear challenges based on violation of subsidiarity, and 
such challenges may be brought by Member States or the Committee of the 
Regions.629 The Commission must submit annual reports on compliance with 
Article I-11.630 
 
                                                 
621 See Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273. 
622 Id., art. 1. 
623 Id., art. 2. 
624 Id., art. 4. 
625 Id., art. 5. 
626 Id., art. 6. 
627 Id., art. 7. Certain legislation requires only one-fourth of the possible votes to 
comprise an objection that triggers a review. Id. 
628 Id. 
629 Id., art. 8. 
630 Id., art. 9. 
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 Related to the Protocol on Subsidiarity is the “Protocol on the role of 
national parliaments in the European Union” (Protocol on National 
Parliaments).631 This protocol requires the Commission and other EU 
institutions to forward reports, proposed legislation and other items to the 
national parliaments for review.632 The protocol requires a six-week review 
period between notification and adoption of proposed legislation633 (six 
months in the case of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution),634 
but it refers to the Protocol on Subsidiarity for the procedures by which one or 
more parliaments may object to legislation on subsidiarity grounds.635  
 
 The Protocol on Subsidiarity and the Protocol on National 
Parliaments were transferred from the Treaties, although both were amended. 
Both originated in 1997 in the Treaty of Amsterdam as additions to both the 
EC Treaty and TEU.636 As appended to the Constitution the Protocol on 
Subsidiarity offers significant procedures and rights that were entirely absent 
in the treaty version. In particular, the new protocol offers the requirement of 
notifying national parliaments of proposed legislation, the opportunity for 
parliaments to object to legislation and force a review, and the right of a 
Member State to challenge legislation at the Court of Justice. The 
Constitution’s Protocol on National Parliaments also offers more than its 
predecessor. The new version expands the list of matters that must be 
forwarded to the national parliaments for review, references the objecting 
procedure in the Protocol on Subsidiarity, and offers an unprecedented six-
month review period relating to certain proposed amendments to the 
Constitution.637 
 
 Several observations can be offered regarding the Constitution’s 
refinements to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. First, the 
Constitution’s rewording in the description of subsidiarity, referring to 
central, regional and local levels of the Member States rather than simply to 
                                                 
631 Protocol on National Parliaments, supra note 273. 
632 Id., arts. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. 
633 Id., art. 4. 
634 Id., art. 6. 
635 Id., art. 3. 
636 Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, Nov. 10, 1997, 
O.J. (C 340) 113; Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 105.   
637 For a discussion on the general role of national parliaments within the EU, see 
Heidi Hautala, The Role of Parliaments in the EU Constitutional Framework: A 
Partnership or Rivalry? in The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre 
Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
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the states, is at best a nuanced expansion in the concept of how potential state 
action is to be viewed. The new language does not suggest an actual shift in 
the definition or substance of subsidiarity. Second, the Constitution’s change 
in language relating to proportionality, substituting “the content and form” of 
EU action for “any action,” does not seem intended to alter the substance of 
the proportionality principle. Third, the Protocol on Subsidiarity is upgraded 
to a substantial extent. The rights of national parliaments to review, make 
objection and challenge EU legislation on subsidiary grounds arguably put 
more teeth into the principle, although Michael Dougan has criticised this 
“early warning system on subsidiarity which suffers from almost enough 
operational flaws to undermine the arguments supporting its very 
existence.”638 Finally, the changes to the Protocol on National Parliaments are 
less dramatic, but they do offer somewhat more information to the Member 
States to enable them to review proposed EU legislation.639   
 
 Subsidiarity and proportionality may be seen as logical extensions of 
the conferral principle, in that they contribute to protecting the residuum of 
Member State power. With the EU limited to the competences specifically 
granted under the Constitution, and with all other authority reserved to the 
Member States, subsidiarity and proportionality support these concepts by 
requiring the Union to behave prudently even when it is permitted to act. 
Under the Constitution the new procedures adding a measure of enforcement 
to the rule of subsidiarity arguably add more legal character to the principle, 
but it remains the object of scepticism as to its actual impact. For example, 
Lars Hoffmann and Jo Shaw assert that “in reality the [subsidiarity] principle 
itself is both unclear and widely regarded as rather toothless.”640 They contend 
                                                 
638 Michael Dougan, The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty:  Bringing Europe 
Closer to its Lawyers, 28 Eur. L. Rev. 763, 793 (2003). 
639 Two commentators have noted the EU has permitted expansion of the activities of 
national parliaments beyond the formal role provided in the protocols and beyond the 
concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality. First, “the EU has produced laws on 
topics considered beyond the traditional remit of national parliaments,” and as a result 
the national governments have produced “new domestic laws in those areas that not 
only incorporate but also build upon EU law.” Second, “the EU has facilitated 
communication and data sharing across Member States. The resulting knowledge has 
helped legislators and government officials design more effective legislative 
frameworks. This has confirmed national parliaments as viable regulatory 
institutions.” Francesco Duina & Michael J. Oliver, National Parliaments in the 
European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?, 11 Eur. L.J. 173, 174 
(2005).  
640 Hoffmann & Shaw, supra note 617, at 6. For a recent wide-ranging criticism of 
subsidiarity, see Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at 
the Wrong Time, 43 C.M.L.R. 63 (2006). 
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that subsidiarity “has never been successfully invoked, for example, before 
the Court of Justice as a basis for finding that a measure should not have been 
adopted by the EU institutions.”641 P. W. Barber acknowledges that 
subsidiarity has not been credited with any overt decisions by the Court, but 
he nevertheless believes that the principle is deserving of respect: 
 
The European principle of subsidiarity is important because it is one 
of the key constitutional principles that serve to set the character of 
the EU. As a legal principle, a justiciable constraint on the power of 
the Community Institutions, subsidiarity has had little obvious effect. 
Perhaps daunted by the complicated political assessments the 
principle entails, or, less charitably, perhaps disinclined to develop a 
principle that limits the centralization of power, the European Court 
of Justice has not made use of the principle. The degree to which 
subsidiarity has indirectly affected measures advanced by the 
Community is unclear. But the principle stands as a declaration of 
how the EU perceives itself, and as the sort of political community 
the authors of the Treaties intended it to be. In particular, it represents 
a commitment to democracy, to de-centralised power and, most 
importantly, opposition to nationalist ideals of state legitimacy.642 
 
Michael Dougan asserts that the Constitution’s innovations “should 
help give more practical force to the principle of subsidiarity,” but he argues 
that the Constitution still lacks “a truly coherent conception of the role 
national parliaments should play with the Union legislative process.”643  He 
contends that there are “major gaps” in the Member States’ ability to function 
effectively, but he also argues that if the new provisions were inserted as mere 
“window dressing . . .  to enhance the Union’s democratic credentials,” then 
the Convention and IGC have run the risk of “complicating and prolonging 
still further the Union’s legislative procedures.”644 
 
Even without the Constitution, the EU leadership has indicated its 
intention to pay greater attention to subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Conferences in The Hague in 2005 and in St. Pölten, Austria, in 2006 led the 
                                                 
641 Id. 
642 Barber, supra note 618, at 324-25. 
643 Dougan, supra note 358, at 6. 
644 Id. For additional analysis of the subsidiarity principle and the role of national 
parliaments in EU legislation, see Anna Verges Bausili, Rethinking the methods of 
dividing and exercising powers in the EU – Reforming subsidiarity, national 
parliaments and legitimacy, in Shaw, supra note 29, at 95.  See also Collignon, supra 
note 29, at 84-87. 
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European Council in its June, 2006 Presidency Conclusions to endorse an 
ongoing examination of new approaches to application of these principles.645 
In addition the Conclusions welcomed the Commission’s commitment to 
carry out greater consultation with national parliaments on new Union 
legislation, and the European Council specifically “invited” the Council, 
Parliament and Commission to “consistently check the correct application of 
the principles and guidelines laid down in the Protocol on subsidiarity and 
proportionality.”646 
 
3. PRIMACY 
 
 The effectiveness of EU action within the Union, that is, within each 
of the Member States of the Union, has its legal basis in the principle of 
primacy.647 Article I-6 of the Constitution states: “The Constitution and law 
adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, 
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.” The Member States in 
turn are required by Article I-5(2) to take “any appropriate measure . . .  to 
ensure fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the Constitution or 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.” Closely connected to 
the concept of primacy is the principle articulated in Article I-33(1) that 
“European laws,” which are legislative acts of the Union “of general 
application,” are binding in their entirety throughout the EU and are “directly 
applicable in all Member States.” Under Article I-33(1) certain “European 
regulations” may also be binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all 
of the Member States. 
 
 The Treaties do not contain the word “primacy.” However, Article I-5 
of the Constitution is a carryover from EC Treaty Article 10, which imposes 
all of the following obligations on the Member States:  
 
                                                 
645 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, supra note 5, at 13. 
646 Id. at 14. 
647 In American constitutional parlance, primacy is referred to as “supremacy,” with 
Article VI of the United States Constitution declaring that Constitution itself and 
federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Another term commonly used in 
American jurisprudence is “pre-emption,” and the U.S. Supreme Court has declared 
that “under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 
‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’” Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992). See also Chemerinsky, 
supra note 615, at 376-401. 
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Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. 
 
Furthermore, Article 249 of the EC Treaty defines a “regulation” of the 
Community (renamed in the Constitution as a “European law”) as a measure 
that “shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.” Although the Treaties do not 
explicitly state that EU law has primacy, the concept is implicit. For example, 
if a Member State has law that is inconsistent with EU law on the same 
subject, and if the state is required to “ensure fulfilment” of the EU law, then 
the Treaty obligation would require the state to follow EU law in preference 
to its national law. The practical result would be the superior force of Union 
law – indeed its primacy over the Member State’s law. The Constitution’s 
expression of the concept is evidently intended to clarify the point, but as 
noted below, primacy has its limits, and some scholars argue that its nuances 
may well have survived.  
 
 Despite the imprecise manner in which the Treaties deal with 
primacy, case law interpreting the Treaties has firmly established the 
principle. The first decision was the 1963 ruling in the matter of Van Gend en 
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen.648 In this case the Court 
of Justice ruled that the authority of the EC Treaty was not dependent upon 
any national implementing legislation or any other measure taken by a 
Member State. The second ruling was in the 1964 case of Costa v. ENEL,649 
in which the Court declared that Community law must be superior to national 
law because of the nature of the Community legal order: 
 
[T]he law stemming from the [EC] Treaty could not, because of its 
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
considerations, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question. 
 
 The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to 
the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising 
                                                 
648 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos, supra note 58. 
649 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 ECR 585. 
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under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.650   
 
A further ruling in 1970 affirmed the primacy of Community law even over a 
national constitution. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H v. Einfuhr- 
und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel the Court declared:  
 
[T]he validity of a Community instrument or its effect within a 
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to 
either the fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that 
State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.651 
 
Primacy flows from the propriety of the action taken. Any act of the 
Union that exceeds its conferred authority would presumably lack legal 
validity and thus could not have primacy over Member State law. For 
example, the Constitution identifies two specific fields in which EU activity is 
curtailed. Article III-425 of the Constitution states: “The Constitution shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership.” Similarly, Article III-436 states that the treaty may not interfere 
with the right of a Member State to withhold information it considers vital to 
its national security, or the right of a state to protect its “production of or trade 
in arms, munitions and war material” as long as this protection does not have 
an anti-competitive effect in the internal market outside the military sphere. 
Article III-425 is taken directly from Article 195 of the EC Treaty, and Article 
III-436 is virtually identical to EC Treaty Article 296. In these fields the 
Member States retain exclusive control, their laws enjoy absolute primacy, 
and their activities are exempt from interference by EU law. 
 
Another limitation on primacy arises from the fact that certain EU law 
depends on implementation at the Member State level. Article I-33(1) of the 
Constitution creates a classification called “European framework law,” an EU 
legislative act that is “binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.” Other than its new label 
“European framework law,” Article I-33 is essentially transposed from EC 
Treaty Article 249, which states that a “directive” is a Community act that 
“shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of 
                                                 
650 Id. at 594. 
651 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 ECR 1125, 1134. 
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form and methods.” In similar fashion, Constitution Article I-33(1) describes 
a class of “non-legislative act” under the name “European regulation,” which 
may be designated as fully binding and directly applicable in the Member 
States, or may be declared to be “binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.” The EC Treaty does not offer a 
counterpart to “European regulations,” and it should be noted that the Treaty’s 
instrument called a “regulation” is the primary form of EU legislation, which 
the Constitution has renamed as “European laws.” Whether under the EC 
Treaty or the Constitution, the described EU instruments are subject to further 
action at the Member State level. They are by themselves binding only “as to 
the result to be achieved,” but not as to the “form and methods” of achieving 
that result.652 The significance of this type of EU legislation is that if each 
Member State is permitted to determine the details for governing the regulated 
activity within its own territory, then it might be argued that the control over 
that activity – the primacy of authority, if you will – is shared between the EU 
and the state.  
 
 Beyond these obvious qualifications, certain commentators have 
argued that primacy is subject to complexities not readily apparent in the 
Constitution’s appealingly simple formulation.653 Paul Craig raises several 
concerns, including his assertion that the wording of Article I-6 leaves room 
to argue that EU law has primacy over national legislation, but not over 
national constitutions.654 He also questions whether EU regulations should 
have primacy equal to EU legislation, whether the Member States retain a 
residual competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) to decide issues of primacy,655 
                                                 
652 Constitution art. I-33(1). 
653 For a review of the supremacy issue as the subject of long-standing judicial and 
academic attention, see Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 
Eur. L.J. 262 (2005).  
654 Paul Craig, What Constitution does Europe Need? The Federal Trust Online Paper 
26/03, at 8, available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/26_03.pdf. 
655 George Bermann notes the “slowly growing number of Member States whose 
supreme or constitutional courts have, following the German example, in effect stated 
that, while they intend for them and their national judiciaries to show the highest 
degree of respect for the pronouncements of the Court of Justice (even on matters as 
sensitive and important as protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms), 
they will not in principle cede to that Court ultimate authority for determining the 
outer boundaries of the EU’s legislative and policy powers. Under that view, 
Kompetenz/Kompetenz does not lie in Luxembourg (except of course for 
Luxembourg); it lies in the seats of the highest courts of the Member States, almost as 
if in the USA it lay, as it assuredly does not, in the state capitals.” Bermann, supra 
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and whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality limit the scope 
of primacy.656 He assures the academic world that Article I-6 will not “signal 
the death of one of the staple topics in EU law courses.”657 Mattias Kumm 
likewise comments that “the supremacy clause does not by itself say who 
should settle the question whether EC legislation is or is not ultra vires, even 
though this is exactly the issue [that] has been the subject of disagreement 
between the Court of Justice and some national courts.658 Michael Dougan 
also questions “the merits of the Convention’s attempt to codify a principle 
characterised by sophisticated nuance in the [EU] caselaw, and extensive 
debate among academics.”659  He suggests that “we should accept that this 
[Article I-6] is a largely hortatory provision which offers little of substance to 
the complex debate on relations between the Union and domestic legal 
orders.”660  
 
 Surely the matter of primacy has been the subject of much nuance 
under the regime of the Treaties. Equally certain is the fact that certain 
scholars and national courts have thus far resisted the notion that the Court of 
Justice alone should have the authority to decide matters of the EU’s 
competence. Admittedly, the argument that national courts have authority to 
determine Union competence may have some merit when the primacy concept 
exists primarily by virtue of pronouncements by the Court of Justice itself. 
However, the above commentators seem too quick to dismiss what the 
Constitution actually says. First, Article I-6 for the first time offers a clear and 
explicit textual declaration on primacy. Second, with regard to existing 
decisions of the Court, Article IV-438(4) states: 
 
The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
and the Court of First Instance on the interpretation and application of 
the treaties and acts repealed by Article IV-437, as well as of the acts 
and conventions adopted for their application, shall remain, mutatis 
mutandis, the source of interpretation of Union law and in particular 
of the comparable provisions of the Constitution. 
 
                                                                                                                    
note 47, at 367. For a general analysis of the Constitution and its impact on the 
sovereignty of the Member States’ constitutional courts, see Albi & Van Elsuwege, 
supra note 116. 
656 Id. at 8-9. 
657 Id. at 8.  
658 Kumm, supra note 653, at 296. 
659 Dougan, supra note 358, at 7. 
660 Id. at 8. 
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Third, going forward, Article I-29(1) identifies the Court of Justice as the 
institution that “shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Constitution the law is observed.” Taken together, these three provisions 
suggest a change from the past, and it may be profound. The words of Article 
I-6 are not subtle, nor are they qualified except by the conferral principle. 
Article IV-438(4) identifies existing EU case-law as the source of 
interpretation existing Union law and of comparable provisions of the 
Constitution. Article I-29(1) affirms the basic role of the Court. Arguably the 
cumulative effect of these three articles is to eliminate any doubt that EU law 
is supreme and that the Court of Justice is the ultimate source of its 
interpretation. 
 
 But even this new legal order has its boundaries. Nathan Gibbs, has 
set the primacy principle next to the Article I-11 conferral provisions and has 
evaluated their joint impact. He observes: 
 
Taken together, both provisions explicitly reinforce the post-state 
characteristics of the evolving European constitution. The first 
[primacy] confirms the supranational characteristics of the EU legal 
order, the way in which it cuts across the regulatory authority of the 
Member States. The second [conferral] confirms that the European 
Union will not itself evolve into a statal constitutional order. This is 
significant in so far as it places the burden of further EU integration, 
not so much on any large institutional scheme, but rather on the more 
flexible arenas of substantive policy coordination currently explored 
through the various “new governance” procedures. The Constitutional 
Treaty thus offers an implicit confirmation of the current 
developments in European constitutionalism and its move away from 
the liberal constitutional model.661 
 
In the end, the Constitution’s statement on primacy proved to be too 
controversial to survive. The June 2007 IGC decided to omit the provision 
from the Reform Treaty, and in its place a Declaration will refer to the “well 
settled case-law of the EU Court of Justice.”662   
 
                                                 
661 Nathan Gibbs, Examining the Aesthetic Dimensions of the Constitutional Treaty, 
11 Eur. L.J. 326, 341 (2005). For an analysis of “new governance” procedures in the 
EU, see the discussion in part 5 of this chapter. 
662 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 19, Annex I at 16, n. 1.  
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4. EXCLUSIVITY 
 
 The concept of exclusivity arises from the Constitution’s 
classification of powers. Certain delineated competences are granted to the 
EU alone, others are shared between the EU and the Member States, and in 
other areas the Member States act with the EU providing a measure of 
coordination.663 Article I-12 explains the differences between the categories, 
while Articles I-13 to I-17 describe the areas of activity that fall within each 
category, as follows: 
 
 (1) Article I-13(1) lists the following areas as exclusive to the EU: the 
customs union, competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market, monetary policy for the euro-zone states, conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy and the common 
commercial policy (international trade policy of the Union.) In addition, 
Article I-13(2) grants the EU exclusive competence to conclude international 
agreements relating to these fields. According to Article I-12(1), where the 
Constitution assigns the EU an exclusive competence, only the Union may 
legislate unless it assigns authority to the states or the Union act requires 
Member State implementation.  
 
 (2) Article I-14(2) delineates the areas of “shared competence” as the 
following “principal” areas: the internal market; social policy “for the aspects 
defined in Part III [of the Constitution];” economic, social and territorial 
cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding conservation of marine 
biological resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-
European networks; energy; the area of freedom, security and justice; and 
common safety concerns in public health matters “for the aspects defined in 
Part III.” Article I-12(2) explains that in these areas the EU and Member 
States may act, but Member States may legislate only “to the extent that the 
Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence.” 
However, Article 14 contains exceptions to the rule of Article I-12 – the fields 
of research, technological development, space, development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid are identified as areas of shared competence, but Union 
action in these fields will not preclude Member State action.664  
 
                                                 
663 Prior to the 2002-2003 Convention, in a wide-ranging discussion of what a 
constitution might accomplish, Jürgen Habermas wrote that everyone could agree 
“that delimitation of the competences of federal, national and regional levels is the 
core political issue to be settled by any European constitution.” Jürgen Habermas, 
Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 New Left Rev. 5, 26 (2001). 
664 Constitution art. I-14(3), (4). 
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 (3) Articles I-12(3) and I-15 relate to coordination of Member State 
economic and employment policies and to creation of a common foreign and 
security policy. The Union is expected to provide coordination, but basic 
responsibility for national policy is left with each Member State. 
 
 (4) Article I-12(4) permits the Union to “define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy.” Article I-16(1) notes that these matters include “all 
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security.” The 
Member States are to “actively and unreservedly” support these policies.665 
 
 (5) Article I-17 identifies the following areas in which the Union may 
carry out “supporting, coordinating or complementary action” at the European 
level: protection and improvement of human health; industry; culture; 
tourism; education, youth, sport and vocational training; civil protection; and 
administrative cooperation. Article I-14(1) identifies these areas as fields in 
which the Union is not required to share competence: “The Union shall share 
competence with the Member States where the Constitution confers on it a 
competence which does not relate to areas referred to in Articles I-13 
[exclusive competence] and I-17.” However, the EU’s own competence 
relates only to supporting, coordinating or complementary action. Article I-
12(5) makes it clear that in these areas the Union may not supersede the 
underlying competence of the Member States, and Union acts may not “entail 
harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations.”  
 
 The approach of the Treaties is far more scattered and far less clear 
than presented in the Constitution. Competences in specific fields are found in 
the substantive provisions relating to that field, rather than a series of broad 
statements. The following are examples of how the Treaties deal with 
competences and exclusivity: 
 
 (i) EC Treaty Article 5 notes that in areas outside its exclusive 
competence, the Community may act only in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. However, the treaty offers no definition as to which substantive 
matters fall within this exclusive competence. 
 
 (ii) Article 127(1) of the EC Treaty permits the Community to 
encourage Member State cooperation in the field of employment policy, but it 
requires respect for “the competences of the Member States,” and Article 129 
                                                 
665 Constitution art. I-16(2). 
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states that the Community’s measures “shall not include harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States. 
 
 (iii) EC Treaty Articles 131 to 134 govern the common commercial 
policy of the Community, which the Constitution designates as an area of 
exclusive EU competence. Article 133(6) deals with negotiation of 
international trade agreements by the Community, but it states that an 
agreement “may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions 
which would go beyond the Community’s internal powers, in particular by 
leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the Member States in an 
area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonisation.” Article 133(6) 
further designates certain subjects as falling within “the shared competence of 
the Community and its Member States.” 
 
 (iv) EC Treaty Article 137(4) states that Community activities in the 
field of social policy may not affect “the right of Member States” to define 
their own fundamental principles. Respect for the “responsibility” or 
“responsibilities” of the Member States is found in relation to Community 
support for education (Article 149(1)), vocational training (Article 150(1)) 
and public health (Article 152(5)).  
 
 (v) EC Treaty Article 174(4) speaks of the Community and Member 
States acting within “their respective spheres of competence” to cooperate 
with third countries and international organisations in the field of 
environmental protection, but any action must be “without prejudice to 
Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to 
conclude international agreements.” Similar statements are made in Article 
181 with regard to Community activity in the field of development 
cooperation, and in Article 181a(3) in relation to economic, financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries. 
 
 (vi) TEU Article 11 requires the Union to pursue a common foreign 
and security policy, and the Member States are required to support it. 
However, as further explained in Chapter 17 of this treatise, the Member 
States retain substantial power in this field. 
 
 (vii) TEU Articles 29 to 42 call upon the EU to provide an area of 
freedom, security and justice, which Constitution Article I-14 delineates as an 
area of “shared competence.” The TEU does not use the term “shared 
competence,” but its focus is on coordination of a field in which the Member 
States retain substantial power. This area is further examined in Chapter 16 of 
this treatise. 
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 (viii) TEU Article 43 permits “enhanced cooperation” among groups 
of Member States, but not in “the areas which fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community.” 
 
 The general difficulty with the Treaties is that they mention spheres 
of competence, shared competence, EU competence and Member State 
competence without ever delineating clearly just where EU activity will run 
afoul of authority reserved to the Member States. At best, the Treaties indicate 
what the Union is permitted to do in specific subject areas, but the Treaties’ 
lack of precision on matters of competence creates a need for the Court of 
Justice to provide interpretation. This shortcoming was duly noted by the EU 
leadership in 2001. The Intergovernmental Conference at Nice stated that a 
re-evaluation of the EU should include addressing “how to establish and 
monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union 
and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.”666 The 
Commission White Paper noted that the Union needs “clear principles 
identifying how competence is shared between the Union and its Member 
States.”667 The Laeken Declaration in late 2001, by which the IGC instituted 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, identified the critical need for the 
Convention to “clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence 
between the Union and the Member States in light of the new challenges 
facing the Union.”668  
 
The Convention attempted to respond to these challenges. The 
approach in the Constitution represents a significant step forward toward 
helpful and necessary clarification as to where the dividing lines lie. However, 
the Constitution’s approach in Articles I-12 to I-17 has several shortcomings. 
First, it is not comprehensive. The final provision of Article I-12 states: “The 
scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union’s competences shall be 
determined by the provisions relating to each area in Part III.”669 This 
necessitates a careful review of the great textual detail of Part III, an exercise 
similar to that required to interpret the EC Treaty. In addition, two areas of 
shared competence identified in Article I-14 specifically refer to “the aspects 
defined in Part III.”670 Furthermore, the introduction to the list of shared 
competences in Article I-14(2) acknowledges that it is incomplete, by 
                                                 
666 Nice Declaration, supra note 132, at 85. 
667 White Paper, supra note 52, at 34. 
668 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 21. 
669 Constitution art. I-12(6). 
670 Constitution art. I-14(2)(b) (social policy), I-14(2)(k) (common safety concerns in 
public health matters). 
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referring to “the following principal areas.” (emphasis supplied) This 
wording, along with the reference to Part III in Article I-12, compels the 
reader to look beyond the overview provided in Part I. However useful, 
Articles I-12 to I-17 are incomplete. 
 
 The second point of concern is that it is not clear as to why several 
subject areas are set apart from the three main types of competence 
(exclusive, shared and supporting, coordinating or complementary action). In 
Article I-14(3), matters of research, technological development and space are 
treated differently from the shared-competence items listed in I-14(2). The 
same is true for development cooperation and humanitarian aid in Article I-
14(4). Furthermore, economic and employment policies are set apart in 
Article I-15, while matters of foreign and security policy are treated 
separately in Article I-16. Apparently there is a case for affording special 
treatment to each of these areas, but one could just as well argue for including 
them in the three general categories of competence.  
 
 Third, there is an inherent paradox posed by the Union’s supporting, 
coordinating or complementary acts that under Constitution Article I-17 may 
be binding on the Member States, but under Article I-12(5) may not supersede 
Member State competence in the area and may not require harmonisation of 
national law. Paul Craig has argued that the entire area of supporting, 
coordinating and complementary action will prove to be “problematic.”671 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates that the matter of competences 
under the Constitution includes a substantial role for the Member States. In 
areas of activity under Articles I-15, I-16 and I-17, the Member States are in 
essence considered the primary actors, with the Union offering no more than 
support, coordination or complementary action. Shared competences under 
Constitution Article I-14 anticipate that the states will act where the EU 
chooses not to.672 Even the areas of exclusive EU competence under Article I-
13 may involve Member State action if the Union assigns such authority to 
the states.673 Furthermore, regardless of whether competence is exclusive to 
the EU or shared with the Member States, in the case of European framework 
laws and certain European regulations it will be left to the Member States to 
pass implementing legislation.674 While such framework laws and regulations 
emanating from the EU are binding on the Member States “as to the result to 
                                                 
671 Craig, supra note 654, at 7-8. See the discussion in part 1.4 of Chapter 17. 
672 See also Constitution art. I-12(2). 
673 See also Constitution art. I-12(1). 
674 Constitution arts. I-33(1), I-37. 
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be achieved,”675 by their nature they require, rather than preclude, Member 
State action in the subject field. 
 
 The allocation of competences, whether presented in a random 
fashion as in the Treaties or more clearly as in the Constitution, assists in 
defining what the European Union is and what its limits are. George Bermann 
describes the competence delineation as “an exercise whose evident purpose 
is to halt, or at least give the impression of halting, what has come in the trade 
to be known as the Union’s competences ‘creep’.”676 As illustrated above, the 
Constitution’s clearer expressions also offer ample evidence that the EU is a 
dual system. The Union has substantial power, but the Member States are 
vital actors in its activities. 
 
5. FLEXIBILITY 
 
5.1 EU action beyond its designated competences 
 
 Even the highly detailed Constitution cannot anticipate every need for 
EU action. As a consequence, the drafters have included a flexibility clause, 
Article I-18, which allows the Union in limited circumstances to take steps 
beyond its designated competences. Article I-18(1) contains the following 
basic statement:  
 
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework 
of the policies defined in Part III, to attain one of the objectives set 
out in the Constitution, and the Constitution has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the European Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate 
measures. 
 
Substantively, Article I-18(1) requires that any step taken under the flexibility 
clause must be “within the framework of the policies defined in Part III, to 
attain one of the objectives set by the Constitution.” Procedurally, the process 
begins with the Commission proposing an action and advising the Member 
State parliaments of the proposal.677 Under the procedures described in Article 
I-11(3) and in the Protocol on Subsidiarity, the parliaments may issue a 
challenge if they believe that the proposal will violate the subsidiarity rule.678 
                                                 
675 Constitution art. I-33(1). 
676 Bermann, supra note 47, at 368. 
677 Constitution art. I-18(2).   
678 See discussion of this challenge procedure in part 2 of this chapter. 
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The next step is to obtain the consent of the European Parliament, and lastly 
the Council must vote unanimously to approve the action.679 One further 
requirement under Article I-18 is that actions taken under the flexibility 
provision “shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or 
regulations in cases where the Constitution excludes such harmonisation.”680  
 
 The principal provision of Constitution Article I-18 is drawn from 
Article 308 of the EC Treaty. The EC Treaty provision states:  
 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of operation of the common market, one of the objectives of 
the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures. 
 
Note that the EC Treaty refers to actions relating to “operation of the common 
market,” while the Constitution refers to the subjects covered in its own Part 
III. The Constitution’s realm of flexibility is thus more extensive, because, as 
further illustrated in Chapter 17 of this treatise, Part III of the Constitution 
encompasses much more than the internal market. In addition, the 
Constitution provides for consent by the European Parliament, rather than the 
mere consultation procedure under the EC Treaty. The Constitution’s 
notification provision and its clarification regarding harmonisation of Member 
State law are also new. None of these differences significantly enhances the 
protections offered to the Member States under Article 308, although the 
Constitution’s prohibition regarding harmonisation of Member State law may 
be seen as a benefit to the states. 
 
 The primary protection for the Member States in Article I-18 and in 
EC Treaty Article 308 is that Council decisions under the flexibility procedure 
must be taken unanimously, and thus each Member State can block the action. 
Also, because of the restriction on harmonisation of Member State law, the 
flexibility procedure may fill constitutional gaps, but it may not serve as a 
back-door method to avoid any specific harmonisation restrictions set forth in 
the Constitution. 
 
 Peter Ludlow has called Constitution Article I-18 “a potentially far-
reaching enabling clause . . .  which, like [EC Treaty Article 308], can and 
should obviate the need for future IGC’s as long as the Council can agree 
                                                 
679 Constitution art. I-18(1).    
680 Constitution art. I-18(3).   
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unanimously that changes are needed.”681 He argues that Article I-18 should 
be viewed in conjunction with Article IV-444, the simplified constitutional 
amendment procedure, which “allows the European Council, acting 
unanimously, to extend the provisions regarding the use of qualified majority 
voting” in Part III of the Constitution, and also in conjunction with Article I-
40(7) “where the same principle is applied to foreign and security policy.”682 
Ludlow notes that some critics have claimed that the unanimity requirement 
“negates the value” of these three articles,683 but he believes that these 
criticisms are misleading. He contends:  
 
In certain cases, such as these, which involve ‘fast track’ decisions 
regarding the scope and character of the EU system as such, the 
unanimity requirement seems both reasonable and necessary. Actual 
experience further suggests that it need not inhibit boldness.684  
 
Ludlow notes that the “radical expansion of the European Community’s 
agenda in the 1970s into areas such as environmental policy, regional policy 
and the EMS was based on [EC Treaty Article 308] which also required 
unanimity.”685 
 
 If EU officials determine that a law must be enacted or a decision 
taken that will enhance EU activity despite not being provided for in the 
Constitution, and if the matter is of a technical nature or does not infringe on 
any essential aspect of Member State sovereignty, then the flexibility clause 
would work in practice. Lack of controversy would lead to full cooperation 
and the necessary unanimity to see the matter through. Because of the 
procedural safeguards in Article I-18, employment of the flexibility clause 
would not likely have led to any extension of EU competences. Michael 
Dougan has commented that the flexibility clause “could not be used either to 
add new objectives to the Constitution, or to exceed the basic parameters of 
Union competence established in Part III.”686 However, Dougan does note that 
Article I-18 is slightly broader than its predecessor, Article 308 of the EC 
                                                 
681 Peter Ludlow, The Thessaloniki European Council, EuroComment Briefing Note, 
No. 2.3, July 3, 2003, at 28. 
682 Id. See Constitution arts. IV-444, I-40(7). 
683 For example, Michael Dougan observes that in an enlarged EU the unanimity 
requirement “automatically reduces the practical significance of the flexibility 
clause.” Dougan, supra note 358, at 4. 
684 Id. at 28-29. 
685 Id. at 29. 
686 Id. at 4. 
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Treaty, in that the new provision is not limited to action tied to the “operation 
of the common market.”687  
 
 Peter Norman comments that Articles I-18 and IV-444 of the 
Constitution “promise to put national parliaments on their mettle” because 
these provisions “have the potential to shift responsibilities from the member 
states to the Union.”688 He adds: “In both cases the national parliaments must 
be informed, giving them an opportunity to influence the decisions of their 
own governments.” However, he warns that such “checks and balances” will 
be successful only if the Member State parliaments “pay heed to what is 
happening at the European Union level.”689 An alert parliament might be able 
to influence its country’s Council or European Council representative before a 
decision is taken. 
 
5.2 The Open Method of Coordination 
 
 While EC Treaty Article 308 provides a mechanism for the EU itself 
to act beyond its designated competences, there are instances in which action 
in new areas is not politically feasible (recall that Article 308 requires 
unanimity by the Council). In these circumstances, if there is a perceived need 
for centrally encouraged cooperation among the Member States, the EU has 
devised a process by which it can at least facilitate a common approach to 
national action. This process is known as the Open Method of Co-ordination 
(OMC). Because this activity does involve a measure of Union activity, a 
description of it is included in this section on the Union’s flexibility. 
 
 The OMC was formally endorsed at the Lisbon IGC in March 2000, 
and has been described as follows:  
 
 Its purpose was to spread legislative “best practices” across the 
Member States in areas where the EU has no competence for 
regulation. . . . Observers have described OMC as a clear effort on the 
part of the EU to encourage policy transfers among member states. 
OMC is in fact a compendium of mechanisms for cross-national 
communication.690 
 
In the Open Method of Coordination the EU does not enact its own legislation 
or other measures. Rather, it carries out any of several different types of 
                                                 
687 Id. 
688 Norman, supra note 152, at 328-29. 
689 Id. at 329. 
690 Duina & Oliver, supra note 639, at 183. 
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activity: (1) it collects National Action Plans from the Member States and 
makes them available for public review; (2) it evaluates the National Action 
Plans and issues Joint Reports (of the Council and Commission) including 
recommendations of best practices; (3) it creates statistical indicators and 
other measurements relating to the information it is evaluating; and (4) it 
creates and supports Peer Review Programs such as conferences and 
exchanges among representatives of interested Member States.691 In short, the 
OMC is an activity in which the EU fulfills the role of a facilitator, not a 
legislator or administrator.  
 
 The OMC has been controversial, and commentators David M. 
Trubek and Louise G. Trubek have summarised the debate as follows: 
 
Both those who favour the OMC as a mode of governance and those 
who question its desirability compare the OMC, implicitly or 
explicitly, with the Community Method. The Community Method is 
thought of as “hard law” because it creates uniform rules that Member 
States must adopt, provides sanctions if they fail to do so, and allows 
challenges for non-compliance to be brought in court. In contrast, the 
OMC, which has general and open-ended guidelines rather than rules, 
provides no formal sanctions for Member States that do not follow the 
guidelines, and is not justiciable, is thought of as “soft law”. 
Proponents of the OMC argue that it can be effective despite – or 
even because of – its open-ended, non-binding, non-justiciable 
qualities. Opponents question that conclusion. They not only argue 
that the OMC cannot do what is needed to construct Social Europe 
and that “hard law” is essential, but also contend that use of the OMC 
could undermine efforts to build the hard law they think will be 
needed.692 
 
Gráinne de Búrca has characterised the opposing “soft law” and “hard law” 
categories respectively as “new governance” and “traditional 
constitutionalism,” and explains that new governance is necessary because the 
EU’s “constitutional framework does not have a settled and embedded 
existence of the kind enjoyed by most national systems.”693 
 
                                                 
691 Id. at 183-84. 
692 Trubek & Trubek, supra note 351, at 344. 
693 Gráinne de Búrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the 
European Union, 28 Eur. L. Rev. 814, 815-16 (2003).  
For additional relevant commentary, see Collignon, supra note 29, at 119-21.  
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 Notwithstanding this theoretical debate, the EU has tackled 
employment issues through the OMC, and its European Employment Strategy 
was, after its first five years, judged a success by the Commission.694 As a 
result, the OMC process has been applied under the Treaties695 into additional 
subject areas, such as information technology, research and development, 
economic reforms, education, employment, social inclusion and pensions.696 
The OMC was described favorably in the Commission’s White Paper on 
Governance, with the following endorsement: “In some areas it sits alongside 
the programme-based and legislative approach; in others, it adds value at the 
European level where there is little hope for legislative solutions.”697  
 
 At the European Convention the process was the subject of much 
discussion,698 and several provisions in the Constitution reflect the OMC. 
Article I-12(5) mentions Union competence “in certain areas and under the 
conditions laid down in the Constitution . . .  to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby 
superseding their competence in these areas.”699 The same article states: 
“Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions in 
Part III relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member 
                                                 
694 European Commission, Taking Stock of Five Years of the European Employment 
Strategy, COM (2002) 416 final. In a discussion entitled “Soft law may be harder than 
you think,” commentators Trubek and Trubek identify several different ways in which 
the OMC actually results in compliance by the Member States: “shaming, diffusion 
through mimesis or discourse, deliberation, learning and networks.” Trubek & 
Trubek, supra note 351, at 356-59. 
695 Pertinent treaty articles are identified in the final paragraph of this section. 
696 Duina and Oliver, supra note 639, at 183. 
697 White Paper, supra note 52, at 21-22. Despite its general endorsement, the 
Commission warned of necessary limitations: “The use of the open method of co-
ordination must not dilute the achievement of common objectives in the Treaty or the 
political responsibility of the Institutions. It should not be used when legislative 
action under the Community method is possible; it should ensure overall 
accountability in line with the following objectives: 
 --It should be used to achieve Treaty objectives. 
--Regular mechanisms for reporting to the European Parliament should be 
established. 
 --The Commission should be closely involved and play a co-ordinating role. 
--The data information generated should be widely available [and] provide 
the basis for determining whether legislative or programme-based action is 
needed to overcome particular problems highlighted. 
Id. at 22. 
698 Trubek & Trubek, supra note 351, at 344. 
699 Note that under Constitution Article I-14(1) these fields are not areas of shared 
competence. See the discussion regarding exclusivity in part 4 of Chapter 12. 
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States’ laws or regulations.” In substantive areas, Article I-15(1) provides for 
EU “guidelines” to assist Member States to coordinate their economic 
policies, Article I-15(2) provides for EU “guidelines” to “ensure 
coordination” of Member State employment policies, and Article I-15(3) 
provides for EU “initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ social 
policies.”700 Article I-17 identifies seven areas in which the EU “shall have 
competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action.” 
These areas are protection and improvement of human health; industry; 
culture; tourism; education, youth, sport and vocational training; civil 
protection; and administrative cooperation. Specific provisions on each of 
these subjects are found in Part III of the Constitution, Articles III-278 to III-
285, and are analysed in Chapter 17 of this treatise. The interplay of Articles 
I-17, I-15 and I-12(5) is also discussed above in this chapter in relation to 
exclusivity. 
 
 The Treaties do contain suggestions of the OMC, but less clearly than 
in the Constitution. Article 99 of the EC Treaty permits the Community to 
draw up guidelines for the Member States’ economic policies, and to assist in 
coordination of those policies. Article 127(1) permits the Community to 
encourage Member State cooperation in the field of employment policy, but it 
requires respect for “the competences of the Member States,” and Article 129 
states that the Community’s measures “shall not include harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States.” Articles 137 and 140 
contemplate a variety of activities to coordinate the states’ social policies. 
Several of the other substantive areas covered in Articles III-278 to III-285 of 
the Constitution are carried over from the EC Treaty as well.701 Overall, it is 
fair to say that the flexibility available to the EU to encourage coordinated 
Member State activity in fields where the Union may not legislate is given 
greater recognition in the Constitution. However, Trubek and Trubek have 
argued that the Constitution’s approach is indirect, its results “murky,” and its 
text “ambiguous,” and as a consequence the OMC “is hardly given the robust 
endorsement and full-blown constitutional status some hoped for.” 702 
 
                                                 
700 Additional provisions for issuance of EU guidelines and other coordinating 
activities on these subjects may be found in Part III. Articles III-178 to III-184 deal 
with economic policy; Articles III-203 to III-208 address employment policy; and 
Articles III-209 to III-219 address social policy. 
701 See part 1.3 of Chapter 17 (comparing the Constitution’s provisions with the 
corresponding EC Treaty sections, if any. 
702 Trubek & Trubek, supra note 351, at 354.  See also Myrto Tsakatika, The Open 
Method of Co-ordination in the European Convention: An Opportunity Lost?, in 
Dobson, supra note 29, at 90-102. 
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6.  FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 The principles discussed in this chapter do much to define the 
European Union, and they illustrate critical dividing lines between the Union 
and the Member States. Having said that, let us summarise the foregoing 
observations as to whether the Constitution would have impacted the dividing 
lines:  
 
Conferral by the Member States to the Union is more clearly 
emphasised in the Constitution, but this does not appear to do anything other 
than state what was already the case. Thus, no shift in this dividing line.  
 
Subsidiarity and proportionality are defined in the Constitution 
essentially as they are in the Treaties. However, the Protocol on Subsidiarity 
offers new opportunities for national parliaments to object to proposed EU 
legislation. Here a dividing line between EU legislative competence and 
national oversight would shift toward the Member States. One may argue that 
this only undercuts the efficiency of EU lawmaking, but the procedural rights 
of the states would be enhanced.  
 
The Constitution’s enshrinement of the primacy of EU law is 
arguably a step in the direction of greater Union authority. However, in light 
of the previous establishment of the principle through decisions of the Court 
of Justice, the Constitution’s provision is essentially a confirmation of the 
status quo. From an academic point of view there may have been added value 
in committing the principle to constitutional text, and the new provision may 
have created nuanced enhancement of the Court pronouncements. 
Nevertheless, there is no obvious shifting of this dividing line.  
 
The division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States, described above as the exclusivity principle, is much more clearly 
stated in the Constitution than it has been in the Treaties. However, we have 
seen that clarity can cut both ways, and that it does not necessarily favor 
either the Union or the states. By itself, clarity is a good thing, but in this 
instance it does not appear to shift any of the EU’s dividing lines.  
 
Finally, we have noted that the Constitution’s flexibility clause, which 
permits legislation in areas not clearly specified in the document’s text, is 
somewhat broader than its EC Treaty counterpart. Nevertheless, the existing 
legislative unanimity requirements are preserved, and thus the new clause 
would not shift any competences to the Union. 
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 All in all, the drafters of the Constitution did not express these 
foundational principles in a fashion that would have shifted competences to 
the European Union. If anything, the Member States might have gained a bit 
in the right of their national parliaments to challenge EU legislation on the 
ground of subsidiarity. With that minor exception in favor the the states, the 
dividing lines illustrated in this chapter would have essentially stayed in 
place.  
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Part Three:  Institutions and Decision-Making  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As we have observed in Part Two, the European Union’s essential 
character is defined through its stated values and objectives, its structural 
features, and certain core principles. These elements work in combination to 
drive the Union’s agenda, but also to limit its activities. We will now turn 
from the Union’s basic identity to a review of the means by which EU policy 
is carried out. Chapter 13 will describe in detail the EU institutions, and 
Chapter 14 will analuse the instruments and procedures used by them in 
making EU law. Chapter 15 will focus on where the Constitution would have 
replaced unanimous decision-making with qualified majority voting and 
where it would have applied QMV to new subjects of EU activity. 
Throughout this analysis, the EU’s dividing lines will reveal themselves. The 
Union’s institutional structure reflects careful attention to the limits placed on 
EU competences, and the opportunities for individual Member State influence 
are readily discernible.  
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Chapter 13 
 
 
The EU Institutions and Organs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Constitution contains articles that identify and describe the 
following institutions and organs: 
 
--European Parliament 
 --European Council 
 --Council of Ministers 
 --Commission 
 --Court of Justice 
 --European Central Bank 
 --Court of Auditors 
 --European Investment Bank 
--Advisory Committees: Committee of the Regions, Economic and 
Social Committee 
 
These bodies are likewise identified in the Treaties, with most detail being 
presented in the EC Treaty. Because the Treaty on European Union “builds 
on” the EC Treaty, the drafters of the TEU saw no need to repeat the broad 
descriptions already included in the earlier document.  
 
The Constitution in general maintains the assigned roles of all of the 
EU institutions – the internal balance of power within the Union – with little 
variation from the Treaties. Nevertheless, certain changes are proposed under 
the Constitution, and these changes have the potential of affecting both the 
institutional balance and the dividing lines between the Union and its Member 
States. The most notable developments are the new “permanent” European 
Council Presidency and the new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. These 
and other matters of structure are described in this chapter, with a focus on the 
institutions’ existence, characteristics and competences. Their specific 
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responsibilities in carrying out the EU’s substantive activities are noted at 
various points throughout this treatise. 
 
1. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
1.1 A functioning parliament for the Union 
 
 Under the Constitution the European Parliament bears reasonable 
resemblance to a traditional national parliament in its makeup and its 
function. Article I-20 of the Constitution introduces the Parliament and 
provides that it is elected by popular vote of the EU citizens, elects its own 
officers and participates in enacting legislation and approving the EU budget. 
Part III of the Constitution provides further detail about the institution and its 
workings.703 Article III-336 states that Parliament is to meet annually and may 
hold special sessions. Article III-331 acknowledges that its members are 
affiliated with European-level political parties, and Article I-46(4) notes that 
these parties “contribute to forming European political awareness and to 
expressing the will of citizens of the Union.” According to Article III-339, the 
Parliament is to determine its own rules of procedure, although Article III-338 
mandates that decisions of the Parliament generally require a majority of the 
votes cast. 
 
 The EC Treaty offers detailed descriptions of the European 
Parliament, and its Article 7 lists the Parliament first in the list of EU 
institutions. Articles 189 to 201 provide the structural and operational details, 
which have largely been carried over into the Constitution. Article 189 
introduces the Parliament. Article 190 provides that it is elected by popular 
vote of the EU citizens; Article 197 permits it to elect its own officers; and 
Article 192 permits it to participate in enacting legislation. Article 196 states 
that Parliament is to meet annually and may hold special sessions. Article 191 
acknowledges that its members are affiliated with European-level political 
parties and notes that these parties “contribute to forming European awareness 
and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.” According to Article 199, 
the Parliament is to determine its own rules of procedure, although Article 
198 mandates that decisions of the Parliament generally require a majority of 
the votes cast. 
 
 The Parliament is mentioned frequently in the TEU, with the most 
significant general reference being found in Article 5, where Parliament is 
identified as one of the primary EU institutions. 
                                                 
703 Constitution arts. III-330 to III-340. 
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 With regard to inter-institutional relationships, Article III-333 of the 
Constitution permits the Parliament to set up committees of inquiry to 
investigate improper implementation of EU law, and Article III-335 assigns it 
the responsibility to appoint the permanent European Ombudsman to receive 
citizen complaints about EU institutions. Furthermore, under Articles I-20(1) 
and I-27(1) the Parliament, upon a proposal by the European Council, elects 
the President of the Commission, and under Article I-27(2) it approves the 
slate of Commissioners nominated by the President-elect. Under Articles I-
26(8) and III-340 it can force the resignation of the entire Commission. 
Article I-22 provides that the Parliament is entitled to receive a report from 
the European Council President after each meeting of the European 
Council.704  
 
 EC Treaty Article 193 permits the Parliament to set up committees of 
inquiry to investigate improper implementation of EU law, and Article 195 
assigns it the responsibility to appoint the permanent European Ombudsman 
to receive citizen complaints about EU institutions. Furthermore, under 
Article 214 the Parliament, upon a nomination by the Council, “approves” the 
President of the Commission and approves the slate of Commissioners 
nominated by the Council and the President-elect.705 Under Article 201 it can 
force the resignation of the entire Commission.  
 
 The substantive changes from the EC Treaty to the Constitution 
include the following: Article 190 of the treaty provides for a Parliament of no 
more than 732 members, with no minimums or maximums stated, but with the 
                                                 
704 Constitution art. I-22(2)(d). 
705 The appointment of the Commission in late 2004 illustrated that the Parliament’s 
approval powers under EC Treaty Article 214 can be significant. Because of 
controversy surrounding certain Commissioners nominated by incoming president 
José Manuel Barroso, the Parliament threatened to reject his entire slate. In the face of 
such unprecedented opposition, Mr. Barroso made adjustments to the slate, and the 
newly configured Commission was accepted by the Parliament on November 18, 
2004. One commentator has observed: “This marked a new stage in the development 
of the powers of the European Parliament, not through Treaty revisions, or soft law, 
or recourse to the European courts, but instead through the constitutionally mandated 
procedure for approving the members of the European Commission. Naturally, in 
flexing its legal muscles, the European Parliament improved its position in inter-
institutional politics, notably in relation to the Commission. But the most significant 
gain was not to a specific institution but instead to the EU’s constitutional system: it 
strengthened representative, democratic EU government.” Francis Snyder, Editorial: 
Enhancing EU Democracy, Constituting the European Union, 11 Eur. L.J. 131 
(2005). 
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precise allocation indicated for each Member State. The Treaties’ Protocol on 
the Enlargement of the European Union permits increases in that number to 
reflect new accessions to the Union. The Constitution, in Article I-20(2), 
provides for a maximum of 750 members, with a minimum of six and a 
maximum of 96 for any Member State. Article III-404 of the Constitution 
expands the Parliament’s role to full participation in the EU’s budgeting 
process.706 The little-used cooperation procedure under EC Treaty Article 252, 
by which the Parliament could affect the course of EU legislation but could 
not block a measure, is finally eliminated.707 Under Article I-34(2) of the 
Constitution the “ordinary legislative procedure” is the co-decision procedure. 
This procedure is detailed in Constitution Article III-396, which, like Article 
251 of the EC Treaty, allows the Parliament full participation in the legislative 
deliberation, coupled with the power to prevent a legislative measure from 
taking effect.708 
 
 From a drafting perspective and political point of view, it is 
interesting that the European Parliament is the first institution mentioned in 
Article I-19 of the Constitution, which identifies the EU’s “institutional 
framework.” The Parliament is also the first institution described in the 
separate institutional sections of Part I709 and the first described in detail in 
Part III,710 and it also enjoys top billing in Article 7(1) of the EC Treaty and in 
the institutional section of the EC Treaty.711 This placement is reminiscent of 
the United States Constitution in which the Congress is the first institution 
described. The popular conception in the United States is that the 
Constitution’s reference to Congress before the executive and judiciary 
implies that the Congress, as the body most representative of the people, is the 
premier branch of government. However, the political reality is otherwise – 
                                                 
706 Under Article III-404 the Parliament must approve all aspects of the budget and 
may propose amendments to it. Under Article 272 of the EC Treaty the Parliament’s 
right to amend was limited to compulsory expenditures. Article 272(4) states that 
Parliament has a right “to amend the draft budget, acting by a majority of its 
Members, and to propose to the Council, acting by an absolute majority of the votes 
cast, modifications to the draft budget relating to expenditure necessarily resulting 
from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance therewith.” (emphasis supplied) 
707 EC Treaty art. 252. The only instances in which the cooperation procedure is 
found after the Treaty of Nice relate to certain matters of economic and monetary 
union. See EC Treaty arts. 99, 102, 103, 106. 
708 For an overview of the development of the Parliament, see Ricardo Passos, The 
Expanding Role of the European Parliament, in The EU Constitution: The Best Way 
Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
709 Constitution arts. I-20 to I-32. 
710 Constitution arts. III-330 to III-340. 
711 EC Treaty arts. 189-280. 
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for the past 75 years the US has been dominated by its executive branch. In 
the European Union the legislative assembly also represents the broadest 
spectrum of the EU citizenry, but despite the fact that Parliament’s legislative 
and budgetary competences have grown steadily,712 the Council and 
Commission continue to drive the EU agenda. 
 
 It is particularly notable that the European Parliament lacks the 
traditional power of a national legislature to appoint and remove the highest 
political officials – in the Union, both the European Council and Council are 
beyond Parliament’s control. Also significant is the fact that Parliament is 
denied the most basic competence of a legislature, namely, the right to initiate 
legislation.713 This power is generally reserved to the Commission, although 
under Constitution Article III-332 the Parliament may “request” the 
Commission to submit particular legislative proposals, and the Commission 
must inform the Parliament of its reasons if it does not comply with the 
request.714 Article 192 of the EC Treaty also establishes the right of 
Parliament to request legislation, but without the requirement that the 
Commission justify its inaction if the request is not complied with. 
 
 While the Parliament’s lack of legislative initiative is often viewed as 
a weakness in the EU system, particularly as regards the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union’s legislative process, at least one commentator has 
seen a positive side to the matter. John Temple Lang has observed: 
 
 One advantage of the “Community method” has been greatly 
underestimated. Since only proposals made by the Commission can 
be considered by the Council and the Parliament, it is impossible for 
lobbyists to get Members of the European Parliament to propose 
                                                 
712 The Treaty of Rome created a Parliamentary Assembly with minimal supervisory 
powers over the Commission and a consultative role in legislation. Following a name 
change to European Parliament in 1962 and the first direct elections in 1979, the 
Parliament has gradually received greater supervisory, legislative and budgetary 
authority through subsequent treaties. The most significant step was the Maastricht 
Treaty’s grant of co-decision authority with the Council in specific areas of 
legislation.  Expansion of these areas, more supervision over the Commission through 
censure and Committees of Inquiry, and more involvement in the Union’s budgetary 
procedures have enhanced Parliament’s role as an important Union Institution. For a 
concise and useful analysis of the evolution of the Parliament, see Newman, supra 
note 42, at 174-83.  
713 Constitution art. III-332. 
714 Constitution art. I-26(2). In certain instances legislation may be initiated by a 
group of Member States, the European Parliament or other EU bodies. Constitution 
art. I-34(3). 
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legislation. The “Community method” is a tremendous constraint on 
excessive legislation, and a valuable limitation on the powers of big 
business and vested interests. One has only to look at the United 
States to see how easily lobbyists can get Senators and Congressmen, 
anxious for re-election, to propose Bills on every conceivable subject. 
If the power of the Commission to influence policy is sometimes 
resented, its value as a safeguard against pressure groups should also 
be welcomed.715 
 
Interestingly, although the Constitution does not offer a general legislative 
initiative to the European Parliament, Article I-47(4) creates an initiative 
procedure for EU citizens outside the normal institutional scheme. Carrying 
forward the Lang sentiments, this is arguably even worse than creating a 
parliamentary competence, and commentators have complained that this is a 
could “hijack” the Union’s normal legislative processes.716 
 
1.2  Elements of Member State control over the European Parliament 
 
 Under Article III-330(1) of the Constitution, the system for electing 
the Parliament is subject to both a unanimous vote of the Council and separate 
ratification by the Member State governments. In addition, the Council must 
vote unanimously on any rules relating to taxation of Parliament’s members 
or former members.717 And while Constitution Article I-20(2) sets a 
maximum size of the European Parliament and minimum and maximum 
numbers of representatives per Member State, the actual composition of the 
Parliament will be subject to a unanimous vote of the European Council. The 
Constitution’s provisions are reflective of the EC Treaty, whose Article 
190(4) requires a unanimous vote of the Council (not the European Council) 
and Member State “adoption” to approve the procedures for electing the 
European Parliament. Under Article 190(5), any rules relating to taxation of 
Parliament’s members or former members also need unanimous approval by 
the Council. The primary difference between the EC Treaty and the 
Constitution is that Article 190(2) specifies the actual allocation of 
parliamentary seats to the Member States, while Constitution Article I-20(2) 
mandates that the Parliament’s composition be determined by a unanimous 
vote of the European Council. In both documents unanimity is required – to 
amend the allocations in the EC Treaty (via a treaty amendment) and to assign 
seats under the Constitution. 
                                                 
715 John Temple Lang, The Commission:  The Key to the Constitutional Treaty for 
Europe, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1598, 1601 (2003). 
716 See part 3.1 of Chapter 9. 
717 Constitution art. III-330(2). 
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In many ways the Parliament may determine the procedures for its 
own operation.718 However, in those instances identified above where the 
Council or European Council must decide unanimously on the composition of 
the European Parliament or the rules relating to its election or the taxation of 
its members, each of the Member States has the ability to block a decision or 
use the threat of a veto to influence the details of the decision. This is true of 
decisions made under the EC Treaty or under the Constitution. 
 
The Parliament’s inability to remove the European Council and 
Council carries with it two implications. First, it demonstrates the absence of 
a complete system of institutional checks and balances at the EU level. 
Second, it reflects a significant power residing in the Member States – 
representatives on the two Councils are ministerial level officials of the 
national governments, and as such they are answerable to their national 
parliaments. On the other hand, the limits of Parliament’s legislative power do 
not correlate to any broad reservation of authority in the Member States, 
because the power to initiate EU legislation is generally in the hands of the 
Commission.719 
 
2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
 
2.1  The European Council as the EU’s highest authority 
 
 The Constitution for the first time includes the European Council 
among the Union’s institutions. Article I-19(1) identifies it as part of the EU’s 
“institutional framework.” Article I-21 provides basic information, while 
Article I-22 focuses on the European Council’s President. Article III-341 
provides additional information about the group’s functions. The Constitution 
calls on the European Council to meet quarterly720 to set the “general political 
directions and priorities” of the Union,721 and the institution is mentioned 
more than 100 times in the document, in many instances with respect to 
taking decisions on policy matters. However, actual legislating is reserved to 
                                                 
718 Both Constitution Article III-330(5) and EC Treaty Article 190(5) permit the 
Parliament, after consulting with the Commission and obtaining QMV approval of the 
Council, to determine the “general conditions governing the performance of the duties 
of its Members.” 
719 See Constitution art I-34(3) (regarding instances in which legislation may be 
initiated by other EU institutions or by Member States). 
720 Constitution art. I-21(3). 
721 Constitution art. I-21(1).  
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the Council and the European Parliament,722 because Article I-21(1) mandates 
that the European Council “shall not exercise legislative functions.” Where 
decisions are taken, presumably outside the realm of actual legislation, the 
normal voting requirement is consensus.723 
 
 As set forth in Constitution Article I-21(2), the European Council is 
composed of the heads of state or government of each of the Member States, a 
President, and the President of the Commission; however, Article I-25(5) 
states that the latter two are not entitled to vote. The President of the European 
Council, described in detail in Article I-22,724 is a new position created by the 
Constitution to replace the half-yearly rotating presidency under the 
Treaties.725 The President will serve a two and one-half year term, renewable 
once,726 and may not hold a national mandate during his or her term.727  In 
addition to chairing the European Council, the President will provide cohesive 
external representation for the European Union728 along with another newly 
created official, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is described in 
Constitution Article I-28. 
 
 The position of the European Council in the Treaties is less clear than 
in the Constitution. From the earliest days of the Community the heads of 
state met from time to time, and formal recognition of this process eventually 
followed. The first textual mention of the body was included in the Single 
                                                 
722 Constitution art. I-23(1).  
723 Constitution art. I-21(4). The Constitution provides in specific instances for 
European Council decisions to be taken by less than unanimity. For situations calling 
for a qualified majority vote, see Constitution art. I-22(1) (election of the European 
Council President), I-24(4) (establishing the list of Council configurations), I-24(7) 
(rotation of presidencies of Council configurations), I-27(1) (selection of the 
Commission President), I-27(2) (final approval of the Commission), I-28(1) 
(appointment or removal of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs), III-382(2) 
(appointment of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank). Abstentions by 
a member of the European Council will not prevent unanimous decisions from being 
taken. Constitution art. III-341(1). The European Council may adopt its own 
procedural rules by simple majority vote. Constitution art. III-341(3). It may also 
decide by simple majority whether to examine proposed amendments to the 
Constitution and whether to convene a new constitutional convention. Constitution 
art. IV-443(2). 
724 The conditions of employment of the President are to be determined by a European 
regulation adopted by the Council. Constitution art. III-400(1)(a). 
725 EC Treaty art. 203. 
726 Constitution art. I-22(1). 
727 Constitution art. I-22(3). 
728 Constitution art. I-22(2). 
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European Act in 1986.729 Compared to the many references to this body in the 
Constitution, it is cited just eight times in the EC Treaty730 and eight times in 
the Treaty on European Union.731 Interestingly, it is not identified in Article 7 
of the EC Treaty in the list of Community institutions, nor in the articles that 
extensively describe the institutions in Part Five of the treaty. The most 
prominent treaty reference may be found in TEU Article 4, which corresponds 
to Article I-21 of the Constitution. Article 4 mandates the European Council 
to “provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and 
shall define the general political guidelines thereof.” The same provision 
defines the group as consisting of the heads of state or government of the 
Member States, assisted by the foreign affairs ministers of the states and a 
Commission member. The European Council is to meet at least twice a year 
under the chairmanship of the head of state or government of the state that 
holds the Council’s rotating presidency.732 The European Council must report 
to the European Parliament annually and after each of its meetings.733 
 
 The remaining references to the European Council in the TEU relate 
to the EU’s Second and Third Pillar. Article 13 requires the group to define 
principles, guidelines and common strategies in the Second Pillar, the 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP).734 Article 17 assigns the 
European Council the task agreeing on a “common defence” should it so 
desire. The only reference to voting on the European Council is found in TEU 
Article 23 which requires the Council to act unanimously in decisions with 
respect to the CFSP, but also permits the Council to refer decisions to the 
European Council “for decision by unanimity.” The final mention of the 
European Council in the TEU is in the Third Pillar section, relating to police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.735 TEU Article 40a calls for a 
Council decision on programmes of enhanced cooperation within the Third 
Pillar, but permits any member of the Council to have the matter referred to 
the European Council, presumably for consultation only, because the article 
notes that the Council will nevertheless be responsible to act on the 
proposal.736 
 
                                                 
729 Single European Act, supra note 118. 
730 See EC Treaty arts. 11, 99, 113, 128. 
731 See TEU arts. 4, 13, 17, 23, 40a. 
732 TEU art. 4. See also EC Treaty art. 203 (describing the rotating Council 
presidency). 
733 TEU art. 4. 
734 See TEU arts. 11-28 (provisions on the CFSP). 
735 See TEU arts. 29-42 (provisions on the Third Pillar). 
736 See also TEU arts. 43-45 (provisions on implementing enhanced cooperation). 
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 Since there is no mention of the European Council in the extensive 
institutional section comprising Part Five of the EC Treaty,737 the treaty’s few 
references seem almost random. Article 11(2) mentions the possibility of a 
reference from the Council to the European Council in cases of proposed 
enhanced cooperation, on the same terms as in TEU Article 40a. In the matter 
of economic and monetary union, EC Treaty Article 99 calls for the European 
Council to receive reports from the Council and then “discuss a conclusion on 
the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the 
Community.” Similarly, Article 113 entitles the European Council to receive 
annual reports from the European Central Bank. In the matter of employment 
in the Community, EC Treaty Article 128 calls for the European Council to 
receive reports from the Council and Commission,738 and the European 
Council is expected to “adopt conclusions” on the employment situation.739 
 
 By virtue of the stature of its voting members, the European Council 
under the Constitution would have maintained and might even have expanded 
its role in representing the supreme executive and legislative authority within 
the European Union.740 It is noteworthy that in the Constitution the European 
Council is formally recognised as an EU institution for the first time, and its 
functions and responsibilities are spelled out more concretely than in the 
Treaties. The Constitution describes many instances in which the European 
Council will make policy decisions, and even if it must refrain from 
legislating in the technical sense, this institution certainly possesses the 
political power to instruct the Council on legislative matters. The 
Constitution’s statement that the European Council sets policy but does not 
legislate is an apparent attempt to reduce confusion as to the differences 
between the competences of the Council of Ministers and those of the 
European Council. Another important clarification is the Constitution’s 
specification that decisions on the European Council are normally to be taken 
by consensus.  
 
Among the changes proposed for the European Council, it is the new 
office of the President that represents the most significant development, and it 
offers new evidence of the state-like nature of the Union. No longer would the 
                                                 
737 EC Treaty arts. 189-280. 
738 EC Treaty art. 128(4). 
739 EC Treaty art. 128(1). 
740 For a review of the increasing importance of the European Council, see Jan Werts, 
The Unstoppable Advance of the European Council, in The EU Constitution: The 
Best Way Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, 
eds., 2005). 
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President be the elected leader of a Member State government, and no longer 
would the President’s term of office be based upon the six-month rotating 
Council presidency. Under the Constitution the President could not hold a 
national mandate and would serve a two and one-half year term, renewable 
once. The elimination of the national mandate coincides with the 
Constitution’s job description for the new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
The Minister, who would chair the Council’s foreign affairs formation, would 
not be the foreign affairs minister from the Member State holding the 
Council’s rotating presidency, but would be separately appointed by the 
European Council.741 
 
 Internally and externally the new European Council President would 
offer a more recognisable and consistent leadership presence than is offered 
by the Treaties’ rotating presidency. However, this office has the potential to 
usurp the position of the Commission President (and even the Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs) as the day-to-day face of the Union. Would this 
necessarily be a positive development? Jürgen Schwarze is sceptical: 
 
First, how much weight will the word of the President of the 
[European] Council have, and what will his position be among the 
Member States’ Heads of State or Government? Second, who will be 
willing to accept this position, if the President of the [European] 
Council cannot occupy a position in the Member States 
simultaneously? Besides these issues, there may be some tension 
between the President of the [European] Council and the President of 
the Commission, but also between the President of the [European] 
Council and the – also new – Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. This 
possibility arises especially with regard to the Union’s foreign and 
security policy.742 
 
In the same vein, Michael Dougan warns that the European Council President, 
especially if he or she is supported by a permanent professional staff, “could 
create a competing centre of executive power which might undermine the 
influence of the Commission, or at least create inefficiencies by setting the 
two institutions against each other.”743 Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Ruth 
suggest that the new President should “avoid conflicts by exercising his/her 
duties in the spirit of the political compromise that led to the creation of the 
post and by meticulously respecting the division of responsibilities within the 
                                                 
741 Constitution art. I-28. 
742 Jürgen Schwarze, The Convention’s Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, 40 C.M.L.R. 1037, 1039 (2003). 
743 Dougan, supra note 358, at 775. 
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institutional system without encroaching on the role of the Commission’s 
President, the Foreign Minister or even the Council.”744 
 
2.2  Members of the European Council represent the Governments of 
      the Member States 
 
 There are few textual references in the Constitution that connect the 
European Council to the Member States, but few are really needed. 
Constitution Article I-20 states the obvious, namely, that the members of the 
European Council are the heads of state or government of the Member States 
(assisted by a redefined President, the Commission President and the new 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs). Because the voting representatives on the 
European Council are chief officials of their nations, each member of this 
body will be expected to promote and protect the interests of his or her 
nation.745 This is in stark contrast to other EU institutions such as the 
Commission, Court of Justice and European Central Bank, whose members 
have always been required to act independently and without regard to any 
national consideration.746 It is fair to say that when the European Council 
meets, it looks less like an EU institution than like an international summit 
meeting. Reinforcing the dominating presence of the Member States on the 
European Council is the fact that the default voting rule for decisions of this 
group is consensus, thus ensuring that the government of each Member State 
must be in accord with any steps taken to set broad policies for the Union.747 
 
 The qualities described above are also a legitimate way to 
characterise the European Council its current embodiment under the Treaties. 
In fact, the European Council today looks even less like an EU institution than 
an intergovernmental gathering. The Constitution’s new institutional 
references might be seen as a helpful emphasis on this body’s function as an 
EU organ, but the fact that all its decisions must be taken by consensus acts as 
a constant reminder of the power of each Member State. Despite the 
Constitution’s changes, the European Council would remain a voice for the 
                                                 
744 Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1338. 
745 Interestingly, the Constitution mentions that members of the Council are to be 
ministerial level officials of each Member State who “may commit the government of 
the Member State in question and cast its vote.” Constitution art. I-24(2) (emphasis 
supplied). These words are not used in reference to the European Council, but each of 
its members, as a head of state or government, is to an even greater degree expected 
by his or her constituents to represent the interests of the state and cast votes on behalf 
of the state’s elected government. 
746 Constitution arts. I-26(7), I-29(2), I-30(3). 
747 Constitution art. I-21(4).  
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governments of the Member States in the most critical areas of EU policy and 
development. The elected government of each state would be in accord with 
each broad policy decision. Failing that, the European Council would be 
unable to act.   
 
3. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
 
3.1  A legislature and executive 
 
 The Council of Ministers (Council) is introduced in Articles I-23 to I-
25 of the Constitution and further elaborated in Articles III-342 to III-346. 
Article I-23(1) provides that the Council serves as a legislative chamber of the 
EU, and it must enact legislation jointly with the European Parliament.748 It 
also serves as the Union’s executive body, to exercise the budgetary function 
and “carry out policy-making and coordinating functions.”749 Although the 
Council may not itself initiate legislation, Article III-345 permits it to request 
the Commission to do so, and the Commission must either comply or explain 
its inaction. Articles III-395 to III-415 describe the Council’s pivotal role in 
passing EU legislation and in approving the Union budget. 
 
 According to Constitution Article I-24(1), the Council must meet in 
various “configurations,” depending on the subject under consideration, and 
in each configuration it is composed of one ministerial level representative 
from each Member State.750 As provided in a Draft Decision of the European 
Council, the presidencies of all Council configurations other than Foreign 
Affairs are to be shared by groups of three States, serving collectively for 18 
months, which each state holding the all of the presidencies for six months 
during the 18-month term.751 The groups are to be assigned on the basis of 
“equal rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity 
and geographical balance within the Union.”752  
                                                 
748 Further details on the Council are presented in Part III of the Constitution. 
Constitution arts. III-342 to III-346. 
749 Constitution art. I-23(1).  
750 Constitution art. I-23(2). The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is an additional 
member of the Council, and he or she will chair the Foreign Affairs configuration. 
Constitution art. I-28(3). Another example of a configuration is General Affairs, 
which is mandated in Article I-24(2) to “prepare and ensure follow-up to meetings of 
the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the 
Commission.” 
751 Draft Decision, supra note 164.  See Constitution art. I-24(6), which mandates the 
European Council’s decision.  
752 Draft Decision, supra note 164, art. 1. 
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 Article I-24(6) requires the Council to meet in public “when it 
deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act,” although not when dealing 
with non-legislative activities. Article III-343(1) permits a Council member to 
accept a proxy from one other member. Article III-344 provides that the 
Council is to be assisted by a full time administrative staff, including a 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and a General 
Secretariat.753  
 
 The ordinary decisional requirement for the Council, set forth in 
Constitution Article I-23(3), is that it will act on the basis of a qualified 
majority vote (QMV). The original voting scheme proposed for the 
Constitution by the Convention was that a qualified majority would consist of 
a majority of the Member States representing three-fifths of the EU’s 
population, but this formula was rejected at the IGC meetings that took place 
in December, 2003, and approval of the Constitution was postponed. 754  The 
chief problem was that Spain and Poland wished to protect the favorable 
weighting of their Council votes as assigned to them in the Treaty of Nice, 
and the proposed QMV percentage formulas negated the special advantage 
they had come to expect.755 The Irish Presidency invested a great deal of 
energy in solving the problem, and the result was a revised voting scheme that 
somewhat increased the percentages necessary to achieve a qualified majority, 
to 55 percent of the Member States and 65 percent of the EU population.756 
According to a protocol to the Constitution, this formula would take effect in 
2009.757 (Under the Reform Treaty this would officially be deferred until 
2014, although special requests by any member of the Council could 
effectively postpone application of the formula until 2017.758) 
 
 The Council is mentioned throughout the TEU with respect to its 
involvement in a variety of Union programmes and processes. The only TEU 
                                                 
753 For a detailed analysis of COREPER, see Jaap W. de Zwaan, The Permanent 
Representatives Committee: Its role in the decision-making of the European Union 
(T.M.C. Asser Institute – The Hague, Elsevier - North Holland 1995). 
754 Fuller, supra note 108. 
755 Id. For an extensive historical review of QMV formulas and an assessment of the 
positions of Spain and Poland under the Nice Treaty, see Edward Best, What is Really 
at Stake in the Debate over Votes? 2004/1 Eipascope 14, available at http:// 
www.eipa.nl/cms/repository/eipascope/Art_2(2).pdf.   
756 Constitution art. I-25(1). 
757 Protocol on the transitional provisions relating to the institutions and bodies of the 
Union, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 382, art. 2(1). 
758 Draft IGC Mandate, supra note 20, at 18, art. 13. 
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provisions of a structural nature are Article 3, which refers to a “single 
institutional framework” for the Union, and Article 5, which lists the five 
primary Union institutions, including the Parliament, Council, Commission, 
Court of Justice and Court of Auditors. 
 
 As in the TEU, the EC Treaty refers to the Council numerous times 
with regard to Union programmes and processes, but the present focus is on 
sections that describe the Council’s structure and general competences, and 
the EC Treaty contains these important details. To begin, Article 7 of the EC 
Treaty lists the same five institutions and refers to the two advisory 
committees of the Community.759 Thereafter, Articles 202 to 210 add to the 
detail regarding the Council. Article 202 describes the Council as having the 
power to “ensure coordination” of Member State economic policies, “take 
decisions,” confer implementation powers on the Commission and “exercise 
directly implementing powers itself.”  
 
Interestingly, the wording of EC Treaty Article 202 about the 
Council’s right to “directly exercise implementing powers itself” – a phrase 
that helps define the Council as an executive as well as a legislative body – 
was not carried over into the Constitution’s institutional sections. Article I-
23(1) of the Constitution merely states that the Council “shall carry out 
policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Constitution.” 
However, where the Constitution generally addresses “the exercise of Union 
competence,” Article I-37 provides:  
 
Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union 
acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the 
Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases 
provided for in Article I-40 [the common foreign and security policy], 
on the Council.” 
 
A further indication that the Council would retain the right of direct 
implementation may be found in the Comitology Decision of 1999. It 
describes the various ways in which the Commission’s implementing powers 
are to be carried out, and it explicitly refers to the Council’s right in new 
legislation to reserve implementation for itself.760 This Decision would have 
remained in effect under the Constitution as part of the acquis of the Union. 
                                                 
759 The advisory committees are the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 
760 Council Decision of 28 June 1999 (1999/486/EC) laying down the procedures for 
the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, July 7, 1999, O.J. 
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 EC Treaty Article 203 describes representation on the Council and the 
system of rotating Presidencies, while Article 204 sets the terms for 
convening of Council meetings. Article 207 describes the offices that assist 
the Council, namely, COREPER and the General Secretariat. Article 208 
allows the Council to request the Commission to initiate legislation, although 
without the Constitution’s requirement that the Commission must give 
reasons if it declines.761 Article 209 permits the Council to set rules for the 
Community’s advisory committees. Last, Article 210 grants the Council the 
authority to set salaries and benefits for members of the Commission, Court of 
Justice and Court of First Instance. 
 
 The critical matter of voting on the Council is covered in EC Treaty 
Article 205, which has several parts. First, Article 205(1) provides for Council 
decisions to be taken by “a majority of its Members” unless the Treaty 
provides otherwise. Second, Article 205(2) lists the population-weighted 
votes assigned to each Member State in qualified majority voting situations, 
and provides that 62 votes are required in all cases in which a matter has been 
proposed by the Commission. Third, Article 205(2) also requires 62 votes, but 
from at least 10 Member States, “in other cases.” Finally, Article 205(3) 
provides that abstentions will not prevent a unanimous vote being taken, if 
such is required. Also in connection with voting, Article 206 notes that a 
Council member may accept a voting proxy from one other member. 
 
 EC Treaty Articles 249 to 254 describe in detail the creation of EU 
legislation and regulations, including the Council’s critical role in the various 
processes. Likewise Articles 268 to 280 describe budgeting and fiscal 
procedures for the Community, again highlighting the Council’s key 
participation in these processes.  
 
 The Constitution proposes several significant changes relating to the 
Council: The most controversial has been the Constitution’s new formula for 
qualified majority voting, which is a double calculation based on percentages 
of the Member States and percentages of their populations. This approach 
would have replaced the system under the Treaties that bases a qualified 
majority on a fixed number of votes allocated to each state. The treaty 
allocation of votes is population-based, but less fluid than the Constitution’s 
approach. The second development is the Constitution’s requirement for the 
Council to meet in public when legislating. Third is the fact that the new 
                                                                                                                    
(L 184) 23, art. 1. The 1999 Decision has been amended by the Council Decision of 
July 17, 2006 (2006/512/EC), O.J. (L 200) 11. 
761 Constitution art. III-345. 
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Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would preside over the Foreign Affairs 
Council formation in lieu of a national representative serving in rotation. He 
or she would also serve as foreign affairs vice-chair of the Commission.762 A 
fourth and less dramatic development is a change to the Council’s system of 
rotating presidencies. The semiannual hand-off of the Council Presidency is 
restructured somewhat from the EC Treaty. The treaty describes the 
Presidency as being “held in turn by each Member State,”763 while the 
Constitution states that for periods of 18 months the Presidency will shared by 
three Member States, with each of them holding the presidencies of each 
configuration during six months of that period. Beyond these structural and 
procedural changes, certain areas in which the Treaties require unanimous 
Council decisions are changed in the Constitution to a qualified majority vote. 
These matters are analysed in Chapter 15 of this treatise. 
 
 Qualified majority voting is, by definition, a majoritarian procedure 
that on one hand resembles the democratic process within a typical nation 
state and on the other hand undercuts the autonomy of the Member States in 
the European Union.764 Under the Constitution’s version of QMV no single 
Member State would have had the ability to block EU legislation. Likewise, 
because more 55 percent of the Member States would be represented in a 
prevailing vote under the Constitution’s QMV formula, no small group of the 
largest Member States would have been able to dictate decisions. However, 
because of the requirement that 65 per cent of the EU population be 
represented, a small group of the largest States would have been able to 
prevent a successful vote, although the Constitution requires at least four 
States to form a “blocking minority.”765 Giovanni Grevi has observed that the 
requirement of four States to form a blocking minority would “prevent 
                                                 
762 Juliane Kokott and Alexandra Ruth have commented that “this Foreign Minister, 
depending on the field, will continue to act according to different procedures. Only 
when exercising the responsibilities regarding current first pillar matters will he/she 
follow the regular Commission procedures. In contrast, within the ambit of CFSP, 
he/she will act ‘as mandated by the Council’. This is all the more problematic as the 
role the Commission enjoyed so far with regard to CFSP will be taken over by the 
Foreign Minister. Actual practice will prove whether the inherent dangers to this 
functional merger without a substantive harmonization will manifest themselves, or 
whether the aim of enhancing efficiency and overall coherence will be realized.” 
Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1327. 
763 EC Treaty art. 203. 
764 For a detailed analysis of QMV formulas and suggestions for alternative 
allocations of voting power, see Bela Plechanovová, Draft Constitution and the 
Decision-Making Rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU – Looking for an 
Alternative Solution (Eur. Integration Online Papers, Working Paper No. 12, 2004). 
765 Constitution art. I-25(1).   
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Germany, the UK, France or Italy from forming a blocking coalition of 
three.”766 Interestingly, a draft Council decision would have required that for a 
5-year period from 2009 to 2014 the Council would be required to reconsider 
any measure if requested by Member States with three-fourths of the 
population or three-fourths of the number of States necessary to form a 
blocking minority.767 This measure may be seen a means of temporarily 
limiting the dilution of the large states’ power as a result of the EU accessions 
in 2004 and 2007. 
 
 The Constitution requires the Council to meet in public when it 
“deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act,” but not when it considers 
“non-legislative activities.”768 It is interesting that no open-meeting 
requirement is imposed on the European Council, and the Constitution’s 
admonition that the European Council “shall not exercise legislative 
functions”769 appears to be designed in part to justify insulating its activities 
from public scrutiny. Nevertheless, by requiring the Council to conduct its 
legislative business in public, the Convention and the IGC offered a response 
to public demands for more EU transparency and to the Commission’s White 
Paper challenge to take concrete steps to boost public confidence in the 
                                                 
766 Grevi, supra note 402, at 8. For a detailed analysis of the various majority and 
blocking formulas possible under the Constitution and its predecessors, see Janis A. 
Emmanouilidis, Historically Unique, Unfinished in Detail – An Evaluation of the 
Constitution, Centre for Applied Policy Research, 2004/3 EU Reform 5-8, 12-13. For 
an earlier review of coalition-forming and negotiations that have led to QMV 
decisions on the Council, see Madeleine O. Hosli, Coalitions and Power: Effects of 
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union, 34 J. Common Mkt. 
Stud. 255 (1996). 
767 Draft Council Decision relating to the implementation of Article I-25 [previously 
Article I-24], Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 421, art. 1. The editors of the Common 
Market Law Review have described the “blocking clause” as follows: “Finally, in 
order to reach agreement, the Ioannina compromise was reintroduced. If three-
quarters of the States or of the population necessary to form a blocking minority so 
request, the adoption of the measure is suspended for a reasonable period in order to 
find a satisfactory solution. This suspension cannot result in the postponing of 
deadlines provided for in the Constitution (e.g. co-decision cases) or in other rules 
(provisions in the rules of procedure which allow a majority of States to call for a 
vote). The Ioannina compromise was rarely used in practice, so one can hope it will 
be the same in this case.” Editorial Comments, supra note 305, at 905.  
768 Constitution art. I-24(6). Note that in response to the difficulties in the process of 
ratifying the Constitution, the European Council in June 2006 chose to implement this 
reform on its own initiative (and under its general authority under the Treaties), rather 
than to wait for the Constitution to take effect. See note 8 supra and accompanying 
text. 
769 Constitution art. I-21(1). 
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Union. However the effectiveness of an open-meeting requirement is 
questionable. A Council desiring secrecy could easily declare a “non-
legislative” session and conduct its deliberations behind closed doors. Its 
members could also conduct extensive, but informal discussions in corridors 
or other venues away from the Council chamber. Such tactics would 
undermine the Constitution’s spirit of openness.  
 
 The change in the system of rotating the Council presidencies is 
arguably a modest change from the present form of cooperation, in which the 
current Presidency may informally receive assistance and coordination from 
the Member States representing the immediately preceding Presidency and the 
one to follow.770 Whether joint coordination and cooperation among the same 
three Member States for an 18-month period would result in more operating 
and policy consistency remains to be seen. It might be argued that the 
disruption caused by a complete replacement of the Presidency team every 
year and a half would be greater than that caused by informally adding and 
removing a cooperating member every six months. However, even under the 
Constitution’s proposed system it should be expected that out-going and 
incoming Presidencies would be available for consultation. Furthermore, 
under the Constitution the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would be in a 
position to provide continuity in the face of Council Presidency rotations,771 
and COREPER would remain fully active in providing ongoing bureaucratic 
support for the Council.  
 
3.2 The Council serves as an additional voice for the states 
 
 There is little question that members of the Council, like their 
counterparts on the European Council, are expected to represent the separate 
                                                 
770 In the area of the common foreign and security policy, the cooperative 
arrangement has been referred to as a “troika,” although Article 18(4) of the TEU 
says only that the current Council Presidency “shall be assisted in these tasks if need 
be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.”  
771 Jürgen Schwarze has commented: “Notwithstanding all the difficulties, the 
creation of the position of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is a sound decision. 
Yet, from an idealistic point of view, the improvements in the field of foreign and 
security policy remain unsatisfactory. With the principle of unanimity still in effect, 
the strength of Europe’s foreign policy will remain rather limited. Realistically, the 
claim for national sovereignty, especially in the field of foreign policy, seems difficult 
to overcome in the near future. The office of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the proposed solution of a ‘double hat’ both reflect the current situation with 
regard to the different positions on foreign policy existing in the Member States. At 
the moment, a greater extent of common policy in this field does not seem achievable. 
Schwarze, supra note 742, at 1040. 
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interests of the Member States. In fact, Article I-23(2) of the Constitution 
speaks of them as having the authority to “commit the government of the 
Member State in question and cast its vote.” Also, as suggested in the 
previous section, the influence of each state is to some extent protected by the 
“equal rotation” language of Article I-24(7): “The Presidency of Council 
configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs [which is chaired by the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs], shall be held by Member State 
representatives in the Council on the basis of equal rotation,” with the system 
of rotation to be determined by a qualified majority decision of the European 
Council.  
 
 The primary changes relating to the Council, as described in the 
preceding section (the new QMV formula, the open-meeting requirement, the 
new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the new Presidency rotation 
scheme) would not appreciably affect the influence of the Member States 
within the Council. The change in QMV formulas might impact the individual 
influence of Spain and Poland, but in general the Constitution’s new approach 
preserves the existing majoritarian approach to Council action. It is uncertain 
whether the requirement for open meetings would cause Council members to 
act in a more collegial, EU-focused manner than they might have in private. 
Except in foreign affairs, the new system of Presidency rotation would not 
likely have dramatic impact. Overall, the Member States would not gain or 
lose essential power as a result of the Constitution’s structural changes to the 
Council. The impact of any movement from unanimous Council voting to 
QMV in matters of substance will be addressed in Chapter 15. 
 
4.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
4.1 The central and essential Union institution 
 
 The Commission acts as the permanent executive and chief 
administrative body of the European Union. It is described in Part I of the 
Constitution in Articles I-26 to I-28,772 with more detail provided in Part III, 
Articles III-347 to III-352.773 Article I-26(1) broadly describes the 
                                                 
772 Article I-26 is the basic description of the Commission, with Articles I-27 and I-28 
respectively describing the Commission President and the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, who is a vice-president of the Commission. The conditions of employment of 
the Commission President, the Minister and the Commissioners are to be determined 
by a European regulation adopted by the Council. Constitution art. III-400(1)(a). 
773 The conditions of employment of the Commission President and the 
Commissioners are to be determined by a European regulation adopted by the 
Council. Constitution art. III-400(1)(b). 
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Commission’s responsibilities as (1) carrying out “coordinating, executive 
and management functions,” (2) acting as the promoter of “the general 
interest of the Union,” and (3) preserving the EU by ensuring “the application 
of the Constitution, and measures adopted by institutions pursuant to the 
Constitution.” Article I-26(1) appoints the Commission as manager of the EU 
budget and programmes, and it further assigns it the task of enforcing EU law 
by overseeing “the application of Union law under the control of the Court of 
Justice.”  Article III-360 provides that its enforcement responsibilities extend 
even to the Member States. 
 
 The Commission has the primary role in proposing new EU 
legislation, and Article I-26(2) states that “Union legislative acts may be 
adopted only on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the 
Constitution provides otherwise.” Article I-34(3) expands on the exceptions 
by referring to instances in which EU legislation may be adopted “at the 
initiative of a group of Member States or of the European Parliament, on a 
recommendation from the European Central Bank or at the request of the 
Court of Justice or the European Investment Bank.” Examples of the 
exceptions are given in the conclusion of this discussion. The Commission’s 
power to initiate legislation is bolstered by Article III-395(1), which states 
that except in specified cases the Council may amend a Commission proposal 
only by acting unanimously, and by Article III-395(2), which permits the 
Commission to amend proposed legislation at any time prior to its adoption.774 
Furthermore, under Article III-396(9) if the Commission delivers a “negative 
opinion” on an amendment proposed by the European Parliament, a 
unanimous vote of the Council is required to approve such an amendment.775  
 
Article I-26(7) requires the Commission to be independent at all 
times, and its members may not “seek nor take instructions from any 
government or other institution, body, office or agency.” Member States are 
required to respect the Commissioners’ independence and “not seek to 
influence them in the performance of their tasks.”776 The Commission is, 
however, answerable to the European Parliament, which may censure the 
Commission and force its resignation.777  
 
 The Constitution provides for eventual and certain reduction in the 
size of the Commission. According to Article I-26(6), after the first full 
                                                 
774 As noted below, these constitutional provisions have their antecedents in EC 
Treaty Article 250(1) and (2). 
775 The treaty counterpart to Article III-396(9) is EC Treaty Article 251(3). 
776 Constitution art. III-347. 
777 Constitution art. I-26(8). 
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Commission term after the effective date of the Constitution the Commission 
will have a composition equal to two-thirds of the number of Member States, 
including its President and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs – each of 
whom (except for the Union Minister) will serve a five-year term.778 A 
unanimous vote of the European Council will be required to change the size 
of the Commission and also to determine its rotation, but representation is to 
be assigned with demographic and geographical diversity in mind and on the 
basis of a strictly enforced “equal rotation between the Member States.”779 As 
described below, the EC Treaty generally provides for one Commissioner per 
Member State, with the prospect of an unspecified reduction in number of 
members when the EU has 27 Member States.780 
 
 In keeping with the Commission’s status as a central organ of the EU, 
members of the Commission, its President and the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs are appointed by other EU institutions. Under Constitution Article I-
27(1) the President is nominated by a qualified majority vote of the European 
Council and elected by the European Parliament. Under Article I-28(1) the 
European Council, with the consent of the President-elect, also “appoints” the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs by qualified majority vote. After election 
of the President-elect, Article I-27(2) provides that each of the Member States 
to be represented on the Commission then “suggests” its candidate to the 
Council and President-elect, who by common accord then adopt the list of 
candidates. The entire slate of President, Foreign Affairs Minister and 
Commissioners is then submitted for approval by the Parliament and is 
thereafter appointed by a QMV decision of the European Council.781  
 
 Once the Commission is approved, Constitution Articles I-27(3) and 
III-350 empower the President to determine its internal organisation, while the 
Commission adopts its own rules of procedure.782 Commission decisions are 
taken by majority vote.783 
 
                                                 
778 Constitution art. I-26(3), A Commissioner must resign if so requested by the 
Commission President, or upon the order of the Court of Justice. Constitution arts. I-
27(3), III-349. A replacement of the same nationality will be selected in the same 
fashion as the original appointment. Constitution art. III-348(2). The Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs will serve at the pleasure of the European Council. Constitution 
art. I-28(1). 
779 Constitution art. I-26(6). 
780 EC Treaty art. 213. 
781 Constitution art. I-27(2). 
782, Constitution art. III-352. 
783 Constitution art. III-351. 
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 In the Treaties the Commission is identified in Article 5 of the TEU 
and in Article 7(1) of the EC Treaty as one of the primary EU institutions. 
The institutional detail is found in EC Treaty Articles 211 to 219. The 
Commission’s general mandate in Article 7 is similar to that in Constitution 
Article I-26, although the treaty mentions “the proper functioning and 
development of the common market,”784 rather than the “general interest of 
the Union.”785 EC Treaty Article 7 makes the Commission the guardian of the 
treaty by calling on it to “ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied.” Article 211 
adds that the Commission must “exercise the powers conferred on it by the 
Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.”  
 
 The EC Treaty does not state that the Commission alone may initiate 
legislation. However, Article 211 mandates the Commission to “participate in 
the shaping of measures taken by the Council and the European Parliament,” 
and the two primary forms of legislative procedure, co-decision under Article 
251 and cooperation under Article 252, are initiated only upon the 
Commission’s submission of a proposal.786 The Commission’s right of 
initiative is further strengthened by Article 250, which requires a unanimous 
vote of the Council of Ministers to amend a Commission proposal787 and 
which permits the Council to amend proposed legislation “at any time during 
the procedures leading to the adoption of a Community act.”788 In addition, 
Article 251(3) requires a unanimous Council vote to approve a Parliament-
proposed legislative amendment, if the Commission has delivered a “negative 
opinion” on the amendment. 
 
 Article 274 calls on the Commission to “implement the budget,” and 
the Commission has a prominent role throughout the entire budgeting process 
under the treaty.789 Regarding enforcement powers, Article 226 permits the 
Commission to take steps against a Member State that has “failed to fulfil an 
obligation” under the treaty. 
 
 EC Treaty Article 213(2) requires the Commission to be independent 
at all times, and its members may not “seek nor take instructions from any 
government or other body.” Member States are required to respect the 
Commissioners’ independence and “not seek to influence the Members of the 
                                                 
784 EC Treaty art. 211. 
785 Constitution art. I-26(1). 
786 EC Treaty arts. 251(2), 252(a). 
787 EC Treaty art. 250(1). 
788 EC Treaty art. 250(2). 
789 EC Treaty arts. 268 to 280. 
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Commission in the performance of their tasks.”  The Commission is, however, 
answerable under Article 201 to the European Parliament, which may censure 
the Commission and force its resignation. 
 
 Under Article 213(1) of the EC Treaty, the 15-member Union 
appoints a 20-member Commission, with two Commissioners for each of the 
five largest Member States, but with the number of Commissioners changing 
to one per Member State after the 2004 enlargement to 25 Member States.790 
Pursuant to the Protocol on Enlargement, upon expansion of the EU to 27 
states (which occurred in January of 2007) the Commission should be reduced 
to less than one Commissioner per Member State, with the actual number to 
be set by a unanimous Council vote, and with the rotation to be unanimously 
agreed, subject to the “principle of equality.”791 As of the writing of this 
treatise, the reduction has not yet been achieved, and the Commission had 
expanded to 27 members. 
 
 EC Treaty Article 214(2) provides that the Commission President is 
nominated by the Council, meeting in the composition of heads of state or 
government, and then approved by the European Parliament. The Council and 
President-nominee by “common accord” then “adopt the list” of 
Commissioners on the basis of candidates proposed by the Member States. 
The Parliament must then approve the slate, after which the Council 
“appoints” the Commission. The term is five years.792 Once the Commission 
is approved, EC Treaty Article 217 empowers the President to determine its 
internal organisation, while the Commission adopts its own rules of 
procedure.793 Commission decisions are taken by majority vote.794 
 
 Overall, the following developments in the Constitution with respect 
to the Commission are noteworthy:  
 
--The Commission’s eventual reduction in size has been 
controversial, even though the EC Treaty already contemplates some 
measure of reduction after the EU reaches 27 Member States. The 
paring down under the Constitution will undoubtedly increase the 
                                                 
790 Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 376, art. 4(1). 
791 Id. at art. 4(2), (3).  
792 EC Treaty art. 214(1). A Commissioner must resign if so requested by the 
Commission President, or upon the order of the Court of Justice. EC Treaty arts. 
217(4), 216. A replacement will be selected by the Council. EC Treaty art. 215. 
793 EC Treaty art. 218. 
794 EC Treaty art. 219. 
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Commission’s operating efficiency, but its political outreach within 
the “unrepresented” Member States may be undermined.  
 
--The new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would both preside 
over the Foreign Affairs formation of the Council and serve as a vice-
president of the Commission.795 This would undoubtedly create 
confusion from time to time as to which hat the Minister is wearing at 
any given moment, and to whom he or she is answerable.  
 
--The Constitution transfers from the Council to the European 
Council the unanimous decisions as to the Commission’s eventual 
size and its system of rotation. Fortunately, this seems unlikely to 
cause any procedural difficulties or political challenges.  
 
--In the matter of legislative initiative, the Constitution both adds and 
detracts. In the area of freedom, security and justice, Article III-264 
of the Constitution identifies matters on which one-fourth of the 
Member States may initiate legislation. The counterpart provisions in 
Articles 34(2) and 42 of the TEU permit a single state to initiate the 
legislative process.796 Arguably, this change would reduce Member 
State authority and correspondingly strengthen the Commission. On 
the other hand, the unprecedented right of citizen initiative under 
Article I-47(4) of the Constitution would serve as a potential 
challenge to the Commission’s legislative competence.  
 
Despite these changes, under the Constitution the Commission and its basic 
competences are essentially carried over from the Treaties.797 Through its 
independence and its means of functioning the Commission remains the 
embodiment of the “Community method” – a distinct contrast with the 
                                                 
795 Constitution art. I-28(3), (4). 
796 Under Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty, during a 5-year transitional period 
expiring on May 1, 2004, a single Member State was permitted to initiate legislation 
on matters of visas, asylum, immigration and other related policies. EC Treaty art. 
67(1). 
797 For a review of the development of the Commission, see Michel Petite and 
Clemens Ladenburger, The Evolution in the Role and Powers of the European 
Commission, in The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, 
Alfred E. Kellermann & Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
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intergovernmental approach that prevails in the Council and European 
Council.798  
 
4.2 The Member States have limited influence over the Commission 
 
 In general, both the Constitution and the Treaties create institutional 
separation between the Member States and the Commission. Under the 
Constitution the only Commission-related matters subject to a national veto 
are (1) the requirement of a unanimous European Council decision to change 
the size of the Commission after it has been reduced in size commencing in 
2014,799 (2) the consensus voting requirement for the European Council to 
determine the Commission’s rotation after 2014,800 (3) the need for a 
unanimous Council decision not to fill a vacant Commission seat,801 and (4) 
the requirement of a unanimous Council decision to amend or approve 
amendments to certain legislative proposals from the Commission.802 
Furthermore, each Member State possesses the exclusive right to name its 
candidate for a seat on the Commission.803   
 
 The Constitution’s provisions generally mirror those of the EC 
Treaty. The Treaty’s Protocol on Enlargement contains the requirement of a 
unanimous Council decision to determine the size of the Commission after the 
EU reaches 27 Member States, as well as the consensus voting requirement 
for the Council to determine the Commission’s rotation after the Commission 
has been reduced in size.804 The Constitution maintains the consensus 
requirement, although it moves the decision from the Council to the European 
Council. EC Treaty Article 215 contains the requirement for a unanimous 
Council decision not to fill a vacant Commission seat, while Articles 250(1) 
and 251(3) express the requirement of a unanimous Council decision to 
amend or approve amendments to certain legislative proposals from the 
Commission. Last, Article 214(2) creates each Member State’s exclusive right 
to name its candidate for a seat on the Commission.   
 
                                                 
798 For a comparison of the Community method with alternative means for managing 
the European Union, along with an analysis of the value of the Commission to the 
ongoing success of the EU project, see Lang, supra note 715. 
799 Constitution art. I-26(6). 
800 Constitution art.  I-26(6).  
801 Constitution art. III-348(2). 
802 Constitution art. III-395(1), III-396(9). Treaty counterparts are EC Treaty Articles 
250(1) and 251(3). 
803 Constitution art. I-27(2). 
804 Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 376, art. 4(3). 
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 The prospect of reducing the size of the Commission raised 
concerns,805 with many of the smaller Member States protesting that they need 
to be represented on the Commission at all times to maintain a better link 
between their people and the operations of the EU. Although the Commission 
must act completely independent of Member State influence, a seat on the 
Commission carries with it an emotional appeal and a special means of 
communicating developments in Brussels back to the “represented” Member 
State. Thus, the eventual temporary loss of representation may represent a 
further separation of this EU institution from the states and their citizens. 
 
5. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
5.1 Expanded jurisdiction for the Court 
 
 The European Court of Justice is identified as an EU institution in 
Article I-19(1) of the Constitution and is generally introduced in Article I-29. 
The Court and its institutional system, jurisdiction and activities are further 
described in Part III, Articles III-353 to III-381.806 The Court is granted 
certain power over the Member States, in that Articles III-360 and III-361 
permit it to hear cases brought against a Member State respectively by the 
Commission or another Member State where the ground for action is that the 
accused State “has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Constitution.” 
Article III-362 permits the court to issue judgments requiring the defendant 
State to comply with a Court decision, or, failing that, to pay a “lump sum or 
penalty payment.”807 
 
 In the TEU the Court is listed among the primary EU institutions in 
Article 5, and the treaty also contains numerous references to the scope and 
limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction.808 However, the primary institutional 
descriptions are found in the EC Treaty. Article 7 of the EC Treaty lists the 
Court among the primary EU institutions, and Articles 220 to 245 provide 
much more detail. Under the EC Treaty the Court is granted the authority to 
hear cases brought against a Member State by the Commission, under Article 
226, or by another Member State, under Article 227, where the ground for 
                                                 
805 European Commission, Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European Union 
(Eur. Opinion Res. Group, June 2003), at 10-11, 32. See also Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency Note, 
Brussels, 11 December 2003, CIG 60/03 ADD 2. 
806 The conditions of employment of the Court’s members are to be determined by a 
European regulation adopted by the Council. Constitution art. III-400(1)(a). 
807 Constitution art. III-362(1), (2). 
808 See, e.g. TEU art. 46. 
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action is that the accused State “has failed to fulfil an obligation under this 
Treaty.” Although Article 227 actions are rare, “infringement actions” under 
Article 226 are regularly brought by the Commission. Article 228 adds 
significant coercive power to judgments of the Court by permitting it to 
require a defendant State to comply with a Court decision, or, failing that, to 
pay a “lump sum or penalty payment.” 
 
 Article III-353 of the Constitution describes the Court as a body that 
can sit as a Grand Chamber or as the full Court. In addition to the Court itself, 
Article III-356 perpetuates the lower court, whose name will be changed from 
the Court of First Instance to the General Court. Normally, decisions of the 
General Court can be appealed to the Court of Justice on points of law only.809 
A third level of court is described in Article III-359 as “specialised courts,” 
that may be created by European laws to hear certain types of cases. Appeals 
from the specialised courts will go to the General Court on points of law only, 
or on points of fact and law, depending on the mandate in the relevant 
European law that establishes the specialised court. The constitutional 
arrangement mirrors that of the EC Treaty. Three levels of court are provided 
in Articles 220 and 225a. Under Article 221 the Court may sit as a full court 
or in chambers, and Articles 225 and 225a provide for appeals in a similar 
fashion to the appeals processes described in the Constitution. 
 
 Under the Treaties the Court has been an institution that is both 
central to the operations of the EU and independent of the other Union 
institutions. In carrying out its work the Court is also independent of the 
governments and courts of the Member States. The Constitution does not 
tamper with these basic characteristics of the Court, nor does it generally alter 
the Court’s basic competences and procedures. However, several 
developments are of interest.  
 
 The Constitution extends the Court’s jurisdiction into the 
controversial area of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which 
generally corresponds with the Second Pillar under the TEU.810 As a general 
matter Article III-376 states that the Court shall have no jurisdiction with 
respect to Article I-40 (the common foreign and security policy) or I-42 (the 
common security and defence policy). Likewise, there will be no jurisdiction 
under Article III-293 (the EU’s external action) to the extent it relates to the 
                                                 
809 Constitution art. III-358(1).  
810 For a discussion on the Constitution’s impact on the Court’s jurisdiction, see Ad 
Geelhoed, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice, in The EU 
Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & 
Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
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CFSP. These provisions are consistent with TEU Article 46, which limits the 
Court’s jurisdiction under the TEU to a specific list of subjects, which do not 
include any aspects of the treaty’s Title V (the CFSP). However, the 
Constitution includes an unprecedented, albeit limited, insertion of the Court 
into the CFSP. Article III-376 permits the Court to review two types of 
activity in this field.  
 
First, the Court may “monitor compliance with Article III-308,” 
which states that CFSP activities may not affect the Union’s competences as 
set forth in Articles I-13 to I-15 and I-17 of the Constitution. Article III-308 
also states that implementation of these articles may not affect the 
competences of the EU in the CFSP. The Court will thus be empowered to 
referee disputes over the interface of the Union’s general authority and its 
specific authority relating to the common foreign and security policy. Second, 
Article III-376 permits the Court to “rule on proceedings, brought in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in Article III-365(4), reviewing the 
legality of European decisions providing for restrictive measures against 
natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter II of 
Title V” (articles III-294 to III-313 – the CFSP provisions). Article III-365(4) 
generally permits the Court to review the legality of EU action that affects 
“third parties” if a person challenges an act that is addressed to him or her or 
is otherwise of “direct concern” and “does not entail implementing measures.” 
 
 The second area of extension of the Court’s jurisdiction relates to 
those portions of the Constitution’s “area of freedom, security and justice” 
(AFSJ) that formerly comprised the Union’s Third Pillar under the TEU.811 
Simply stated, the Constitution would abandon the Pillar structure, and, 
except as noted below, all of the AFSJ would be subject to the Court’s 
ordinary jurisdiction, under the following provisions: 
 
--Article III-365 (action for annulment – comparable to EC Treaty 
Article 230); 
 
--Article III-367 (complaint for failure to act – comparable to EC 
Treaty Article 232); and 
 
--Article III-369 (plea of illegality – comparable to EC Treaty Article 
241). 
 
                                                 
811 Constitution arts. III-257 to III-277; TEU arts. 29-42. For a delineation of those 
provisions in the AFSJ that have their basis in the Third Pillar, see Chapter 16 of this 
treatise. 
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The exception to this general jurisdiction is expressed in Article III-377 of the 
Constitution, which states that the Court has no authority to review “the 
validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of a Member State” or the activities of a Member State 
“with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security.”  
 
The approach of the TEU is quite different. TEU Article 46 states that 
the powers of the Court in the Third Pillar are specifically limited to those 
enumerated in TEU Article 35. That provision identifies three areas in which 
the Court may act: 
 
--Article 35(1) states that the Court may give preliminary rulings on 
the “validity and interpretation” of EU Third Pillar measures, but 
Article 35(2) makes subparagraph (1) applicable only to those 
Member States that have affirmatively accepted such jurisdiction. 
 
--Article 35(6) permits the Court to hear EC Treaty Article 230 
actions for annulment brought by a Member State or the Commission 
to challenge a Third Pillar framework decision or decision. 
 
--Article 35(7) authorises the Court to rule on disputes between 
Member States regarding the interpretation of Third Pillar acts, as 
well as disputes between the Commission and Member States 
regarding “conventions” adopted under the Third Pillar. 
 
Any other acts relating to the Third Pillar are outside the Court’s jurisdiction, 
and TEU Article 35(5) contains specific prohibitions on the tribunal’s 
authority in matters of Member State police and law enforcement services, 
maintenance of law and order and safeguarding of internal security.812 These 
restrictions are the same limits that have been carried over into Constitution 
Article III-377.  
 
 A third jurisdictional extension for the Court is that actions for 
annulment of an EU regulatory act may be brought by an individual under 
Article III-365(4) of the Constitution if the act “is of direct concern to him or 
her and does not entail implementing measures.” The corresponding provision 
in Article 230 of the EC Treaty requires that an action can be brought only if 
the regulatory act is of “direct and individual concern” to the plaintiff. This 
                                                 
812 EC Treaty Article 68(2) contains a similar restriction on the Court’s jurisdiction in 
“any measure of decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the maintenance 
of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” 
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extension lacks the political impact of expanded jurisdiction in the CFSP and 
AFSJ, but its practical impact might be significant.813 
 
 Beyond these jurisdictional matters, two phrases in the Constitution 
affirm the role of the Court as guardian of EU law. Article I-29(1) mirrors the 
language of Article 220 of the EC Treaty and requires the Court to “ensure 
respect for the law in the interpretation and application of the Constitution.” 
The treaty provision requires the Court to “ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of this Treaty the law is observed.”814 In addition, the 
Constitution’s Article I-26(1), which describes the Commission and its 
responsibilities, states that the Commission “shall oversee the application of 
Union law under the control of the Court of Justice.”  This is a statement not 
found in either of the Treaties. The Constitution’s two phrases may not 
constitute an actual endorsement of the Court’s historically activist approach, 
but they certainly do not support any curtailment of the Court’s role.  
 
 An additional item worthy of note is that the Constitution partially 
subjects the Court to the expanded public access provisions of Article I-50(3). 
This article requires each EU institution to make its documents available to 
the public. The Court is not included in the EC Treaty’s corresponding Article 
255(1). However, Constitution Article III-399(1) states that the Court (and the 
European Central Bank as well) “shall be subject to the provisions of Article 
I-50(3) . . .  only when exercising their administrative tasks.” Administrative 
tasks are not defined, but Article III-399 is obviously intended to maintain the 
confidentiality of the Court’s deliberations on pending cases. 
 
5.2 The Member States’ interaction with the Court 
 
 The Constitution offers several areas in which each Member State has 
direct input into matters relating to the Court of Justice. First, pursuant to 
Constitution Article I-29(2), the Court is to be comprised of one judge from 
each of the Member States, and the appointment of judges is to be 
accomplished by “common accord” of the states.815 Second, Article III-375(1) 
provides that in suits in which the Union is a party the Court’s jurisdiction is 
exclusive only to the extent that jurisdiction is specifically conferred by the 
Constitution. In other cases, the courts of the Member States will have 
concurrent jurisdiction. Related to these limits is the fact that the Court’s 
                                                 
813 See the discussion in Piris, supra note 304, at 14. 
814 EC Treaty art. 220. 
815 Constitution art. III-355. Advocates-General and members of the General Court 
(formerly the Court of First Instance) are also chosen by common accord of the 
Member States. Constitution arts. III-355, III-356. 
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jurisdiction is limited, as described above, in matters of the common foreign 
and security policy, certain aspects of police operations, maintenance of law 
and order, and matters of internal security. Finally, according to Constitution 
Article III-381, certain provisions of the Court’s Statute (which is appended to 
the Constitution) may be amended only through the elaborate procedure 
required to amend the Constitution itself, which requires ratification by each 
of the Member States.816   
 
The Constitution’s provisions on membership and appointment to the 
Court by common accord are essentially the same as found in EC Treaty 
Articles 221 and 223. Likewise, Article 240 of the EC Treaty provides that the 
Court’s jurisdiction in suits against the Union is exclusive only to the extent 
that jurisdiction is specifically conferred by the Constitution, and thus in other 
situations the courts of the Member States will have concurrent jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the Statute of the Court of Justice is appended as a protocol to 
the EC Treaty and TEU,817 and according to EC Treaty Article 245, Title I of 
the Statute may be amended only through the treaty amendment procedure, 
requiring ratification by the Member States.818  
 
A change from the Treaties is that Article III-357 of the Constitution 
creates a new panel to give an “opinion” on the suitability of nominees to the 
Court. This panel will be appointed by the Council of Ministers and will 
consist of seven members who must be former judges of the Court of Justice, 
the High Court or a national supreme court, or “lawyers of recognised 
competence.” One of the panel members “shall be proposed by the European 
Parliament.”  
 
 The most notable development in the Constitution is the expansion of 
the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP and the AFSJ. Except for this, the 
Treaties’ provisions relating to the interface between the Member States and 
the Court of Justice have been transferred into the Constitution with little 
substantive change. The new panel to review nominees to the Court might 
offer some further input from the Member States as to the Court’s 
composition, but their primary contribution would arise in the process of 
nominating members to the Court and then reaching common accord on the 
full membership of the Court. Through concurrent jurisdiction, the EC Treaty 
and Constitution both allow substantial involvement of the Member State 
courts in dealing with matters of EU law. 
                                                 
816 See Constitution art. IV-443 (the amendment procedure). 
817 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, Dec. 12, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 167 
[hereinafter Protocol on Statute of Court of Justice]. 
818 See TEU art. 48 (the treaty amendment procedure). 
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6. OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANS 
 
 The European Central Bank, Court of Auditors, European Investment 
Bank, Committee of the Regions and Economic and Social Committee are 
dealt with in detail in the Constitution.819 However, these institutions would 
not be changed under the Constitution in any manner impacting the EU’s 
dividing lines. The Central Bank would retain its independence from Member 
State influence. The Court of Auditors would retain its largely internal role, 
also independent of Member State influence, although Member States would 
be required to cooperate when the Court audits national activities relating to 
EU revenues and expenditures. The Members of the European Investment 
Bank would remain the Member States themselves.  
 
 The advisory committees are just that – advisory bodies with little 
power. However, the Constitution does offer them somewhat more than they 
possess under the Treaties. Article 8 of the Constitution’s Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles and Subsidiarity and Proportionality grants the 
Committee of the Regions the right to commence an action with the Court of 
Justice to challenge any new EU legislative act on the ground that it violates 
the principle of subsidiarity.820 This is similar to the right granted to Member 
State governments in the same section of the Protocol. Article 9 of the 
Protocol provides that the Commission must also provide annual reports to 
both of the committees (as well as to the Member States and the major EU 
institutions) regarding the compliance of new EU laws with the subsidiarity 
principle.821 Neither the right of action nor the right to receive reports is found 
in the Treaties or their protocols.  
 
7. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
This chapter has explored the principal institutions and has noted that 
the Constitution does propose some changes to their structure and their 
responsibilities. Let us consider whether the most prominent of these 
innovations would affect the EU’s dividing lines.  
 
The European Parliament’s role in legislation (co-decision) and in 
budgetary matters would be expanded, but no major institutional change (such 
                                                 
819 See Articles I-30 and III-185 to III-202 (European Central Bank); I-31 and III-384 
to III-385 (Court of Auditors); III-393 to III-394 (European Investment Bank); I-32 
and III-386 to III-392 (the advisory committees). 
820 Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273, art. 8. 
821 Id. at art. 9. 
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as the right of legislative initiative) is offered. In reality, no constitutional 
provisions relating to the Parliament would impact the dividing lines. 
 
The European Council and its responsibilities would be more clearly 
identified, and its new President would be a dramatic development. However, 
the prominence of the President is not accompanied by any competence-shift 
to Brussels. A more coherent voice for the Union does not constitute a 
dividing line shift vis-à-vis the Member States.  
 
The Council of Ministers would receive a new formula for qualified 
majority voting, a new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a mandate to 
meet in public when legislating. The QMV formula may be seen as merely a 
technical adjustment, and the new Minister might offer greater coherence, but 
none of these changes affects the dividing lines. 
 
The Commission would be reduced in size, and its right to propose 
new legislation might be modestly affected in the AFSJ as well as by the new 
right of citizen initiative. Arguably, the elimination of representation by all 
Member States reduces somewhat the ability of the states to influence the 
course of EU activity, thus creating a minor shift in one of the dividing lines. 
In legislation, the more demanding requirements for Member State initiatives 
in the AFSJ arguably strengthen the Commission, while the citizen initiative 
might undercut the Commission, but these dividing line movements are of 
relatively little consequence. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice would be extended into new 
areas in the Treaties’ Second and Third Pillars. This is arguably a real 
dividing-line shift, because where the Court gains power, the national courts 
generally lose. However, even this development must be seen as relatively 
incremental. This is not a wholesale increase in the Court’s competence, nor 
an overt reduction in the powers of the national courts. This shift represents a 
thoughtful attempt to provide greater accountability in the CFSP and greater 
efficiency and predictability in the AFSJ. 
 
 In light of the above summaries, it is fair to conclude that in broad 
terms the institutions under the Constitution would have maintained their 
essential character, their functions and their mandates. It might be speculated 
that the structural changes to the institutions could have led to their increased 
strength and effectiveness, and that these qualities could result in a stronger 
Union that would better be able to draw power away from the Member States. 
However, this is a theoretical possibility at best. In general, the Constitution’s 
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treatment of the EU institutions does not appear intended to significantly shift 
the Union’s dividing lines. 
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Chapter 14 
 
 
Instruments and Procedures Available to the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This chapter addresses the techniques that may be employed by the 
EU institutions in the process of making laws and decisions. On these matters 
the Constitution displays a good measure of innovation. The primary focus 
here will be on the EU’s legal instruments and acts, although we will also 
briefly address the matter of co-decision by the European Parliament and the 
designated role of Member State law in EU affairs. As noted at the end of this 
chapter, the proposed changes in these matters appear to have minimal impact 
on the EU’s dividing lines. Nevertheless, this analysis is included to provide a 
fuller description of the Constitution and to provide information relevant to 
the workings of the EU institutions and to the subjects discussed in Chapters 
15, 16 and 17. 
 
1.  TYPES OF LEGAL ACT 
 
1.1 The Union may use a variety of instruments and acts 
 
a.  The primary legal instruments 
 
 Articles I-33 to I-44 of the Constitution, grouped under the title 
“Exercise of Union Competence,” describe the functioning of the EU 
institutions in their legislative and regulatory activity. According to Article I-
33(1), six “legal instruments” are to be employed by the institutions: 
 
(1) A European law is “of general application” and “binding 
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”  
 
(2) A European framework law is “binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
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shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.” 
 
(3) A European regulation is “of general application for the 
implementation of legislative acts and certain provisions of the 
Constitution.” It may be binding in its entirety and directly applicable, 
or binding as to the result to be achieved while leaving to the states 
the form and methods of its application. 
 
(4) A European decision is binding in its entirety, but if 
certain parties are specified in the decision, it will be binding “only on 
them.” 
 
(5) Recommendations are simply that – they “shall have no 
binding force.” 
 
(6) Opinions are likewise pronouncements that “shall have no 
binding force.”  
 
Among the six instruments, European laws and European framework laws are 
classified in Articles I-33(1) and I-34 as “legislative acts” that are generally 
adopted through action involving the Commission, Council and European 
Parliament. On the other hand, European regulations and European decisions 
are defined in Articles I-33, I-35 and I-36 as “non-legislative acts” and may 
be issued, as specifically mandated in the Constitution, by the European 
Council, Council, Commission or European Central Bank. Article I-12(6) 
notes that specific provisions of Part III of the Constitution will contain the 
“scope of and arrangement for” exercising the Union’s competences. 
 
 The Constitution’s primary forms of legislation are similar to the five 
principal types currently provided under Article 249 of the EC Treaty: 
 
(i) A regulation (renamed in the Constitution as a “European 
law”) has “general application” and is “binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.” 
 
(ii) A directive (renamed as a “European framework law”) is 
“binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods.” 
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(iii) A decision (renamed as a “European decision”) is to be 
“binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.” 
 
(iv) A recommendation (no change in designation) has “no 
binding force.” 
 
(v) An opinion (no change in designation) likewise has “no 
binding force.”  
 
The EC Treaty does not include a description of what the Constitution refers 
to as “European regulations.” 
 
 The complexity of the treaty approach arises from the fact that 
activities relating to the common foreign and security policy (the TEU’s 
Second Pillar) and cooperation and justice in home affairs (Third Pillar) do 
not fit within the five categories specified in EC Treaty Article 249. Rather, 
the Second and Third Pillars are subject to their own types of legislation, such 
as “common strategies,” “joint actions” and “common positions” in the 
Second Pillar,822 and “common positions,” “framework decisions” (similar to 
directives), “decisions” and “conventions” in the Third Pillar.823 
 
b. Additional forms of activity 
 
 In addition to employing the six legal instruments, the Constitution 
authorises the EU to engage in other types of activity.824 The following are 
primary examples:  
 
(1) Article I-15 requires the Union to adopt “measures” and 
“guidelines” to assist Member States in coordinating their economic 
and employment policies, and the Union may take “initiatives” to 
assist the states in coordination of their social policies.825  
 
(2) Article I-12(5) permits the EU to “carry out actions to 
support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States” 
                                                 
822 TEU arts. 13-15. 
823 TEU art. 34. 
824 See also discussion of the Open Method of Co-ordination in part 5.2 of Chapter 10 
of this treatise. 
825 Constitution arts. I-15(1), (2), (3). See discussion of the Open Method of Co-
ordination in part 5.2 of Chapter 10 of this treatise. 
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in “certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the 
Constitution.”826  
 
(3) Article III-323(1) permits the Union to “conclude an 
agreement with one or more third countries or international 
organisations.” 
 
(4) Article III-324 permits the EU to enter into “association 
agreements” with third countries or international organisations in 
order to create “an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common actions and special procedures.” 
 
(5) In Part III of the Constitution, the Commission is granted 
administrative, investigative and enforcement powers to ensure the 
proper application of EU law.827 Employment of these powers, 
especially at the investigative stages of an activity, may take the form 
of particular actions that do not necessarily fall within the primary 
forms of act described in Article I-33. 
 
 The EC Treaty also refers to several of the additional forms of action 
described in the Constitution. These include the following: 
 
(i) Article 3 requires the Community to engage in the 
“promotion of coordination” relating to Member State employment 
policies, and Article 127(1) states that it must “contribute” to high 
employment by “encouraging cooperation,” “supporting” and 
“complementing” the actions of the states. Article 128(2) mandates 
that the Community draw up “guidelines for employment.” 
 
(ii) EC Treaty Article 99(2) calls on the Council to draft 
“broad guidelines” for the economic policies of the Member States, 
and Article 202 requires the Council to “ensure coordination” of these 
policies. 
 
                                                 
826 See discussion of the Open Method of Co-ordination in part 5.2 of Chapter 10 of 
this treatise. 
827 See, e.g., the Commission’s extensive role in enforcing EU competition law. 
 Constitution arts. III-165, III-168. 
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(iii) Community action to “support,” “coordinate” or 
“supplement” Member State action is provided in various provisions 
of the EC Treaty.828  
 
(iv) Several articles in the EC Treaty permit the Community 
to enter into agreements with third countries and international 
organisations.”829 
 
(v) EC Treaty Article 310 contemplates the Community 
entering into “association agreements” with third countries or 
international organisations.” 
 
(vi) The Commission is granted administrative, investigative 
and enforcement powers to ensure the proper application of EU 
law.830 As noted above with regard to the Constitution, use of these 
powers, especially at the investigative stages of an activity, may take 
the form of particular actions that do not necessarily fall within the 
primary forms of act described in EC Treaty Article 249. 
 
c. Choosing a form 
 
 Unless the Constitution specifies the type of instrument or procedure 
that should be used in a particular instance, Article I-38(1) states that it will be 
left to the EU institutions to decide “on a case-by-case basis” what form of 
action to take. Likewise, in the case of a European regulation, Article I-33(1) 
provides that the Union institutions must choose whether it will be “binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States,” or binding simply 
“as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed.” If the latter, the national authorities are free to choose the 
appropriate “form and methods” of local implementation. Article I-38(2) 
requires that legal acts of the EU must state “the reasons on which they are 
based,” and Article I-39 mandates that most acts must be formalised and 
published prior to taking effect. Article I-38(2) mirrors EC Treaty Article 253, 
                                                 
828 See, e.g., EC Treaty arts. 149(1) (regarding education policy), 150(1) (vocational 
training), 151(2) (culture), 152(2) (public health), 153(3) (consumer protection), 
155(1) (trans-European networks), 157(3) (industry), 159 (economic and social 
cohesion) and 163(2) (research and technological development). 
829 See, e.g., EC Treaty arts. 174(4) (regarding environmental matters), 181 
(development cooperation), 181a (economic, financial and technical cooperation with 
third countries).  
830 See, e.g., the Commission’s extensive role in enforcing EU competition law. EC 
Treaty art. 85. 
246 INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
  
and Article I-39 is substantially identical to EC Treaty Article 254. Articles I-
38(1) and I-33(1) have no antecedents in the Treaties. However, these new 
provisions arguably do no more than state the obvious fact that when the 
Commission exercises its right of initiative – or when any other institution 
takes action – it is the inherent right of the institution to propose which 
available form of action it will take under the circumstances.  
 
d. Comment 
 
 As described above, the Constitution consolidates the possible 
instruments for EU action. In so doing, it renames three of the five types of 
act described in the EC Treaty, and it adds “European regulations” as a new 
form of action. Furthermore, under the Constitution the special types of 
activity described for the Second and Third Pillars in the TEU would be 
carried out through means of the same six legal instruments as used in all 
other forms of EU law-making. The Constitution’s classification of acts as 
either “legislative” or “non-legislative” is also new, although its significance 
is not readily apparent. Also, although Community action to “support,” 
“coordinate” or “supplement” Member State action is provided in various 
provisions of the EC Treaty, the general statement in Constitution Article I-12 
that the EU may “carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the Member States” in “certain areas and under the conditions laid 
down in the Constitution” has no precedent in the Treaties. 
 
 The EU is a complex organisation with wide-ranging responsibilities. 
The variety in its array of potential acts is necessary for its successful 
operation. The Constitution’s six primary forms of law-making for all fields 
of activity represent a simplification from the Treaties, whose Three Pillars 
each had their own distinct type of legislative and regulatory act. The 
variation among the Pillars is unnecessarily confusing. However, despite 
some improvement offered by the Constitution, it has been noted above that 
other forms of action would be possible, and thus the picture would be more 
complicated than suggested by Article I-33.  
 
 Herwig C. H. Hofmann has written a detailed analysis of the 
“typology of acts” in the Constitution, including comparison with the 
Treaties.831 He notes that the constitutional changes emerged from a 
longstanding debate that included concerns about “the democratic legitimacy 
of EC/EU decision-making,” whether EU legislation should be modeled after 
Member State forms of law, the balance of power among the EU institutions, 
                                                 
831 Hofmann, supra note 597. 
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and the lack of “elegance or clarity” displayed in the Treaties.832 Hofmann 
notes many subtleties in analysing EU legislation, and he recognises that the 
proposed system under the Constitution “has its faults.”833 Nevertheless he 
concludes that the Constitution represents a “very welcome step in reducing 
the intransparencies of the EU’s legal system and adding to its overall 
maturity.”834 
 
1.2 Member State participation in EU law-making 
 
 In broad terms Article I-5(2) of the Constitution requires the Member 
States to “take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Constitution or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union.” This means that the governments of 
the states must cooperate with EU institutions in their regulatory and 
enforcement activities. For example, the Member States have cooperative 
responsibilities relating to enforcement of EU competition law.835 In addition, 
the rules of procedure and the competent authorities of the Member States 
may be used to enforce “pecuniary obligations” imposed by EU law on 
“persons other than Member States.”836 Article I-5 reflects Article 10 of the 
EC Treaty, which requires the Member States to “take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community.” The EC Treaty also requires the governments 
of the States to cooperate with the Commission in enforcing Community 
competition law.837 In addition, the rules of procedure and the appropriate 
authorities of the Member States may be used to enforce “pecuniary 
obligations” imposed by Community law on “persons other than States.”838 
 
 In the case of European framework laws and certain European 
regulations, Articles I-33(1) and I-37 of the Constitution contemplate 
implementation by the Member States, and in these circumstances Article I-
33(1) states that the Member States are free to choose the “form and methods” 
of how to fulfill their responsibilities. The actual means of implementation 
will left entirely to the individual states, although the results achieved by each 
                                                 
832 Id. at 1-2. 
833 Id. at 25. 
834 Id. at 24. For an evaluation of the Constitution’s simplification of legal 
instruments, see Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1340-43. 
835 Constitution arts. III-165, III-168. 
836 Constitution art. III-401. 
837 EC Treaty arts. 85, 88. 
838 EC Treaty art. 256. 
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state must be consistent with the EU mandate. The Constitution’s requirement 
of Member State implementation has its origins in the EC Treaty’s definition 
of directives. Article 249 of the EC Treaty states that a directive “shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.” The actual means of implementation will depend upon national or 
local law and the particular legal mandates for national or local officials.  
 
 A specific reservation in favor of the Member States is found in 
Article I-12(5) of the Constitution, which provides that in cases where the 
Union acts to “support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member 
States,” EU involvement may not supersede Member State competence in the 
field. This provision has no precedent in the Treaties. 
 
 Article I-34(3) of the Constitution notes that in “specific cases 
provided for in the Constitution” a group of Member States may initiate the 
EU legislative process. An example is the provision in Article III-264 
permitting one-fourth of the Member States to initiate legislation pertaining to 
administrative cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice.839 
Such actions are also mentioned in the Treaties. For example, TEU Articles 
34 and 42 provide that the Council may act in the Third Pillar on the initiative 
of any Member State. In addition, EC Treaty Article 67(1) provided for a 
temporary right of initiative by any Member State in matters relating to the 
area of freedom, security and justice; this right has now expired.  
 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that an amendment to the Constitution may 
be initiated by a proposal from any Member State to the Council under Article 
IV-443(1) or to the European Council under Article IV-445(1). This right is a 
reflection of Article 48 of the TEU, which provides that any Member State 
may submit proposals to amend the Treaties.  
 
 In general, the responsibility of Member States to cooperate in 
enforcing EU law, their limited right to initiate EU legislation and their right 
to trigger the treaty amendment process do not change from the Treaties to the 
Constitution. However, relating to local implementation of EU law, the 
Constitution adds “European regulations” as a new class of EU action. 
Likewise, there is no Treaty counterpart to the Constitution’s reservation that 
Union action to “support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member 
States” may not supersede Member State competence in the field. 
 
                                                 
839 Article III-264 cross-references articles relating to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and cross-border police cooperation. 
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 Herwig C. H. Hofmann contends that the “structure of the typology of 
acts and the allocation of decision-making procedures is at the heart of the 
relation between the Member States . . . and the EU powers.”840 This cannot 
be contested, because law-making procedures both reflect and determine the 
roles that various institutions will play. Nevertheless, as the above analysis 
indicates, the Constitution would have changed very little in regard to the 
Member States’ role in EU law-making or enforcement. Interestingly, 
Andreas Føllesdal expresses concern about “the allocation of enforcement 
authority, which is still largely left with the Member States.”841 Citing the 
ongoing dispute over the Stability and Growth Pact, he warns that “partial 
compliance” by certain states “may unravel trust among citizens and 
officials.”842 A greater enforcement role at the central level – most likely 
through the Commission – would create more uniformity in the application of 
EU law, and it would offer less opportunity for individual Member States to 
arbitrarily apply Union law for their own purposes or to their exclusive 
benefit. 
 
2. CO-DECISION AS THE ORDINARY PROCEDURE 
 
 Article I-34(1) of the Constitution provides that “legislative acts” of 
the Union, which are “European laws” and “European framework laws” are to 
be adopted “jointly by the European Parliament and the Council under the 
ordinary legislative procedure as set out in Article III-396.”843 Under co-
decision, Parliament’s refusal to approve legislation will result in its not being 
adopted. Article I-34(2) also contemplates certain legislative acts being 
adopted “by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council, or 
by the latter with the participation of the European Parliament,” but these 
instances will be considered exceptional circumstances specifically provided 
for in the Constitution, and their procedures are considered “special legislative 
procedures.”  
 
 The EC Treaty contains the co-decision procedure in Article 251, and 
the Constitution’s ordinary procedure has been modeled on this article. 
However, Article 252 of the EC Treaty maintains a “cooperation” procedure 
as an alternative law-making method, and under this procedure the European 
Parliament is consulted but has no final authority to block the legislation. 
Cooperation has been steadily excised from the EC Treaty, and today its use 
                                                 
840 Hofmann, supra note 597, at 1. 
841 Føllesdal TFT, supra note 323, at 7. 
842 Id.  
843 For the details of the ordinary procedure, see Constitution art. III-396. 
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is limited to a few provisions relating to economic and monetary union.844 
Under Article I-34 of the Constitution, co-decision is the “ordinary legislative 
procedure,” and cooperation is entirely eliminated.  
 
 Beyond the cooperation procedure, Jean-Claude Piris has identified 
approximately 30 instances under the Treaties in which decisions or other acts 
may be taken by the Council without participation by the Parliament or after 
consultation with the Parliament.845 All of these matters would be subject to 
co-decision under the Constitution. 
 
 These developments would have had an obvious inter-institutional 
impact within the EU, but they would not affect the balance of competences 
and powers of the Union vis-à-vis those of the Member States. 
 
3. A PLACE FOR MEMBER STATE LAW 
 
 As previously discussed in Chapter 8, Article III-426 of the 
Constitution grants the EU capacity as a legal person under the laws of the 
Member States, and in particular, the rights to own property and to be a party 
to legal proceedings.846 Likewise, under Article III-431 the Union is 
specifically made subject to the contract law of individual Member States and 
to tort law based on “the general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States.” The provisions of Article III-426 are identical to the grant of 
authority to the Community under Article 282 of the EC Treaty, while 
Constitution Article III-431 retains the substance of EC Treaty Article 288. 
The TEU, which does not create legal capacity for the EU, also does not 
contain any provisions relating to the Union’s relationship to Member State 
law. Thus, the Constitution would expand upon the Treaties and bring the 
entire EU into a direct relationship with Member State law. 
 
 Although these provisions of the Constitution reinforce the legal 
personality of the EU, they also underscore the vitality of Member State law. 
Wherever the EU has a physical presence within any of its states, it would be 
subject to a host of local and national laws relating to its movable and 
                                                 
844 The only instances in which the cooperation procedure is found after the Treaty of 
Nice relate to certain matters of economic and monetary union. See EC Treaty arts. 
99, 102, 103, 106. 
845 These items, along with their counterpart Constitution provisions, are listed in 
Piris, supra note 304, at 209, Annex 2. 
846 The discussion in part 1.1 of Chapter 8 points out that this capacity may be 
referred to as “private law personality,” in contrast to the “public law personality” 
granted to the Union under Article I-7 of the Constitution. 
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immovable physical property. Also, in contracting for goods and services, the 
Union would be subject to “the law applicable to the contract in question.”847 
Strictly speaking, this need not be local contract law, because the EU and its 
contracting party could select a different jurisdiction’s law, but national 
contract law of some sort would likely be a factor. In the area of “non-
contractual liability” (tort), the Union would be required to “make good any 
damage” it causes, with its liability to be determined “in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States.”848 This perhaps 
might not lead immediately and directly to the local law where the incident 
occurs, but it seems highly unlikely that the EU in a proceeding before a local 
court would try to assert its rights on the basis of principles established in 
other Member States.  
 
As this analysis has shown, in certain matters of contract and tort the 
Constitution would preserve and actually broaden the EU’s subjection to 
Member State law. The existing dividing lines in these areas would be 
maintained and made even brighter. 
 
4. INSTRUMENTS, PROCEDURES AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
The Constitution provides for a simplified set of six legal instruments 
to be used in EU law-making, and on the surface this would be a noteworthy 
improvement over the complex legislative scheme of the Treaties with their 
Three Pillars. As noted, however, the constitutional system is actually more 
complex than it appears at first blush. In any event the question remains as to 
whether the Constitution’s new approach would have any impact on the 
dividing lines. Do simplification and more transparency result in any net gains 
for Brussels? It is difficult to imagine any such gain, and thus our conclusion 
is that the dividing lines are not affected. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Member States are called upon in the 
Constitution to work side-by-side with the Union to “ensure fulfillment” of 
EU law, and in the case of framework laws (currently directives) national 
implementing laws are required, with each state being free to choose the form 
and method of implementation. This role for the national governments is 
significant, signaling a partnership between the states and the EU, but its 
character would not change from the relationship described in the Treaties. 
  
                                                 
847 Constitution art. III-431. 
848 Constitution art. III-431. 
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 The Constitution’s elimination of the EC Treaty’s cooperation 
procedure in favor of co-decision in all cases might represent a slight inter-
institutional shift of power to the European Parliament, but this would not 
affect the dividing lines between the EU and the Member States.  
 
 The Constitution’s expansion of the affect of Member State law to 
include the full Union, rather than merely the European Community, would be 
a slight extension of the impact of national law on the institutions of the EU. 
However, this is at best a technical change, and it does not appear that it 
would affect the dividing lines as they are described in this treatise. 
 
 In concluding this brief analysis of instruments and procedures, we do 
well to recall several procedural concepts that have a bearing on all EU 
legislation. First, Member State parliaments must be advised of all proposed 
EU legislation, and they may object, force reconsideration or bring a 
challenge to the Court of Justice if they feel that the law will violate the 
subsidiarity principle. Second, a citizen initiative may propose legislation 
where the Union institutions choose not to do so. Third, the requirement for 
unanimous Council decisions in many instances and the general necessity for 
consensus on the European Council create a veto right for each Member State 
in critical areas of EU legislation. Fourth, where the EU is unable to legislate 
due to lack of sufficient consensus, groups of Member States may bypass the 
Union by engaging in some form of enhanced cooperation. These principles 
are beyond the technical focus of this chapter, but no discussion of legislative 
procedures should overlook their significance. 
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Chapter 15 
 
 
Where QMV Replaces Unanimous Voting 
or Applies to New Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A recurring and important theme in this treatise is the fact that the 
Constitution would have preserved the two primary voting requirements that 
have been available to the Council of Ministers and the European Council, 
namely, unanimity and qualified majority vote (QMV). The policy-making 
European Council must generally decide by consensus,849 but the real 
battleground on voting is at the Council of Ministers, where most legislation 
is approved. At the Council level the Constitution’s preference for QMV is 
clear enough,850 but it is equally obvious that certain critical decisions would 
have remained subject to approval by all Council representatives.  
 
This chapter offers a detailed description of where the Constitution 
embraces QMV decision-making either as a departure from unanimity 
required under the Treaties or in a new field of EU activity. This analysis will 
be divided into four parts. Section 1 provides a brief perspective on why the 
European Union would choose unanimity or QMV. Section 2 identifies those 
instances in which a requirement of unanimity in the Treaties would be 
changed to qualified majority voting under the Constitution. These areas are 
seen to represent a diminishment of the national blocking power. Section 3 
describes the new subjects of legislation in the Constitution for which the 
qualified majority vote would be the means of Council action. These are areas 
which could have been designated for unanimous Council voting, but QMV 
was selected. Finally, to illustrate the continuing vitality of unanimous voting 
in certain fields, section 4 introduces the Addendum, which identifies all of 
                                                 
849 Constitution Article I-21(4) states: “Except where the Constitution provides 
otherwise, decisions of the European Council shall be taken by consensus.” 
850 Constitution Article I-23(3) states: “The Council shall act by a qualified majority 
except where the Constitution provides otherwise.” 
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the constitutional articles in which unanimity or another form of unity would 
have been required on the Council and the European Council. These 
provisions highlight the substantial number of policy areas in which the 
Member State veto power would have been retained.  
 
It should be noted that the primary purpose of this chapter is to 
evaluate whether the Constitution significantly shifts voting on the Council 
from unanimity to qualified majority. The mechanics of QMV, especially the 
voting formulas, have been addressed in part 3 of Chapter 13.  
 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNANIMOUS DECISION-MAKING 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 11 of this treatise, a foundational principle of 
international law is that all parties to a treaty must consent to its initial 
ratification and its subsequent amendment.851 Likewise, when a group of 
nations has contracted to form an international organisation, history indicates 
that they have expected unanimity to be the general rule for decision-making 
within the new entity. Stephen Zamora has observed: 
 
Under traditional international law, as exemplified by early 
diplomatic conferences, two basic truths controlled the question of 
voting: every state had an equal voice in international proceedings 
(the doctrine of sovereign equality of states), and no state could be 
bound without its consent (the rule of unanimity). These rules were 
bound together, and were extensions of the general principle of the 
state’s sovereign immunity from externally imposed legislation.852 
  
The straightforward expectation of absolute sovereignty has a major flaw, 
however. It inhibits the actual achievement of results. Zamora adds: 
 
The disadvantage of the rule of unanimity, of course, is that 
international agreement is impossible to obtain when any single 
participant can block a decision; to achieve unanimous consent, the 
strength of a decision must be diluted so as to please everyone. Either 
result is unsatisfactory for an effectively functioning international 
organization that is charged with making and implementing decisions 
to meet urgent, practical problems.853 
                                                 
851 Vienna Convention, supra note 549, arts. 24, 40. 
852 Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 566, 571 (1980). 
853 Id. at 574. 
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Andreas Føllesdal concurs. Referring to voting patterns within the European 
Union he notes that “the multiple veto points ensuring stability easily leads to 
stagnation, preventing common action even where required.”854 Even worse 
than inaction, according to Føllesdal, is that a nation may threaten a veto to 
exact concessions in its favor: “Thus many hold that this safety valve has been 
abused by some Member States to extort unfair benefits from cooperation.”855 
The EU Commission White Paper of 2001 echoed this concern, noting that a 
consensus requirement often “holds policy-making hostage to national 
interests.”856 The consequence of this reality is, according to Zamora, that 
international organizations have gradually abandoned unanimity in favor of 
majority rule.857 But this trend has led to inevitable conflicts,858 and the 
European Union has reflected this tension. 
 
 According to Youri Devuyst, the founders of the European 
Community were determined to avoid the shortcomings of previous 
organisations. He quotes Paul Henri-Spaak as having stated that “unanimity 
formulae are the formulae of impotence.”859 To avoid the “unanimity trap” 
Devuyst describes Spaak as urging the Community’s initial members to 
“leave ancient notions of sovereignty behind and accept the principle of 
majority voting.”860 This was not to be grounded in mere idealism, but in 
recognition that a successful Community would advance the “substantive 
political and economic preferences” of the Member States.861   
 
 Notwithstanding the practical appeal of majority voting, the force 
behind it was by no means irresistible as the EU developed.862 To the 
contrary, national interests at times appeared to be an immovable object, as in 
the 1965 episode of the French “empty chair” to protest the Treaty of Rome’s 
                                                 
854 Føllesdal TFT, supra note 323, at 5. 
855 Id. 
856 White Paper, supra note 52, at 29. 
857 Zamora, supra note 852, at 574. 
858 Id. at 566. 
859 Devuyst, supra note 68, at 30. 
860 Id. 
861 Id. at 8. 
862 It is appropriate to note that qualified majority voting as a means of making 
decisions among the Member States is a step well short of full delegation of authority 
to the EU institutions. Andrew Moravcsik describes QMV as an example of “pooling” 
of sovereignty, as contrasted with the delegating of sovereignty that takes place when 
Union institutions (the Commission one example) are given the power to make and 
carry out law without consulting the Member States. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice 
for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 67 (1998). 
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phase-in of qualified majority voting in certain policy fields. French 
representatives simply boycotted Community activities for a seven-month 
period, until the Luxembourg Accord was adopted to allow any Member State 
to halt Community action that might threaten its vital interests.863 Paul Craig 
comments that this was “the prime example of negative inter-
governmentalism.”864 Twenty years later the Single European Act finally 
overcame the Accord to enable the decision-making efficiency necessary for 
completion of the Community’s internal market.865 
 
 Despite much progress toward qualified majority voting in the past 20 
years, the path has been marked with many concessions toward preserving 
Member State sovereignty. For one matter, under the Treaties a qualified 
majority has always been defined in such a manner as to provide extra 
protection to the smallest states. In addition, there is a continuing attempt to 
reach consensus on the Council even on matters for which a QMV decision 
may be taken. Edward Best describes these phenomena as follows:  
 
[T]he “Founding Fathers” of Europe explicitly rejected “objective” 
keys and population, in favor of a distribution of votes reflecting a 
balancing act between the states. This balance was conceived in terms 
of clusters of states and responded to a general principle of 
“degressive proportionality” . . . by which the larger units are under-
represented compared to the smaller ones. This in turn has loosely 
reflected the belief that, in such a diverse and sensitive union as the 
European Community, the pursuit of consensus and the protection of 
minorities are more important principles than simple majority rule.866 
 
Other concessions have included opt-outs, derogations and transition periods 
for new policies,867 and Volker Roben notes: “The trend to qualified majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers at the center is counter-balanced by the 
ever-increasing role on the periphery of the European Council.”868 Finally, 
despite the expansion of QMV, there remain many areas in which unanimity 
                                                 
863 Devuyst, supra note 68, at 31. 
864 Paul Craig, The Community Legal Order, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 79, 86 
(2003). 
865 Id. at 89-100. The Single European Act is cited in note 118, supra. 
866 Best, supra note 755, at 17. 
867 Devuyst, supra note 68, at 20-21. 
868 Volker Roben, Constitutionalism of the European Union After the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty: How Much Hierarchy, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 339, 359 (2004). 
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has been preserved, leaving much room for what Pavlos Eleftheriadis has 
termed “discretionary state action.”869  
 
The following sections will identify precisely where the Constitution 
would have increased the opportunities for qualified majority voting, and 
where it would have preserved the unanimity requirement. Please note that 
this chapter provides only a brief description of the identified matters. Greater 
elaboration and fuller context may be found in the subject matter analyses 
offered in Chapters 16 and 17. 
 
2. WHERE UNANIMOUS VOTING WOULD CHANGE TO QMV  
 
The Constitution contains a number of provisions in which voting or 
decision-making would be changed from a unanimity requirement in the 
Treaties to qualified majority voting. Each of these instances may be seen as a 
loss of Member State power, in that the states lose their right to block these 
decisions. This section identifies these new QMV subject matters and their 
predecessor provisions in the Treaties.  
 
For the constitutional provisions described, the QMV requirement 
would arise, unless otherwise noted, as a result of the decision being subject 
to the “ordinary legislative procedure,” which entails a QMV decision of the 
Council under Article I-23(3), and co-decision with the European Parliament 
under Articles I-34(1) and III-396. However, this analysis will not focus on 
the role of the Parliament, but solely on the Council’s voting requirements.  
 
2.1 Institutional matters 
 
a. Council presidencies. Constitution Article I-24(7) provides for a 
qualified majority decision of the European Council to determine the system 
for rotation of the Council formation presidencies other than Foreign Affairs. 
This is a rare instance in which the European Council would vote by QMV. 
Under Article 203 of the EC Treaty the rotation of Council presidencies is to 
be determined by the Council of Ministers itself, acting unanimously. Under 
the Treaty, the Foreign Affairs formation is treated like all other formations, 
whereas under the Constitution it is to be headed by the new Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 
 
b. Commission. Under Article I-37(3) the Constitution provides for 
European laws to “lay down in advance the rules and general principles 
                                                 
869 Eleftheriadis, supra note 85, at 38-39. 
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concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s 
exercise of implementing powers.” These European laws would require a 
QMV decision of the Council. There is not a directly parallel provision in the 
Treaties that addresses how to assign to the Member States the control over 
the Commission’s implementing authority. Instead, EC Treaty Article 202 
generally permits the Council to confer on the Commission the power to 
implement “rules which the Council lays down.” The Council may “impose 
certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers,” presumably 
including any assignment of authority to the Member States. In any event it 
must act according to “principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from Commission and after 
obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament.” Thus, in at least one 
respect the unanimous approval required under the Treaty would be changed 
to a QMV decision under the Constitution. 
 
c. Statute of ESCB and ECB. Article III-187(3) of the Constitution 
permits European laws to amend specified provisions in the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
relating to monetary policy. These laws would require a QMV decision of the 
Council. In contrast, EC Treaty Article 107(5) identifies the same provisions 
in the Statute, and if an amendment to any of them is proposed by the 
Commission, the Council’s vote on the matter must be unanimous. If such an 
amendment is proposed by the ECB itself, the Council may vote by QMV. 
The Constitution thus offers a shift to QMV for Commission-proposed 
amendments only. Arguably this would be an inter-institutional change that 
would remove a measure of protection for the ECB against unwanted 
adjustments to its Statute. 
 
d. ECB Executive Board. Constitution Article III-382(2) permits the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank to be appointed by a qualified 
majority vote of the European Council (euro-zone Member State 
representatives only870). This is a change from EC Treaty Article 112(2) 
which requires the appointment to be made by the common accord of the 
heads of state or government of the euro-zone Member States.871 
 
e. Court of Justice Statute. Article III-381 of the Constitution allows a 
European law (requiring only a qualified majority vote of the Council) to 
amend all but Title I and Article 64 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. Title 
I sets the basic rights and duties of judges, while Article 64 governs the 
language arrangements at the Court, and amendments to these provisions 
                                                 
870 Constitution art. III-197(2)(h). 
871 EC Treaty art. 122(3). 
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would require a constitutional amendment. The corresponding treaty 
provision is EC Treaty Article 245, which requires a unanimous Council 
decision for amendments to the Statute, with Title I (but not Article 64) 
excepted. While amendment to Article 64 actually becomes more demanding 
under the Constitution, requiring a constitutional amendment rather than a 
mere Council vote, in general the Constitution offers a broad shift to qualified 
majority voting for changes to the Statute. 
 
f. Specialised courts. Constitution Article III-359 permits European 
laws to create and set the governing rules for specialised courts to be attached 
to the General Court (currently called the Court of First Instance). These laws 
would require a qualified majority vote of the Council, whereas similar 
provisions in Article 225a of the EC Treaty require a unanimous Council 
decision. Interestingly, the Constitution retains the Treaty’s requirement that 
members of specialised courts be appointed by unanimous vote of the 
Council, and both the Treaty and Constitution permit a QMV Council vote to 
approve rules of procedure for the special panels. 
 
g. Intellectual property jurisdiction. Pursuant to Constitution Article 
III-364, a European law may be approved by a QMV decision of the Council 
to confer jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice in regard to European 
Union intellectual property rights. This is a change from EC Treaty Article 
229a, which specifies that such Council decisions be taken unanimously. In an 
age of increasing emphasis on intellectual property, the ability of the Council 
to more easily expand the Court’s jurisdiction must be seen as an 
acknowledgment of the need for greater efficiency in EU lawmaking in this 
field. 
 
2.2 Resources and revenues 
 
a. Own resources. Constitution Article I-54(4) permits a European 
law with a QMV Council vote to implement measures relating to the Union’s 
own resources. However, such an implementing law must be based on a 
policy previously approved by a unanimous Council vote. EC Treaty Article 
269 requires unanimity at both stages. Because the budget is a politically 
sensitive area, it is apparently necessary to preserve the veto power of each 
Member State at the critical policy-setting stage. Any state that is concerned 
about subsequent implementation can withhold its vote at the policy stage 
until any controversial aspects of implementation are agreed in advance. 
 
b. Revenues. Article III-412(2) of the Constitution permits the 
Council to adopt by QMV a European regulation governing how EU budget 
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revenues will be made available to the Commission. This is a change from EC 
Treaty Article 279(2), which does not contemplate a shift from unanimity to 
QMV.  
 
2.3 Internal market 
 
a. Social security. Constitution Article III-136 permits European laws 
or framework laws, approved by a QMV decision of the Council, to protect 
the social security of workers moving from one state to another within the 
Union. This is a change from the predecessor provision, EC Treaty Article 42, 
which specifies that the Council must act unanimously on these matters. 
Despite this potentially significant change, Article III-136(2) of the 
Constitution provides an “emergency brake” by which a Member State may 
refer the question to the European Council (for a unanimous decision) on 
grounds that a proposed EU law might “affect fundamental aspects of its 
social security system.” Thus, under Article III-136 it is possible that some 
decisions by QMV might be made despite opposition, but realistically no 
Member State need fear that the Constitution would affect its sovereignty on 
any vital matter. 
 
b. Freedom to provide services. The right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services are covered by Articles III-137 to III-150 of the 
Constitution, and these provisions correspond closely to Articles 43 to 45 of 
the EC Treaty. Under both the Constitution and the Treaty, EU legislation in 
these areas is governed by the general rule of QMV decision-making on the 
Council. One particular point of difference is that in relation to “the taking-up 
and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons,” the Constitution 
consistently provides for QMV decisions, while Article 47(2) of the Treaty 
requires a unanimous Council decision “on directives the implementation of 
which involves in at least one Member State amendment of the existing 
principles laid down by law governing the professions with respect to training 
and conditions of access for natural persons.” The Constitution’s elimination 
of this one unanimity requirement reflects a specific shift to QMV, the result 
of which could be more efficient EU decision-making on the matter of 
professional licensing.  
 
2.4 Policies in other areas 
 
a. Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. Constitution Article III-223 
addresses the point at which QMV will be permitted regarding the Structural 
Funds and Cohesion Fund. Under the Constitution the first provisions on 
these funds to be adopted after the signing of the Constitution would be 
15:  NEW APPLICATIONS OF QMV  261 
 
approved unanimously by the Council, and thereafter European laws (with 
Council QMV) would be utilised. This is a change from EC Treaty Article 
161, under which QMV would replace unanimity on January 1, 2007, if a 
multiannual financial perspective and an Interinstitutional Agreement have 
been adopted. The constitutional provision represents a timing change, with 
no apparent alteration of the underlying policies. 
 
b. Transport. European legislation to support a common transport 
policy is permitted by Constitution Article III-236(2), and the Council’s 
decision on these new laws will be determined by qualified majority vote. 
Article III-236(3) requires that these laws take account of “cases where their 
application might seriously affect the standard of living and level of 
employment in certain regions, and the operation of transport facilities.” In 
contrast, EC Treaty Article 71(2) states that where these special circumstances 
exist the EU legislation is subject to a unanimous Council vote. The 
Constitution’s provision thus eliminates the veto of a Member State that might 
be concerned about the standard of living within one of its own regions or that 
of a different state. 
 
2.5 Area of freedom, security and justice 
 
Constitution Articles III-257 to III-277 provide for a wide variety of 
EU laws in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), and in most 
instances the decisions of the Council will be made by QMV. On the surface 
this appears to be a major shift from the Treaties. For example, under TEU 
Article 34(2) the Council is required to act unanimously in a number of 
matters that correspond to the Constitution’s AFSJ provisions. Furthermore, 
EC Treaty Article 67(1) generally requires unanimity for decisions on matters 
found within Articles 61 to 69 of that treaty, which also correspond to certain 
constitutional provisions on AFSJ. EC Treaty Article 67(2) contemplates a 
move away from unanimity in this field, but it does require a unanimous 
Council decision to shift certain decisions to QMV.872 Despite the fact that a 
Council decision in December, 2004, did institute QMV for certain matters 
under Articles 62 and 63,873 the Constitution would apparently generate 
greater movement in this direction.  
                                                 
872 See Chapter 16 of this treatise (analysing the AFSJ). 
873 Decision of the Council of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered 
by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be 
governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, Dec. 22, 2004, 
O.J. (L 396) 45 [hereinafter 22 December 2004 Council Decision].  The Decision 
approves QMV decisions on (i) the crossing of internal EU borders (EC Treaty art. 
62(1), (ii) standards and procedures for checking persons crossing external EU 
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 There is, however, a theoretical catch to all of this. Article III-258 of 
the Constitution requires the European Council to “define the strategic 
guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, 
security and justice.” Such action, of course, will require a unanimous 
decision. As a practical matter, these guidelines would ordinarily be on the 
broadest level, and the European Council would not insert itself into the 
details of lawmaking. However, as a political matter, a Member State with 
concerns as to the ultimate nuts and bolts of AFSJ legislation theoretically 
could object at the strategic guideline stage. Such an objection might be tabled 
to avoid future legislation that would be initiated by the Commission and 
ultimately voted upon by the Council through QMV. This scenario might be 
highly unlikely, but the Constitution seems to create the possibility.874 
 
 The specific voting changes relating to the AFSJ are as follows: 
 
a. Administrative cooperation. Constitution Article III-263 permits 
the Council, by QMV, to adopt EU regulations relating to administrative 
cooperation in the area of AFSJ. TEU Article 34(2), although not specifically 
referring to administrative cooperation, requires unanimity for actions of this 
type. 
 
b. Border controls.  Article III-265 of the Constitution provides for 
EU laws, with the Council voting by QMV, to set forth a policy on border 
controls. This is a change from EC Treaty Article 62, in which measures on 
border controls are subject to the unanimity requirement of EC Treaty Article 
67(1) unless the Council under Article 67(2) unanimously decides that QMV 
is to be employed. In fact, such a Council decision was made in December, 
2004,875 but the Constitution would enshrine the qualified majority vote.  
 
c. Asylum.  Constitution Article III-266(2) permits EU laws to 
determine a “common European asylum system,” with the Council approving 
the measures by a qualified majority vote. This is a departure from EC Treaty 
Article 63, which contemplates such measures,876 but under which 
                                                                                                                    
borders (art. 62(2)(a)), and (iii) measures relating to third country nationals traveling 
within the EU (art. 62(3)). The Decision leaves intact the unanimous voting 
requirement for rules on the issuance of visas to third country nationals (EC Treaty 
art. 62(2)(b)). 
874 For an extensive analysis of the AFSJ and for further references to Article III-258, 
see Chapter 16 of this treatise. 
875 22 December 2004 Council Decision, supra note 873.  
876 EC Treaty art. 63(1), (2). 
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Community action is subject to the unanimity provisions of EC Treaty Article 
67(1). However, note that under Article 67(2) the December 2004 Council 
decision has partially shifted Article 63 to QMV.877 The Constitution would 
complete the shift. 
 
d. Immigration.  European laws or framework laws (with a QMV 
Council approval) to provide for a common immigration policy are mandated 
by Constitution Article III-267.878 This deviates from EC Treaty Article 63, 
whose corresponding measures879 are subject to the unanimity provisions of 
EC Treaty Article 67. However, note that the December 2004 Council 
decision has partially shifted Article 63 to QMV.880 
 
e. Cooperation in criminal matters.  Constitution Article III-270(2) 
permits European framework laws, approved by a QMV decision of the 
Council, to establish minimum rules for cooperation on recognition of 
judgments and in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This is a 
change from TEU Articles 30(1) and 31(1), in which legislation is subject to 
the unanimity requirements of TEU Article 34(2). Note, however, that the 
constitutional provision is subject to an “emergency brake” by which by 
which a Member State may refer the question to the European Council (for a 
unanimous decision) on grounds that a proposed EU law might “affect 
fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system.”881 This is a highly 
significant protection for the Member States, and it dramatically undercuts the 
effectiveness of the shift to QMV. 
 
f. Definition of criminal offences. Legislation to define certain 
criminal offences having cross-border dimensions is permitted by Article III-
271(1) and (2) of the Constitution. The Council would approve such 
                                                 
877 22 December 2004 Council Decision, supra note 873. The Decision moves to 
QMV all decisions on measures aimed at balancing the efforts among Member States 
with regard to receiving and caring for refugees (EC Treaty art. 63(2)(b)). The 
Decision leaves in place the setting of standards and mechanisms for asylum (art. 
63(1) and setting standards relating to temporary protection to displaced persons (art. 
63(2)(a)). 
878 Constitution art. III-267(2), (4). 
879 EC Treaty art. 63(3). 
880 22 December 2004 Council Decision, supra note 873. The Decision permits QMV 
decisions immigration measures relating to immigration and illegal residence, 
including repatriation of illegal residents (EC Treaty art. 63(3)(b)). The Decision does 
not change the unanimity requirement for measures on conditions of entry and 
residence, and standards for issuance of long-term visas and residence permits (art. 
63(3)(a)). 
881 Constitution art. III-270(3). 
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legislation by a qualified majority vote. The corresponding TEU provision, 
Article 31(1)(e), subjects such legislation to the unanimity requirements of 
TEU Article 34(2). However, the Constitution once again provides an 
“emergency brake,” permitting any Member State to move the question to the 
European Council for a unanimous decision. The only justification required 
for such a referral is the Member State’s belief that a proposed EU law might 
“affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system.”882 
 
g. Eurojust. Constitution Article III-273(1) mandates EU legislation 
(with the Council approving by QMV) to determine the structure of Eurojust, 
its field of activities and its responsibilities. Under the Treaties this is 
governed by TEU Article 31(2), under which such activity is subject to the 
unanimity requirements of TEU Article 34(2). 
 
h. Non-operational police cooperation. EU legislation on non-
operational aspects of police cooperation is permitted under Constitution 
Article III-275(2), with such legislation to be approved by the Council on a 
qualified majority vote. Under TEU Article 30(1) all aspects of legislation 
relating to police cooperation are subject to the unanimity requirement of 
TEU Article 34(2). 
 
 i. Europol. Article III-276(2) of the Constitution requires EU 
legislation to determine Europol’s structure and responsibilities. Once again 
the ordinary procedure would have the Council voting by qualified majority, 
whereas under TEU Article 30(2) all aspects of legislation relating to Europol 
are subject to the unanimity requirement of TEU Article 34(2). 
 
2.6 Areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action 
 
The only voting change with regard to the Union’s actions to support, 
coordinate or complement Member State activities is found in Constitution 
Article III-280, which addresses EU action to “contribute to the flowering of 
the cultures of the Member States.” This provision authorises European laws 
and framework laws to create “incentive measures,” and it further permits 
recommendations, all of which may be adopted by a qualified majority 
decision of the Council. The same activities under EC Treaty Article 151 
specifically require unanimous Council approval. 
 
                                                 
882 Constitution art. III-271(3). 
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2.7  External action 
 
a. Decisions based on European Council requests. Constitution 
Article III-300(2) identifies certain European decisions in the field of 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that may be made by the Council 
through a qualified majority vote. This expands a list of QMV decisions 
permitted under Article 23(2) of the TEU, and it does so by providing for a 
qualified majority vote on all proposals presented by the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. However, such proposals must be based on a request from 
the European Council, which would act unanimously. In addition, several 
safeguards under the TEU would be preserved in the Constitution. First, under 
Article III-300(2) as well as under TEU Article 23(2) a Member State might 
invoke “vital and stated reasons of national policy” and force referral of a 
Council matter to the European Council for a unanimous vote. Second, under 
Article III-300(1) and TEU Article 23(1) a Member State might abstain from 
a Council vote and declare its intention not to be bound by the decision. 
Finally, Constitution Article III-295(1) carries forward the mandate of TEU 
Article 13(1) that the general guidelines for the CFSP are to be determined by 
the European Council, acting unanimously. 
 
 b. Operating expenditures.  Article III-313(2) permits the Council to 
decide that particular CFSP expenditures should not be charged to the EU 
operating budget, and if such a decision is made, the Council may decide how 
to allocate the expenditures among the Member States.  Both Council 
decisions would be by QMV. EC Treaty Article 28(3) contains similar 
provisions, but the Council decisions must be unanimous. 
 
2.8 Assessing the changes 
 
A legitimate question is whether the identified items would provide 
for the loss of veto power in any areas of policy that are critical to Member 
State sovereignty. Brendan Donnelly and Lars Hoffmann have described the 
additional areas for QMV as “technical policy areas with cross-border 
implications . . . .”883 Andreas Føllesdal comments that the move toward more 
QMV decision-making in the EU “requires a well-developed trust in other 
Europeans and officials,” and that it is “unsurprising that the default 
procedure [QMV] does not apply in a number of key cases involving 
legislation on matters close to national sovereignty.”884  
                                                 
883 Brendan Donnelly & Lars Hoffmann, All change or no change? Convention, 
constitution and national sovereignty, The Federal Trust Policy Brief No. 1, at 3 
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief1.pdf. 
884 Føllesdal TFT, supra note 323, at 5. 
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 The items described above indeed consist primarily of non-critical 
areas relating to the functioning of the EU and its current programs. However, 
several of the changes arguably would go beyond the category of technical 
adjustment. Foremost among these is the change to qualified majority voting 
in many aspects of the area of freedom, security and justice. The Member 
States would retain certain veto rights, but a significant shift would occur in 
the field of AFSJ.885 The analysis in Chapter 16 examines these areas more 
closely. Another change of interest is the broadening of QMV on EU laws 
that support free movement of professional services. The loss of the limited 
unanimity requirement under EC Treaty Article 47(2) might be narrow in 
scope, but it arguably would affect Member State control over professional 
training and licensing. A third item of note relates to EU support for culture. 
The elimination of unanimity in this area might raise concerns in countries of 
particular cultural sensitivity, such as France. It is fair to predict that cultural 
affairs will not become a major EU program in the near future, if ever, but the 
field has the potential to be classified as more than mere technical cross-
border policy. 
 
It is also interesting to consider whether under the Constitution there 
could be future movement toward more qualified majority voting. As noted in 
Chapter 11,886 Article IV-444 of the Constitution does provide a “simplified” 
amendment process, not found in the Treaties, to change the Council’s voting 
procedures in any area. However, even this streamlined procedure would 
require a unanimous decision by the European Council and the right of any 
national parliament to block the change.887 Each Member State would thus 
have two opportunities to exercise its veto over any attempt to change any 
aspect of unanimous Council voting to decision by QMV. 
  
 There are several additional articles in the Constitution that permit 
increased qualified majority voting on the Council, without the Article IV-444 
amendment process. These passerelle provisions include the following: 
 
--Articles I-40(7) and III-300(3) permit additional QMV to be 
instituted in the common foreign and security policy. 
 
                                                 
885 As noted in part 2.5 of this chapter, there is the theoretical possibility that the shift 
to QMV could be affected by the European Council’s right to (unanimously) set 
strategic guidelines in matters of the AFSJ. 
886 See part 2 of Chapter 11 of this treatise. 
887 Constitution art. IV-444(3). 
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--Article I-55(4) allows the establishment of more QMV in relation to 
the EU’s multiannual financial framework. 
 
--Article III-269(3) provides for QMV to be expanded in certain 
matters of family law with cross-border implications. 
 
--Article III-422(1) permits additional QMV (participating Member 
States only) within a program of enhanced cooperation. 
 
These bridging provisions are without precedent in the Treaties. However, 
each decision to permit more qualified majority voting on the Council 
requires a unanimous decision of the European Council. In the case of a 
program of enhanced cooperation, only those European Council members 
representing participating Member States will take part in the decision. 
 
How should these proposed new areas of qualified majority voting be 
viewed? There would indisputably be some movement toward more QMV, 
and a positive comment is offered by Janis A. Emmanouilidis: 
 
The extension of decisions taken by majority in the Council of 
Ministers is a step forward for the enlarged EU’s ability to act 
efficiently. It is also positive that decisions in the Council of 
Ministers taken on the grounds of the ordinary legislative procedure 
will as a rule be decided by qualified majority. Exceptions to this rule, 
when Council decisions are to be taken on the basis of unanimity, will 
have to be explicitly listed. In the end, this will not only substantially 
improve the enlarged EU’s ability to act. It will also help prevent 
unjustified crossover deals, for example, between milk quotas and tax 
issues.888 
 
Nevertheless, as the above analysis demonstrates, it is difficult to conclude 
that the Constitution’s new areas of qualified majority voting would represent 
a major shift toward greater centralisation and away from the existing, critical 
reservations of Member State sovereignty. 
 
3. NEW SUBJECTS FOR APPLICATION OF QMV 
 
 This section addresses those provisions in the Constitution that would 
create new areas of EU legislative activity subject to qualified majority voting 
                                                 
888 Emmanouilidis, supra note 766, at 5. 
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on the Council.889 Under the Treaties these new matters would either (1) fall 
outside the EU’s competence, in which case action would not be possible, or 
(2) if relating to “the operation of the common market,” be subject to EC 
Treaty Article 308. This provision permits legislation in new internal market 
fields outside the Community’s specified powers, but always subject to a 
unanimous vote on the Council. The Constitution contains its own flexibility 
clause, Article I-18, and it likewise requires unanimous Council action to 
approve lawmaking on subjects not specifically covered in the document’s 
text.890 However, the new subjects identified below are addressed explicitly 
and affirmatively in the Constitution, and thus there would be no need to 
resort to the special requirements of Article I-18. 
 
In instituting these new fields of EU activity, the drafters of the 
Constitution could have selected a unanimous voting requirement as a 
reflection of what the EC Treaty would have required under Article 308. But 
the Constitution was an opportunity to update the text of the Treaties and to 
provide for new subjects that fit within the current and anticipated needs of 
the Union, and in addressing these new fields the drafters decided that the 
more efficient procedure of qualified majority voting on the Council would be 
appropriate. 
 
In the following list, unless there is a specific mention of the required 
voting method, the utilisation of qualified majority voting by the Council 
would stem from application of the Constitution’s ordinary legislative 
procedure under Article I-23(3). Also note that one identified item (number 
3.1(b) below) calls for a QMV decision by the European Council. All of the 
provisions mentioned below are articles of the Constitution unless otherwise 
noted.  
 
3.1 Institutional and general Union matters 
 
a. Accession to ECHR. Article I-9(2) requires the EU to accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Article III-325(8) specifies that the Council will act by qualified 
majority vote in negotiating international agreements, and the Convention 
                                                 
889 For a list of the Constitution’s new legal bases, both those permitting QMV 
decision-making and those requiring unanimity, see Piris, supra note 304, at 215 
(Annex 4). 
890 Note that Article I-18 is not limited to matters of the common market, but covers 
all subjects addressed in Part III of the Constitution. 
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accession would be subject to that procedure. The Treaties do not contemplate 
this accession.891 
 
b. New Council configurations. Article I-24(4) permits the European 
Council to decide by QMV the list of Council configurations other than 
Foreign Affairs. This coincides with the European Council’s mandate under I-
24(7) to determine by qualified majority vote the rotation of the Presidencies 
of Council formations. EC Treaty Article 203 requires a unanimous vote of 
the Council to set the Presidency rotations, but it does not address how 
configurations are to be created. 
 
c. Representation on advisory committees. Under Article I-32 the 
Council may adopt European decisions regarding the types of representatives 
who will comprise the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and 
Social Committee. Adjustments are contemplated to reflect “economic, social 
and demographic developments within the Union.” Actual composition of the 
committees – the number of members allocated to each Member State – is 
subject to a unanimous Council vote under Articles III-386 and III-389. The 
EC Treaty specifies the allocation of members by country, but it is silent as to 
adjusting the segments of society represented. 
 
d. Citizen initiatives. Article I-47(4) requires European laws to 
determine the procedures and conditions for citizen initiatives. These 
initiatives are not contemplated in the Treaties. 
 
e. Withdrawal agreement. If a Member State wishes to withdraw from 
the Union under Article I-60, subsection 2 of that provision requires the 
Council, acting by QMV, to conclude an agreement with the withdrawing 
state. There is no withdrawal provision in the Treaties. 
 
f. Services of general economic interest. Article III-122 permits EU 
laws to establish principles and conditions relating to services of the general 
economic interest to be provided by the Union. Article 16 of the EC Treaty 
addresses these services, but there is no provision for any EU legislation on 
the matter. 
 
g. Diplomatic and consular protection. Article III-127 permits EU 
laws to facilitate Member State diplomatic and consular protection of Union 
citizens in third countries. EC Treaty Article 20 contemplates such protection, 
but with no provision for EU legislation on the subject. 
                                                 
891 See discussion in part 3 of Chapter 7 of this treatise. 
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h. EU administration. European laws to support an “open, efficient 
and independent European administration” of the EU institutions are 
mandated by Article III-398(2). There is no precedent for this provision in the 
Treaties. 
 
3.2 Internal market 
 
Intellectual property. Article III-176 permits European legislation to 
create European intellectual property rights. This is a new field, not covered 
in the Treaties. 
 
3.3 Policies in other areas 
 
a. Space. European laws and framework laws to create a European 
space programme are permitted by Article III-254(2). Space is not a subject of 
the Treaties. 
 
b. Energy. Article III-256(2) permits legislation to support a Union 
policy on energy. Although Article 3(u) of the EC Treaty mentions energy as 
one of a long list of Community activities, there are no specific provisions for 
legislation in the field. 
 
3.4 Area of freedom, security and justice 
 
Crime Prevention. Article III-272 permits EU laws to support 
Member State efforts in crime prevention. TEU Article 31 generally supports 
cooperation in criminal matters through judicial cooperation and through 
Eurojust.892 However, it does not specifically mention crime prevention 
measures. Although this is best considered as a new matter that would be 
subject to the unanimity requirement under Article 308 of the EC Treaty, it 
could also be argued that it falls within the scope of TEU Article 31, in which 
case it would be subject to the general unanimity requirement of TEU Article 
34(2). In any event, the Constitution’s permission for legislation approved by 
a qualified majority vote on the Council is an extension of what is possible 
under the Treaties. 
 
                                                 
892 TEU art. 31(1), (2). 
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3.5 Areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action 
 
a. Public health. Article III-278 permits the Union to take action 
complementary to national policies aimed at improving public health and 
preventing disease. In general, the terms of this article are carried over from 
EC Treaty Article 152, but two changes are noteworthy. First, where the 
Treaty refers only to the Community taking “measures” to contribute to public 
health, the Constitution specifically calls for European laws and framework 
laws pursue the public health goals. Second, the Constitution expands upon 
the Treaty’s list of Community activities by mandating the Union to take 
action for the purpose of combating cross-border threats to health,893 setting 
standards for medicines and medical devices,894 and dealing with the use of 
tobacco and alcohol.895  
 
Interestingly, health issues are described in Constitution Article I-
14(2)(k) as part of the Union’s shared competence, but at the same time health 
is identified in Article I-17(a) as a matter of supporting, coordinating or 
complementary action. This creates confusion as to the force of EU action – 
does it preclude Member State activity or not? Article I-12(2) grants the 
Union the first right to exercise its competence if an area is “shared,” and such 
EU acts enjoy primacy over Member State. On the other hand, Article I-12(5) 
states that in areas of supporting action the Union’s acts may not supersede 
Member State competence. Subsection 4 of Article III-278 attempts to resolve 
the inconsistency by cross-referencing Article I-14(2)(k) – and at the same 
time specifically excluding the application of Articles I-12(5) and I-17(a) – 
and stating that the actions described in that subsection will fall within the 
general rule for matters of shared competence. The items listed in subsection 
4 include the new subjects of combating cross-border threats to health and 
setting standards for medicines and medical devices. 
 
b. Tourism. Article III-281(2) provides for EU laws to promote 
European tourism. The EC Treaty mentions tourism in Article 3(u) as a 
subject of Community activity, but no separate provision is made for 
legislation in the field. 
 
c. Sport. Article III-282(2) permits legislation to promote and support 
sporting activities. Sport is not mentioned in the Treaties. 
 
                                                 
893 Constitution art. III-278(1)(b). 
894 Constitution art. III-278(4)(d). 
895 Constitution art. III-278(5). 
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d. Civil protection. Article III-284 provides for Union legislation to 
support Member State cooperation in civil protection. Civil protection is 
mentioned in Article 3(u) of the EC Treaty, but its inclusion as a Community 
“activity” is not accompanied by any specific call for legislation. 
 
e. Administrative assistance. Article III-285(2) allows for EU laws to 
assist Member States in improving their administrative capacity to implement 
EU law. There is no counterpart to this provision in the Treaties. 
 
3.6 External action 
 
a. European Defence Agency. Article III-311(2) permits the Council 
to adopt a European decision by qualified majority vote to define the “statute, 
seat and operational rules” of the European Defence Agency, a body not 
contemplated in the Treaties. It should be noted that the Council’s ability to 
act by QMV is limited to the statute, seat and operational rules. Actual 
creation of the Agency and its mandate would be subject to the general 
unanimity requirement relating to Council decisions in the CFSP, set forth in 
Article III-300 of the Constitution. In addition, the Agency’s birth would 
likely be the result of a unanimously adopted European Council policy 
guideline issued under Article III-295(2).  
 
b. Permanent structured cooperation. Article III-312(2) permits a 
European decision of the Council, pursuant to a qualified majority vote, to 
establish a permanent structured cooperation in the area of defence and to 
determine which Member States will participate. In addition, Article III-
312(3) contemplates a QMV decision (by Council members of participating 
states only) that a particular Member State qualifies to be engaged in the 
cooperation, while Article III-312(4) permits such a decision that would end a 
state’s participation. Although the word “cooperation” is used frequently in 
the CFSP provisions of the Treaty on European Union,896 the precise concept 
of “permanent structured cooperation” is not presented. This is a new 
construct under the Constitution, and the provision for a QMV Council vote is 
a departure from the general requirement of Article III-300 that Council 
decisions in the CFSP be unanimous, as well as the requirement of Article I-
41(4) for unanimity in Council decisions on the common security and defence 
policy. Furthermore, it should be noted that the general establishment of a 
“common defence” is subject to a unanimous decision of the European 
Council under Article I-41(2). 
 
                                                 
896 TEU articles 11-28. 
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c. Start-up fund. Article III-313(3) permits the Council to adopt a 
European decision as to how to provide EU budget appropriations relating to 
urgent policies under the common security and defence policy. The same 
provision permits a European decision on the creation and administration of a 
start-up fund for these purposes, which is to be made up of contributions by 
the Member States. 
 
d. Urgent financial assistance. Under Article III-320 the Council may 
make European decisions when “the situation in a third country requires 
urgent financial assistance from the Union.” There is no counterpart to this 
provision in the Treaties. 
 
e. Humanitarian aid. Article III-321(3) mandates EU legislation to 
determine the framework within which the Union’s humanitarian aid 
operations will be implemented. TEU Article 17(2) makes reference to 
“humanitarian and rescue tasks” as part of the CFSP, but a formal, ongoing 
program of humanitarian aid is not mentioned. 
 
f. Aid Corps. A European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps is 
contemplated in Article III-321(5), and European laws may determine its 
operating rules. This is an entirely new program. 
 
g. Solidarity clause. Article III-329(2) permits a European decision of 
the Council to implement the solidarity clause of Article I-43. This clause 
requires the Member States to support any of them that becomes a victim of a 
terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. While solidarity is 
mentioned as a political ideal in the Treaties, Articles I-43 and III-329 of the 
Constitution are unprecedented.  
 
3.7 No major shift in EU competences  
 
Many of the matters described in this section are intriguing, and a few 
may even be dramatic. Citizen initiatives and the Article I-60 withdrawal 
clause have been controversial. Expansion of EU activity into space, public 
health, tourism, sport and energy could potentially extend the impact of the 
Union in people’s lives and imaginations. A European Peace Corps could help 
young people further identify with the EU as a whole. However, it is difficult 
to conclude that these activities would meaningfully expand the competences 
of the Union. Perhaps the most attention will be paid to those proposed 
changes in the EU’s external activities, which are always matters of 
heightened national sensitivity. However, the common foreign and security 
policy even under the Constitution would generally be subject to unanimity 
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requirements, so Member States should have been assured that the approved 
new areas of QMV-based activity in external affairs would not lead to 
unapproved expansion into other areas.  
 
Overall, it is fair to suggest that most of the Constitution’s new 
subjects are technical institutional matters, subjects tied to existing Union 
activity, or fields that pose no threat to essential Member State sovereignty. 
 
4.  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES UNANIMITY 
 
 To conclude this analysis of voting requirements, it is useful to 
identify all of the points in the Constitution in which a unanimous vote, 
consensus or common accord – by all Member States or their representatives 
– would be required to enact EU legislation, make decisions or otherwise 
carry out EU law. Because these matters are rather numerous, the list of such 
provisions is placed in the Addendum. A review of these items reveals that 
most references are to decisions of the Council, for which unanimity is the 
exception rather than the rule. However, the addendum also identifies each 
instance in which the Constitution mentions a decision of the European 
Council, either specifying that it must be taken by consensus or unanimous 
vote, or not specifying a voting procedure, in which case the default 
consensus requirement of Article I-21(4) would govern.897 In addition to acts 
of the two councils, the addendum identifies several provisions in which the 
unanimous consent of the Member State governments is specifically 
mandated. 
 
 The retention of unanimity is may be characterised as positive or 
negative,898 depending on one’s feelings about whether the European Union 
should be federal or intergovernmental in character. Nevertheless, unanimous 
decision-making remains an important feature of the Union landscape. As 
                                                 
897 Those few situations in which the European Council may vote by less than 
unanimity have been described in note 723, supra. 
898 Janis A Emmanouilidis has commented: 
In the case of the extension of majority decision-making in the Council of 
Ministers, it is unfortunate that the Constitution provides for a large number 
of areas where decisions will still be taken unanimously. Most prominent 
among these are tax harmonization, questions of social security, some areas 
of trade in services and intellectual property, some areas of environmental 
policy, anti-discrimination measures, European legislation on structural and 
cohesion funds (through January 1, 2007), some areas of immigration policy, 
and – with a few exceptions – the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Emmanouilidis, supra note 766, at 7.  
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noted in previous discussions, the unanimity requirements in the Constitution 
in many ways offer the essential protection and preservation of Member State 
sovereignty within the EU. These provisions mark the brightest dividing lines 
between majoritarian-based Union authority and the ability of each Member 
State to prevent Union encroachment in matters of vital national interest.  
 
5. UNANIMITY, QMV AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 Some critics of the Constitution have complained of a wholesale shift 
of decision-making on the Council from unanimity to QMV. Section 2 of this 
chapter identifies all such changes – and there are a number – but if each of 
them represents the shift of one of the EU’s dividing lines, what is their 
overall impact? Added together, it does not appear to be cause for any alarm. 
At best there is evidence of further incremental movement of the sort that has 
characterised the course of the EU throughout its history. But this 
development is both logical and measured, fashioned to make the Union more 
effective in light of today’s challenges. It is not designed as an assault on the 
general competence or sovereignty of the Member States. 
 
 Similarly, the new areas of EU activity for which QMV is specified, 
as described in Section 3 of this chapter, appear to be carefully contained. 
Overall, they would enhance existing and related Union responsibilities. They 
certainly lack the drama of the changes instituted by the Maastricht Treaty. 
These new areas of activity demonstrate an attempt to continue the evolution 
of an organisation that seeks to respond to the times and meet the needs of its 
members. The proposed new competences for the Union represent a shifting 
of the dividing lines, but not in a manner that should strike fear in the hearts 
of anyone but the most dedicated of Euro-sceptics.   
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Part Four:  The Subject Matters of EU Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In addition to its general principles, institutional descriptions and a 
procedural overview of Union activities, Part I of the Constitution describes 
the basic substantive division of responsibilities between the EU and its 
Member States. As previously noted, this division is framed in terms of 
exclusive Union competences, competences shared with the Member States 
and areas in which the Union may support, coordinate or complement the 
Member States.899  Beyond this introduction, Article I-12(6) prescribes that 
“[t]he scope of and arrangements for exercising the Union’s competences 
shall be determined by the provisions specific to each area in Part III.” Part III 
is titled “The Policies and Functioning of the Union,”900 and it incorporates 
the bulk of what has been contained in the EC Treaty and TEU. As a result, 
Part III contains two-thirds of the total text of the Constitution and provides 
the primary coverage of the Union’s substantive activities.  
 
 Chapters 16 (the area of freedom, security and justice) and 17 
(internal activities and external action) examine the subjects of EU activity. 
The AFSJ is addressed first, because it would be most significantly affected 
by the Constitution. Because of the great amount of text devoted to the 
Union’s other internal activities and its external action, the analysis in Chapter 
17 is generally limited to the constitutional articles that might impact the EU’s 
dividing lines. The titles relating to internal and external action are: 
 
--Title III (Articles III-130 to III-285) – “Internal Policies and 
Action”  
                                                 
899 See discussion in part 4 of Chapter 12 of this treatise. 
900 Constitution arts. III-115 to III-436. 
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--Title IV (Articles III-286 to III-291) – “Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories”  
 
--Title V (Articles III-292 to III-329) – “The Union’s External 
Action”  
 
It should also be noted that certain titles in Part III of the Constitution 
are not addressed at all in these chapters. Those other titles address broad 
concepts and institutional matters that are dealt with in other parts of this 
treatise. They include:  
 
--Title I (Articles III-115 to III-122) – “Provisions of General 
Application”  
 
--Title II (Articles III-123 to III-129) – “Non-Discrimination and 
Citizenship” 
 
--Title VI (Articles III-330 to III-423) – “The Functioning of the 
Union,” including extensive provisions relating to the EU institutions, 
EU fiscal matters and the rules for enhanced cooperation 
 
 --Title VII (Articles III-424 to III-436) – “Common Provisions.” 
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Chapter 16 
 
 
The AFSJ – Justice and Home Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Constitution’s area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) is 
presented in Articles III-257 to III-277. It comprises subject matter that is 
covered partly in the TEU (the Third Pillar of the Treaties) and partly in the 
EC Treaty.901 The constitutional provisions have been described as a grouping 
that “brings together the already ‘communitarized’ provisions on border 
checks, asylum and immigration and on judicial cooperation in civil matters 
with the third pillar provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.”902 As the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, the regrouping of the 
AFSJ provisions has ramifications well beyond mere organisational 
convenience. The effective transfer of the Third Pillar provisions into a field 
of ordinary legislative procedure also shifts unanimous Council decision-
making to qualified majority voting, thus adjusting one of the EU’s dividing 
lines in the direction of centralised administration. 
 
 The Constitution introduces the AFSJ in various sections of its Part I. 
In Article I-2 the term “justice” is included among the values that are to 
prevail in the Union. Article I-3(2) mandates the EU to “offer its citizens an 
                                                 
901 TEU arts. 29–42; EC Treaty arts. 61–69 (regarding visas, asylum, immigration and 
other matters). See also TEU art. 2 (describing as a Union objective the creation of an 
area of freedom, security and justice). 
902 Kokott & Ruth, supra note 116, at 1325. For a general analysis on the AFSJ, 
including the tensions between public order and individual rights within the European 
Union, see Hans Lindahl, Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice:  The 
European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity, 29 Eur. L. Rev. 461 (2004). For a 
history of the evolution of the AFSJ from its beginnings to its treatment in the 
Constitution, see Kuijper, supra note 575, at 609. Kuijper’s topics include “The 
evolution of the Third Pillar and the intergovernmental method,” “Transition to the 
Community method,” “Variable geometry,” and “Integration of the Schengen 
Acquis.” 
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area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers.” Article I-5(1) 
requires the Union to respect the Member States, “including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security.” A more specific reference is found in Article I-14(2), 
where the AFSJ is designated as a matter of shared competence. In Part II of 
the Constitution there is a series of provisions under the title “Justice,” and 
these establish the rights of the individual within the criminal justice 
system.903 As described below, the primary substantive provisions are found 
in Article I-42 and in a series of articles in Part III.904 
 
 Under the Constitution the field would be subject to the ordinary 
forms of EU legislation, while the TEU provides for a separate set of 
instruments (common positions, framework decisions, decisions and 
conventions)905 and the EC Treaty speaks of “measures” being adopted.906 
Specific comparisons between the constitutional provisions and those found in 
the Treaties will be made in the ensuing discussion. The Constitution’s 
chapter on the AFSJ is divided into five sections, which will be analysed 
separately. 
 
1. SETTING THE STAGE (I-42, III-257 – III-264) 
 
 The general provisions in Articles I-42 and III-257 to III-264 have 
their counterparts in Articles 29 to 42 of the TEU, which constitute the Third 
Pillar of the European Union, and in certain provisions of the EC Treaty 
relating to visas, asylum, immigration and other related matters.907 The textual 
arrangement in the Constitution is quite different from the Treaties, and thus 
tracking the similarities and differences in the two documents involves an 
extended exercise in text-finding. To make the comparisons somewhat easier, 
the following analysis will describe each noteworthy constitutional provision 
as a separate item, immediately followed by a corresponding treaty provision, 
if any. 
 
 a. General description. The AFSJ is given a general introduction in 
Article I-42(1) of the Constitution. The specific Union task is to “constitute an 
area of freedom, security and justice” through the following activities: 
 
                                                 
903 Constitution arts. II-107 to II-110. 
904 Constitution arts. III-257 to III-277. 
905 TEU art. 34(2). 
906 EC Treaty arts. 61-67. 
907 EC Treaty arts. 61-69. 
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  (i) by adopting European laws and framework laws intended, 
where necessary, to approximate laws and regulations of the Member 
States in the areas referred to in Part III; 
  (ii) by promoting mutual confidence between the competent 
authorities of the Member States, in particular on the basis of mutual 
recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions; 
 
  (iii) by operational cooperation between the competent 
authorities of the Member States, including the police, customs and 
other services specialising in the prevention and detection of criminal 
offences.  
 
This basic provision contains the seeds of the tension that is inherent 
in the entire matter of the AFSJ. On the one hand, Article I-42 mentions EU 
laws and the requirement of harmonisation of Member State laws. On the 
other hand, tribute is paid to “the competent authorities of the Member 
States,” “mutual recognition” among the states, and “operational 
cooperation.”  
 
 The TEU lacks an overview provision like Article I-42. However, the 
stage is set for the AFSJ in Article 2 of the TEU, which identifies as a Union 
objective the intention “to maintain and develop the Union as an area of 
freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is 
assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of 
crime.” 
 
 b. Member State legal traditions. Article III-257(1) mandates that 
Union action must take into account “the different legal traditions and systems 
of the Member States.” There is no counterpart to this provision in the TEU or 
EC Treaty, but this new emphasis appears to be merely rhetorical. 
 
 c. Preventative measures. Article III-257(3) calls upon the Union to 
exert efforts to ensure security through “measures to prevent and combat 
crime, racism and xenophobia,” as well as through measures to coordinate 
police and judicial cooperation, mutual recognition of criminal judgments 
and, as necessary, approximation of criminal laws. These goals and activities 
have their antecedent in Articles 29 and 31(1)(a) of the TEU. A number of the 
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objectives are covered in greater detail in Article III-270, which is discussed 
below.908  
 
 d. Strategic guidelines. Article III-258 requires the European Council 
to develop “strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within 
the area of freedom, security and justice.” In accordance with the general 
Article I-21(4) requirement for European Council decisions, the adoption of 
these guidelines would require a consensus decision. This is a significant 
reflection of intergovernmentalism, and for each of the AFSJ matters 
addressed in the following analysis there is the theoretical potential that 
Article III-258 could undercut any use of qualified majority voting. Article 
III-258 has no direct antecedent in the TEU, although the European Council 
has in fact set strategic guidelines for the AFSJ,909 and the Constitution may 
be seen as a codification of the institution’s existing practice. Neither is the 
unanimity requirement a new development. TEU Article 34(2) generally 
requires that all action in the field of the Third Pillar must be adopted 
unanimously, albeit by the Council and not the European Council. Under TEU 
Article 42 a unanimous Council vote may also move EU competence into 
Title IV of the EC Treaty and change the requisite voting requirements.910 
Furthermore, EC Treaty Article 67(1) generally requires unanimity for 
decisions under Title IV of Part III of the treaty, while Article 67(2) permits a 
unanimous Council decision to shift certain decisions to QMV. In fact, the 
Council decision in December, 2004, did employ the Article 67(2) procedure 
to shift the majority of decisions under EC Treaty Articles 62 and 63 to 
QMV.911 After the 2004 decision only a few areas remain subject to 
unanimity under Article 67(1).912  
 
                                                 
908 For an extended analysis of how the EU and its Member States can cooperate to 
fight crime within the constitutional constraints of the Treaties and the Constitution, 
see Elspeth Guild, Crime and the EU’s Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice, 10 Eur. L.J. 218 (2004). 
909 See, e.g., the European Council’s Tampere Conclusions of 15 & 16 October, 1999, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm, and their 
successor guidelines, the Hague Programme, of 5 November, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf. 
910 The Finnish Presidency in 2006, not wishing to wait for final ratification of the 
Constitution, stated its intention to pursue greater use of the “community method” in 
the Third Pillar. This approach would likely take place through the Article 42 
procedure. See note 601 supra. 
911 22 December 2004 Council Decision, supra note 873. 
912 The remaining subjects for unanimity are identified in notes 873, 877 and 880, 
supra. 
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 e. Subsidiarity. Article III-259 requires national parliaments to ensure 
that EU legislation on the AFSJ respects the principle of subsidiarity. There is 
no corresponding provision in the TEU, and the constitutional section injects 
a reminder of the Union’s limitations in this field. Sceptics might contend that 
subsidiarity is an aspiration without any force behind it, but 
intergovernmentalists are given some support for expecting the EU to proceed 
carefully, with the national parliaments monitoring each legislative move. 
 
 f. Cooperation. Article III-260 emphasises “mutual recognition” 
between EU and Member State authorities, while Article III-261 speaks of 
“operational cooperation” and “coordination” among the Member States. 
These are reflective of TEU Article 34(1), which states that “Member States 
shall inform and consult one another within the Council with a view to 
coordinating their action.” The treaty provision also urges the states to 
“establish collaboration between the relevant departments of their 
administrations.” As with the principle of subsidiarity, mutual recognition and 
cooperation may prove to be toothless concepts, but the Member States are 
offered grounds to argue that they must play a significant role in AFSJ 
legislation. 
 
 g. National responsibility. According to Article III-262, EU efforts in 
the AFSJ may not affect the ultimate responsibility of each Member State 
“with regard to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.” This is a direct carryover from Article 33 of the TEU, and it 
maintains the Third Pillar’s emphasis on national sovereignty. 
 
 h. Administrative cooperation. Article III-263 permits the Council to 
adopt European regulations to “ensure administrative cooperation” among the 
Member States and between the states and the Commission in the areas 
covered by the AFSJ chapter. These regulations would be adopted by the 
Council acting on a qualified majority vote, and this represents a procedural 
change. TEU Article 29 mentions various forms of cooperation, and Article 
34 provides for the Council to take a variety of measures to achieve these 
objectives.913 Under the treaty the Council must act unanimously. 
 
 i. Legislative initiative. In one of the relatively rare instances in which 
the proposing of EU legislation is not reserved to the Commission, Article III-
264 states that Union acts pertaining to judicial or police cooperation may be 
initiated by one-fourth of the Member States.914 This appears to weaken the 
                                                 
913 TEU arts. 34(1), 34(2). 
914 See also Constitution arts. I-34(3), I-42(3) (referring to the Member States’ right of 
legislative initiative). 
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rights of individual states, because Articles 34(2) and 42 of the TEU permit a 
single Member State to initiate a Council decision. If individual states were to 
lose this right, a measure of power would transfer to the only other entity 
empowered to initiate legislation – the Commission. Possibly increasing the 
loss to the Member States is the fact that under the treaty a Council decision 
on judicial or police cooperation must be taken unanimously, whereas under 
the Constitution the general rule would be qualified majority voting. 
However, the discussions below also identify certain constitutional 
requirements for unanimous decision-making, as well as “emergency brakes” 
that permit reference of legislative matters to the European Council for a 
unanimous vote. 
 
 j. Legislative instruments. Under Article I-33 the AFSJ is to be dealt 
with through use of the normal six EU legislative instruments. In contrast, 
under TEU Article 34(2) EU activity in the field is subject to its own set of 
instruments, including common positions, framework decisions, decisions, 
and conventions. While the Constitution’s approach may be more easily 
understood, it does not suggest any substantive movement away from or 
toward Member State influence within the Union. 
 
 k. Recapping the major changes. From the above comparisons it can 
be noted that the general treatment of the AFSJ in the Constitution contains 
several significant changes from the TEU. First and foremost, the Pillar 
structure of the Treaties would be abandoned, and all AFSJ activity under the 
Constitution would take place as the ordinary working of the European Union. 
Second, under the TEU Article 34 all EU legislation and decisions in the field 
must be adopted unanimously by the Council. In contrast, the Constitution 
would require unanimity only for certain guidelines adopted by the European 
Council (but see the comment below). Third, the Constitution would permit 
one-fourth of the Member States to initiate AFSJ legislation, while the TEU 
permits any single Member State to do so. Fourth, the Constitution would do 
away with the special set of legislative instruments that the TEU specifies for 
this field. Finally, as analysed in part 5 of Chapter 13, the Constitution would 
expand the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice within the Third 
Pillar. 
 
 The reduction in the unanimity requirement for legislation and 
decision-making in the field of AFSJ might signal a turn in the direction of 
significantly more Union activity in this area. However, the impact of 
Constitution Article III-258 remains to be seen. If new legislation is 
dependent on the European Council unanimously approving “strategic 
guidelines for legislative and operational planning,” there remains at least the 
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theoretical possibility that new AFSJ activity could be blocked at the policy-
setting stage.915 But the possibility of a Member State to use its seat on the 
European Council to hold up further AFSJ development need not be seen as a 
vital safeguard. As this discussion has demonstrated, and as further illustrated 
in the following analyses, there would remain other, more accessible 
protections for the Member States. 
 
2. BORDER CHECKS, ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION (III-265 – 
III-268)  
 
 Article III-265 requires the EU to develop open border policies 
relating to movement of persons within the EU, with a goal of “the absence of 
any controls.”916 Under Article III-266 the Union is also expected to develop a 
common asylum policy, while III-267 calls for a common approach to 
immigration.  Article III-268 states that in all of these EU programs the Union 
must seek “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility” among the Member 
States, including the financial costs. While Article III-268 is unprecedented, 
Articles III-265 to III-267 are based on EC Treaty Articles 61 to 69, as 
follows:  
 
 --Article III-265 (border controls) corresponds with Article 62, 
--Article III-266(1), (2) (asylum) corresponds with Article 63(1), (2), 
-- Article III-266(3) (sudden inflows) corresponds with Article 64(2), 
and 
 --Article III-267 (immigration policy) corresponds with Article 63(3). 
  
Due to these correlations, much of the substance of the Constitution may be 
described as a carryover from the EC Treaty. However, the treaty contains a 
number of transitional articles whose time periods have by now expired.917   
 
 More significant is the fact that in the AFSJ the Constitution’s general 
change from unanimity to qualified majority voting on the Council affects 
these provisions, even though the Constitution’s articles are taken not from 
the unanimity-based Third Pillar of the TEU. Article 67 of the EC Treaty also 
generally requires the Council to act unanimously under Articles 61 to 69918 
unless the Council unanimously decides to apply QMV to a particular 
                                                 
915 The possible impact of Article III-258 is introduced for consideration in section 
1.1(d) of this chapter and in section 2.5 of Chapter 15. 
916 Constitution art. III-265(2). 
917 See, e.g., EC Treaty arts. 61(a), 62, 63, 67(1). 
918 These provisions comprise EC Treaty Part III, Title IV. 
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matter.919 A Council decision in December, 2004, did indeed shift most (but 
not all) decisions under Articles 62 and 63 to QMV,920 but the Constitution 
might well represent a substantial broadening of majority voting.  
 
Interestingly, Articles III-265 to III-267 contain protections for 
Member States not found in the EC Treaty or the TEU. Article III-265(3) 
states that despite the goal of common border controls the Member States 
retain the competence to determine the “geographical demarcation of their 
borders, in accordance with international law.” Article III-267(5) declares that 
an EU-wide immigration policy “shall not affect the right of Member States to 
determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third 
countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-
employed.” These provisions represent at least a clarification of Member State 
rights, and they arguably strengthen the position of the members. Beyond this, 
the “fair sharing” requirement of Article III-268 reflects a newly articulated 
ideal of parity among the Member States in these vital matters of national 
sovereignty and identity. It is unclear whether these gains would offset the 
intended losses in unanimous voting.921  
 
3. JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CIVIL MATTERS (III-269) 
 
 In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, Article III-269 
permits the EU to enact a variety of laws or framework laws to promote 
cooperation.922 These measures may include requirements for the 
approximation of Member State laws, but any policies affecting family law 
must be unanimously adopted by the Council.923 Article III-269 is based upon 
Article 65 of the EC Treaty, a provision that is included in Title IV of the 
treaty along with visa and asylum policies.924 Also, EC Treaty Article 67(5) 
permits the Council to act by QMV in matters governed by Article 65, “with 
the exception of aspects relating to family law.” Except for the additions 
                                                 
919 See EC Treaty art. 67(2). 
920 22 December 2004 Council Decision, supra note 873, art. 1. The changes are 
described in part 1.1 of this chapter, in the text accompanying notes 935-38, and are 
specifically identified in notes 873, 877 and 880, supra. 
921 Note again that the final position of these dividing lines could theoretically be 
affected by the role of the European Council in setting strategic guidelines. See 
discussions in sections 1.1(d) and 1.1(k) of this chapter and in section 2.5 of Chapter 
15. 
922 Constitution art. III-269(1), (2). 
923 Constitution art. III-269(3). 
924 The title in which EC Treaty Article 65 is found is Title IV of part three of the EC 
Treaty. EC Treaty arts. 61-69. 
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mentioned below, the Constitution’s provision is consistent with its treaty 
antecedents.  
 
 The following goals for EU legislation are included in Article III-
269(2) as additions to the material carried over from EC Treaty Article 65: 
 
 --“effective access to justice,” 
 --“the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement,” and 
 --“support for the training of the judiciary and staff.” 
 
It should also be noted that the general change from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting on the Council with regard to the AFSJ is not relevant to this 
section, because Article III-269 is based on EC Treaty Article 65, for which 
Article 67(5) does not generally require unanimity.925 Thus, the Constitution’s 
adaptation of the EC Treaty provision appears intended to carry the existing 
regime forward, while amplifying its scope in non-controversial areas.  
 
4. JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (III-270 – 
III-274) 
 
 The EU is granted wide authority in Articles III-270 to III-274 to 
legislate the details of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including 
mutual recognition of judgments, harmonisation of laws relating to cross-
border crimes, and coordinated crime prevention programmes. However, there 
are a number of limitations on EU competence.  First, certain Union acts must 
receive unanimous approval on the Council.926 Second, under Articles III-270 
and III-271 a Member State that believes that a proposed European 
framework law – one that can be approved by a QMV Council decision – 
might “affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system” can force the 
proposal to be referred to the European Council, where unanimous approval 
will be required.927 Whether subject to a required unanimous vote or an 
                                                 
925 Note again that the unanimity requirement for the European Council to set 
strategic guidelines under Constitution Article III-258 could theoretically affect the 
Council’s ability to create legislation by QMV. See discussions in sections 1.1(d) and 
1.1(k) of this chapter and in section 2.5 of Chapter 15. 
926 Constitution arts. III-271(1) (regarding expanding the list of serious cross-border 
crimes), III-274(1) (establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office). 
927 Constitution arts. III-270(3), III-271(3). This procedure in the AFSJ realm has 
been referred to as an “emergency brake.” Grevi, supra note 402, at 10. Jean-Claude 
Piris comments that the emergency brake is accompanied by an “accelerator” 
provision to avoid a stalemate on the proposed framework law. If certain time periods 
have expired without satisfactory action, Member States wishing to proceed with the 
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“emergency brake” referral to the European Council, these matters of EU 
competence are significantly impacted by intergovernmental protections. A 
third limitation on the Union is that Member States in some instances may 
adopt higher levels of protection of individual rights than are mandated by EU 
law.928 Fourth, EU promotion of crime prevention is merely supportive of 
national action and may not require approximation of Member State laws.929 
Fifth, Article III-273 calls for European laws to determine the structure and 
operations of Eurojust, an office that supports and coordinates, but does not 
supplant, the efforts of national investigating and prosecuting authorities. 
Finally, Article III-274 permits the Council to establish a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, but it must act unanimously in establishing the office and 
in granting extended powers to the prosecutor.930 
 
 The provisions of Articles III-270 to III-274 are broad and richly 
detailed in comparison to their predecessors in the TEU. Article 31 of the 
TEU is the antecedent, but it is much less developed. Article 31(1) lists five 
aspects of EU action on judicial cooperation. Its constitutional counterpart is 
Article III-270, which is more extensive. A closer correlation is found in 
Article 31(2), whose references to Eurojust have essentially been transferred 
into Article III-273.  
 
 In addition to the broader language of Article III-270 on judicial 
cooperation, the Constitution offers three related provisions that would 
expand somewhat on the treaty. First, Article III-271 describes an ambitious 
EU programme of developing uniform standards for crimes with a cross-
border dimension, such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and money 
laundering. This provision is based on TEU Article 29, which speaks 
generally of “preventing and combating” such activities, and on Article 
31(1)(e), which calls for action including “progressively adopting measures 
establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug 
trafficking.”  The Constitution’s approach, if not new, is more descriptive and 
vigorous. The second expansion is Article III-272, which authorises EU 
legislation “to promote and support the action of Member States in the field of 
crime prevention,” albeit without the right of requiring harmonisation of 
national laws. TEU Article 29 speaks of crime prevention as a goal, but with 
no legislative program described. The third development is Article III-274, 
                                                                                                                    
proposed framework law may do so under a program of enhanced cooperation. 
Constitution arts. III-270(4), III-271(4). See Piris, supra note 304, at 169. 
928 Constitution art. III-270(2). 
929 Constitution art. III-272. 
930 Constitution art. III-274(1), (4). 
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which anticipates creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from 
Eurojust. While Eurojust is described in TEU Articles 29 and 31, the 
prosecutor is not mentioned. Interestingly, the Constitution demands 
unanimous Council approval to establish the prosecutor’s office and to extend 
its mission,931 an approach that is consistent with the Treaties. For example, if 
a prosecutor were to be established under the Third Pillar, the action would be 
subject to the unanimity requirements of TEU Article 34(2). Unanimity would 
also pertain to any of the constitutional developments in the field of AFSJ that 
go beyond the precise power conferred upon the Union by the Treaties. 
 
One example of a shift away from Member State control is that under 
Constitution Article III-273 any laws relating to Eurojust may be approved by 
the Council voting by qualified majority, while similar laws under the Third 
Pillar would require unanimity under TEU Article 34(2). 
 
 As a reflection of the relative lack of detail in TEU Article 31, all of 
the areas identified above as requiring unanimous Council action or offering 
special protections to the interests of the Member States are innovations in the 
Constitution. But the Constitution’s selective use of the unanimity 
requirement may be somewhat deceiving. Since Article 31 is part of the AFSJ 
title in the TEU, it is subject to the general requirement of TEU Article 34 that 
all EU legislation and decisions in the field must be adopted unanimously by 
the Council. Under the Constitution the default rule for Council voting in the 
field of AFSJ is the qualified majority vote. Thus, the specific constitutional 
provisions requiring unanimity may be seen not as new restrictions on AFSJ 
activities, but as the retention of some unanimity in the face of a general move 
to QMV.932  
 
5. POLICE COOPERATION (III-275 – III-277) 
 
 Under Article III-275 the EU may enact legislation to require cross-
border police cooperation,933 but such laws relating to operational cooperation 
are subject to unanimous vote on the Council.934 Article III-276 allows the 
Union to create Europol to assist in these efforts, but national parliaments are 
                                                 
931 Constitution art. III-274(1). 
932 Note again the theoretical possibility of strategic guidelines from the European 
Council under Article III-258. See discussions in sections 1.1(d) and 1.1(k) of this 
chapter and in section 2.5 of Chapter 15. If such guidelines were to be restrictive on 
future legislation, the opportunities for QMV decisions on new legislation would be 
reduced. 
933 Constitution art. III-275(1). 
934 Constitution art. III-275(2). 
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expected to monitor its activities, it must work with Member State authorities, 
and any “application of coercive” measures is reserved to national authorities. 
Last, Article III-277 provides that any EU law permitting police officials from 
one Member State to operate in another Member State is subject to unanimous 
vote on the Council. 
 
 The provisions of Article III-275 are drawn from Article 30(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, Article III-276 is a restatement of TEU Article 
30(2), and Article III-277 is a carryover from TEU Article 32. In general, the 
constitutional provisions mirror the treaty provisions, although the 
Constitution eliminates a five-year time period mentioned in the treaty,935 and 
the Constitution contains updated language referring to information 
collection, analysis and exchange.936 Significantly, areas of police cooperation 
other than operational cooperation could be decided by the Council by QMV 
under Constitution Article III-275, where TEU Article 30(1) requires 
unanimity for all forms of cooperation. Furthermore, EU laws relating to 
Europol would be subject to a QMV Council vote under the Article III-276, in 
contrast to the unanimity required under TEU Article 30(2). 
 
 The primary wording changes in the Constitution are those described 
above that require unanimity on the Council or protect Member State 
competences.937 However, as noted in the previous section, TEU Articles 30 
and 32 are already subject to unanimous voting on the Council. Thus the 
Constitution’s “new” references to unanimity are actually a means of 
maintaining the status quo in the subject provisions.  
 
6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AFSJ 
 
 Several recent commentaries have addressed the importance of the 
European Union’s continuing development as an area of freedom, security 
and justice. A supportive argument is presented by Dario Melossi, who notes 
the global threats confronting the EU, such as “the evil-doing of wayward 
States, . . . domestic enemies, terrorists, narcotraficantes, common criminals 
and, of course, ‘undocumented’ or ‘irregular’ migrants,” and he contends: 
 
                                                 
935 TEU art. 30(2). 
936 Constitution art. III-276(2). 
937 Furthermore, any future legislative activity in the field of police cooperation could 
theoretically be limited by strategic guidelines emanating from the European Council, 
which under Article III-258 must act unanimously. See discussions in sections 1.1(d) 
and 1.1(k) of this chapter and in section 2.5 of Chapter 15. 
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In view of such global developments, we Europeans have to proceed 
with the greatest urgency and decision toward the creation of an 
actual common area of ‘freedom, security and justice’, but this should 
not be an area of conversation among a few government functionaries 
preoccupied with defending what has been named the ‘fortress 
Europe’. Rather, it should be a crucial part of that construction, or 
indeed ‘constitution’, of a European democracy that is increasingly 
becoming the order of the day.938  
 
On the other hand, as we are reminded by Elspeth Guild, one must not 
forget the fact that the AFSJ is a field with an inherent tension built into its 
very fabric. First, Constitution Article I-42(1)(a) speaks of EU law “intended, 
where necessary, to approximate laws and regulations of the Member States.” 
This is a Euro-centric component that anticipates a “consolidation of 
power.”939 In contrast, Article I-42(1)(b) speaks of promoting “mutual 
confidence” among the Member States and “mutual recognition” of their 
judicial and extrajudicial decisions. Likewise, Article I-42(1)(c) speaks of 
“operational cooperation” between the Member States. These are components 
that emphasise “the sovereignty of the Nation State as a territory, people, and 
system of governance enclosed by borders and required by [Constitution 
Article I-5].”940 
 
Finally, Pieter Jan Kuijper injects a note of pessimistic realism into 
the discussion of the AFSJ, by describing the diverse ways in which several 
states have participated in EU programs.941 These have included Member 
States who have opted out of certain activities, as well as non-members who 
have opted in. Kuijper, writing prior to publication of the draft Constitution, 
comments:  
 
Variable geometry is not a success. The non-participants may be free 
riders in the decision-making, and may not even intend to participate. 
The fact that they must declare their intentions is not sufficient. Even 
combined with qualified majority, the Member States have a right to 
opt to have, in practice, too much influence on decision-making when 
the others attach importance to their participation. In the field of 
external relations variable geometry creates untold technical 
                                                 
938 Dario Melossi, Security, Social Control, Democracy and Migration within the 
‘Constitution’ of the EU, 11 Eur. L.J. 5, 21 (2005). 
939 Guild, supra note 908, at 219.  
940 Id. 
941 Kuijper, supra note 575, at 620-23. 
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complications which will make the Union’s international life only 
more miserable.942 
 
7. THE AFSJ AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 While discarding the Pillar structure of the Treaties, the drafters of the 
Constitution proposed more than the conversion of the AFSJ into an activity 
subject to the new set of ordinary legislative instruments. They offered two 
more profound consequences: First, a shift from unanimity to QMV at the 
Council was to be incorporated into this field. Second, the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in the AFSJ would be significantly expanded. Together, these 
developments would be potentially far-reaching – a relatively profound 
shifting of the EU’s dividing lines. There are safeguards in the Constitution, 
but one should acknowledge that its most significant substantive legacy would 
have been found here.  
 
Was this really cause for alarm? Were the sceptics correct in seeing a 
profound movement toward Brussels? To respond to these questions, we 
should reflect on the subject matter represented in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. As discussed in Section 6 of this chapter, the authors of 
the Constitution did not fabricate a need for greater EU efficiency and 
oversight in these matters. Rather, the need already exists, and it is urgent. 
The arguments for greater integration and coordination in the AFSJ predated 
the Constitution, and the case grows stronger each year. There is little doubt 
that absent a new constitutional document the representatives of the Member 
States would be pursuing these initiatives through EU legislation or treaty 
amendment, or, failing that, cooperation outside the Union mechanisms. In 
other words, the drafters of the Constitution were merely responding to the 
vital requirements of the Member States. Yes, it proposed a shift in the EU’s 
dividing lines, but the shift would have been happening in any event. 
 
 
 
                                                 
942 Id. at 626. 
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Chapter 17 
 
 
The Union’s Internal Activities and External Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The most extensive section of Part III of the Constitution is Title III, 
which consists of 186 articles governing the EU’s “internal policies and 
action.”943 Each of the five chapters in Title III addresses a distinct class of 
subject areas. Chapter I covers the internal market and the free movement of 
goods, persons, capital and services throughout the Union.944  Chapter II deals 
with the EU’s economic and monetary policies, including its common 
currency, the euro.945 Chapter III is a basket of provisions aptly titled “policies 
in other areas,” and it includes employment, social policy and agriculture, 
among others.946 Chapter IV addresses the area of freedom, security and 
justice,947 which we have already examined in the previous chapter of this 
treatise. Chapter V of Part III948 concludes the title with a diverse set of 
subjects gathered under the rubric “areas where the Union may take 
coordinating, complementary or supporting action.”949 With the exception of 
of the AFSJ, the Constitution’s would primarily have rearranged the internal 
market provisions of the Treaties without shifting the dividing lines between 
EU and Member State competences. 
 
 In Title V of Part III the Constitution addresses the Union’s “external 
action.”950 Its seven chapters govern subjects as diverse as the common 
foreign and security policy (which includes defence), common commercial 
                                                 
943 Constitution arts. III-130 to III-285. 
944 Constitution arts. III-130 to III-176. 
945 Constitution arts. III-177 to III-202. 
946 Constitution arts. III-203 to III-256. 
947 Constitution arts. III-257 to III-277. 
948 Constitution arts. III-278 to III-285. 
949 Constitution arts. III-278 to III-285. 
950 Constitution arts. III-292 to III-329. 
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policy, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, restrictive 
measures and international agreements. 
 
 The following analysis will begin with a review of the non-AFSJ 
chapters of Title III, but the discussion will be limited to those few provisions 
in which the dividing lines would be affected. Thereafter, a similarly brief 
review of Title V will address only those matters of external action that are 
relevant to the dividing lines theme.   
 
1.  INTERNAL POLICIES AND ACTION (III-130 – III-285) 
 
1.1 The internal market (III-130 – III-176) 
 
 From its earliest days and continuing to the present, one of the 
principal successes of the European Union has been its creation and 
management of the internal market.  
 
a. The Constitution’s new approach to the internal market 
 
 Articles I-11 to I-18 of the Constitution offer an overview of the EU’s 
competences in this field, and in Part III the internal market is further 
introduced in Articles III-130 to III-132. Notably the EU is generally given 
“shared competence” in managing the internal market and its “four 
freedoms.”951 The Constitution would grant the Union exclusive competence 
in the customs union and in competition rules “necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market.”952 As previously discussed, in areas of exclusive 
competence only the Union may act,953 while in matters of shared competence 
the EU is free to act, and Member States may legislate only to the extent the 
Union has not done so.954 In all cases the authority granted to the EU includes 
the right act within the Union and externally as necessary to support the 
                                                 
951 Constitution arts. I-14, III-130 to III-160, III-170 to III-176. The freedoms include 
free movement of persons, goods and capital, as well as services and the related right 
of establishment. See Constitution arts. III-133 to III-136 (regarding free movement 
of persons), arts. III-137 to III-143 (regarding freedom of establishment), arts. III-144 
to III-150 (regarding freedom to provide services), arts. III-151 to III-155 (regarding 
free movement of goods – customs union) and arts. III-156 to III-160 (regarding free 
movement of capital). For a review of recent case law development of the four 
freedoms, see Spaventa, supra note 386. 
952 Constitution art. I-13(1).  
953 Constitution art. 12(1). 
954 Constitution art. I-12(2). 
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Union’s internal programmes.955 Under the Constitution the Member States 
would take an active role in the functioning of the internal market, and the 
Constitution’s delineation of competences establishes the basic parameters for 
both EU and Member State action.  
 
 The EC Treaty lacks an introductory section like that of Part I of the 
Constitution, and a delineation of exclusive and shared competences is not 
presented. However, certain broad principles are stated in the treaty. Article 2 
explains that the Community “shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common 
policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote [economic 
development and other goals] throughout the Community.” However, it is not 
made clear whether the Community’s task is exclusive or shared with the 
Member States. Also without reference to exclusivity, Article 3 sets out a long 
list of tasks for the Community, all of which are dealt with in specific treaty 
articles, and all of which will be discussed below. Article 3 also refers to 
approximation of Member State laws as part of the activity “required for the 
functioning of the common market.”956 Article 4 mentions activities of the 
Member States as well as the Community in relation to adoption of a 
Community economic policy “which is based on the close coordination of 
Member States’ economic policies.”957  
 
 EC Treaty Article 5 does not refer to the internal market or any other 
subject area, but it most explicitly refers to competences. It begins with an 
attribution principle that affirms the Community’s mandate to “act within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein.” It then states that where activities “do not fall within its 
exclusive competence” the Community must abide by the principle of 
subsidiarity, and in any event it must adhere to the concept of proportionality. 
However, as noted, there is no list of which activities – whether related to the 
internal market or not – actually are exclusive to the Community. The fact 
that the Constitution fills in this gap arguably represents a significant 
improvement. On the other hand, one might contend that the Constitution 
                                                 
955 Constitution art. I-13(2).  
956 EC Treaty art. 3(1)(h). 
957 EC Treaty art. 4(1), (3). There are several other overview provisions in the EC 
Treaty. Article 6 states environmental protection to be a Community goal. Article 14 
mentions the broad objective of establishing the internal market. Article 15 anticipates 
temporary derogations from internal market policies to take into consideration the 
special economic needs of certain Member States. Articles 297 and 298 commit the 
Member States to work to preserve the internal market even in the face of wars and 
other threats to internal security. 
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would also remove an element of flexibility permitted under the Treaties, 
replacing it with more clarity but also more rigidity. 
 
 Beyond the matter of competences, a notable stylistic change is that 
the Constitution alters the order of topics relating to the internal market. The 
EC Treaty addresses first the free movement of goods, then the free 
movement of persons, services and capital. The Constitution deals first with 
the movement of persons and services, second the movement of goods, and 
third the movement of capital and payments. No explanation for this change is 
offered, but it is fair to say that the free movement of goods – so vital to the 
creation of the internal market – is fully developed, while many aspects of the 
movement of persons and services are still evolving. The drafters of the 
Constitution simply took the hottest topic and moved it to the front of the line. 
 
b. Specific changes of interest relating to the internal market 
 
(1) Multi-state social security calculations. With respect to the free movement 
of workers within the European Union, Articles III-133 to III-136 of the 
Constitution correspond to Articles 39 to 42 of the EC Treaty. Both 
documents provide the Community or EU with broad authority to override 
Member State law as necessary to promote worker mobility. However, within 
this broad mandate Article 42 of the treaty always requires a unanimous 
Council vote in relation to multi-state social security calculations. In contrast, 
Article III-136(2) of the Constitution starts with a presumption that decisions 
on such calculations will be taken by QMV at the Council. However, the 
Constitution also provides an “emergency brake” by which a Member State 
fearing potential disruptions to its social security system may move decisions 
in the field from the Council to the European Council, where unanimity would 
be required. Thus, a dividing-line shift would occur, but it would be carefully 
contained. 
 
(2) Professional licensing. Articles III-137 to III-143 permit wide-ranging EU 
activity to ensure that nationals of one Member State may set up 
establishments or engage in self-employment in other Member States. These 
provisions mirror EC Treaty Articles 43 to 48, plus Article 294. In general, 
the two documents offer the Community/Union the same authority, and the 
Member States are granted the same protections. A minor difference is that 
Article 47 of the treaty provides for a unanimous Council decision “on 
directives the implementation of which involves in at least one Member State 
amendment of the existing principles laid down by law governing the 
professions with respect to training and conditions of access for natural 
persons.” The Constitution does not contain this safeguard. All decisions 
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under the Constitution regarding right of establishment are to be taken by 
qualified majority vote of the Council, as are all decisions under the EC 
Treaty except the one identified here. The Constitution thus offers a small 
shift from unanimity to qualified majority vote with regard to the licensing of 
professionals, permitting QMV decisions of the Council to create more 
uniformity in this field at the expense of an objecting Member State. 
 
(3) Free flow of capital. In the Constitution, Articles III-156 to III-160 
establish EU competence in supporting a free flow of capital, and they are 
very similar to Articles 56 to 60 of the EC Treaty. However, there are two 
differences of note.  
 
First, Article III-160, contemplates measures to combat terrorism by 
permitting the freezing of assets of individuals or groups.  The counterpart 
provision in the treaty is Article 60(1), which (by cross-reference to Article 
301) refers broadly to restrictions on movements of capital and payments to 
and from third countries in matters described in Article 301 as “relating to the 
common foreign and security policy.” The Constitution’s specific grounds for 
restrictions (terrorism) and the means it provides (freezing assets) wold 
constitute a substantial narrowing of EU’s options compared to those under 
the treaty.958  
 
The second change relates to the ability of a Member State to act 
unilaterally if the EU has not done so. Article 60(2) of the treaty permits a 
Member State “for serious political reasons and on grounds of urgency” to 
take action against a third country to restrict capital and payment flow. 
However, the Council by qualified majority vote may override the state’s 
action. The counterpart provision in the Constitution is found in Article III-
158(4), which allows a Member State to request a European decision of the 
Council approving unilateral action by the state. Such decision must be taken 
unanimously, and the Constitution does not explain what happens if the 
Council fails to approve the request. Presumably, the Member State will not 
be permitted to act. Thus, where the EC Treaty makes it clear that unilateral 
Member State action is permitted, subject to an overriding decision by the 
Council, the Constitution implies that state action is not allowed. This may be 
seen as a loss of national competence – a movement of one dividing line away 
from the Member States. 
 
                                                 
958 Note that Article III-159 of the Constitution does preserve the EC Treaty Article 
59 possibility of restrictions on movement of capital to or from third countries if there 
is a threat to the EU’s economic and monetary union.  
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(4) EU intellectual property rights. The “Common Provisions” in Articles III-
172 to III-176 discuss the means by which Member State laws must be 
harmonised to support the internal market. The substance of these articles is 
taken relatively intact from EC Treaty Articles 94 to 97, but one significant 
addition is Article III-176, which permits the Union to create EU intellectual 
property rights and to provide for Union-wide protection of such rights. 
Article III-176 has no precedent in the Treaties, and this represents a proposed 
expansion of Union competences in a matter vital to cross-border commerce. 
Interestingly, Article III-176 reflects some sensitivity to national interests by 
requiring a unanimous Council vote in regard to establishing “language 
arrangements” relating to European IP rights.  
 
(5) Tax law harmonisation – the change that didn’t happen. It is noteworthy 
that an early draft of the Constitution contained a provision that would have 
allowed qualified majority voting at the Council on certain aspects of 
company tax law harmonisation. Any form of authority on direct taxation has 
to this point been outside the EU’s competence, with the Union being limited 
to indirect measures such as the prohibition of tax discrimination between the 
Member States. The harmonisation proposal coming out of the Convention 
was ultimately rejected by the IGC at the insistence of the United Kingdom 
and others. Giovanni Grevi has commented that tax harmonisation constitutes 
a “red line” that has been “drawn by a few Member States,”959 and under the 
Constitution this dividing line would stay in place. 
 
 
1.2 Economic and Monetary Policy III-177 – III-202) 
 
 The economic and monetary union, popularly characterised by 
Europe’s common currency, is a significant and highly visible 
accomplishment of the European Union. The Constitution’s chapter on EMU 
has its counterpart in EC Treaty Article 4 and Articles 98 to 115, and the 
Constitution offers no significant EMU changes that would affect the EU’s 
dividing lines.  
  
1.3 Policies in other areas (III-203 – III-256) 
 
a. Overview of the policies 
 
 Ten separate fields are collected in this chapter of the Constitution. 
The constitutional provisions and their EC Treaty counterparts are: 
                                                 
959 Grevi, supra note 402, at 10. 
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 --employment (III-203 – III-208; EC Treaty Arts. 125 – 130), 
 --social policy (III-209 – III-219; TEC 136 – 148),  
 --economic, social and territorial cohesion (III-220 – III-224; TEC 
 158 - 162),  
 --agriculture and fisheries (III-225 – III-232; TEC 32 – 38), 
 --environment (III-233 – III-234; TEC 174 – 176),  
 --consumer protection (III-235; TEC 153), 
 --transport (III-236 – III-245; TEC 70 – 80), 
 --trans-European networks (III-246 – III-247; TEC 154 – 156), 
 --research, technological development and space (III-248 – III-255; 
 TEC 163 – 173), and 
 --energy (III-256; no direct EC Treaty counterpart). 
 
These fields are diverse, and yet they share certain characteristics. First, all of 
them except employment policy are areas of shared competence under Article 
I-14(2), meaning that the Member States would be permitted to act only to the 
extent the Union would choose not to. Second, they offer the prospect of more 
EU activity than in those areas in which the Union is limited to “supporting, 
coordinating and complementary” action. Third, these subjects were 
apparently not viewed as natural components of the internal market, the EMU 
or the AFSJ. If they had been, they would likely have been included in those 
chapters. In short, these provisions are something of a constitutional hotch 
pot. 
 
 As indicated above, most of these activities have direct antecedents in 
the EC Treaty, and on the surface the dividing lines between EU action and 
Member State activity do not appear to be much affected in the transfer of 
these matters from one document to the other. However, there is a significant 
“catch” here. As noted, all of these matters except employment are defined in 
the Constitution as areas of shared competence, meaning that Member States 
may act only if the EU does not.960 Where the Union takes steps, the states are 
to abstain. Since the EC Treaty never defines shared competence as such, it 
seems logical that under the treaty a Member State retains the right to act even 
after the EU has stepped in, so long as its acts are not contrary to the Union 
legislation. This interpretation would be consistent with EC Treaty Article 10 
(mirrored in Article I-5(2) of the Constitution), which requires Member States 
to “abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
                                                 
960 Constitution art. I-12(2). However, note the special exceptions with respect to 
research, technological development and space, discussed in section 4.2(2) of this 
chapter. 
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objectives of this Treaty.”961 The Constitution’s express restriction on national 
action in matters of shared competence would at least clarify, and possibly 
weaken, the position of the Member States. In offering the new classification 
of shared competence the authors of the Constitution replaced an undefined 
concept with a formal one. They did not so much propose a shift in the EU’s 
dividing lines as the articulation of lines that have not been expressly 
described under the Treaties. 
 
 Beyond these general comments, there are several specific 
developments that would affect EU competences, and they are described 
below. 
 
b. Specific developments of interest 
 
(1) Transport. Transport is obviously critical to the operation of the internal 
market, and broad EU authority is to be expected. Articles III-236 to III-245 
of the Constitution offer sweeping EU competence in the field, and the only 
references to Member State rights are: (i) Article III-236(3) requires that EU 
law must take local economic circumstances into consideration, (ii) Member 
States themselves are urged to reduce the costs assessed “in respect of 
crossing of frontiers,”962 and (iii) special consideration is given to Germany in 
relation to the economic challenges associated with the country’s 
reunification.”963  
 
The Constitution’s provisions are essentially taken from Articles 70 to 
80 of the EC Treaty. The treaty includes the same focus on the EU with 
limited references to Member State authority. However, two noteworthy 
changes are proposed in the Constitution.964 The first is that Article III-236(2) 
calls for European laws or European framework laws to establish common 
transport rules, conditions for non-resident carriers to operate, safety measures 
                                                 
961 The European Court of Justice, interpreting EC Treaty Article 10, has stated that 
“to the extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of the 
Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those rules or alter 
their scope.” Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971 ECR 263 ¶ 22. 
962 Constitution art. III-242. 
963 Constitution art. III-243. 
964 A third change merely establishes a possible cut-off point for the special 
consideration given to Germany as a result of its reunification. Article III-243 of the 
Constitution adds a provision stating that five years after the Constitution takes effect 
the Commission may propose and the Council may adopt a decision repealing 
Germany’s special treatment. 
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and “any other appropriate measure.” No special procedure is mandated for 
such laws, meaning that they would be subject to a qualified majority vote on 
the Council.965 In contrast, where these special factors are concerned, EC 
Treaty Article 71(2) requires legislation to receive a unanimous vote on the 
Council. The change from unanimous voting to qualified majority represents a 
modest loss of Member State power, a shift in the dividing lines, albeit one 
that does not threaten essential national competences. The second change is 
that here again the Constitution for the first time would classify transport as 
an area of shared competence, a potentially significant development. 
 
(2) Space. For the first time the EU would be permitted to include matters of 
space on its agenda. Articles III-248 to III-255 allow the EU to carry out 
programmes in research, technological development and space. These fields 
are identified in Article I-14(2) of the Constitution as areas of shared 
competence. The Union would “encourage” and “support” such 
development,966 but would also implement its own programmes.967 The EU’s 
activity is also described as “complementing the activities carried out in the 
Member States.”968 The Union would be required to “coordinate” its activities 
with the Member States and cooperate with them.”969 In some matters of 
research the EU might establish “supplementary programmes involving the 
participation of certain Member States only,” although the participating states 
would have to consent to be involved.970  
 
 These provisions are carried over from Articles 163 to 173 of the EC 
Treaty. The Constitution renumbers and rearranges the text to some extent, 
but the substance would remain largely the same.  The primary exception is 
the Constitution’s addition of space as a field of activity. The provisions in the 
EC Treaty are gathered in a title named “Research and Technological 
Development,” while the Constitution adds the reference to space in the title 
of its section. Article III-254 has no counterpart in the treaty, and it would 
permit the Union to draw up a European space policy and implement a 
European space programme, as well as establishing relations with the non-EU 
                                                 
965 Constitution Article III-236(3) does note that “account shall be taken of cases 
where their application might seriously affect the standard of living and level of 
employment in certain regions, and the operation of transport facilities.” No 
procedures or remedies are attached to this exhortation. 
966 Constitution art. III-248. 
967 Constitution art. III-249. 
968 Constitution art. III-249. 
969 Constitution art. III-250. 
970 Constitution art. III-252(2). 
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European Space Agency. This is obviously an expansion of EU competence, 
but one that hardly controversial.  
 
 Curiously, although research, technological development and space 
are classified by the Constitution as areas of shared competence – in which 
Member States may act only if the EU does not971 – Article I-14(3) states that 
in these fields the Union’s exercise of competence “may not result in Member 
States being prevented from exercising theirs.”972 Thus, as previously noted in 
part 4 of Chapter 12 of this treatise, this field constitutes its own class of EU 
competence, not purely one of shared competence, but something more than 
merely an area of supporting, coordinating or complementary action. Since 
the EC Treaty never defines shared competence, one can argue that the 
ongoing right of Member States to act in this field after the EU has stepped in 
is merely a continuation of the treaty regime. However, at the same time the 
special arrangement in Article I-14(3) carries a negative implication. Since its 
exception is not offered for any of the other policies described in Articles III-
209 to III-256, the designation of those areas as matters of shared competence 
suggests an actual loss of Member State rights to act when the Union does.   
 
(3) Energy. Energy is another field that is addressed specifically for the first 
time in the Constitution. Under Article III-256(1) the Union is mandated to set 
an overall Union energy policy tied to the functioning of the internal market 
and to environmental protection. The EU would aim to ensure the functioning 
of the energy market and the security of the energy supply, and it would be 
required to promote energy efficiency and renewable forms of energy. Energy 
is identified in Article I-14(2) as an area of shared competence, but there are 
two primary reservations in favor of the Member States. First, EU action 
might not affect each state’s right to “determine the conditions for exploiting 
its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply.”973 Second, any energy laws “of a fiscal 
nature” would be required to receive the unanimous approval of the 
Council.974  
 
The Treaties mention energy only in passing. Article 3(1)(u) of the 
EC Treaty refers to “measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and 
tourism” among the intended Community activities. The treaty also makes 
passing reference to energy in its provisions on trans-European networks975 
                                                 
971 Constitution art. I-12(2). 
972 Constitution art. I-14(3).  
973 Constitution art. III-256(2). 
974 Constitution art. III-256(3). 
975 EC Treaty art. 154(1). 
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and environment,976 and energy may be included in Article 86(1), which 
mentions “public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States 
grant special or exclusive rights.” However, there is no stand-alone section 
like Article III-256.977  
 
The Constitution’s unprecedented approach may might have spurred 
greater EU activity in this field, and if so, the level of Member State action 
might have been correspondingly diminished. Furthermore, the classification 
of energy as a shared competence might have prevented national action where 
it had previously been permitted. However, the Constitution would leave in 
Member State control the critical choice and structure of their energy sources 
to the Member States, and it would require that fiscal measures relating to 
energy be unanimously approved on the Council. The Constitution might have 
shifted the energy dividing line toward Brussels, but it also offered important 
safeguards for national sovereignty in this field. 
 
1.4  Coordinating, complementary or supporting action  
(III-278 – III-285) 
 
a.  Overview 
 
 There are seven separate areas identified in Article I-17, further 
elaborated in Part III, in which the European Union might take supporting, 
coordinating or complementary action. Significantly, under Article I-17 the 
Union “shall have competence” but is not required to take this sort of action. 
If the Union did choose to act, Article I-12(5) states that EU action “may not 
entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations.”  
 
The constitutional provisions and their EC Treaty counterparts, if any, 
are the following:  
 
--public health (III-278; EC Treaty Art. 152), 
--industry (III-279; TEC 157), 
--culture (III-280; TEC 151), 
--tourism (III-281; no TEC counterpart), 
--education, youth, sport, and vocational training (III-282 – III-283; 
 TEC 149 – 150) 
                                                 
976 EC Treaty art. 175(2)(c). 
977 Although energy programmes as such are not addressed in the Treaties, energy 
matters have been the subject of numerous competition decisions of the Commission, 
and significant harmonisation of energy standards in relation to the internal market 
has taken place under Articles 94 and 95 of the EC Treaty. 
304 SUBJECT MATTERS OF EU ACTIVITY 
 
  
--civil protection (III-284; no TEC counterpart), and 
--administrative cooperation (III-285; no TEC counterpart). 
 
Among these fields all but the subject of industry are of interest to our 
examination of the EU’s dividing lines. 
 
b.  New fields and other noteworthy developments  
 
(1) Public health. A “high level of human health protection” is stated as an 
EU goal in Constitution Article III-278(1). Union action “shall complement 
national policies” and “”shall complement the Member States’ action” in this 
area. The EU is to “encourage cooperation between the Member States . . . 
and, if necessary, lend support to their action.”978  The Member States are 
expected to “coordinate among themselves their policies and programmes,”979 
while the states and the Union together must cooperate with third countries 
and international health organisations.980 The EU must “respect the 
responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy 
and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care.”981 
Article III-278 does identifiy a number of specific subjects in which the EU 
may legislate,982 although even in these areas there are limitations in favor of 
the Member States.983 
 
 The constitutional provision is taken directly from Article 152 of the 
EC Treaty, although the Constitution contains several additions. For example, 
a new area of EU action would be “monitoring, early warning of and 
combating serious cross-border threats to health,”984 and the Union would be 
required to establish measures in on these matters.985 The Union is also called 
upon to adopt new measures in “setting high standards of quality and safety 
for medicinal products and devices for medical use.”986 In addition, the 
Constitution mentions for the first time the adoption of EU law relating to 
“the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, 
                                                 
978 Constitution art. III-278(2). 
979 Constitution art. III-278(2). 
980 Constitution art. III-278(3). 
981 Constitution art. III-278(7). 
982 Constitution art. III-278(4). 
983 Constitution art. III-278(4)(a), (7). 
984 Constitution art. III-278(1)(b). 
985 Constitution art. III-278(4)(c). 
986 Constitution art. III-278(4)(d). 
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excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States.”987 
 
In addition to adding to the treaty, the Constitution would create an 
inconsistency in this field. The general matter of public health is an Article I-
17(2) subject for supporting, coordinating or complementary action by the 
EU, while under Article I-14(2) the Union enjoys shared competence in the 
area of “common safety concerns in public health matters.” It may be possible 
to navigate through Article III-278 and assign some of its provisions to public 
health in general and others (such as pandemics) to safety concerns relating to 
public health, but it can also become a game of semantics. Nevertheless, the 
nuances may be important, since Article I-14 would allow full EU legislation 
(and thus EU dominance over Member State law), while Article I-17 would 
significantly limit Union action (thus preserving a greater measure of Member 
State competence). 
 
(2) Culture. The Union is required under Article III-280 of the Constitution to 
“contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States,” and it must 
encourage expression of “the common cultural heritage,” but it must respect 
the “national and regional diversity of the Member States.”988 The EU is to 
encourage cooperation among the states, and work with them to cooperate 
with third countries and international organisations.989 In its other activities 
the EU must consider cultural aspects, but “in particular in order to respect 
and promote the diversity of its cultures.”990 The Union may legislate to create 
“incentive measures,” but this action may not require harmonisation of 
national laws.991 The Council may also adopt recommendations.992 
 
Article III-280 is a direct carryover from Article 151 of the EC 
Treaty. There is no variation in the substantive coverage of the two articles, 
but certain of the voting rules have changed. Article 151 contains two 
mandates for a unanimous vote on the Council, while the Constitution drops 
both of these requirements. The first is found in a provision permitting the 
Council to create incentive measures, and the second relates to the Council’s 
adoption of recommendations. The elimination of unanimity as a voting 
requirement in the matter of culture is curious, since culture is a particularly 
emotional matter for some Member States and their political leaders. 
                                                 
987 Constitution art. III-278(5). 
988 Constitution art. III-280(1). 
989 Constitution art. III-280(2), (3). 
990 Constitution art. III-280(4). 
991 Constitution art. III-280(5)(a). 
992 Constitution art. III-280(5)(b). 
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However, under the Constitution culture would be subject to no more than 
supporting action by the EU, and harmonisation of Member State laws would 
be prohibited. Thus, there might be little risk to a Member State that its 
cultural heritage would be infringed upon when the EU acts under the 
limitations of Article I-17. 
 
(3) Tourism. In the area of tourism promotion, Article III-281 of the 
Constitution would permit the EU to encourage “a favourable environment” 
for tourism and promote cooperation among the Member States.993 EU laws in 
this field might not require harmonisation of Member State laws.994 Article 3 
of the EC Treaty mentions the possibility of Community action in the area of 
tourism,995 but neither the EC Treaty nor the TEU contains any substantive 
provision on the subject. Thus, Article III-281 is novel. Nevertheless, there 
would not likely be a surge in Union activity in this field. Due to EU budget 
constraints and more pressing needs for centralised action, tourism promotion 
would likely have been left to the Member States, with the Union playing no 
more than a minor supportive role.  
 
(4) Sport and education. The Constitution for the first time includes sport as a 
subject of EU activity, through Articles III-282 and III-283, which address the 
diverse fields of education, youth, sport and vocational training. Under Article 
III-282(1) the EU would be required to “contribute” to education by 
“encouraging cooperation between Member States” and “supporting and 
complementing their action.” However, the Union would be required to “fully 
respect the responsibility of the Member States for the content of their 
teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and 
linguistic diversity.” The article also would require the EU to “contribute to 
the promotion of European sporting issues,” and in both education and sport 
the EU would be required to focus on the pan-European aspect, on exchanges 
between nations and on cross-border cooperation within the Union.996 The EU 
would also be mandated to work with the Member States to cooperate with 
third countries and international organisations.997 Any EU legislation relating 
to education or sport would be prohibited from requiring harmonisation of 
national laws.998 
 
                                                 
993 Constitution art. III-281(1). 
994 Constitution art. III-281(2). 
995 EC Treaty art. 3(1)(u). 
996 Constitution art. III-282(1). 
997 Constitution art. III-282(2). 
998 Constitution art. III-282(3). 
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An EU vocational training policy is mandated under Article III-283, 
but this activity must “support and complement” Member State action while 
“fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and 
organisation of vocational training.”999 The Union would be required to work 
with the Member States to cooperate with third countries and international 
organisations,1000 and any EU laws in the field might not require 
harmonisation of national laws.1001 Both Articles III-282 and III-283 contain 
reminders that EU law in these fields might not entail any harmonisation of 
Member State laws, and EU activity in these fields would be merely 
supportive and complementary, leaving the Member States in charge. 
 
 The education provisions in Article III-282 are taken from Article 149 
of the EC Treaty, with Article III-283 on vocational training being nearly 
identical to Article 150 of the EC Treaty. As noted, the chief development in 
the Constitution is that sport is added as a new area of EU activity. This 
proved to be controversial, resulting in a softening of the original language of 
provision, with the apparent intention of limiting EU competence in actual 
regulation of the field.1002 In any event, EU laws might not entail any 
harmonisation of Member State laws, and EU activity would be supportive 
and complementary, leaving the Member States in charge. 
 
(5) Civil protection. Under the subject of civil protection, Article III-284 
requires the EU to “encourage cooperation between Member States in order to 
improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against 
natural or man-made disasters.”1003 EU action would entail supporting and 
complementing state action, promoting cooperation and promoting 
                                                 
999 Constitution art. III-283(1). 
1000 Constitution art. III-283(2). 
1001 Constitution art. III-283(3). 
1002 “This is the first time the EU has claimed power over sport in its basic legal 
documents. UEFA [the body that regulates soccer in Europe] was alarmed that it 
might herald a fresh barrage of legislation. So it launched an energetic lobbying 
campaign that has now managed to get the phrase ‘taking account of its special 
nature, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function’ inserted into a new draft [of the Constitution]. The hope is that this phrase 
will provide a legal basis to argue that sport can, in certain circumstances, be 
exempted from the usual strictures of the EU’s single-market rules.” How special 
interests infiltrate the European Union Constitution, Economist, May 22, 2004. The 
referenced insert into Article III-282(1) has been included in the final version of the 
Constitution, with the exception that the introductory words are “taking account of the 
specific nature of sport.” 
1003 Constitution art. III-284(1). 
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consistency,1004 and Union laws in this area might not require harmonisation 
of national laws.1005 There is no corresponding provision in the Treaties. 
However, as defined in the Constitution, the area of civil protection would not 
relate to actual responses to disasters. Rather, Article III-284 deals only with 
planning and prevention. Even with the Constitution’s new provision, the 
EU’s involvement in the field would clearly be secondary to that of the 
Member States. 
 
(6) Administrative cooperation. Article III-285 aims at the effective 
implementation of EU law by the Member States.1006 The EU might “support 
the efforts of the Member States to improve their administrative capacity to 
implement Union law,” and offer information and training to the states.1007 If 
the EU were to offer assistance, any State might decline to accept such 
support, and EU action could not require harmonisation of national laws.1008 
However, the foregoing flexibility was specifically to be “without prejudice to 
the obligations of the Member States to implement Union law or to the 
prerogatives and duties of the Commission.”1009 Article III-285 is innovative, 
not based on any treaty provision. Administrative training and coordination 
are areas in which the EU can indeed provide useful support and 
complementary action, but significant responsibility would remain with the 
Member States to implement and administer EU law.  
 
2.  THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES  
(III-286 – III-291) 
 
 Title IV of Part III of the Constitution, “Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories,” deals with matters that seem to fall somewhere 
between “internal policies and action” and “external action.” It relates to EU 
relations with non-European countries and territories having special relations 
with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Its 
provisions are carried over from Articles 182 to 188 of the EC Treaty, with no 
substantive changes. 
 
                                                 
1004 Constitution art. III-284(1). 
1005 Constitution art. III-284(2). 
1006 Constitution art. III-285(1). 
1007 Constitution art. III-285(2). 
1008 Constitution art. III-285(2). 
1009 Constitution art. III-285(3). 
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3. THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION 
 
 The field of external action has always been a subject of controversy 
for the European Union and its Member States. The desire for Europe to take 
concerted action in foreign affairs is offset by an insistence that Member 
States maintain their sovereignty in the international arena. In its mandate for 
the Convention, the Laeken Declaration asked for consideration of Europe’s 
role in a “fast-changing, globalised world,” and it stated: “Europe needs to 
shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation.”1010 It noted 
that EU citizens “want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security 
and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with 
trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.”1011 
Ultimately, it asked “How . . . should a more coherent common foreign policy 
and defence policy be developed?”1012 It offered no guidance, however, as to 
how these questions should be answered. Thus, the Convention possessed 
wide latitude to consider dramatic new programs and procedures in the EU’s 
external action, but its response to this opportunity was, at best, conservative. 
The Constitution’s substantive treatment of external action is not significantly 
at variance with the approach of the Treaties, and as a result, only a few points 
of interest will be described here. 
  
3.1 Common foreign and security policy 
 
 Article I-3(4) of the Constitution provides a broad mandate for the 
European Union to have “relations with the wider world.” This is 
accompanied by several statements of objectives that are somewhat broader 
than those found in TEU Articles 3 and 11. However, in matters of substance 
the Constitution’s approach to the CFSP is more a matter of emphasis than 
substance. 
 
(1) Unanimous decision-making and exceptions. Article III-300(1) of 
the Constitution provides that decisions on CFSP matters are to be taken 
unanimously by the Council, but Article III-300(2) offers four exceptions – 
four instances in which the Council may act by QMV. The first and third of 
these involve implementing prior (unanimous) decisions by the European 
Council, and the fourth relates to appointment of a special representative. The 
                                                 
1010 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 20. Note that the Declaration of Nice, 
which preceded the Laeken Declaration, called for a “deeper and wider debate about 
the future of the European Union” but did not specifically mention external relations. 
Nice Declaration, supra note 132, at 85. 
1011 Laeken Declaration, supra note 143, at 21. 
1012 Id. at 22. 
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second exception permits a qualified majority vote on a decision proposed by 
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that proposal itself must be 
requested by the European Council (which must act by consensus).1013 The 
basic unanimity requirement is carried over from Article 23(1) of the TEU, 
and the first, third and fourth provisions for QMV under the Constitution have 
antecedents in Article 23(2). However, the second exception, relating to 
proposals from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, is not found in the 
treaty. The fact that such proposals would first be requested by the European 
Council (acting by consensus) is an indication that no meaningful shift to 
QMV is offered by the Constitution. 
 
 (2) Increasing QMV. A potential increase in QMV decision-making is 
offered in Article III-300(3), which would permit the European Council to 
extend QMV to areas beyond those identified in Article III-300(2). This is a 
passerelle, because it would permit a change in the constitutional voting 
requirements without resorting to an amendment to the document. The 
procedure is not provided in the TEU. The obvious limitation on any 
significant movement under Article III-300(3) is that the European Council 
would be required to act unanimously in any decision to alter the rules.  
 
 (3) Extended ECJ jurisdiction. As analysed in Chapter 13, Article III-
376 offers a limited, but significant extension of the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice into the CFSP.   
 
(4) Limits on EU competences. Article I-40(1) of the Constitution 
makes it clear that the mandate to the Union to engage in foreign and security 
policy is based not on the relinquishment of Member State competence, but 
on “the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States . . . 
and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member 
States’ actions.” This is taken in part from TEU Article 11(2), which requires 
                                                 
1013 Marise Cremona describes the second exception as follows: “This is likely to 
apply where the European Council, by specifically requesting a Ministerial proposal, 
has given a clear indication of the policy line to be adopted on a specific issue.” 
Marise Cremona, The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External 
Action, 40 C.M.L.R. 1347, 1358 (2003). With regard to all of the QMV matters, she 
comments: “In all these cases the existing safeguard clause is preserved, allowing a 
Member State to oppose a vote for vital and stated reasons of national policy. As is 
now the case [under the TEU], following this use of the ‘veto’ the Council may refer 
the matter to the European Council for a decision by unanimity; however the draft 
[Constitution] interposes, before such a deferral, a stage during which the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs attempts to broker a solution acceptable to all; in other words a 
unanimous decision taken at Council of Ministers level obviating the need for referral 
to the European Council.” Id. at 1358-59. 
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the Member States to “work together to enhance and develop their mutual 
political solidarity.” Furthermore, according to Article III-308 the 
implementation of the CFSP might not affect the application of other EU 
competences, and the exercise of those other competences might not affect the 
carrying out of the CFSP. These statements, which have no antecedents in the 
Treaties, are reminders that under the Constitution the EU’s competences are 
carefully drawn. The common foreign and security policy would have defined 
limits, and activities in the field might not be used to affect the powers and 
rights reserved to the Member States. 
  
3.2 Common security and defence policy (CSDP) 
 
 (1) Scope of the CSDP. The common security and defence policy is 
introduced in Part I of the Constitution, in Articles I-12, I-16 and I-41. 
Articles III-309 to III-312 offer additional detail as part of the chapter on the 
common foreign and security policy.1014 Article I-12(4) states that the 
“progressive framing of a common defence policy” is one of the goals of the 
EU’s common foreign and security policy, and under Article I-16(1) the 
Union is granted competence in this field. The EU would be required by 
Article I-41(1) to seek an “operational capacity drawing on assets civil and 
military” and to use its assets outside the Union for peace-keeping missions 
and conflict prevention. Article III-309(1) also mentions a Union 
responsibility to fight terrorism. Under Articles I-41(3) and III-311 a 
European Defence Agency would be established by the EU to develop 
information and generally promote the CSDP. Under Article III-311(2) the 
Agency’s “statute, seat and operational rules” would be decided by a QMV 
decision of the Council. 
 
A common defence policy is referred to in the Preamble to the TEU 
and in Article 2 of the treaty. In Article 13 defence is mentioned as part of the 
CFSP. The primary article on the CSDP is TEU Article 17, which was the 
basis for Articles III-309 to III-312 of the Constitution. However, the TEU 
contains no overview provision like Article I-41. The treaty does mention 
peace and peacekeeping in Articles 11 and 17, but no reference is made to 
using EU assets outside the Union for peacekeeping activities. The TEU’s 
only references to terrorism are in the Third Pillar.1015 The Constitution’s 
requirement of unanimity in Council decisions on defence is a carryover from 
                                                 
1014 For general commentary on the CSDP, see Cremona, supra note 1013, at 1359-61. 
For an analysis of decision-making on CFSP matters under the Treaties, see Gisela 
Müller-Bandeck-Bocquet, The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the 
European Union, 7 Eur. Foreign Affairs Rev. 257 (2002). 
1015 See TEU arts. 29, 31. 
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Article 23(1) of the TEU, which applies to the entire field of CFSP. Like 
Article III-300, TEU Article 23(2) provides that QMV decision-making is not 
applicable in the case of decisions “having military or defence implications.”  
 
 The Constitution offers a much more complete picture of the EU’s 
possible activities related to defence. Article I-41 provides an overview that is 
lacking in the TEU. The Constitution also speaks of the Union developing an 
operational capacity and using its assets outside the EU for peacekeeping and 
conflict prevention, whereas the treaty mentions peacekeeping,1016 but is silent 
as to an EU operational capacity. The Constitution’s reference to establishing 
a European Defence Agency is unprecedented. 
 
 (2) Emphasis on Member States and defence. Despite the stated 
intention of developing a common policy, the Constitution repeatedly 
emphasises the defence needs of the individual Member States, it anticipates 
action by the states, and it leaves ultimate power in their hands. Article I-41 
would require that Union decisions on security and defence be taken 
unanimously by the Council,1017 and the actual creation of a common defence 
would be subject to a consensus vote of the European Council.1018 The 
provisions of Article III-300 permitting some QMV decision-making in the 
CFSP would expressly not be applicable to “decisions having military or 
defence implications.”1019 Furthermore, there is emphasis in Article I-41(3) on 
the fact that military resources would remain in the hands of the Member 
States, who are urged to progressively improve their individual military 
capabilities. Articles I-41(6) and III-312 provide mechanisms for “permanent 
structured cooperation” among groups of Member States who might act on the 
Union’s behalf.1020 Last, under Article III-311(2), a Member State’s 
participation in the European Defence Agency would be optional. 
                                                 
1016 TEU art. 17(2). 
1017 Constitution art. I-41(4). 
1018 Constitution art. I-41(2). 
1019 Constitution art. III-300(4). 
1020 Marise Cremona has commented on the Constitution’s provision for action by 
groups of Member States: “The extended CSDP provisions in the draft Treaty, as well 
as providing a more extensive basis for the development of an increasingly important 
aspect of Union external policy, are also characterized by their emphasis on 
flexibility. Smaller—or larger—groups of Member States will take on more extensive 
commitments, on both a long-term and on a case-by-case basis. This is the way that 
the CSDP has developed and it makes pragmatic sense in terms of the very different 
traditions and capabilities of the Member States. The role of the European Council 
and Council of Ministers will however be crucial, in ensuring consistency and 
avoiding a multiplicity of Member State initiatives with insufficient coordination and 
linkage to other Union policies.” Cremona, supra note 1013, at 1361. 
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 In matters emphasising Member State assets and actions the 
constitutional provisions are generally without precedent. The TEU contains 
no provision like Articles I-41 and I-43 that call on Member States to provide 
assistance to each other. Likewise, the references in Article I-41 to the 
defence policies and the NATO obligations of certain Member States are 
innovative. Furthermore, there is no treaty antecedent for references in 
Articles I-41 and III-310 to the use of Member States or their assets for EU 
purposes, and there is no treaty language comparable to the reference in 
Article III-312 to permanent structured cooperation among groups of Member 
States. The Constitution’s provision for structured cooperation resembles 
“enhanced cooperation” under the Treaties, but without the requirement for 
participation by a certain number of states.  
 
 (3) Style versus substance. The far more elaborate approach of the 
Constitution with regard to EU defence matters is not matched with 
commensurate new Union assets and powers to institute and implement a 
defence policy. It is also not accompanied by any real EU power. In terms of 
dividing lines, the status quo would be maintained, with all defence decisions 
still requiring Member State consensus. Thus, the actual expansion of EU 
activity in the area of CSDP would most likely have continued to be a process 
of gradual development. 
 
3.3 Other aspects of external action 
 
 The other chapters of Title V of Part III of the Constitution include: 
 
 --Common commercial policy (Articles III-314 to III-315)  
 --Cooperation and humanitarian aid (III-316 to III-318) 
 --Restrictive measures (III-322) 
 --International agreements (III-323 to III-326) 
 --EU representation (III-327 to III-328) 
 --Mutual assistance (I-43, III-329)  
 
None of these areas proposes any movement of any dividing lines. 
 
4. SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND THE DIVIDING LINES 
 
 In matters of the EU’s substantive activity it is important to note that 
a detailed comparison of the Constitution’s 156 articles governing internal 
activities and its 38 articles on external action would reveal a significant 
rearrangement of the counterpart provisions in the Treaties. However, the 
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substance of the Treaties would largely be preserved, and it is beyond the 
scope of this treatise to recite each constitutional provision and its treaty 
antecedent. In Chapter 16 and in this chapter we have reviewed all of the 
internal and external provisions of the Constitution that arguably might have 
an impact on the Union’s dividing lines. Let us briefly recap what we have 
found. 
 
 With respect to internal matters, certain decisions relating to multi-
state social security calculations, professional licensing, transport and culture 
would move to QMV under the Constitution. Member States wishing to 
impose restrictions on capital and payment flow would be required to first 
obtain unanimous approval by the Council, in contrast to a state’s 
presumptive authority under the EC Treaty. The Constitution also offers for 
the first time the prospect of EU activity in creating intellectual property 
protection, space programs, energy policy, sport, civil protection and 
administrative cooperation. New Union initiatives in public health and 
tourism promotion are also provided for. 
 
In external affairs the Constitution offers some prospect for additional 
QMV decision-making in the common foreign and security policy as well as 
for extended jurisdiction by the Court of Justice, but these are very carefully 
contained. An expanded common defence activity is also contemplated, but 
without clearly defined mandates.  
 
 With the notable exception of the AFSJ, discussed in Chapter 16, a 
wholesale reworking of the substantive competences of the European Union 
was clearly not on the Convention’s agenda. Looking at the items identified in 
this chapter, none of them individually amounts to a significant dividing-line 
shift. Even taken collectively, they should not raise any concern. These items 
represent either relatively minor adjustments, or relatively cautious 
innovations.   
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Chapter 18 
 
 
A Critique of the Constitutonal Treaty’s Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
In our search for the European Union’s dividing lines we have 
explored the text of the Constitution from front to back, and we have 
examined its provisions from many angles. One byproduct of this inquiry is 
that we have developed an intimate acquaintance with the structure of the 
document and its style. It is going too far to state that this familiarity breeds 
contempt, because there is much to admire in the Constitution. However, 
working with the document also gives rise to disappointment over its 
craftsmanship. It is appropriate, then, to offer a few observations on the merits 
of the Constitution as a workable legal text. 
 
In Chapter 2 we noted that one of the primary motivations behind the 
Constitution was a desire to reorganise and simplify the existing EU Treaties. 
Was this accomplished? Yes and no. We can recognise a number of positive 
results, and these will be identified in the first section of this chapter. But the 
same analysis will also describe the Constitution’s most obvious negative 
features – its length and style. Following that we come to the heart of the 
matter, which focuses on the awkward results created by drafters when they 
chose to scatter related provisions throughout various parts of the document. 
In the third section two possible solutions to this drafting problem are 
proposed. One would maintain most of the present text but with many of the 
overlapping parts merged together. The second would eliminate much of the 
Constitution’s detail in favor of a more basic statement of critical principles. 
The conclusion is that the Constitution as written is not as effective as it could 
have been, and that its quality as a document does not match its potential 
political significance.  
 
1.  TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING? 
 
Among the Constitution’s innovations that reflect both substantive 
improvement and simplification are the following:  
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--The Three Pillars of the TEU would be scrapped, although their 
subjects of activity would remain intact.  
 
--The EC Treaty and the TEU would be merged into a single text.  
 
--The European Union would replace the European Community, and 
all references to the Community would be excised.  
 
--In connection with elimination of the Pillars, there would be a 
reduction in the types of EU legal instruments, and decision-making 
procedures would be made more uniform.  
 
--The Constitution would provide a much clearer delineation of the 
relative competences of the Union and the Member States, even 
though the actual balance of power would generally be unchanged. 
 
It might also be argued that Part I, which offers an unprecedented 
snapshot of the EU and its institutions, makes the Constitution more 
approachable to the average European citizen.1021 This is a contestable point, 
however, and will be the subject of further discussion below. 
 
The Constitution also offers a number of important institutional and 
procedural changes to the European Union, including a more permanent 
European Council Presidency, a new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, a 
smaller Commission, a revised formula for qualified majority voting in the 
Council, and more co-decision for the European Parliament. 
 
Unfortunately, the Constitution’s length and style leave much to be 
desired. Brevity is entirely lacking – the text alone consumes 202 pages in the 
Official Journal. With protocols, declarations and other addenda the 
constitutional corpus comprises a book of 482 pages. The principal reason is 
that in addition to the newly crafted provisions in Part I and the new subject 
matter in Part II, Part III of the Constitution largely retains the substance and 
particulars of the existing Treaties. 
                                                 
1021 Peter Ludlow offers “twenty six reasons for welcoming Part 1 of the 
Constitution.” Ludlow, supra note 681, at 27. For a general comment on the positive 
and negative aspects of the document, see Emmanouilidis, supra note 766, at 5-8. 
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One commentator has asserted that the text’s provisions are “hardly 
less complex than the treaties they are meant to supplant.”1022 The Centre for 
Applied Policy Research has criticised “the opaque structure of the text as a 
whole and the resulting fact that the citizens will find it difficult to read and  
comprehend the Constitution.”1023 Another observer has characterised the 
document as “depressingly long and wordy,” containing too much “EU 
jargon” and “far too much detail to be easily intelligible to ordinary 
citizens.”1024 A commentary has asked: “Did anyone test-drive the turgid, 
legalistic text with a sample of citizens from different backgrounds and 
different countries? This would soon have shown that this text is heavy and 
rather impenetrable.”1025 One writer has decried the document’s “lack of 
Jeffersonian democratic artistry,”1026 while another has caustically remarked 
that it possesses “the literary charm of an unhelpful set of instructions 
accompanying flatpack furniture.”1027 
 
Succinctness and artistry aside, a significant challenge in working 
with the Constitution’s text is the fact that related provisions are scattered 
throughout the document, rather than presented together. This compels the 
reader to jump back and forth through the text, searching for articles relevant 
to a particular subject. The following section will highlight the most 
pronounced examples of this phenomenon. 
 
2. A CONFUSING TEXTUAL DIASPORA 
 
The general categories of material that comprise the Constitution may 
be broadly described as preambles and statements of objectives, operating 
principles, institutional provisions, articles on the forms of EU legislation, and 
                                                 
1022 Siedentop, supra note 153, at 21. 
1023 Janis A. Emmanouilidis & Claus Giering, Light and Shade—An Evaluation of the 
Convention’s Proposals, in Centre for Applied Policy Research, EU Reform, 
Convention Spotlight 1 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Emmanouilidis & Giering]. The 
opaqueness of the Constitution’s text has been attributed to the “continuing elitist 
nature of EU construction.” Hughes, supra note 153, at 6. 
1024 Quentin Peel, Europe’s constitution misses its moment, Fin. Times, June 17, 2003, 
at 23.  
1025 Head-to-head: Is EU blueprint democratic?, BBC News, June 20, 2003, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3006156.stm. 
1026 John Vinocur, An EU Constitution? No Big Deal, Int’l Herald Trib., June 25, 
2003, at 1.  
1027 A draft EU constitution that is far from satisfactory, Times London, May 27, 
2003, at 17.  
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substantive provisions on human rights, the internal market and other matters. 
Textual fragmentation is found in each of these categories. 
 
2.1 Preambles and statements of objectives 
 
An initial observation is that the Constitution contains two preambles, 
one relating to the entire document and another introducing Part II. Both 
contain appropriately lofty statements that provide context and express intent, 
but it is not clear why two preambles are necessary. Both speak of common 
values and shared heritage, with due respect for the differences in national 
cultures. Both emphasise the central role of the individual in society, the 
necessity for protecting human rights, and respect for law. Important as these 
principles are, it seems unnecessary to state them twice. In addition, the 
function of the Part II preamble is not obvious. It apparently relates to Part II 
only, but its ideals might well be useful to interpret the entire Constitution. On 
the other hand, the preamble for the entire document is evidently intended to 
serve the entire text, including Part II, but it could also be argued that the 
more specific Part II preamble should supersede its more general Part I 
counterpart with regard to interpretation of Part II. 
 
Parts I and III do not have preambles as such, but they contain 
statements of objectives that serve a similar function. Title I of Part I is 
captioned “Definition and Objectives of the Union,” and it contains two 
provisions, Articles I-2 and I-3, that broadly express values comparable to 
those included in the preambles—equality, human rights, non-discrimination, 
and the rule of law.1028 Likewise, Title I of Part III broadly requires the Union 
to act with consistency,1029 promote equality of the sexes1030 and certain social 
rights,1031 combat all forms of discrimination,1032 protect the environment and 
promote sustainable development,1033 protect the rights of consumers,1034 
respect the welfare of animals,1035 and behave with fiscal responsibility.1036 
While most of these articles expressly relate to Union activity under Part III 
                                                 
1028 In addition, with respect to the internal market only, Article I-4 prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
1029 Constitution art. III-115. 
1030 Constitution art. III-116. 
1031 Constitution art. III-117. 
1032 Constitution art. III-118. 
1033 Constitution art. III-119. 
1034 Constitution art. III-120. 
1035 Constitution art. III-121. 
1036 Constitution art. III-122. 
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(“The Policies and Functioning of the Union”),1037 curiously two of the 
provisions are not so limited.1038 An additional statement of objectives is 
Article III-292, which identifies many of the same values as principles to 
guide the EU’s external action.  
 
None of the referenced provisions in Parts I and III contain sufficient 
detail to be qualitatively distinguishable from the preambles, and thus their 
purpose might be questioned. Their placement as textual articles is not 
explained, nor is it clear whether their inclusion in the text gives them more 
authority than similar statements in the preambles. Quite obviously, they 
could be included in the preambles, but they are not; and indeed, longer 
preambles would not be desirable. However, as the above description 
demonstrates, the drafters of the Constitution chose a decidedly random 
approach in expressing the ideals for the Union. 
 
2.2 Competences and operational concepts 
 
The Constitution contains critical information about the powers 
assigned to the EU and how the Union and Member States may function 
within the EU system. Finding this information, however, requires searching 
through various parts of the document.  
 
The Union’s competences are conferred by the Member States. This 
is a key concept that is described at several points in the Constitution. Its first 
expression is found in Article I-1(1), which states that the Constitution 
establishes the Union, “on which the Member States confer competences.” 
The same provision requires the EU to pursue Member State objectives by 
exercising the competences conferred by the States. Article I-11 then 
reiterates twice that conferral is granted by the Member States.1039 Implying 
conferral by the States without specifically mentioning them, Article II-111(1) 
links activities under the Charter with the limits of Union power “as conferred 
on it in the other parts of the Constitution.” Similarly, Article III-115 
emphasises that the Union must act under Part III “in accordance with the 
principle of conferring of powers.” These repeated reminders of the conferral 
principle may be seen as nothing more than appropriate emphasis of the 
doctrine. However, the multiple references lack a clear pattern, and they are 
somewhat inconsistent by describing Union competences as being conferred 
                                                 
1037 It is worthwhile to note that the basic prohibition against nationality-based 
discrimination found in Constitution Article I-4, like its counterpart in EC Treaty 
Article 12, is a critical factor to the operation of the internal market.  
1038 Constitution arts. III-120, III-122. 
1039 Constitution arts. I-11(1), I-11(2).  
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by the Member States in some instances and by the Constitution itself in 
others.1040 
 
Union action is restricted by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, and Article I-11 provides useful definitions of the two 
terms.1041 Much more detail on the application of these principles is found in a 
protocol attached to the Constitution,1042 and Article I-11 helpfully refers to 
the supplemental document. However, the provision fails to mention another 
relevant protocol1043 that contains procedural details regarding the role of 
Member State parliaments in reviewing proposed legislation against the 
subsidiarity and proportionality requirements.1044  
 
Enhanced cooperation is nicely described in Article I-44.1045 
However, critical details are found in Part III,1046 and in this instance the 
drafters of Article I-44 have helpfully included cross references to the related 
provisions.1047 But the Constitution does contain additional cooperative 
procedures that are not mentioned in Article I-44 or its Part III counterparts. 
For example, in the area of common security and defense policy, there are 
mechanisms created for “permanent structured cooperation” among groups of 
Member States who might act on the Union’s behalf,1048 or “commitments and 
cooperation” among States for mutual defense.1049 Neither of these 
mechanisms has yet been implemented. One further cooperative measure is 
found in Part IV, in which the Benelux “regional union” (which predates the 
Treaty of Rome and continues to exist) is specifically approved.1050 Like 
enhanced cooperation, the mechanisms for permanent structured cooperation 
are introduced in Part I of the Constitution and elaborated in Part III.1051 
Regarding commitments and cooperation on defense, Article I-41(7) refers 
not to Part III but to the Member States’ obligations under NATO and under 
the United Nations Charter.  
                                                 
1040 Constitution arts. I-12(1), I-12(2), I-14(1). See also Constitution arts. I-3(5), I-6.  
1041 See discussion in part 2 of Chapter 12 of this treatise.  
1042 See Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 273.  
1043 See Protocol on National Parliaments, supra note 273.  
1044 Id. at arts. 1–4. 
1045 For a discussion on enhanced cooperation and other cooperative procedures, see 
part 4 of Chapter 10 of this treatise. For a description of the Convention’s negotiations 
over enhanced cooperation, see Norman supra note 152, at 99, 117, 186, 242-43. 
1046 Constitution arts. III-416 to III-423. 
1047 Constitution arts. I-44(1), I-44(2). 
1048 Constitution art. I-41(6). 
1049 Constitution art. I-41(7).  
1050 Constitution art. IV-441. 
1051 Constitution art. III-312. 
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Another operational concept that is covered in both Part I and Part III 
of the Constitution is the financial and budgetary scheme for the Union.1052 
The provisions in Part I comprise a separate title, “The Union’s Finances,”1053 
and they offer general principles for EU revenue and expenditure,1054 along 
with descriptions of the Union’s financial resources,1055 the multiannual 
financial framework1056 and the annual budget.1057 The real nuts and bolts, 
however, are to be found in Part III,1058 whose provisions are only partially 
cross-referenced in Part I.  
 
The foregoing examples illustrate the Convention’s apparent intention 
to use Part I of the Constitution to lay out the basic principles of how the Union 
is to act and under what authority it may do so. Unfortunately, the drafters 
failed to include all of the relevant material in Part I or failed to provide 
adequate cross references to related provisions in Part III. 
 
2.3 The institutions and their activities 
 
Among the innovative sections of Part I, its Title IV provides a 
description of the Union’s institutions.1059 Article I-19 identifies the primary 
institutions and states their objectives, while ensuing articles offer basic 
information on each body. Additional provisions deal with key matters such 
as the presidencies of the European Council and Commission, the new Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, formations of the Council and the revised system 
of qualified majority voting on the European Council and Council.  
 
As a summary, Title IV of Part I is useful, and it does offer in 
straightforward fashion the Constitution’s institutional innovations. However, 
as governing text the provisions of Part I are obviously incomplete. All of the 
following institutions or bodies are introduced in Part I, but with important 
details reserved for Part III: the European Parliament,1060 the European 
Council,1061 the Council,1062 the Commission,1063 the Court of Justice,1064 the 
                                                 
1052 For a broader discussion of the budget, see part 3 of Chapter 8 of this treatise. 
1053 Constitution arts. I-53 to I-56. 
1054 Constitution art. I-53. 
1055 Constitution art. I-54. 
1056 Constitution art. I-55. 
1057 Constitution art. I-56. 
1058 Constitution arts. III-402 to III-415. 
1059 Constitution arts. I-19 to I-32. For an extended analysis of the institutions see 
Chapter 13 of this treatise. 
1060 Constitution arts. I-20, III-330 to III-340. 
1061 Constitution arts. I-21 to I-22, I-25, III-341. 
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European Central Bank,1065 the Court of Auditors,1066 the Committee of the 
Regions,1067 and the Economic and Social Committee.1068 In addition, Part III 
contains provisions, not reflected in Part I, relating to the European 
Ombudsman1069 and the European Investment Bank.1070 Part III also contains 
a number of procedural articles affecting all of the EU’s institutions and other 
bodies.1071 Furthermore, several protocols to the Constitution describe the 
functioning of the institutions.1072  
 
Voting rules for the institutions are found in Parts I, III, and IV of the 
Constitution. For the European Parliament, its standard rule of majority voting 
is found in Article III-338, although other rules may apply.1073 For the 
European Council, the requirement of consensus voting as the norm is found 
in Article I-21(4), but other provisions permit decisions to be taken by less 
than a unanimous vote.1074 Article I-23(3) provides that the standard 
procedure for the Council is to vote by qualified majority vote,1075 but other 
                                                                                                                    
1062 Constitution arts. I-23 to I-25, III-342 to III-346. 
1063 Constitution arts. I-26 to I-28, III-347 to III-352.  
1064 Constitution arts. I-29, III-353 to III-381. In addition to the Constitutional text, 
there is an extensive Statute of the Court of Justice. See Protocol on Statute of Court 
of Justice, supra note 817. 
1065 Constitution arts. I-30, III-382 to III-383. 
1066 Constitution arts. I-31, III-384 to III-385. 
1067 Constitution arts. I-32, III-386 to III-388. 
1068 Constitution arts. I-32, III-389 to III-392. 
1069 Constitution art. III-335. 
1070 Constitution arts. III-393 to III-394. 
1071 Constitution arts. III-395 to III-401. 
1072 See, for example, Protocol on Statute of Court of Justice, supra note 817; Protocol 
on Privileges, supra note 367; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 225; 
Protocol on the Location of the Seats of the Institutions and of Certain Bodies, 
Offices, Agencies and Departments of the European Union, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 
310) 261; Protocol on the Euro Group, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) 341. These and 
others are appended to the Constitution.   
1073 Certain special procedures may require less than a majority or a super-majority. 
Constitution arts. III-333 (one quarter of Parliament’s members may set up a 
Committee of Inquiry), III-340 (two-thirds vote to censure the Commission). 
1074 Article I-25 provides two different formulas for qualified majority voting on the 
European Council. For a description of the decisions for which unanimity is not 
required, see note 723, supra.    
1075 The voting formulas are found in Article I-25. 
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voting rules may be found elsewhere throughout the Constitution1076 and in a 
draft decision of the Council.1077 
 
Because of the described arrangement of the text, anyone studying the 
Constitution’s institutional provisions must set Part I against the other parts of 
the document, including its protocols, to see the whole picture. In the case of 
voting rules, the normal procedures are found in various places, but the 
exceptions to those rules are numerous, and a careful search of the full text is 
necessary to determine whether one of the many exceptions might apply. In 
broad terms, Part I describes the Constitution’s innovations, but it does not 
offer enough institutional detail to stand alone or to permit the reader to rely 
on its provisions. Likewise, and if the intention of the Constitution’s drafters 
was to summarise in Part I all of the innovations relating to the institutions, 
they have not succeeded. The best that can be said is that Part I offers a nicely 
organised overview, but nothing more. 
 
2.4 Legal instruments 
 
The Constitution’s reduction in the number of permissible legal 
instruments, as outlined in Article I-33, appears on the surface to be a 
significant step toward simplifying EU law, and it serves as a concrete 
manifestation of the elimination of the Pillar structure. A closer look, 
however, reveals that there are many other legal acts available to the 
Union.1078 Herwig Hofmann1079 offers a useful analysis, demonstrating that 
Article I-33 is by no means exclusive.1080 He notes that the EU will continue 
to use delegated regulations,1081 inter-institutional arrangements,1082 and “soft 
law tools” such as “guidelines, vademecums, codexes, notices or circulars to 
Member State administrations.”1083 Furthermore, Article I-37(3) calls for 
“rules and general principles” for Member States to control the Commission’s 
                                                 
1076 See discussion in Chapter 15 of this treatise. 
1077 See Declaration on Article I-25. The draft decision, which will be adopted by the 
Council on the day the Constitution takes effect, permits three-fourths of a blocking 
minority (based on population or numbers of States in such a minority) to force the 
Council to reconsider a measure that has received a qualified majority vote. One 
commentator has noted that this is “an additional complicating factor” that may 
interfere with efficient Council operations. Grevi, supra note 402. 
1078 See the discussion in part 1 of Chapter 14. 
1079 Hofmann, supra note 597. 
1080 Id. at 3, 7. 
1081 Id. at 9–14; see also Constitution, at art. I-36. 
1082 Hoffman, supra note 589, at 17-18. 
1083 Id. at 7. 
326 COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSION 
  
exercise of its delegated implementing powers, and the implementing acts of 
the States would themselves take many forms and be part of the system of 
Union law.1084  
 
The Constitution also provides various types of direct EU action 
outside the normal scope and procedures of Article I-33, including: 
agreements between the EU and IGOs or third countries,1085 budgetary and 
financial framework decisions,1086 certain acts of the European Parliament,1087 
various forms of “coordinating, complementary or supporting action”1088 and 
actions relating to the common foreign and security policy,1089 common 
security and defense policy,1090 and the area of freedom, security, and 
justice.1091 Finally, amendment of the Constitution itself is subject to special 
procedures.1092  
 
The European Union is a complex system, internally and with regard 
to its relationship with the Member States. The need for variety and fluidity in 
the forms of EU action is understandable, and the Constitution provides ample 
flexibility. The concern here is that Article I-33 suggests a simple approach 
that does not withstand closer scrutiny. 
 
2.5 Fundamental rights and EU citizenship 
 
Part II is the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, its great statement of 
fundamental human rights that must be guaranteed by and within the 
Union.1093 But there are additional provisions on the subject. Part I has a title 
named “Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union.”1094 In it, Article I-
9 requires the EU to recognise the rights expressed in Part II, and it calls for 
the Union to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights (ECHR).1095 It also incorporates as “general principles of the Union’s 
                                                 
1084 Constitution art. I-37(1). 
1085 Constitution art. III-317(2). 
1086 Constitution arts. I-54(3) (requiring Member State ratification), I-55(4) 
(permitting the European Council to change the specified voting procedures). 
1087 Constitution arts. III-330(2), III-333. 
1088 Constitution arts. III-278 to III-285. 
1089 Constitution art. I-40. 
1090 Constitution art. I-41. 
1091 Constitution art. I-42. 
1092 Constitution arts. IV-443, IV-444, IV-445. See discussion in Chapter 11 of this 
treatise. 
1093 See discussion in part 3 of Chapter 7 of this treatise. 
1094 Constitution arts. I-9 to I-10. 
1095 Constitution arts. I-9(1), I-9(2). 
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law” the fundamental rights arising from the “constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States.”1096 The preamble to Part II then refers to 
these same sources of law and actually expands on them. It “reaffirms” the 
rights arising from the “constitutional traditions and international obligations 
common to the Member States,” the ECHR, “the Social Charters adopted by 
the Union and by the Council of Europe,” the case law of the European Court 
of Justice and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.1097 It 
further states that Part II will be interpreted by the Court of Justice and 
Member State courts “with due regard” to certain “explanations” prepared by 
the Charter Convention, as later updated by the European Convention.1098  
 
Closely related to “fundamental rights” are EU citizenship rights and 
principles of democracy within the Union. Article I-10 guarantees Union 
citizens the right to “move and reside freely” in any Member State, the right 
as a resident to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and European 
Parliament elections, certain rights to diplomatic and consular assistance from 
any Member State and the right to deal with EU institutions in any official EU 
language.1099 Part II repeats the grant of rights relating to voting and standing 
for election,1100 and Part III, in its own title on “Non-Discrimination and 
Citizenship,”1101 contemplates additional Union legislation relating to 
citizens’ rights.1102 An additional set of principles in Part I is entitled “The 
Democratic Life of the Union.”1103 Once again, equality is demanded,1104 and 
citizens are offered access to the EU institutions,1105 transparency in 
institutional activities,1106 personal data privacy1107 and the assistance of an 
ombudsman to address grievances about the institutions.1108 
                                                 
1096 Constitution art. I-9(3). 
1097 Constitution pt. II Preamble. 
1098 Constitution pt. II Preamble. A logical question is whether these explanations 
should be treated as part of the Constitution itself, subject to amendment only through 
the elaborate process required to amend the Constitution. A difficulty presented in this 
analysis is the fact that the explanations themselves are prefaced with the statement 
that “they do not as such have the status of law.” Praesidium, Updated Explanations 
relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, July 18, 2003, CONV 
828/1/03 REV 1, at 2. For an analysis of this point, see Hofmann, supra note 597, at 
20. 
1099 Constitution art. I-10(2).  
1100 Constitution arts. II-99, II-100. 
1101 Constitution arts. III-123 to III-129. 
1102 Constitution arts. III-125 to III-128. 
1103 Constitution arts. I-45 to I-52. 
1104 Constitution arts. I-45. 
1105 Constitution arts. I-45 to I-47. 
1106 Constitution arts. I-47(2), I-50. 
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While the Constitution’s guarantee of human rights is a positive 
development, its approach is highly complicated. Substantive provisions on 
individual rights are scattered throughout Parts I, II, and III, and there is 
considerable repetition among them, a situation characterised by one 
commentator as “pointless duplications.”1109 Furthermore, the incorporation of 
the ECHR, constitutional traditions and international obligations common to 
the Member States, Social Charters of the EU, and Council of Europe, case 
law of two courts, and official explanations of the original Charter means that 
the text of the Constitution, however presented, would not be the last word on 
the subject.1110 The same could be said, of course, about any national 
constitution, whose pronouncements on human rights are necessarily 
supplemented by legislation, regulation and decisional law. Interestingly, 
Articles II-111 to II-113 of the Constitution recognise the interplay among the 
various systems of rights, and they attempt to offer guidance in applying the 
different schemes.1111 Unfortunately, these provisions are themselves 
complex, and an interpretation by the European Court of Justice would likely 
have been needed to sort out the various sets of principles.1112 
 
2.6 The internal market and other subjects of EU law 
 
Consistent with the pattern established for other provisions, the 
drafters of the Constitution utilised Part I to debut most of the substantive 
areas of EU action, while reserving the essential detail for Part III. These 
fields include: the internal market;1113 monetary policy for the Eurozone 
Member States;1114 economic and social policy;1115 external action;1116 
                                                                                                                    
1107 Constitution arts. I-51. 
1108 Constitution arts. I-49. 
1109 Dougan, supra note 358. Other commentators have criticised the overlap between 
human rights provisions in Part I and Part II of the Constitution, noting that this 
“weakens the structural clarity of the text. Furthermore, differing formulations may 
well lead to legal uncertainties.” Emmanouilidis, supra note 766, at 3. 
1110 The Constitution’s approach is not entirely unprecedented. As discussed in detail 
in part 3 of Chapter 7, the Treaties themselves recognise a variety of sources of 
human rights law. For example, Article 6(2) of the TEU requires the EU to “respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] . . . and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community Law.” 
1111 Constitution arts. II-111 to II-113. 
1112 See the discussion in part 3 of Chapter 7 of this treatise. 
1113 Constitution arts. I-13(1) (regarding competition rules relating to the internal 
market), I-14(2) (the internal market generally), III-130 to III-176. 
1114 Constitution arts. I-13(1), I-15(2), I-30, III-177, III-185 to III-202. 
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common foreign and security policy;1117 common security and defense 
policy;1118 and “the area of freedom, security and justice.”1119 The elaboration 
in Part III largely mirrors the text of the Treaties on these subjects, and, as 
noted, the introductory references in Part I are unprecedented.  
 
3. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
In broad terms, the Convention took the EC Treaty and TEU and 
combined them as Part III of the new Constitution. The drafters added Part I 
as an overview of the Union and its competences and institutions, Part II as a 
bill of rights, and Part IV as a housekeeping section. Despite the real 
improvements mentioned earlier in this Article, is it really legitimate to 
describe this overall construct as a simplification? 
 
From a drafting point of view one might argue that Part I is the most 
problematic section of the Constitution. Ironically, it was offered as an easy-to-
digest, inspirational introduction to the European Union, a succinct rendition of 
the EU’s components and characteristics. But in this attempt to make the 
Constitution more approachable and understandable, the drafters of the 
document actually created a deception. Just as a movie’s promotional trailer 
may fail to reflect the true quality of the entire film, Part I’s sneak preview does 
describe the Constitution’s innovations, but it fails to reveal the document’s full 
plot. Virtually every one of the provisions of Part I is amplified, clarified or 
limited by articles elsewhere in the document. Thus, the Convention presents a 
set of basic statements, none of which can be relied upon without an exegetical 
foray into Parts II, III and IV.1120 The unhappy conclusion is that this 
                                                                                                                    
1115 In Part I, see Constitution arts. I-12(3), I-14(2), I-15(1), I-17. In Part III, see 
Constitution arts. III-177 to III-184 (regarding economic policy), III-203 to III-208 
(employment policy), III-209 to III-115 (social policy), III-220 to III-224 (economic, 
social and territorial cohesion), III-225 to III-232 (agriculture and fisheries), III-233 
to III-234 (environment), III-235 (consumer protection), III-236 to III-245 (transport), 
III-246 to III-247 (trans-European networks), III-248 to III-255 (research and 
technological development, and space), III-256 (energy), III-278 to III-285 (industry, 
human health, education, culture, tourism and civil protection). For a discussion of the 
complex relationship between EU and Member State competence in these fields, see 
Sieberson, supra note 444, at 27-28. 
1116 Constitution arts. I-3(4), I-14(4), I-57, III-286 to III-291, III-292 to III-293, III-
314 to III-328. 
1117 Constitution arts. I-12(4), I-16, I-28, I-40, III-294 to III-313. 
1118 Constitution arts. I-12(4), I-41, III-309 to III-312, III-329, III-436. 
1119 Constitution arts. I-14(2), I-42, III-257 to III-277. 
1120 Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Claus Giering have noted that Part I “is not enough to 
provide EU citizens with a clear-cut picture of the EU as a constitutional community,” 
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arrangement actually increases the complexity of the Constitution under the 
guise of simplification. 
 
Given the pre-Convention demands for a clearer, simpler successor to 
the Treaties, and in light of the textual analysis in Part IV of this Article, two 
straightforward means of improving the Constitution’s text are offered. 
 
3.1 Reeling in the related provisions 
 
The first suggestion would be to eliminate as much of the textual 
fragmentation as possible. Related and overlapping provisions should be 
presented together, so the reader can have confidence that the presentation of 
a particular subject is relatively complete. Where competing considerations 
necessitate that significant, related material be presented elsewhere, cross 
references should be used if possible.1121 This process of regrouping related 
articles would create a felicitous side benefit, namely, the opportunity to 
eliminate redundancies and clear up inconsistencies.  
 
Looking back to the prior section, the following are examples of how 
the Constitution might be rearranged to bring an end to the textual scattering: 
 
--The preambles and statements of objectives could be combined into 
a single preamble for the entire document. 
 
--References to the conferral principle could be consolidated into a 
single article in Part I and thereafter reiterated only where necessary.  
 
--The protocol on subsidiarity could be incorporated into Article I-11, 
and the protocol on the role of Member State parliaments could be 
brought forward into the text of the Constitution. 
 
--The textual material on enhanced cooperation could be combined, 
preferably in Part I. 
 
--The budgetary and financial provisions could be brought together, 
again preferably in Part I. 
 
                                                                                                                    
and that “the rights, obligations, aims and limits of the European Union become 
apparent only after one has read more than 460 articles.” Emmanouilidis & Giering, 
supra note 1023, at 3.   
1121 Article I-44 offers a useful demonstration of cross-references. 
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--All of the institutional provisions in Part III and the relevant 
protocols could be incorporated into the related introductory articles 
in Part I.  
 
--Exceptions to the standard institutional voting rules could be 
identified in a single article in Part I for each institution. For clarity, 
these references to special voting requirements might be repeated in 
the relevant articles in Part III, but a single initial list of these 
exceptions would present a more complete portrayal of how each 
institution operates. 
 
--To account for the additional types of legal instruments beyond the 
new “basic six,” Article I-33 should be expanded to describe other 
means of action available to the EU institutions. 
 
--Because of the symbolic importance of describing fundamental 
rights in a separate part of the Constitution, Part II could be retained, 
but the related provisions in Parts I and III could be incorporated into 
the Charter. Additionally, and more controversially, the Charter could 
be given its full due, and references to the other sources of rights 
could be deleted. Critical principles from those other sources, if not 
currently found in the Charter, could be expressed as provisions of the 
Charter. 
 
--The allocation of competences between the EU and the Member 
States could be retained in Part I, and this would of necessity include 
certain references to substantive areas of action. All other references 
to substantive matters, such as Articles I-40 to 42, could be moved to 
their related sections in Part III. 
 
What emerges from the foregoing is a substantially expanded Part I of 
the Constitution, covering most of the institutional detail currently divided 
between Parts I and III. At the same time, the function of Part III would be 
clarified—it would become the substantive law section of the document. Parts 
II and IV would remain relatively intact. The benefit of this approach is that 
the different parts of the Constitution would no longer overlap, and they 
would have different purposes. Part I would describe in full detail the Union 
and its institutions. Part II would be a stand-alone Bill of Rights. Part III 
would cover all of the subjects of EU activity. Part IV would continue as a 
brief set of technical provisions.  
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The chief victim of this approach would be the putative stylistic 
elegance of Part I in its current form. This is a sacrifice well worth making. 
The sense of order resulting from this restructuring would bring the 
Constitution much closer to the people than do the streamlined but misleading 
introductory provisions of the current document.  
 
3.2 A streamlined constitution—a “basic treaty” 
 
The bolder approach would be to essentially retain Parts I, II and IV 
(amended as described in the preceding section) as the “basic treaty” 
contemplated in the Laeken Declaration,1122 while moving most of Part III to a 
constitutional protocol or to the text of a European law, either of which could 
be amended, for example, by a significant supermajority but without the 
requirement of unanimous Member State ratification. The streamlined 
Constitution would have the look and feel of the rearranged document 
described in the preceding section, but without many of the detailed 
substantive provisions of Part III.1123  
 
Critical features of the shortened Constitution would include the 
following:  
 
--A single preamble or statement of objectives. 
--Clear statements on conferral, subsidiarity, and primacy of EU law. 
--Delineation of competences granted to the EU and reserved to the 
Member States. 
--Essential detail on the institutions, the EU legislative process, legal 
instruments, and the Union budget. 
--A comprehensive list of exceptions to the standard institutional 
voting rules. 
--The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. 
 
As noted, the greatest practical benefit to pruning most of Part III 
from the Constitution is that in matters where unanimity is not politically 
required it would not be necessary to suffer through the constitutional 
amendment process to change the law.1124 Given the vast detail in Part III, its 
                                                 
1122 See Laeken Declaration, as quoted in the text accompanying note 146, supra.   
1123 For commentary on the relationship between Parts I and III, see Jan Wouters, 
Drawing the Threads together from Parts I and III of the EU Constitution, in The EU 
Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (Deirdre Curtin, Alfred E. Kellermann & 
Steven Blockmans, eds., 2005). 
1124 For an analysis of the constitutional amendment procedures, see Chapter 11 of 
this treatise. 
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provisions would undoubtedly require constant fine-tuning as the Union 
continued to evolve,1125 and the EU would be well-served to facilitate the 
necessary textual changes.1126 A related benefit is that when the Court of 
Justice would be called upon to interpret Part III, the other EU institutions 
would more easily be able to override the Court by changing the law.1127 As 
long as Part III is constitutional, a simple legislative response to a judicial 
ruling on Part III would be impossible. Thus, whether to enable legislation to 
reflect changing times or to deal with an unwelcome court decision, a simpler 
amendment process seems imperative to permit the political will to be 
exercised efficiently at the EU level.  
 
                                                 
1125 For example, Roger Goebel has argued that the inclusion of complex and detailed 
provisions on economic and monetary union in the existing treaties is troublesome 
simply because even minor changes will be subject to the “time-consuming and 
cumbersome” treaty amendment process. Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and 
Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 249, 287 (1998). See 
TEU art. 48 for the existing treaty amendment requirements. Essentially all of the 
EMU provisions referenced by Goebel are retained in the Constitution. 
1126 Commentators Emmanouilidis and Giering have noted that removing the “non-
constitutional” provisions from the document would “provide the EU with the ability 
to amend the latter on the basis of a less complex procedure.” Emmanouilidis & 
Giering, supra note 1023, at 7. In a similar vein, columnist George Will has aptly 
observed that “[a] proper constitution does not give canonical status, as rights 
elevated beyond debate, to the policy preferences of the moment.” George Will, EU 
should really study America’s Constitution, Register Guard (Eugene, OR), Jul. 29, 
2003, at A11. He adds: “The more detailed a constitution is in presenting particular 
political outcomes as elevated beyond the reach of changeable majorities, the more 
quickly it is sure to seem dated.” Id. 
1127 U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer has commented that the 
EU’s legislative processes, which should enable the EU institutions to override rulings 
of the Court of Justice, significantly restrict the ability of the institutions to respond. 
This is because Court decisions involving treaty interpretation can be set aside only 
by amending the relevant treaty. The problem, according to Breyer, is that “in light of 
the length and the detailed nature of the ECJ’s ‘constitution’ (namely, the basic 
treaties), many more ECJ decisions will likely rest upon ‘constitutional’ grounds.” 
Stephen Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatisation, and Globalisation: Changing 
Relationships Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1045, 
1053 (2000). The result is that “it is difficult for member states or other EC 
institutions to revise ECJ decisions with which they disagree.” Id. at 1052. Breyer 
compares this situation with the United States, where constitutional decisions of the 
Supreme Court are “very difficult to overturn” but where decisions on statutory or 
administrative grounds can be set aside by “only a new statute or reconsideration by 
the relevant agency.” Id.  
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By including in the more abbreviated Constitution a full recitation of 
voting rules and exceptions, especially detailing those instances in which the 
Council would be required to act unanimously, the dividing lines between the 
EU and its Member States would not be altered. The balance of power would 
also be preserved by continuing to require unanimity to amend the 
Constitution. Granted, any requirement of consensus either in legislation or in 
the constitutional amendment process may be a recipe for stagnation,1128 but 
the point of this analysis is to suggest that the Constitution could be 
streamlined without upsetting the existing political applecart.1129  
 
4. THE LAEKEN SCORECARD 
 
To conclude this analysis, it is useful to recall the challenges posed in 
the Laeken Declaration1130 and to gauge how the Convention and IGC 
responded:  
 
1. The challenge: “Simplifying the existing Treaties without changing 
their content. Should a distinction between the Union and the Communities be 
reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?” The result: The two main 
Treaties would be melded, the substantive content would generally be 
preserved, and the balance of power between the Union and its Member States 
would largely be maintained. The Communities would be replaced by the 
Union in all respects. The Three Pillars would also be officially eliminated, 
although they would survive in spirit. 
 
2. The challenge: “The possible reorganisation of the Treaties. Should 
a distinction be made between a basic treaty and the other treaty provisions? 
Should this distinction involve separating the texts? Could this lead to a 
                                                 
1128 Prior to the Convention, Commission President Romano Prodi had warned that in 
an enlarged EU, a treaty that can be amended only by consensus might well become 
“fossilised.” Devuyst, supra note 68. 
1129 It should be noted that there was discussion at the Convention regarding the 
drafting of a basic treaty. Norman, supra note 152, at 22, 63, 85. There were also 
proposals to relegate much of the Part III detail to a body of “organic law” falling 
somewhere between the Constitution and ordinary EU legislation. Id. at 66, 105. 
Herwig Hofmann comments that creation of organic laws would permit a shorter 
Constitution, but he also cautions that the new category might also “increase the 
overall complexity of the legal system.” Hofmann, supra note 597, at 21. He also 
argues that removing the full detail of the Treaties from the Constitution would have 
weakened Member State influence over “a large range of matters.” Id. at 22. Neither 
approach was accepted, and the Constitution actually expands rather than contracts 
the text of the Treaties. 
1130 See text accompanying notes 143-48, supra. 
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distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic 
treaty and for the other treaty provisions?” The result: Although it may look 
like a basic treaty, Part I of the Constitution is part of, not separate from, the 
document. We have suggested that the extra text in Part I actually creates 
more confusion than clarity. The new, somewhat simpler amendment 
procedures for certain provisions in Part III1131 are an exceedingly modest 
step. 
 
3. The challenge: “Thought would also have to be given to whether 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and 
to whether the European Community should accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.” The result: Both of these have been proposed 
in the Constitution, but the overall treatment of human rights and their sources 
is unduly complicated. 
 
4. The challenge: “The question ultimately arises as to whether this 
simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the 
adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features 
of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes, the 
fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between 
Member States in the Union?” The result: A constitution was crafted, and it 
would have preserve the Union’s values and maintained the sensitive political 
balance between the EU and its Member States. 
 
Overall, it is incontestable that the Constitution offered an 
improvement over the existing Treaties and that would have met many of the 
goals set at Laeken. Nevertheless, what of the broader goals of simplification 
and making EU law more accessible and easily understood? It is perhaps 
wishful thinking to expect that the average EU citizen could ever readily 
grasp any constitutional document, but could it not at least have been more 
transparent? Could it not have been more approachable to the person willing 
to read it?  Will the Reform Treaty be any better in this regard? 
 
Perhaps the blame for the ponderous nature of this document should 
be placed on the Convention process, which relied on separate working 
groups but lacked an influential style committee. Or it might have been a 
manifestation of the old adage: “If I’d had more time I would have written 
you a shorter letter.” Most likely, however, it was the political necessity of 
finding acceptability among the greatest number of decision-makers. Despite 
the innovative spirit that led to the drafting of Part I of the Constitution, the 
                                                 
1131 See part 2 of Chapter 11.  
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Convention displayed an inherent conservatism, a sense of caution that 
produced Part III with the look and feel of the existing Treaties. The 
competing spirits led to inclusion of both parts, and the result is not felicitous.  
 
5. MAYBE NEXT TIME . . .  
 
Given the difficulty of accomplishing dramatic change in the diverse 
and complex EU, it is only fair in the end to credit the Convention and the 
IGC for agreeing on any version of a constitution, regardless of its stylistic 
shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the text of the Constitution 
would have been amenable to significant improvement. A shorter, basic 
document is appealing, but even a mere rearranging of the current text would 
offer substantial benefits, and either approach could be accomplished without 
affecting the Union’s dividing lines. The newly mandated Reform Treaty 
promises to respect the dividing lines to the same extent as the Constitution, 
but its resulting treaty amendments offer no prospects of being either 
economical or elegant. 
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Chapter 19 
 
 
A Final Review – Holding the Middle Ground 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A question never far from the minds of those who follow Union 
developments is: “Will the Creation come to dominate its Creators?” 
Federalists might be tempted to answer: “It must, and it will.” 
Intergovernmentalists would counter: “No, never.” Realists could then raise 
their hands and urge: “Stop! There is a middle ground, and we are standing on 
it. The European Union can be a significant force in Europe and the world, 
but the Member States need not slide into oblivion or irrelevance.” The 
intergovernmental and federal camps are entitled to press their agendas, but 
this treatise has demonstrated that the Constitution would have maintained the 
EU as a blended entity, carefully preserving most of the dividing lines that 
exist under the EC Treaty and the Treaty on European Union. The Union 
would have continued to possess competences considerably more sweeping 
than those granted to a typical IGO, but it would have stopped far short of 
becoming a United States of Europe.   
 
 Our review of the Constitution, however, demands that we conclude 
with a more nuanced summation. Three points should be stressed. First, the 
stated motivation behind the Constitution was that Europe’s foundational 
documents should be clearer and that the EU should be managed more 
efficiently. Deepening the process of integration was not an expressed goal. 
As a result, many of the changes proposed in the Constitution would not have 
entailed any shift of competence or power to the Union. Second, some 
movement of the EU’s dividing lines was indeed proposed in the Constitution. 
Third, this shift was offset somewhat by renewed emphasis on the Member 
States and their sovereignty. Let us briefly elaborate on these propositions.  
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Many changes would not have shifted the dividing lines 
 
If we review the broad list of significant changes proposed in the 
Constitution, which are identified in Chapter 4, we are reminded that most of 
them simply would not have expanded the Union’s competences. Beginning 
with the overview offered in Part I of the Constitution, we are presented with 
a more coherent picture of the Union, but it is essentially a restatement rather 
than the creation of new concepts, new institutions or new programs. The 
simplification of the Union’s legislative instruments was useful, but it offered 
no new powers. Re-definition of the ordinary legislative procedure was 
likewise an internal matter, not affecting the relationship between the Union 
and its members. The highly innovative section on the “democratic life of the 
Union” offered more transparency and accountability in EU affairs, but it did 
not undercut Member State democracy or sovereignty. 
 
Furthermore, if we review the institutional provisions in Parts I and 
III of the Constitution, we observe that the document does not appear to be 
offering the Union’s bodies any meaningful new powers. The scheduled 
reduction in the size of the Commission would arguably have created a 
measure of further separation between it and the Member States, but the 
Commission’s mandate as the Union’s professional executive would have 
remained the same. The EU’s senior legislature, the Council of Ministers, 
would have made greater use of the qualified majority vote, but few matters 
of critical policy were proposed to be removed from the requirement of 
unanimous approval. The new posts of a permanent European Council 
President and Union Minister for Foreign Affairs might have had the potential 
to give the EU a cohesiveness and stature it has not yet enjoyed, but neither 
post appears intended to possess executive powers beyond those already 
assigned to existing Union officials. The identification of the European 
Council as an institution of the EU was little more than articulation of the 
status quo under the Treaties. 
 
Even the simplified amendment procedures in Part IV of the 
Constitution – innovative as they are – would have stopped short of adversely 
affecting the deep protections offered to each Member State. Like the 
Treaties, the Constitution could not have been amended without the explicit 
consent of each state. Streamlining the process does not eliminate the national 
veto. 
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Some shifting would have occured 
 
 While many changes proposed in the Constitution would have had no 
impact on the EU’s dividing lines, it is clear that the existing lines lines would 
not have been preserved absolutely intact.1132 Upon closer inspection one can 
identify certain constitutional innovations that arguably would have 
strengthened the Union – perhaps at the expense of the Member States. For 
example, by calling the new treaty a Constitution, its authors strongly implied 
that this was to be something different from the Treaties. By granting legal 
personality to the Union, the Constitution would have presented an entity with 
enhanced stature. This entity would have utilised a single set of legislative 
instruments and thus a single system, rather than the Three Pillars of the  
Treaties. The creation of this new system and the abolishment of the Pillars 
arguably would have instilled a more supranational character for the Union. 
When the constitutional text states that EU law has primacy over that of the 
Member States, the commitment to this concept arguably went beyond the 
primacy principle as recognised by the European Court of Justice. Overall, we 
have proposed that these changes signal more than mere style. There was a 
new substance in the Constitution, indeed a new legal order. And if this new 
regime would not have posed an immediate threat to the sovereignty of the 
Member States, its new character might have proven to be at least the 
beginning of such a threat. New characterisations may portend new 
dimensions for the future. 
 
The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as Part II of the 
Constitution was without question an expansion on the Treaties, which lack a 
formal bill of rights within their text. But is this an increase in Union 
competence? We recall that the Union has already subscribed to the Charter 
as a “solemn proclamation,” and that the Treaties contain a variety of similar 
– if less formally presented – statements about fundamental rights. Thus, 
inserting the Charter into the Constitution might have been no more than a 
reaffirmation of basic principles to which the Union is already bound or to 
which it has already made a serious political commitment. One could even 
argue that the inclusion of the Charter on its face would have taken no power 
from the states in favor of central authority in Brussels. However, one 
weakness of this position is in the fact that the integration of the Charter into 
the constitutional text likely would have offered greater jurisdictional power 
to the European Court of Justice in matters of human rights. Depending on the 
Court’s behaviour in future cases, the national courts might well have 
                                                 
1132 For a summary of the movement in the dividing lines, see Chapter 6. 
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experienced an erosion of their authority in this field. The Reform Treaty’s 
derogation in favor of the United Kingdom with respect to the relationship 
between the Charter and national law is an indication that at least the British 
were of the opinion that Part II of the Constitution represented a shift in favor 
of Brussels.  
 
  We have also noted a potential shifting of the dividing lines in areas 
of substance other than human rights. These included, for example:  
 
--Incremental extensions of the Council’s ability to make 
decisions by QMV in a number of substantive areas. In general, these 
fields included matters such as transport, social security and services, 
which are closely connected to the EU-dominated internal market. 
The most significant of the affected matters was the AFSJ, although 
limited new QMV decision-making in the CFSP was also provided.  
   
--Expansion of EU activity into new fields, including 
intellectual property rights, space, energy, tourism, sport, civil 
protection and administrative cooperation. 
 
--The extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice into 
the common foreign and security policy and the AFSJ 
 
We have argued that none of these changes by itself should have been cause 
for alarm. We have further proposed that these proposed changes, even when 
added together, did not represent a dramatic competence-shift to Brussels. 
Rather, they must be seen little more than the enhancement of existing Union 
activities and the continued evolution of commitments previously made by the 
Member States. In reality, the Constitution would have done far less than the 
Maastricht Treaty in deepening EU integration. Nevertheless, persons 
concerned about “creeping federalism” were appropriately on the alert, and 
the true Eurosceptic was appropriately wary of each and every shift in favor 
of the Union.   
 
Bolstering the position of the Member States 
 
 A fascinating feature of the European Union is that its constitutional 
coin always has two distinct sides. Notwithstanding the significant central 
features built into the EU system, the power of the Union has always been 
carefully contained. The drafters of the Constitution actually went beyond the 
Treaties in emphasising both the limits on EU action and the sovereignty of 
the Member States. 
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 Like the Treaties, the Constitution is permeated with language that 
speaks to the Member States’ integrity and competence within the EU system. 
However, much of the Constitution’s language is more forcefully expressed 
than in the Treaties. Also, the Constitution’s clarification of EU competences 
cuts both ways – it confirms the propriety of certain Union action, while at the 
same time suggesting limits on such action and offering clearer definition of 
the Member States’ own competences. Under the principle of conferral, which 
is more clearly articulated in the Constitution than in the Treaties, the Union 
would have been permitted to act only within the limits of authority granted to 
it by the Member States. Competences not conferred upon the Union would 
have remained with the national governments. A related principle is that the 
Constitution mandates the Union to respect the integrity of the Member States 
as sovereign nations. In matters of foreign policy and defence, such respect 
translates into permitting the Union to act only when there is full consensus 
by the Member States. These areas, which could have been employed to 
enhance the Union’s stature as a world power, have traditionally been left to 
the Member States, and the Constitution offered no significant challenge to 
this approach. 
 
Institutionally, the European Council is the over-arching voice of the 
Member States in setting EU policy, and under the Constitution it would have 
remained so. Its members are the heads of state or government of all the 
Member States, along with its own President (an innovation in the 
Constitution) and the President of the Commission, and when they convene it 
is more a summit meeting than a board of directors. The group takes its 
decisions by consensus – a principle understood under the Treaties but first 
clearly articulated in the Constitution. Under the Constitution and under the 
Treaties the persons sitting on the Council of Ministers also represent their 
respective Member States, and many of their most critical policy decisions are 
subject to full consensus. Unanimity and consensus are distinctly anti-
majoritarian, and a single Member State can block a decision or exact 
concessions as the price for its vote. To avoid gridlock, opt-outs may be 
necessary. The ultimate expression of the unanimity principle is that the 
Constitution, like the Treaties, could not have been amended without the 
consent of each Member State. The majoritarian ideal would continue to yield 
to the ultimate power of the veto and the absolute right of each state to 
preserve what it has previously agreed to, including the Constitution’s careful 
balancing of authority. Unanimity protects each Member State from the 
unwanted imposition of an ultimate loss of sovereignty.  
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 Four procedures highlight how the Constitution would have 
perpetuated the intergovernmental nature of the EU project. First, the 
Constitution offered a greater role to national parliaments in reviewing 
proposed EU legislation, and it provided an enhanced right for a parliament to 
raise objections to the new laws. The second procedure is enhanced 
cooperation, a carryover from the Treaties, by which groups of Member States 
may proceed to act on their own where the EU is unable to achieve the 
consensus necessary for Union action. Enhanced cooperation was classified in 
the Constitution as an EU activity, but it evidences a certain weakness at the 
central level and a measure of autonomy left to the states. The third 
procedure, also taken from the Treaties, was the Constitution’s provision for 
the Union to suspend a Member State’s voting rights on the Council if the 
state failed to adequately support the EU’s core values. Such suspension of 
rights underscores the fact that the Union lacks ultimate coercive power over 
its members and that the Constitution retained key characteristics of a treaty. 
Finally, the Constitution for the first time would have permitted a Member 
State to withdraw from the Union. Under this right, should a state ever 
become dissatisfied to the point of wanting back the competences it has 
already yielded to the Union, or should it conclude that its vital interests are 
no longer being protected within the EU, it could lawfully resign its 
membership. This is a singular concept. Although the economic and political 
ramifications of withdrawal would likely inhibit this provision from ever 
being invoked, its presence in the Constitution was a bold affirmation of 
ultimate national sovereignty. 
 
The potential of the Reform Treaty 
 
 The foregoing conclusions are based solely upon the text of the 
Constitution as it compares with the EC Treaty and TEU. The new reality is 
that the European Council has decided to abandon the Constitution and 
mandate the drafting of the Reform Treaty. Reflecting the June 2007 
Presidency Conclusions,1133 and based on the new document’s major 
provisions as described in the Introduction to this treatise, the Reform Treaty 
will likely lead to a reaffirmation of these conclusions. In this regard, a few 
observations are appropriate:  
 
--The many constitutional changes described at the beginning of this 
chapter as not affecting the EU’s dividing lines are not likely to be 
adjusted in the Reform Treaty in any manner that would create such 
an effect. 
                                                 
1133 June 2007 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 19. 
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--The name “Constitution” and the inclusion of EU symbols in the 
Constitution would have emphasised what was arguably a shift 
toward a new legal order, but all of these manifestations will be 
absent in the Reform Treaty.  
 
--The elimination of the Pillar structure under the Constitution will, in 
the Reform Treaty, be replaced by preservation of at least the Second 
Pillar, the CFSP, as a separate class of EU activity. The Third Pillar 
will likely disappear, as all provisions relating to justice and home 
affairs are transferred into the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union 
(the renamed EC Treaty). 
 
--The Reform Treaty’s formulations as to to the primacy of EU law 
will be stated in a Declaration rather than in primary text as in the 
Constitution. The Declaration will refer to the principle of primacy as 
expressed in “well settled case-law” of the Court of Justice. 
 
--Where the Constitution would have included the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in its primary text, the Reform Treaty will refer 
to it and place it in a protocol. This alone is not of great significance, 
However, due to many other textual references to human rights 
principles in the Constitution and the Treaties, either approach 
appears to be complex.  
 
--Interestingly, the movement toward further QMV decision-making 
under the Constitution will be carried over into the Reform Treaty. 
The picture on such voting within the AFSJ is not entirely clear, as 
the Constitution and Reform Treaty on one hand offer more QMV, 
while the Reform Treaty may offset that development with more 
exceptions for objecting Member States.  
 
--New areas of EU activity proposed in the Constitution are also 
proposed for the Reform Treaty. We have argued that these do shift 
some competences to the EU, but that the level of such activity in 
areas vital to Member State national sovereignty is not likely to be 
deep.  
 
--The Constitution’s many new reminders of the sovereignty of the 
Member States and its highlighting of their own competences are 
destined to be included in the Reform Treaty, with perhaps even more 
emphasis. 
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 These comments are made with respect to the Presidency 
Conclusions, which are quite detailed. However, the results of the drafting 
and negotiating the new treaty remain to be seen. It is hoped that the analysis 
of the Constitution in this treatise will prove to be of value when a final 
Reform Treaty text has been published and approved by the IGC.  
 
A broader perspective on the dividing lines 
 
 As part of this summing up, we do well to recall the broad questions 
posed in the Introduction, and as a result of the analysis offered in this treatise 
we may suggest the answers that will likely emerge from whatever form of 
constitutional text is eventually ratified: 
 
--What institutions are necessary to ensure that the EU reaches its 
potential, and what authority should they be granted? What is the 
role of the Member States in those institutions? The institutions 
created at the very beginning by the Treaties of Paris and Rome have 
proven to be remarkably effective for the Union. The Commission, 
possessing the right of legislative initiative and operating with the 
legislative approval of the Council, offers continuity and professional 
management. The European Parliament provides popular input, the 
Council represents the interests of the Member States, and the 
European Council serves as a summit meeting to set broad policy 
guidelines. The Court of Justice has served as an effective arbiter and, 
occasionally, as a mover of European integration. In all of these 
institutions the individual interests of the Member States are heard to 
varying extents, and overall the institutional framework displays 
relatively clear dividing lines between the Union and the Member 
States. This is a success, and both the Constitution and Reform Treaty 
would maintain the basic arrangement. 
 
--What instruments and decision-making procedures should be 
employed, and which institutions (including those of the Member 
States) should participate in particular actions? The hodge-podge of 
instruments and procedures under the Treaties begs for simplification. 
The drafters of the Constitution correctly set out to improve this state 
of affairs, but it appears that their ideas and concepts will not 
generally be transposed into the Reform Treaty. The increasing 
influence of the national parliaments on EU legislation (proposed in 
both the Constitution and the Reform Treaty) poses a more interesting 
challenge. On the one hand, the broadening of Union activity carries a 
19:  HOLDING THE MIDDLE GROUND  345 
 
risk of marginalising the national legislatures. On the other, the 
expanded rights of review and objection for national parliaments may 
prove – especially in an EU of 27 members – to hinder the ability of 
the EU to act efficiently. 
 
--In an expanding Union, how should the internal market be 
managed, and should there be a role for the Member State 
governments in its management? The internal market is literally and 
figuratively the bread and butter of the EU, and its success is a result 
of central management and the relinquishment of pure national 
sovereignty in favor of efficiency and equality. However, one of the 
brilliant strokes of the European Union is its device of central 
legislation that must be nationally implemented. This promotes 
efficiency in Brussels and active engagement by national parliaments 
and authorities. This balance has been highly successful, and it need 
not be changed. The Constitution and the Reform Treaty have not 
proposed to do so.  
 
--At what level should social policy be determined? Should key 
concepts be uniform throughout the EU, or should the Member States 
maintain local control? This is certainly the point at which strains can 
develop in the Union. Social policy is a two-edged sword. On the one 
hand, market-related social policy – for example, worker benefits and 
taxation – demands a measure of central coordination to create a level 
playing field within the internal market. On the other hand, nothing 
will create more suspicion and ill will with the average citizen and the 
average national parliamentarian than situations in which policies 
impacting daily life are dictated by institutions outside the country. 
With each extension of EU activity into new areas – for example, 
health policy – feelings of alienation with regard to Brussels are 
bound to intensify. Likewise, the increasing diversity in the EU 
population arising from EU enlargement and internal migration 
creates seemingly insoluble challenges. Although the Constitution 
and Reform Treaty have not proposed any bold moves in social policy 
initiatives – no major shift in the relevant dividing lines – further 
legislative adjustments and treaty changes are undoubtedly in store.  
 
--How should foreign affairs and defence be conducted? This is 
another dilemma, although perhaps less problematic than social 
policy. The simple observation is that the EU would be far more 
effective on the world stage if it could speak with a single voice in 
foreign affairs and defence. However, at the current time this is not in 
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the cards. These matters are a key indicator of nationhood, a primary 
facet of sovereignty. As a bloc, the Union will not achieve a unified 
approach any time soon, and neither the Constitution nor the Reform 
Treaty has suggested significant movement toward shifting these 
critical dividing lines. The best that can be expected is that some sort 
of core group might be able to pool their resources in a “permanent 
structured cooperation within the Union framework”1134 and 
relinquish more of their sovereignty to create a more closely united 
foreign policy or defence.  
 
 As noted in the Introduction, the foregoing questions relate to 
political power and institutional authority within the EU, but we also raised 
questions that relate more deeply to the intrinsic character of the Union. To 
these questions the Constitution suggests the following answers: 
 
--Should the Member States continue to enjoy their status as 
sovereign nations within the world community? There is no indication 
whatsoever that any of the Member States wish to form a true 
federation with supreme central authority. The original members and 
the later-acceding states appear fully committed to retaining their 
sovereignty. Both the Constitution and the Reform Treaty would 
respect this state of affairs, and the line between the current 
intergovernmental Union and a federal superstate will not be crossed. 
 
--Where is the loyalty and attachment of the individual European 
citizen to be focused? The rights to live, work and invest in other 
Member States do create a European-ness that did not exist 50 years 
ago. EU citizenship has value, and it is appreciated. However, for 
linguistic, cultural and historical reasons, the vast majority of Union 
citizens identify first and foremost with their separate nations. The 
EU does well to foster a fealty to the Union, but the Eurocrats must be 
realistic that national attachment is infinitely stronger than regional 
identification. The Constitution proposed a greater use of EU symbols 
to enhance European identity, but these proved to be controversial, 
and the Reform Treaty omits them. What appeared to be a small shift 
of this symbolic dividing line will be avoided. 
 
--Where are the manifestations of democracy to be found – at the 
national level only, at the EU level, or at both levels? Here it may 
well be said that more democracy within the Union system is a good 
                                                 
1134 Constitution art. I-41(6). 
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thing. EU citizens should have rights of information and participation 
with respect to Brussels, and both the Constitution and Reform Treaty 
would enhance these rights. However, even in a more open Union, 
true democracy remains rooted more in national practice than in 
international practice. Thus it seems unnecessary to promote a Union 
that fully offers the democratic rights that EU citizens enjoy at the 
national level. To the extent that there is a dividing line between full 
democratisation at the national level and partial democratisation at the 
Union level, the EU is moving closer toward that line, but it need not 
go all the way.  
 
--How much integration is necessary, and where should it stop? It is 
never a good thing to doubt the capacity of EU leaders to push the 
Union to new heights. New programs in new areas will likely 
develop, even if it takes unanimity to create them. However, in 
structural and programmatic terms it is eminently reasonable to argue 
that some kind of limit has been reached. The Constitution may have 
challenged that limit, at least in the perception of some Europeans, 
and the Reform Treaty may represent a modest retreat back toward 
the status quo. After 50 years the EU has developed to a point at 
which further integration might well encroach on the residual 
sovereignty of the Member States, and this is a dividing line that few 
are willing to cross. Some (who we have referred to as federalists) 
will always seek “ever closer union,” but many others will assert that 
the Union was born as an intergovernmental organisation, so it must 
remain, and further integration would threaten that status.   
 
Will the next step be successful? 
 
 Given the constantly shifting winds of global affairs, regional politics 
and national sentiment, it is impossible to predict whether any revision to the 
EU treaties will be successful or long-lived. The Constitution never took its 
first breath, and so we look ahead to the proposed Reform Treaty. Will the 
new document’s balance of power be workable? Can its political 
compromises be sustained? Will there be continuing pressure to hand more 
power to Brussels, or will there be a trend toward dis-integration or a drift 
toward special cooperation among a core group of States? In short, will the 
dividing lines set forth in the Reform Treaty or any other treaty revision 
withstand the political strains that will inevitably follow? 
 
 The enormous challenge presented to those who seek acceptance of 
the next treaty revision is to sell the system to the Union’s citizens. The 
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difficulty in doing so is directly tied to the fact that the European Union does 
not resemble any other existing governmental or intergovernmental structure. 
The editors of the Common Market Law Review have well articulated the 
task as follows: 
 
It is nonetheless true that the system will remain difficult to explain to 
those who have to be convinced first and foremost: the people. Even 
if the authors of the Constitution found a good balance, it remains, as 
a result of the nuances it contains, complex. That, however, is the 
name of the game. It would be easy to build a super-state or to 
transform the Union into an international cooperation organization, 
but it is difficult to regulate the workings of a machine which is based 
on an association of sovereign States and their peoples, aiming at 
exercising a part of their sovereignty jointly. The difficult task of the 
political leaders now is to explain in a clear way what they wanted to 
create, so that their citizens do not decide on the basis of propagandist 
clichés, but rather on the Union as they wanted it.1135 
 
While it is not easy at this point to define the Constitution’s legacy, it is clear 
that the Reform Treaty will build on the Constitution and will for the 
foreseeable future preserve a European Union that is foundationally similar to 
the current version. The next version of the Treaties will maintain the EU’s 
current duality, with the Member States retaining their status as sovereign 
nations in a union with significant central features. Under the reforms 
currently being proposed, the United States of Europe is not about to be born. 
The dividing lines between the EU and its Member States will largely be 
maintained, and thus the middle ground between intergovernmentalism and 
federalism will be held. 
 
                                                 
1135 Editorial Comments, supra note 305, at 907. 
   349 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Addendum 
350  
  
 
 
 
 
   351 
 
 
 
 
 
Addendum  
 
Where the Constitutional Treaty Requires Unanimous Voting, 
Consensus or Common Accord 
 
[This addendum is referenced in Chapters 5 and 15 of the treatise] 
 
 
 Chapter 15 details those instances in which the Constitution either 
offers QMV as a change from unanimity under the Treaties or assigns QMV 
to new fields of EU activity. The focus is on the shifting dividing lines – 
where Member States may lose their veto or blocking rights. The purpose of 
this addendum is to offer a reminder that even under the Constitution the 
concepts of unanimous voting, consensus and common accord are far from 
dead. There are a significant number of important subjects for which the 
Constitution preserves the status quo, where protections for the Member 
States are not lost. 
 
1. Constitution Part I 
 
a. Institutions and bodies. 
 
(i) European Parliament composition. Constitution Article I-20(2) requires a 
unanimous European Council decision on the composition of the European 
Parliament. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 190 requires a unanimous decision of the 
Council, rather than the European Council. 
 
(ii) European Council decisions in general. Constitution Article I-21(4) 
provides that all European Council decisions are to be taken by consensus. 
 
 --There is no counterpart provision in the Treaties. 
 
(iii) Commission composition. Constitution Article I-26(6) requires 
unanimous European Council decisions to alter the number of Commission 
members and to determine the rotation of Commission members. 
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 --EC Treaty Article 213(1) and Article 4(3) of the Protocol on 
Enlargement of the European Union provide for unanimity on these matters, 
but the decisions are to be taken by the Council.1136 
 
(iv) Judges and Advocates General. Constitution Article I-29(2) requires an 
agreement by all of the Member State governments (common accord) on the 
appointment of judges to the Court of Justice, General Court judges and 
Advocates General. 
 
 --EC Treaty Articles 223 and 224 contain the same requirements. 
 
b. EU competences. 
 
(i) Flexibility clause. Constitution Article I-18(1) mandates that all legislation 
under the flexibility clause will require a unanimous vote of the Council. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 308 contains the same requirement and 
constitutes the Treaties’ flexibility clause. 
 
(ii) Recommendations. Constitution Article I-35(3) requires unanimity for 
recommendations by the Council in cases in which a European law or 
framework law would require unanimity. 
 
 --There is no counterpart in the Treaties. 
 
(iii) CFSP. Constitution Article I-40(6) provides that all decisions by the 
European Council or Council in the area of the common foreign and security 
policy are to be taken unanimously, unless otherwise provided in Part III of 
the Constitution. 
 
 --TEU Article 23(1) contains the same provision, although only the 
Council is mentioned. 
 
(iv) Passerelle to QMV in the CFSP. Constitution Article I-40(7) requires 
unanimity for a European Council decision to allow more QMV on the 
Council in the area of CFSP. 
 
 --There is no counterpart to this passerelle in the Treaties.
                                                 
1136 Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 376, art. 4(1). 
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(v) Common defence establishment. Constitution Article I-41(2) mandates a 
unanimous European Council decision establishing a common defence. 
 
 --TEU Article 17(1) is similar, but unanimity is not specified, and 
there is no general provision requiring the European Council to vote by 
unanimity. 
 
(vi) Common defence policy. Constitution Article I-41(4) requires unanimity 
for all Council decisions relating to the common security and defence policy. 
 
 --TEU Article 23, subsections (1) and (2), contain the same 
requirement. 
 
c. EU finances. 
 
(i) System of own resources. Constitution Article I-54(3) requires a 
unanimous vote of the Council for EU legislation relating to the system of 
own resources. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 269 contains the same requirement. 
 
 --The Constitution and EC Treaty also require approval by all 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
 
(ii) Multiannual financial framework. Constitution Article I-55(2) requires a 
unanimous vote of the Council for EU legislation establishing the multiannual 
financial framework. 
 
 --There is no counterpart to this provision in the Treaties. 
 
(iii) Passerelle to QMV on the multiannual framework. Constitution Article I-
55(4) mandates a unanimous European Council decision to allow QMV on the 
Council relating to the multiannual financial framework. 
 
 --There is no counterpart to this passerelle in the Treaties. 
 
d. EU membership. 
 
(i) New EU member. Constitution Article I-58(2) requires a unanimous 
Council decision to approve a new EU member. 
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 --TEU Article 49 contains the same requirement. 
 
 --The Constitution and TEU require separate ratification by all 
Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. 
 
(ii) Breach of EU values. Constitution Article I-59(2) provides for a 
unanimous European Council decision that a Member State has breached 
principal EU values. 
 
 --TEU Article 7(2) provides for such a decision, but it is to be made 
by the Council “meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or 
Government.” This Council configuration differs from the European Council 
in that the President of the Commission does not participate in the matter. 
 
 --The offending Member State does not participate in the vote under 
the TEU or the Constitution. 
 
(iii) Extension of withdrawal period. Constitution Article I-60(3) provides for 
a unanimous European Council decision to extend the two-year withdrawal 
period of a withdrawing Member State. 
 
 --There is no withdrawal provision in the Treaties and thus no 
counterpart to Constitution Article I-60(3). 
 
2. Constitution Part II 
 
 Part II of the Constitution is essentially a set of stated principles 
relating to fundamental rights. It contains no provisions that mandate or 
permit the EU to implement legislation or make decisions, and thus there is no 
explicit or implied reference to voting on the Council. 
 
3. Constitution Part III 
 
a. Non-discrimination and citizenship. 
 
(i) Discrimination. Constitution Article III-124(1) provides for a unanimous 
vote of the Council on legislation to combat discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race, religion, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 13 contains the same requirement. 
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(ii) Free movement of persons. Constitution Article III-125(2) requires a 
unanimous Council vote on legislation to facilitate the right of free movement 
of persons. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 18(2) contains similar language. 
 
(iii) Right to vote and stand for election. Constitution Article III-126 requires 
the Council to vote unanimously on EU legislation detailing the right of an 
EU citizen to vote and stand for election in another Member State. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 19 contains the same requirement. 
 
(iv) Citizenship rights. Constitution Article III-129 mandates a unanimous 
Council vote on legislation to add to the citizenship rights described in Article 
I-10. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 22 is identical. 
 
 --The Constitution and EC Treaty require approval by all of the 
Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. 
 
b. Internal market. 
 
(i) Social security calculations. Constitution Article III-136(2) provides for a 
European Council decision regarding the impact of a draft EU law relating to 
multi-state social security calculations. Article I-36(1) initially provides for a 
QMV Council vote, but subsection (2) permits any Member State to demand 
that the matter be referred to the European Council. A unanimous decision by 
the European Council is not specified, but unanimity would be required under 
the general consensus requirement of Article I-21(4). 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 42 requires a unanimous Council vote in all 
instances. 
 
(ii) Restrictions on capital flow. Constitution Article III-157(3) requires a 
unanimous vote of the Council on legislation restricting the movement of 
capital to or from third countries. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 57(2) contains the same requirement. 
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(iii) Support for restrictive measures. Constitution Article III-158(4) provides 
for a unanimous Council decision affirming that a Member State’s restrictive 
tax measures against a third country are acceptable. 
 
 --There is no counterpart to this type of decision in the Treaties. 
 
(iv) Approval of aid granted by a state. Constitution Article III-168(2) 
mandates a unanimous Council decision to affirm that aid granted by a 
Member State is acceptable. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 88(2) requires the same type of decision. 
 
(v) Tax harmonisation. Constitution Article III-171(1) requires a unanimous 
vote of the Council on EU legislation to harmonise certain taxes. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 93 contains the same requirement. 
 
(vi) Harmonisation of laws. Constitution Article III-173 provides for the 
Council to vote unanimously on legislation to require harmonisation of 
Member State laws relating to the internal market. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 94 contains the same requirement. 
 
(vii) Language for EU intellectual property rights. Constitution Article III-176 
provides for a unanimous Council vote on legislation establishing language 
arrangements for European intellectual property rights. 
  
--There is no counterpart in the Treaties. 
 
c. Economic and monetary policy. 
 
(i) Economic policy guidelines: Constitution Article III-179(2) requires the 
European Council to reach a “conclusion” on broad guidelines of the 
economic policies of the Member States. Unanimity is not specified, but the 
general consensus requirement of Constitution Article I-21(4) would govern. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 99(2) is the same provision, but unanimity is not 
specified in this provision. 
 
(ii) Replacement of budget deficit protocol. Constitution Article III-184(13) 
provides for a unanimous vote of the Council on legislation to replace the 
protocol on excessive budget deficits. 
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 --EC Treaty Article 104(14) contains the same requirement. 
 
(iii) Expansion of ECB powers. Constitution Article III-185(6) mandates 
unanimity on the Council with respect to legislation to expand powers of the 
European Central Bank. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 105(6) contains the same provision. 
 
(iv) New euro-zone member. Constitution Article III-198(3) requires the 
unanimous agreement of the Council and the euro-zone Member States to 
approve decisions or regulations fixing the euro exchange rate of the currency 
of a Member State that will be permitted to join the euro-zone. A unanimous 
Council vote is not specified, but because only Council members from the 
euro-zone states will participate in the decision, the requirement of approval 
by all the euro-zone Member States necessitates a unanimous vote of the 
euro-zone Council representatives. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 123(5) contains the same requirement. 
 
d. Policies in other areas. 
 
(i) Employment situation. Constitution Article III-206(1) calls for European 
Council “conclusions” on the employment situation in the EU. Unanimity is 
not specified, nor is QMV, and therefore the general consensus requirement of 
Article I-21(4) would govern the action. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 128(1) is the same provision, but unanimity is not 
specified in this provision or in a general voting provision relating to the 
European Council. 
 
(ii) Social policy. Constitution Article III-210(3) requires a unanimous vote of 
the Council on EU legislation in certain areas of EU supporting action relating 
to social policy; a unanimous Council decision is also required to change 
certain of those areas to QMV. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 137(2) contains the same requirements. 
 
(iii) Labor-management agreements. Constitution Article III-212(2) requires a 
unanimous vote of the Council to adopt regulations or decisions relating to 
certain EU-facilitated labor-management agreements. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 139(2) contains the same provision. 
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(iv) Structural and Cohesion Funds. Constitution Article III-223(2) mandates 
a unanimous Council vote on legislation relating to the Structural Funds and 
Cohesion Fund. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 161 contains the same requirement. 
 
(v) Environment. Constitution Article III-234(2) provides for a unanimous 
vote of the Council on EU legislation pertaining to certain environmental 
matters; a unanimous Council decision is also required to institute limited 
QMV decision-making in these areas. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 175(2) contains the same provisions. 
 
(vi) Transport. Constitution Article III-237 requires a unanimous Council 
decision to permit a derogation in the area of transport legislation. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 72 is identical. 
 
(vii) Energy. Constitution Article III-256(3) mandates a unanimous vote of 
the Council on legislation of a fiscal nature relating to energy policy. 
 
 --The Treaties contain no counterpart to this requirement, and energy 
is merely mentioned in a long list of Community activities in Article 3 of the 
EC Treaty. 
 
e. Area of freedom, security and justice. 
 
(i) AFSJ strategic guidelines. Constitution Article III-258 requires the 
European Council to “define” the strategic guidelines for legislative and 
operational planning within the AFSJ. Unanimity or QMV is not specified, 
and therefore the general consensus requirement of Article I-21(4) would 
govern. 
 
 --There is no direct counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
specifies unanimous Council decisions within the Third Pillar, which 
encompasses part of the Constitution’s broader field of AFSJ. 
 
(ii) Judicial cooperation in civil matters. Constitution Article III-269(3) 
mandates a unanimous Council vote on legislation regarding measures 
concerning family law with cross-border implications; it also requires a 
unanimous Council decision to shift certain of these matters to QMV. 
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 -- EC Treaty Article 67(5) permits the Council to act by QMV in 
matters governed by Article 65 (a listing of items relating to judicial 
cooperation in civil matters), “with the exception of aspects relating to family 
law.” There is no counterpart to the passerelle provision of the Constitution. 
 
(iii) Criminal procedure. Constitution Article III-270(2) requires unanimity 
for Council decisions relating to certain aspects of Member States’ mutual 
recognition of criminal procedures. 
 
 --There is no direct counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in the Third Pillar, which represents a part of the 
AFSJ. 
 
(iv) Referral of fundamental matters. Constitution Article III-270(3) permits a 
Member State to refer to the European Council a draft EU law relating to 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, if the Member State believes that the 
legislation will affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system. 
Where the Council might have taken a vote by qualified majority, the 
European Council must make a decision on the matter. Since the method of 
European Council voting is not specified, its decision must be made by 
consensus under Article I-21(4). 
 
 --There is no counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in this aspect of the AFSJ. 
 
(v) New areas of cross-border crime. Constitution Article III-271(1) requires a 
unanimous Council decision to identify additional areas of cross-border 
crime. 
 
 --There is no counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in this aspect of the AFSJ. 
 
(vi) Referral of fundamental matters. Constitution Article III-271(3) permits a 
Member State to refer to the European Council a draft EU law relating to the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions, if the Member State believes 
that the legislation will affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice 
system. Where the Council might have taken a vote by qualified majority, the 
European Council must make a decision on the matter. Since the method of 
European Council voting is not specified, its decision must be made by 
consensus under Article I-21(4). 
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 -- There is no counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in this aspect of the AFSJ. 
 
(vii) Prosecutor’s Office. Constitution Article III-274(1) requires a unanimous 
Council decision to establish European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
 
 -- There is no counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in this aspect of the AFSJ. Otherwise, this type 
of decision might require unanimity under the EC Treaty flexibility clause, 
EC Treaty Article 308, because this is an area of activity not otherwise 
covered in the Treaties. 
 
(viii) Extension of prosecutor’s powers. Constitution Article III-274(4) 
mandates a unanimous European Council decision to extend the powers of the 
European Prosecutor. 
 
 -- There is no counterpart in the Treaties, but TEU Article 34(2) 
generally requires unanimity in this aspect of the AFSJ. Otherwise, this might 
require unanimity under the EC Treaty flexibility clause, EC Treaty Article 
308, as an area of activity not covered in the Treaties. 
 
(ix) Police cooperation. Constitution Article III-275(3) requires a unanimous 
vote of the Council on legislation concerning operational cooperation between 
police authorities of the Member States. 
 
 --TEU Article 31(1) contains counterpart language, but unanimity 
comes through the general unanimity requirement of TEU Article 34(2). 
 
(x) Police operations in another state. Constitution Article III-277 requires a 
unanimous Council vote on legislation regarding operations of one Member 
State’s authorities in another Member State. 
 
 -- TEU Article 32 contains counterpart language, but unanimity 
comes through the general unanimity requirement of TEU Article 34(2). 
 
f. Overseas countries and territories. 
 
(i) Terms of association. Constitution Article III-291 mandates a unanimous 
vote of the Council on legislation regarding the association of overseas 
countries and territories with the EU. Such legislation may include matters 
referred to in Article III-290 relating to free movement of workers between 
Member States and the overseas countries and territories. 
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 --EC Treaty Article 187 contains the general requirement as to 
legislation, but Article 186 provides that matters of freedom of movement of 
workers are to be “governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently 
with the unanimous approval of Member States.” 
 
(ii) Change of status. Constitution Article IV-440(7) permits the European 
Council to unanimously adopt a European decision changing the status of one 
of the overseas countries or territories. 
 
 --There is no counterpart provision in the Treaties. 
 
g. External action. 
 
(i) Strategic interests and objectives. Constitution Article III-293(1) mandates 
unanimous European Council decisions to set the strategic interests and 
objectives of EU external action. 
 
 --TEU Article 11 deals with the common foreign and security policy 
only, rather than the whole of EU external action. Unanimity is provided in 
TEU Article 23(1) with respect to decisions of the Council on the CFSP. The 
European Council is not mentioned. 
 
(ii) CFSP guidelines. Constitution Article III-295(1) requires the European 
Council to “define” the guidelines for the CFSP. Unanimity is not specified, 
and thus the general consensus requirement of Article I-21(4) would govern.  
 
 --TEU Article 23(1) requires unanimous Council decisions on the 
CFSP. The European Council is not mentioned.  
 
(iii) CFSP decisions. Constitution Article III-295(2) provides for unanimous 
Council decisions to implement the CFSP guidelines adopted under Article 
III-295(1). Unanimity on the Council is mandated in Articles I-40(6) and III-
300(1). 
 
 --TEU Article 23(1) requires unanimous Council decisions on the 
CFSP. 
 
(iv) CFSP decisions. Constitution Article III-300(1) requires unanimity for 
Council decisions on the CFSP in general. 
 
 --TEU Article 23(1) contains the same requirement. 
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(v) Objection to a QMV decision. Constitution Article III-300(2) provides for 
a unanimous European Council decision on a QMV matter referred to the 
European Council from the Council after a Member State’s objection on 
reasons of “vital and stated reasons of national policy.” 
 
 --TEU Article 23(2) contains the same requirement. 
 
(vi) Passerelle to more QMV. Constitution Article III-300(3) permits a 
unanimous European Council decision expanding QMV decision-making on 
the Council in the area of CFSP. 
 
 --There is no counterpart passerelle provision in the Treaties. 
 
(vii) Permanent structured cooperation in defence. Constitution Article III-
312(6) requires unanimous Council decisions within the framework of 
permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence, except in matters for 
which QMV is specified. Only the participating Member States may take part 
in this decision-making. 
 
 --TEU Article 17 deals with related matters, but not permanent 
structured cooperation as such. Unanimity in defence is provided in TEU 
Article 23(1). 
 
(viii) Common commercial policy. Constitution Article III-315(4) mandates 
unanimous Council decisions on international agreements in fields where 
internal EU decisions would require unanimity. 
 
 -- EC Treaty Article 133(5) contains the same requirement. 
 
(ix) International agreements. Constitution Article III-325(8) requires 
unanimity for Council decisions relating to the making of international 
agreements in fields where internal EU decisions would require unanimity. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 300(2) and TEU Article 24(2) contain the same 
unanimity requirement. 
 
(x) Euro exchange rate agreements. Constitution Article III-326(1) requires a 
unanimous Council decision on euro exchange rates with third countries. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 111(1) contains the same requirement. 
 
 
ADDENDUM   363 
 
h. Union institutions. 
 
(i) Parliament election procedures. Constitution Article III-330(1) mandates a 
unanimous vote of the Council on legislation setting uniform procedures for 
electing members of the European Parliament. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 190(4) is identical. 
 
 --The Constitution and EC Treaty require Member States to ratify 
these procedures in accordance with their own constitutional requirements. 
 
(ii) Taxation of parliamentarians. Constitution Article III-330(2) mandates a 
unanimous decision of the Council on taxation of members and former 
members of the European Parliament. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 190(5) contains the same requirement. 
 
(iii) Commission vacancy. Constitution Article III-348(2) requires a 
unanimous Council decision not to fill a vacancy on the Commission. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 215 is identical. 
 
(iv) Advocates General. Constitution Article III-354 requires a unanimous 
decision of the Council to increase the number of Advocates General. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 222 contains the same requirement. 
 
(v) Appointment of Court positions. Constitution Article III-355 requires 
common accord of the governments of the Member States to appoint judges 
and to the Court of Justice, as well as Advocates-General. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 223 contains the same requirement. 
 
(vi) Appointments to General Court. Constitution Article III-356 requires 
common accord of the Member States to appoint Judges to the General Court. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 224 contains the same requirement, although in 
the EC Treaty the court is called the Court of First Instance. 
 
(vii) Appointments to specialised courts. Constitution Article III-359(4) 
mandates unanimity in a Council decision to appoint members to specialised 
courts. 
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 --EC Treaty Article 225a is identical. 
 
(viii) Committee of the Regions. Constitution Article III-386 provides for a 
unanimous Council decision to determine the composition of the Committee 
of the Regions. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 263 does not contain such a requirement. 
However, no decision is necessary under the treaty, because the actual 
composition of the committee is specified in this treaty article. Any 
amendment to the specified composition will require an amendment to the EC 
Treaty, which will involve ratification by all of the Member States. 
 
(ix) Economic and Social Committee. Constitution Article, III-389 mandates a 
unanimous Council decision to determine the composition of the Economic 
and Social Committee. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 258 does not contain such a requirement. 
However, no decision is necessary under the treaty, because the composition 
of the committee is specified in this treaty article. Any amendment to the 
specified composition will require and amendment to the EC Treaty, which 
will involve ratification by all of the Member States. 
 
(x) European Investment Bank. Constitution Article III-393 requires a 
unanimous vote of the Council on EU legislation to amend the Statute of the 
European Investment Bank. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 266 deals with the ECB Statute, but only certain 
provisions of the Statute are specified for amendment by unanimous Council 
action. 
 
(xi) Amendment of Commission proposal. Constitution Article III-395(1) 
requires unanimity on the Council to amend most legislative proposals from 
the Commission. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 250(1) contains the same requirement. 
 
(xii) Approval of amendments proposed by Parliament. Constitution Article 
III-396(9) mandates a unanimous Council decision on legislative amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament but opposed by the Commission. 
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 --EC Treaty Article 251(3) is identical as to the unanimity 
requirement. 
i. Financial provisions. 
 
(i) Budget legislation. Constitution Article III-412(1) requires a unanimous 
vote of the Council on legislation relating to implementation of the EU 
budget. Unanimity will be required until the beginning of 2007, when QMV 
will become the rule. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 279(1) contains the same requirement. Unanimity 
is likewise replaced with QMV at the beginning of 2007. 
 
j. Enhanced cooperation. 
 
(i) Enhanced cooperation in CFSP. Constitution Article III-419(2) requires a 
unanimous Council decision (participating Member States only, under Article 
I-44(3)) permitting a program of enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
common foreign and security policy. 
 
 --TEU Articles 23(2) and 27c require Council decisions (participating 
Member States only, under TEU Article 44(1)) to be taken by QMV. 
 
(ii) Permission to join a program in progress. Constitution Article III-420(2) 
requires a unanimous Council decision (participating Member States only, 
under Article I-44(3)) to permit a Member State to join a program of 
enhanced cooperation that is already in progress. 
 
 --TEU Article 23(2) and 27e provide for such Council decisions 
(participating Member States only, under TEU Article 44(1)) to be taken by 
QMV. 
 
(iii) Program costs. Constitution Article III-421 mandates unanimity for 
Council decision (all Member States) to charge the Union budget with the 
costs (other than administrative costs) arising from a program of enhanced 
cooperation. 
 
 --TEU Article 44a contains the same requirement. 
 
(iv) Passerelle to QMV. Constitution Article III-422(1) requires a unanimous 
decision of the Council (participating Member States only) to shift voting 
within a program of enhanced cooperation from unanimity to QMV. 
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 --There is no counterpart to this passerelle in the Treaties. 
 
(v) Passerelle to ordinary legislative procedure. Constitution Article III-
422(2) mandates a unanimous Council decision (participating Member States 
only) to shift the legislative procedure within a program of enhanced 
cooperation from a special procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure. 
 
 --The Treaties do not contain such a passerelle. 
 
k. Common provisions; general and final provisions. 
 
(i) Location of EU institutions. Constitution Article III-432 requires a 
common accord decision of the governments of the Member States with 
respect to the location of EU institutions. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 289 contains the same requirement. 
 
(ii) Languages of the EU institutions. Constitution Article III-433 mandates a 
unanimous Council decision to adopt a regulation setting the rules for use of 
languages in the EU institutions other than the European Court of Justice. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 290 contains the same requirement. 
 
(iii) List of arms, munitions and war material. Constitution Article III-436(2) 
requires a unanimous Council decision to change a 1958 list of arms, 
munitions and war materials that qualify for Member State protective 
measures.1137 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 296 contains the same requirement.1138 
 
4. Constitution Part IV 
 
(i) Amendment by Convention. Constitution Article IV-443(2) requires that in 
the ordinary procedure to amend the Constitution, a Convention must approve 
a proposed amendment by consensus before it is referred to an 
intergovernmental conference for further consideration. 
 
 --The Treaties do not provide for a constitutional convention. 
                                                 
1137 Constitution art. III-436(2). 
1138 Both the Treaty and Constitution focus on the “essential interests” of Member 
State security while prohibiting unnecessary adverse impact on competition within the 
internal market. 
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(ii) IGC and Member State approval of an amendment. Constitution Article 
IV-443(3) requires an IGC (acting with or without a prior Convention) to 
approve a proposed constitutional amendment by common accord. The same 
article requires that all amendments be ratified by all Member States. 
 
 --TEU Article 48 contains these same requirements. 
 
(iii) Simplified amendment. Constitution Article IV-444 permits the European 
Council to unanimously decide to change (1) any unanimous Council voting 
requirement in Part III of the Constitution to a qualified majority voting 
requirement and (2) any special legislative procedure in Part III to the 
ordinary legislative procedure. After such a decision by the European Council 
the matter must be referred to the national parliaments of the Member States, 
and any opposition expressed within six months will nullify the amendment. 
 
 --The Treaties do not contain such a procedure. 
 
(iv) Amendment of internal policies. Constitution Article IV-445(2) permits 
the European Council by unanimity to approve an amendment to Title III of 
Part III of the Constitution in regard to internal policies and action of the 
Union. After such a vote of the European Council, the amendment must be 
ratified by all Member States. 
 
 --The Treaties do not contain such a procedure. 
 
(v) Ratification. Constitution Article IV-447 requires ratification of the 
Constitution by all Member States. 
 
 --EC Treaty Article 313 and TEU Article 52 contain the same 
unanimity requirement for their respective ratification. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Inleiding 
 
De vraag die in dit proefschrift centraal staat is hoe het Verdrag tot 
vaststelling van een Grondwet voor Europa (het ‘grondwettelijk verdrag’) de 
scheidslijnen tussen de Europese Unie en de lidstaten zou hebben beïnvloed. 
Deze scheidslijnen hebben betrekking op de verdeling van macht in het kader 
van het EU-systeem. Bepaalde bevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden zijn 
toebedeeld aan de Europese Unie, terwijl andere zijn voorbehouden aan de 
lidstaten zelf. Deze scheidslijnen zijn, naar aanleiding van de sluiting van 
opvolgende verdragen sinds de oprichting van de Gemeenschap nu een halve 
eeuw geleden, zorgvuldig in kaart gebracht. Het grondwettelijk verdrag zou 
enige invloed hebben gehad op deze scheidslijnen, hetgeen kan worden 
aangetoond door zorgvuldig de teksten van de belangrijkste bestaande 
verdragen (het EG-verdrag en het EU-Verdrag, zoals in de loop der tijd 
gewijzigd) te vergelijken met de tekst van het grondwettelijk verdrag. Deze 
tekstuele vergelijking kan worden aangevuld door de bestudering van andere 
officiële en wetenschappelijke bronnen, zoals protocollen, boeken en 
wetenschappelijke artikelen. 
 
De conclusie die uit het onderzoek naar voren komt is dat het 
grondwettelijk verdrag geen grote wijziging van de scheidslijnen ten gevolge 
zou hebben gehad. Het grondwettelijk verdrag zou een nieuwe rechtsorde 
voor de Europese Unie hebben opgeleverd, met name door het fuseren van de 
Gemeenschap en de Europese Unie, maar ook door de voorrang van EU-recht 
boven nationaal recht te benadrukken. Niettemin zou deze nieuwe rechtsorde 
niet hebben geleid tot een duidelijke verschuiving van bevoegdheden en 
macht naar ‘Brussel’, ten koste van de lidstaten. 
 
In verband met deze bevindingen moet worden vastgesteld dat het 
belangrijk is om het grondwettelijk verdrag te blijven bestuderen. Dit ondanks 
het feit dat de Europese Raad in juni 2007 heeft besloten om het 
grondwettelijk verdrag te laten vallen ten gunste van een alternatieve tekst, 
het ‘Hervormingsverdrag’. Niettegenstaande deze vervanging van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag namelijk moet erkend worden dat dit document een 
serieuze poging deed om een nieuwe koers voor de Europese Unie uit te 
stippelen. Er was veel aandacht besteed aan de inhoud en de aansturing van 
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het EU-beleid, en het document was in de Intergouvernementele Conferentie 
van eind 2004 door alle lidstaten ondertekend. Naast dit historische feit zijn er 
nog twee andere belangrijke redenen om de analyse van het grondwettelijk 
verdrag voort te zetten. In de eerste plaats ziet het er naar uit dat een groot 
deel van de inhoud van dit document zal terugkeren in het 
Hervormingsverdrag. In de tweede plaats is het grondwettelijk verdrag 
doorlopend onderwerp geweest van vele discussies en debatten. Zulke 
debatten en analyses zijn relevant voor de voortgang van het proces van 
Europese integratie. 
 
Het identificeren van de scheidslijnen en wat de gevolgen van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag zouden zijn geweest om deze te beïnvloeden 
 
Het formele debat - wat is de Europese Unie? Het grondwettelijk 
verdrag moet bezien worden in het licht van het voortgaande debat over de 
vraag of de Europese Unie een intergouvernementele organisatie is 
respectievelijk zal blijven, danwel of de Unie zich zal ontwikkelen tot een 
federatie die op een supranationale superstaat lijkt. Elk van deze alternatieven 
wordt aangehangen door een groot aantal wetenschappers. Het 
intergouvernementele kamp wijst daarbij op de oorsprong van de EU als 
intergouvernementele organisatie en op het feit dat haar lidstaten 
internationaal nog steeds als soevereine staten worden beschouwd. Het 
federale kamp wijst erop dat de nationale soevereiniteit binnen de Europese 
Unie geleidelijk plaats heeft gemaakt voor een centrale aansturing, vanuit 
Brussel, van kernactiviteiten zoals de interne markt. De federalisten stellen 
niet dat de Europese Unie reeds geheel federaal is georganiseerd, maar wel 
dat het die kant op gaat. Sommige federale denkers beklemtonen ook dat de 
Europese Unie alleen als een volledig geïntegreerde Verenigde Staten van 
Europa tot volle wasdom kan komen. Tegen de achtergrond van deze twee 
theorieën wordt duidelijk dat de Europese Unie een ‘gemengde’ entiteit is die 
zowel karakteristieken vertoont van een intergouvernementele organisatie als 
van een federaal systeem. De Europese Unie behoeft intussen niet geheel 
intergouvernementeel of geheel supranationaal te zijn, maar kan voortgaan te 
gedijen als een project van soevereine staten die ervoor gekozen hebben om 
hun soevereiniteit op bepaalde gebieden te delen. 
 
Het ontstaan van het grondwettelijk verdrag. Het grondwettelijk 
verdrag is er gekomen als reactie op de Verklaring van Laeken van de 
Europese Raad van 2001 waarbij de Conventie betreffende de Toekomst van 
Europa werd opgericht. De Conventie kwam bijeen in 2002 en 2003 en stelde 
de tekst van een verdrag op dat uiteindelijk werd ondertekend door de 
vertegenwoordigers van alle lidstaten op de conferentie van 29 oktober 2004
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Na deze goedkeuring door de intergouvernementele conferentie werd het 
document aan de lidstaten voorgelegd ter ratificatie. Het falen van de 
ratificatieprocedure heeft er uiteindelijk toe geleid dat een 
‘Hervormingsverdrag’ zal worden opgesteld. 
 
De structuur van het grondwettelijk verdrag. Deel I is vernieuwend in 
de zin dat een overzicht wordt gegeven van respectievelijk de algemene 
doelstellingen van de Europese Unie; de rechten behorend bij het EU-
burgerschap; de bevoegdheden van de EU (waarbij een onderscheid is 
gemaakt met de bevoegdheden van de lidstaten); de instellingen van de EU; 
de wijze van uitoefening van de EU-bevoegdheden; het democratische bestel 
van de EU; de financiën van de Unie; de betrekkingen van de Unie met de 
buurlanden; en andere belangrijke aspecten van het EU-lidmaatschap. Deel II 
heeft betrekking op de tekst van het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de 
Unie. Deel III bevat het grootste gedeelte van de materiële bepalingen van het 
huidige EU-Verdrag en het EG-Verdrag. Deel IV behandelt technische zaken, 
zoals de intrekking van de bestaande verdragen en de wijzigingsprocedures 
betreffende het grondwettelijk verdrag. 
 
Een overzicht van de belangrijkste vernieuwingen van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag. Deel I van het grondwettelijk verdrag bevat een 
nieuw overzicht van de Europese Unie en haar karakteristieken. De 
belangrijkste aspecten van dit deel zijn de volgende: (1) Het grondwettelijk 
verdrag presenteert de figuur van een nieuwe, vaste en niet roterende, 
voorzitter van de Europese Raad alsmede een Minister van Buitenlandse 
Zaken van de EU. (2) De afbakening van de EU-bevoegdheden ten opzichte 
van die van de lidstaten is duidelijker omschreven dan ooit tevoren in een 
Europees verdrag. (3) Voorzieningen zijn getroffen voor een vereenvoudiging 
van de juridische instrumenten van de EU, ter vervanging van de meer 
complexe regelingen onder de drie pijlers van de bestaande verdragen. (4) 
Democratische rechten van EU-burgers zijn duidelijker omschreven, 
waaronder het recht inzake toegang tot de documenten van de EU-instellingen 
alsmede het recht van burgers om voorstellen voor EU-regelgeving te doen. 
Ook de integratie van het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de EU in Deel II 
van het grondwettelijk verdrag betreft een belangrijke vernieuwing. Een 
catalogus van fundamentele rechten heeft tot nu toe namelijk nooit deel 
uitgemaakt van de verdragen. Deel III brengt drie belangrijke veranderingen 
met zich mee: (1) EU-activiteiten zouden zijn toegestaan op nieuwe 
beleidsterreinen zoals ruimte, energie, toerisme, sport, civiele bescherming, 
administratieve samenwerking en (bepaalde aspecten van) de publieke 
gezondheidszorg. (2) Wat de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en 
rechtvaardigheid betreft zouden de onderdelen die nu onder de derde pijler 
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vallen, worden ondergebracht bij de ‘normale’ EU-activiteiten, waardoor 
meer activiteiten onder de gekwalificeerde meerderheidsregel zouden vallen 
en de bevoegdheid van het Hof van Justitie zou zijn uitgebreid. (3) Het 
gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid wordt niet afgescheiden 
van de andere EU-activiteiten, zoals nu het geval is onder het tweede pijler-
regime. Het wordt onderworpen aan de ‘gewone’ spelregels van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag en ook hier wordt de invloed van het Hof van Justitie 
enigszins uitgebreid. Echter, veel zaken op het gebied van het buitenlands en 
veiligheidsbeleid, waaronder zaken betreffende defensie, blijven onderworpen 
aan besluitvorming met unanimiteit in de Raad. 
 
Hoe het grondwettelijk verdrag de scheidslijnen identificeert. De 
scheidslijnen zoals omschreven in het grondwettelijk verdrag hadden de 
volgende verschijningsvormen: (1) De EU heeft haar eigen waarden en 
doelstellingen, maar deze zijn althans deels gebaseerd op de waarden en 
doelstellingen van de lidstaten. (2) De EU vertoont eigen karakteristieken, 
maar ook deze zijn beïnvloed door de lidstaten. (3) De EU vertoont 
democratische karakteristieken die slechts deels vergelijkbaar zijn met die van 
de lidstaten. (4) De EU is een flexibele organisatie die kan uitbreiden (door 
toetreding) en kleiner kan worden als een lidstaat gebruik maakt van zijn recht 
tot uittreding. Dit recht om uit te treden onderstreept dat de lidstaten in dit 
opzicht soeverein zijn. (5) Het wijzigen van het grondwettelijk verdrag is 
mogelijk, maar het betreffende besluit behoeft de goedkeuring van alle 
lidstaten. (6) Een aantal basisbeginselen van de EU, waaronder overdracht 
van bevoegdheden, exclusiviteit, subsidiariteit, proportionaliteit, flexibiliteit 
en voorrang van EU-regelgeving, zijn zodanig omschreven dat zij aangeven 
hoe ze zich verhouden tot de nationale autonomie. (7) De EU-instellingen 
hebben een mate van autonomie, maar worden in zekere zin ook beïnvloed 
door de lidstaten. (8) Op materiële beleidsterreinen bestaan er duidelijke 
scheidslijnen tussen wat de EU wel en niet mag doen. Op veel 
beleidsgebieden bestaat een mengeling van bevoegdheden van EU en 
lidstaten. Per terrein verschilt de situatie, van de vrijwel door de EU 
gedomineerde interne markt tot aan het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en 
veiligheidsbeleid, waar de lidstaten hun zeggenschap in essentie hebben 
behouden. 
 
Opmerkelijke veranderingen die de scheidslijnen kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Er zijn duidelijke voorbeelden waar het grondwettelijk verdrag de 
scheidslijnen zou hebben veranderd, óf richting centrale bevoegdheden óf (in 
bepaalde gevallen) naar meer bevoegdheden voor de lidstaten. Een paar 
voorbeelden: (1) De ontwikkeling van een ‘nieuwe rechtsorde’ zou tot meer 
macht voor ‘Brussel’ hebben geleid. Elementen van deze rechtsorde betreffen 
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onder andere het gebruik van de term ‘grondwet’, de fusie van de 
Gemeenschap met de Europese Unie, het ongedaan maken van de drie pijlers, 
de toekenning van rechtspersoonlijkheid aan de Europese Unie, het opnemen 
van het beginsel inzake voorrang van EU-regelgeving in de tekst van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag, de duidelijker afbakening van EU-bevoegdheden, een 
ruimere flexibiliteitclausule dan in de bestaande verdragen en, tenslotte, de 
uitbreiding van het aantal beleidsterreinen waar besluitvorming met 
gekwalificeerde meerderheid in de Raad mogelijk zou zijn geworden. (2) 
Institutionele veranderingen die ‘Brussel’ zouden hebben versterkt of de 
zeggenschap van de lidstaten zouden hebben beperkt betreffen de aanstelling 
van een ‘vaste’ voorzitter van de Europese Raad, de aanstelling van een 
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de EU, en de beperking van het aantal 
leden van de Commissie. (3)  Belangrijke zaken betreffen verder de opneming 
van het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de Unie in het grondwettelijk 
verdrag; de opneming van een aantal nieuwe EU-beleidsterreinen; een nieuwe 
definitie van het begrip ‘gemengde’ bevoegdheden; de uitbreiding van de 
bevoegdheden van het Hof van Justitie op het gebied van de ruimte van 
vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid en het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands 
en veiligheidsbeleid; het grotere gebruik van gekwalificeerde 
meerderheidbesluitvorming op het gebied van de ruimte van vrijheid, 
veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid; en de mogelijkheid voor de EU om een eigen 
operationele defensiecapaciteit te ontwikkelen. 
 
Daarentegen versterkte het grondwettelijk verdrag, enigszins verrassend, de 
positie van de lidstaten op de volgende manieren: (1) De lidstaten zouden op 
basis van gelijkheid en volledig wederzijds respect moeten worden behandeld. 
(2) De tradities van de lidstaten op het gebied van de mensenrechten zouden 
gerespecteerd moeten worden. (3) ‘Een steeds hechtere Unie’ zou als aparte 
doelstelling van de Europese Unie zijn verdwenen. (4) De duidelijker 
vastlegging van de EU-bevoegdheden betekende ook dat helder is welke 
activiteiten de Europese Unie niet mag ondernemen. (5) Nationale 
parlementen zouden een ruimere bevoegdheid hebben gekregen om tevoren 
kennis te nemen van voorgestelde EU-regelgeving en, in bepaalde 
omstandigheden, daartegen bezwaar te maken op grond van het 
subsidiariteitsbeginsel. (6) Consensus als beginsel voor de besluitvorming 
door de Europese Raad zou voor het eerst in het verdrag zijn opgenomen, 
hetgeen betekent dat hier het vetorecht van de lidstaten zou zijn erkend. (7) 
Stemming bij unanimiteit in de Raad zou gehandhaafd blijven voor een aantal 
onderwerpen van de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid, het 
gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid, en ten aanzien van 
bepaalde specifieke onderdelen van de interne markt. De uiteindelijke 
conclusie is evenwel dat het grondwettelijk verdrag geen grote verschuiving 
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van bevoegdheden of macht naar het centrale EU niveau te zien zou hebben 
gegeven. 
 
Het karakter van de Europese Unie 
 
Waarden en doelstellingen. In de preambule van het grondwettelijk 
verdrag en in een aantal bepalingen wordt de Europese Unie omschreven als 
entiteit die beschikt over waarden als de menselijke waardigheid, gelijkheid 
en de rechtsstaat. Deze worden echter omschreven als zijnde 
gemeenschappelijk met die van de lidstaten, in plaats van als iets unieks van 
de Europese Unie. Verder worden de nationale tradities van de lidstaten op 
verschillende manieren benadrukt. De belangrijkste uitdrukking van waarden 
en doelen betreft de opneming van het Grondvest van de Grondrechten van de 
EU in het grondwettelijk verdrag. Echter moet het belang van deze 
vaststelling enigszins worden gerelativeerd in het licht van het feit dat het 
Handvest reeds door alle lidstaten was onderschreven, namelijk in de 
plechtige verklaring van de Europese Raad van december 2000. Ook betuigt 
het grondwettelijk verdrag respect voor de constitutionele tradities van de 
lidstaten. Afgezien van de opneming van het Handvest, verschillen de 
waarden en doelstellingen van het grondwettelijk verdrag intussen niet 
wezenlijk van die van de huidige verdragen. 
 
De kenmerken van de Europese Unie die gelijkenis vertonen met die 
van de lidstaten. Het grondwettelijk verdrag verschafte formeel 
rechtspersoonlijkheid aan de Europese Unie, hetgeen voorheen alleen gebeurd 
was ten aanzien van de Gemeenschap. Het grondwettelijk verdrag voerde ook 
de Europese vlag, de hymne en andere symbolen in, allemaal zaken die in de 
huidige verdragen niet zijn geregeld. Niettemin gaan deze ‘staatachtige’ 
kenmerken gepaard met talrijke verwijzingen naar de soevereiniteit en de 
identiteit van de lidstaten binnen het Europese systeem. EU-burgerschap is 
aanvullend en komt niet in de plaats van het nationale burgerschap. De 
onafhankelijkheid van de begroting van de Europese Unie wordt enigszins 
gerelativeerd door het feit dat de lidstaten ten aanzien van verschillende 
begrotingsonderwerpen unaniem moeten besluiten. In zijn algemeenheid zou 
de EU uit het grondwettelijk verdrag te voorschijn zijn gekomen als een 
sterkere en beter ontwikkelde entiteit. Evenwel zou dit geen bedreiging 
hebben opgeleverd voor de soevereiniteit van de lidstaten. 
 
De Europese Unie als democratie. Het gebrek aan transparantie 
binnen de EU en het ‘democratisch deficit’ hebben er mede toe geleid dat het 
grondwettelijk verdrag is opgesteld. Het is echter maar de vraag of het 
systeem van democratie zoals de lidstaten dat hebben ontwikkeld, 
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noodzakelijk of zelfs mogelijk is op EU-niveau. De afwezigheid van een 
echte ‘demos’ staat in de weg aan de uitoefening van democratie als een 
exclusieve EU-zaak. Daarnaast is geen enkel democratisch systeem in staat 
om alle individuen te allen tijde volledige en gelijke rechten toe te kennen. 
Delegatie aan wetgevers en bestuurders is nodig om de democratie te laten 
functioneren. De Europese Unie kent reeds democratische elementen, zoals 
het Europees Parlement en bepaalde rechten van individuele burgers. Het 
grondwettelijk verdrag beoogde deze individuele rechten te versterken (onder 
andere via het recht om informatie aan de Europese instellingen te vragen) en 
de bevoegdheden van het Europees Parlement uit te breiden. Niettemin 
suggereerden deze vernieuwingen op geen enkele wijze dat de Europese Unie 
een superstaat zou worden of dat de democratie op nationaal niveau minder 
belangrijk zou zijn geworden. 
 
Een flexibele entiteit. Als entiteit beschikt de Europese Unie over een 
bepaalde mate van flexibiliteit. Ze kan groter worden via toetredingen, en 
onder het grondwettelijk verdrag kon de Europese Unie ook lidstaten 
verliezen door de voorgestelde uittredingsclausule. Onder het grondwettelijk 
verdrag (maar ook reeds onder de huidige verdragen) kan het stemrecht van 
een lidstaat worden opgeschort indien die lidstaat fundamentele beginselen 
van de EU schendt. Ook kunnen lidstaten besluiten niet mee te doen aan 
sommige EU-programma’s (de EMU, en de euro, is in dit verband een 
belangrijk voorbeeld). Al deze uitingen van flexibiliteit maken duidelijk dat 
de Europese Unie een op verdragen gebaseerde organisatie is waarvan de 
lidstaten niet gedwongen kunnen worden om, zonder hun voorafgaande 
instemming, mee te doen aan belangrijke activiteiten. Het grondwettelijk 
verdrag zou de rechten van de lidstaten in dit opzicht niet hebben beperkt. De 
uittredingsclausule kan zelfs gezien worden als een versterking van de 
soevereiniteit van de lidstaten. 
 
Wijziging van het grondwettelijk verdrag - het unanimiteit vereiste. 
Het grondwettelijk verdrag bevatte verschillende vereenvoudigde procedures 
om het verdrag in de toekomst te wijzigen, met inbegrip van regelingen die 
niet in de huidige verdragen voorkomen. Men kreeg de indruk dat lidstaten 
hun recht om een verdragswijziging te blokkeren, zouden kunnen verliezen. 
Echter kent elk van de voorgestelde nieuwe procedures een moment waarbij 
iedere lidstaat zijn toestemming moet geven. De belangrijke scheidslijn die 
wil dat lidstaten beleidsvrijheid hebben ten aanzien van verdragswijzigingen, 
zou dan ook niet veranderen. 
 
  Beginselen die aan de basis liggen van het EU-optreden. 
Verscheidene kernbeginselen die bepalend zijn voor het optreden van de 
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Europese Unie zouden zijn overgeheveld, van de bestaande verdragen naar 
het nieuwe grondwettelijk verdrag. Het beginsel dat nieuwe EU-
bevoegdheden alleen kunnen ontstaan indien deze uitdrukkelijk zijn 
toegekend, is onderstreept. De beginselen inzake subsidiariteit en 
proportionaliteit zijn ook behouden. Beide beginselen geven aan dat er 
beperkingen kunnen worden gesteld aan het optreden van de Europese Unie. 
Het beginsel inzake voorrang van EU-recht is neergelegd in het 
grondwettelijk verdrag, en kwam niet voor in de huidige verdragen (maar 
kwam voort uit de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie). Dit gegeven 
benadrukt het gezag van de Europese Unie, maar het is niet duidelijk of de 
tekstuele uitwerking van het voorrangs-beginsel dat beginsel meer impact zou 
geven. De exclusiviteit van het EU-optreden –af te leiden uit de bepalingen 
betreffende de verdeling van bevoegdheden over de EU en de lidstaten- wordt 
duidelijker geregeld in het grondwettelijk verdrag. Dit was een welkome 
verbetering, maar suggereerde niet dat meer bevoegdheden van de EU zouden 
ontstaan. Ten slotte, flexibiliteit voor de EU om op te treden buiten de 
gebieden waar zij bevoegdheden heeft, wordt niet gegeven in het 
grondwettelijk verdrag. 
 
Instellingen en besluitvorming 
 
EU-instellingen en organen. De invoering van de nieuwe, vaste, 
voorzitter van de Europese Raad en de nieuwe minister van Buitenlandse 
Zaken van de EU leidt tot meer cohesie dan onder de huidige 
verdragsregelingen het geval is. Echter worden geen bijzondere nieuwe 
bevoegdheden voor deze nieuwe posities voorgesteld. De nieuwe formule 
voor de gekwalificeerde meerderheid binnen de Raad (waarbij een 
gekwalificeerde meerderheidsstemming wordt gerealiseerd door goedkeuring 
van 55 procent van de lidstaten die 65 procent van de totale EU-bevolking 
vertegenwoordigen) raakt de positie van de lidstaten, maar leidt niet tot 
uitbreiding van de EU-bevoegdheden. De verkleining van de omvang van de 
Commissie was in beginsel al geregeld in de bestaande verdragen. Wellicht de 
belangrijkste institutionele ontwikkeling onder het grondwettelijk verdrag 
betreft de uitbreiding van de bevoegdheden van het Hof van Justitie op de 
terreinen van de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid en het 
gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. Evenwel gaat het hier, 
opnieuw, niet om een vergaande wijziging. 
 
Instrumenten en procedures van de Europese Unie. De 
vereenvoudiging van de juridische instrumenten en de 
besluitvormingsprocedures onder het grondwettelijk verdrag had een bijdrage 
kunnen zijn tot een efficiëntere en meer inzichtelijke Europese Unie. Echter 
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zouden deze vernieuwingen niet hebben geleid tot overdracht van nieuwe 
bevoegdheden naar ‘Brussel’. 
 
Waar gekwalificeerde meerderheid besluitvorming met unanimiteit 
vervangt en van toepassing is op nieuwe beleidsterreinen. Stemming met 
unanimiteit in de Raad betreft een belangrijk middel ter bescherming van de 
soevereiniteit van de lidstaten. Het grondwettelijk verdrag stelde een aantal 
beleidsterreinen voor waar stemming bij unanimiteit zou worden vervangen 
door gekwalificeerde meerderheid. Ingevolge het grondwettelijk verdrag zou 
de gekwalificeerde meerderheid ook op een aantal nieuwe beleidsgebieden 
van de EU van toepassing worden. Overigens zou het effect van deze 
vernieuwingen slechts beperkt zijn. De ontwikkeling naar meer 
gekwalificeerde meerderheid komt regelmatig voor in de geschiedenis van de 
Europese Unie. In dat opzicht behelsde het grondwettelijk verdrag niet meer 
dan een voortzetting van deze ontwikkeling.  
 
Het materiële beleid van de EU  
 
De ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid – de 
samenwerking op het gebied van justitie en binnenlandse zaken. Het 
grondwettelijk verdrag bevat drie interessante ontwikkelingen op het gebied 
van de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid: (1) Meer besluiten 
kunnen met gekwalificeerde meerderheid worden genomen. (2) Er komt een 
grotere bevoegdheid voor het Hof van Justitie. (3) De derde pijler, met zijn 
speciale bepalingen ter bescherming van de belangen van de lidstaten, wordt 
afgeschaft en de werkzaamheden op het gebied van de ruimte krijgen een 
meer supranationaal karakter. Deze ontwikkelingen zouden de belangrijkste 
wijziging van de scheidslijnen hebben opgeleverd. Echter dient hierbij te 
worden aangetekend dat de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en 
rechtvaardigheid de laatste jaren veel aandacht in de verdragen heeft 
gekregen. De behoefte van de lidstaten om hun activiteiten op het gebied van 
grensoverschrijdende justitiële zaken en preventie te coördineren, heeft hierbij 
een rol gespeeld. In zoverre bevestigen de veranderingen van het 
grondwettelijk verdrag deze trend, en gaat het niet om een verstrekkende 
nieuwe ontwikkeling. 
 
Het interne beleid en het externe optreden van de Europese Unie. De 
belangrijke wijzigingen van het grondwettelijk verdrag op het gebied van het 
interne beleid en het externe optreden van de EU, zouden geen grote 
wijzigingen van de status quo onder de bestaande verdragen hebben 
opgeleverd. Sommige veranderingen zouden de scheidslijnen weliswaar 
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hebben veranderd, maar over het algemeen gezien zou de impact toch niet 
groot zijn geweest. 
 
Commentaar en conclusie 
 
Kritiek op de structuur van het grondwettelijk verdrag. Het 
grondwettelijk verdrag is een document dat aanleiding geeft tot kritiek waar 
het gaat om zijn structuur en redactie. Het is lang en bevat veel overlappende 
teksten in de Delen I en III. Deel I geeft een bruikbaar overzicht. Echter is een 
aantal onderwerpen dat in Deel I is behandeld, ook terug te vinden in Deel III 
zonder dat verwijzingen zijn aangebracht. Dit is met name het geval voor een 
aantal institutionele aangelegenheden. De opsomming van nieuwe, 
vereenvoudigde, juridische instrumenten is in zekere zin een teleurstelling, 
omdat er ook nog andere wijzen van optreden blijken te bestaan. De 
behandeling van de problematiek van de mensenrechten – hier valt te denken 
aan de verwijzing naar het Handvest van de Grondrechten van de EU, het 
Europese Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens, de tradities van de lidstaten 
en andere internationale verplichtingen - is onnodig gecompliceerd. Het 
grondwettelijk verdrag had verbeterd kunnen worden door de overlappende 
onderwerpen samen te voegen en de meer gedetailleerde bepalingen uit het 
document te verwijderen. Het Hervormingsverdrag biedt in dit verband geen 
hoop op verbetering ten opzichte van het grondwettelijk verdrag. 
 
Een laatste terugblik - het innemen van een tussenpositie. Veel 
vernieuwingen van het grondwettelijk verdrag zouden weinig tot geen effect 
hebben gehad op de scheidslijnen tussen de Europese Unie en de lidstaten. 
Slechts kleine veranderingen zouden plaatsvinden, met name op het gebied 
van mensenrechten, de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid, 
het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid en, meer in het 
algemeen, daar waar gekwalificeerde meerderheid in de plaats zou zijn 
gekomen voor besluitvorming met unanimiteit in de Raad. Anderzijds zou de 
positie van de lidstaten ook iets zijn verbeterd. In zijn algemeenheid illustreert 
het grondwettelijk verdrag en het lot dat dat verdrag uiteindelijk is 
toegevallen, dat de Europese integratie een punt heeft bereikt waarbij een 
overdracht van nog meer belangrijke bevoegdheden naar Brussel politiek 
gezien niet meer wordt geaccepteerd. Hier speelt het verlangen van alle, of 
bijna alle, lidstaten een rol om hun soevereiniteit op bepaalde essentiële 
beleidsterreinen te behouden. Onder het grondwettelijk verdrag zou de 
Europese Unie haar gemengde karakter hebben behouden en een entiteit zijn 
gebleven die het midden houdt tussen een intergouvernementele organisatie 
en een klassieke federatie. 
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